Month: August 2012
Do museums mark the acme of power?
My wife and I spent half the day at the The National Museum of the Marine Corps not far from Washington, close by the Quantico Marine base. It’s worth more time, but I got hungry somewhere during World War I and hastened through the rest. The narrative seems to end with 9/11, which leaves out a lot of interesting stuff that happened thereafter in Iraq and Afghanistan. An addition is planned.
The museum is encyclopedic if not always 100% accurate. No, the emancipation proclamation did not free all the slaves, only those in states in rebellion. Slavery still existed in the Union until towards the end of 1865, when the 13th amendment was ratified. There are other small glitches.
But it is hard to complain. The Marines “live their history.” The museum catalogues not only the big wars but also what Rudyard Kipling called “the savage wars of peace,” which is an apt description of many of the things the U.S. Marines have been called on to do in Cuba, Haiti, the Philippines, Nicaragua…. The engagements are recounted with the kind of honor, commitment and courage you would expect of the Corps, answering a lot of questions along the way.
No African Americans served in the Marines from after the revolution until World War II. Yes, the Marine Corps engaged on the shores of Tripoli in the early 1800s, but those shores lay at Derna, almost 550 miles as the crow flies from Libya’s modern-day capital. The “Barbary” wars ended not with military victory but instead a negotiated release of American hostages. While the Marines traditionally vaunt their connection to naval power, it is apparent from the displays that their more recent history depends for much of its success on combined air/ground operations. Semper fidelis did not become the Corps’ motto until 1883.
Meant to evoke the famous photograph of Marines raising the American flag on Iwo Jima, the museum’s building is impressive, but not heart-warming. Dedicated in 2006, and presumably designed a few years earlier, the architecture reflects an America at the height of its 20th century power: soaring, inspirational and dominating. The central “mast” reads more like a sword pointing downwards than a flagpole pointing upwards. The bravura quotations in the main “Leatherneck” hall reflect the Marines’ can-do spirit:
The Marines have landed and the situation is well in hand.
The safest place in Korea was right behind a platoon of Marines. Lord, how they could fight!
The well-done introductory film shows lots of fighting and a few injured Marines (always being helped by comrades), but no dead ones. The emphasis is on winning through constancy and character, though the square jaws and PT exercises remind us that being a Marine is a physical as well as a spiritual pursuit.
It is a rich and powerful nation that can afford to honor its fighting men and women with a museum like this one. They deserve it, but I say that with trepidation, because it seems to me grand museums often mark the acme of power. Witness the spectacular museums of London, Berlin, Paris and Vienna. Is America at, or past, its peak?
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Disintegration is hard to stop
Susan Yackee at Voice of America asked a few questions today about Syria. Here are my replies, which VoA published under the headline “The Syrian Regime Is Coming Apart.” That’s not quite what I said, but judge for yourself. Here is the interview in its entirety (I’ve made a few [corrections] in the transcript):
‘Losing your prime minister says something about your regime’
“The prime minister is not very important within the power structure in Syria, but when you’re losing your prime minister, it says something about your regime. What it says in this case, I’m afraid, is that the Sunni part of the regime is peeling off. Hijab is a Sunni, and the regime is dominated by Alawites. This is one more indication that sectarian conflict is coming to dominate the situation in Syria.”
‘The regime is coming apart’
“A defection of this sort encourages other defections among his friends and family. I certainly think [it] gives the impression, both inside Syria and outside, that the regime is coming apart.”
Sectarian conflict is ‘difficult to stop’
“The history of these things is that once sectarian conflict starts, it’s extremely difficult to stop. I know that many Syrians associated with the revolution don’t regard this as a sectarian conflict, and wouldn’t be happy with a sectarian conflict. But the fact is that people, when there’s violence, retreat into sectarian [and] ethnic protection, and I anticipate that will happen in Syria as it has happened in many other places.”
It’s ‘hard to picture stability returning quickly’
“The most important thing at this point is to reach out as best the revolution can to Alawites, Christians and [Druze] who are still loyal to the Assad regime because they’re frightened of what will happen to them after the fact. I think the revolution has to reach out to them and try to bring them over. At the same time, I think the international community needs to be thinking very hard about what kind of effort to stabilize Syria will be required in the future. It’s very hard for me to picture stability returning quickly to Syria unless there’s external force applied.”
Read more at Middle East Voices.
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Sick and Sikh are both American
I didn’t even know until yesterday that white supremacist heavy metal rock bands existed. I was only slightly more aware of Sikhs, since their turbans and beards are hard to miss. But of this I am sure: what I am hearing from the Sikhs is far more to my liking than anything I will hear from white supremacists, heavy metal or not.
The Sikh community has got to be very angry. They are not only subjected to discrimination, racist violence and worse but have to suffer the colossal ignorance that identifies them as Muslim, which is a bit like treating Jews as if they were Buddhists or vice versa. People are entitled to their own identity, something white supremacists might even be expected to appreciate, since they so aggressively assert their own.
So what how are the Sikhs reacting? With great equanimity. Amardeep Singh of The Sikh Coalition offers:
…we have three core tenants for our daily lives. We believe in working hard and honestly. And in doing, we are respecting our creator. We believe in sharing our bounty with others. And then our third daily obligation is to remember God in everything we do.
The Sikhs are treating this as an opportunity to teach us something about their religion. I am grateful for the lesson.
Now I suppose that even in Sikh community there will be from time to time fallen angels who commit mayhem and even murder. But mayhem and even murder is the purpose of the white supremacists. Here’s a sample lyric:
Burn the tares in flames
Hang the traitors of our race
Judgment Day is here
The hand of God is in this place
Drive you out or cut you off
Your blood will surely flow
Avengers of the innocent
The Earth will soon now know
White Supremacy!
White Supremacy!
White Supremacy!
White Supremacy!
I can only imagine who is attracted to this tripe rather than the Sikh core tenants of their daily lives.
But they are among us: this great nation produces them, at the same time as it attracts the Sikhs. The one may be sick and the other Sikh, but they are both American. Time for a good hard look in the mirror.
PS: Need more on white power lyrics? Try this.
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This week’s peace picks
Africa and India take the spotlight in this relatively quiet week:
1. Assessing Governance in Rwanda, 10:00am-11:30am, Tuesday, August 7
Venue: International Republican Institute
The International Republican Institute’s Democratic Governance Speakers Series and the Atlantic Council invite you to a discussion on governance in Rwanda with Professor Anastase Shyaka, Chief Executive Officer of the Rwanda Governance Board; and Dr. J. Peter Pham, the Director of the Michael S. Ansari Africa Center at the Atlantic Council. Professor Shyaka and Dr. Pham will discuss Rwanda’s governance model and the successes and challenges facing Rwanda in terms of democratic governance.
Speakers:
Anastase Shyaka is currently Chief Executive Officer of the Rwanda Governance Board. Previously, Professor Shyaka was Director of the Center for Conflict Management at the National University of Rwanda. Professor Shyaka is a leading expert on governance and political development in Rwanda and the great lakes region, having worked on many studies and publications focused on peace and conflict analysis, democracy, governance, and international relations. His academic accomplishments also include being named a Fulbright Scholar in Residence at George Mason University and Nothern Virginia Community College. Professor Shyaka holds a Ph.D. in Political Science.
J. Peter Pham is Director of the Michael S. Ansari Africa Center at the Atlantic Council. Dr. Pham was previously a tenured Associate Professor of Justice Studies, Political Science, and African Studies at James Madison University, where he also served as Director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs. A staunch advocate of robust American engagement with Africa, Dr. Pham has served on many of IRI’s election monitoring delegations to Africa, including Liberia (2005), Nigeria (2007, 2011) and Somaliland (2010). He is also a frequent guest lecturer on African affairs at the Foreign Service Institute, the U.S. Army War College, the Joint Special Operations University, the Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management and other U.S. government professional educational institutions.
2. An Indian Perspective on US Strategic Goals in Asia, 6:00pm-7:45pm, Thursday, August 9
Venue: School of International Studies Kenney Auditorium
Much has been talked about the U.S.-India strategic relationship in the last few months in Washington D.C., but mostly from a U.S. perspective. The Obama Administration has begun to pivot US power more toward Asia, recognizing the growing economic importance of Asia to U.S. interests and the heightened threat posed by challenges and instability in the region. While India generally has a sympathetic view of U.S. goals, there are a number of important differences as well as an Indian determination to control its own foreign policy objectives.
Ambassador T.P. Sreenivasan, a former senior Foreign Service officer of India, will lead a discussion of an Indian view of the growing U.S. presence in Asia and what that means for India and its interests. Ambassador Sreenivasan served as the Deputy Chief of Mission in Washington D.C. during 1997-2000, and as India’s Ambassador to several countries including Austria and Slovenia. He also served as India’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Governor for India to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.
3. The Legacy of Iran’s Green Movement: Film Screening and Discussion, 6:00pm-9:00pm, Thursday, August 9
Venue: West End Cinema, 2301 M Street NW
POMED is pleased to host a public screening of the groundbreaking documentary The Green Wave (2010), which examines the 2009 protests in Iran against the fraudulent presidential elections that summer and the subsequent crackdown on pro-democracy activists, members of what became known as the Green Movement. The film – a collage of direct video footage, live interviews, Facebook and Twitter accounts, and animation – won awards in 2011 at the Hamburg Filmfest, IDFA Amsterdam, and the Sundance Film Festival, and it will be released in theaters in the U.S. on August 10th and available on Movies on Demand.
To provide context for the film, Iran experts Alireza Nader, Jamal Abdi, and Suzanne Maloney will provide remarks about the legacy of Iran’s Green Movement, what effect it has had across the region, and opportunities for international actors to constructively and peacefully support democratic change in Iran. Why is the Green Movement important now, three years after mass street protests garnered international attention? How are pro-democracy efforts in Iran viewed in the Arab world, particularly in light of the 2011 Arab uprisings? How did the emergence of Iran’s Green Movement affect U.S. interactions with Iran, and how can the U.S. relationship with the Iranian people be renewed and leveraged in a way that helps Iranians achieve their aspirations for a more representative government and freer country?
6:00-6:30pm
Drink reception, patio of the West End Cinema
6:30-7:15pm
Panel discussion featuring:
Alireza Nader
Senior International Policy Analyst, Rand Corporation
Jamal Abdi
Policy Director, National Iranian American Council
Suzanne Maloney
Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the
Brookings Institution
Moderator: Stephen McInerney
Executive Director, POMED
7:30-9:00pm
Film Screening: The Green Wave
4. Ambassador of the Gambia to the US Discusses Food Crisis, 6:30pm-8:00pm, Thursday August 9
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Join us on August 9 for a discussion with the Ambassador of The Gambia to the United States Alieu Ngum as he addresses the bilateral U.S.-Gambia relationship in the context of regional economic, political, and social issues.
The Gambia is facing a severe food crisis due to water shortages and crop failure in the West Africa region. Ambassador Ngum’s remarks will open with his government’s response to the crisis and his diplomatic role with bilateral and multilateral policymakers in Washington, D.C. He will also touch upon prospects for economic development in the context of a food crisis, regional security concerns that arise in the short and long term, and civil society’s response to national disasters in The Gambia.
The Ambassador Series offers YPFP General Members the opportunity to have a frank and informal discussion with an important member of the Washington diplomatic community. As a premier organization committed to mutual understanding and dialogue, YPFP seeks to engage Washington’s diplomatic community on a number of issues related to U.S. foreign policy, international cooperation and public diplomacy through this highly successful series.
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The worst of all possible worlds
It is getting hard to keep score, though this graphic from Al Jazeera English may help. Today’s big news is the defection of Syria’s prime minister, who didn’t like Bashar al Asad’s “war crimes and genocide.” About time he noticed. There are reports also of more military defections, even as the battle for Aleppo continues.
Does any of this matter? Or does Bashar get to hold on to his shrinking turf despite going into hiding and losing the support of regime stalwarts?
Michael Hanna offers an important part of the answer in a Tweet this morning:
Syrian defections follow strictly sectarian pattern, likely hardening core support. 1st big Alawi defection, if it comes,will be devastating
The Asad regime is increasingly relying on a narrow base of Alawite/Shia (about 12-13% of the population) support, as Sunnis (like the prime minister) peel away and denounce Bashar’s violence against the civilian population, which is majority Sunni. Christians and Druze have also been distancing themselves, and Kurds have taken up arms against the regime (without however aligning themselves with the opposition). The opposition draws its strength from the majority population and is supported by Sunni powers like Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. What we are witnessing is a regional sectarian war in the making, one that could last a long time and involve ever-widening circles in the Levant.
The Alawites fight tenaciously because they think they know what is coming. This is an “existential” war for them: if the lose, they believe they will be wiped out.
That, along with Russian and Iranian support, could make this go on for a long time. If it does, the consequences for Syria and the region will be devastating. Damascus has already unleashed extremist Syrian Kurds to attack inside Turkey. Jordan is absorbing more than 100,000 Syrian refugees. Iraq’s efforts to guard its border with Syria have led to a confrontation with its own Kurdish peshmerga. Fighting between Sunnis and Alawites has spread to Lebanon, which is also absorbing large numbers of Syrian refugees. The Syrian opposition claims to have captured 48 Iranians in Damascus, sent there to help the regime (Tehran unabashedly claims they were religious pilgrims).
Breaking this self-reinforcing cycle of sectarian polarization is an interest broadly shared in the international community. As The Economist pointed out last week, Russian interests won’t be served if Syria descends into total chaos. Some would like to suggest that territorial separation is a solution. This is nonsense: no one will agree on the lines to be drawn, which will be decided by force of arms directed against the civilian population. That is the truth of what happened in Bosnia, however much the myth-makers delude themselves.
There are several ways the violence might end:
- a definitive victory by the opposition (it is hard now to picture a definitive victory by the regime).
- an international intervention to separate the warring forces and impose what the U.S. military likes to call a “safe and secure environment.”
- a coup from within the regime, followed by a “pacted” (negotiated) transition.
Any of these would be better than continuation of the current chaos, which is the worst of all possible worlds. But I’m afraid that is the mostly likely course of events until Moscow and Washington get together and decide to collaborate in ending the bloodshed.
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Circling the square
Joyce Karam of Al Hayat yesterday asked me some interesting questions about Iraq, Iran, Syria and the United States. Here are her questions and my answers:
Q. Where does the US relation with Nouri Maliki stand today? Is he a valuable
ally or more of a necessary one?
A. Maliki is both a valuable and a necessary partner (rather than ally). Necessary because he holds power in Iraq, which is a key country in the Middle East, one that is increasing its oil exports rapidly. That is something the Obama administration greatly appreciates. Valuable because the Americans view him as at least partly cooperative on Syria and Iran, as well as on oil production.
Q. Where does Maliki himself stand inside Iraq? How much has the Barzani-Sadr-Allawi alliance damaged him?
A. I don’t think they’ve done him much real damage. He has outmaneuvered his
political opponents, who seem unable to win a confidence vote in parliament
and more unable to construct an alternative majority.
Q. How do you read Ankara’s rapprochement with Barzani? Should it make Baghdad nervous?
A. Ankara’s rapprochement with the Iraqi Kurds is in my view the natural course of things. So long as Kurdistan is willing to cooperate with Turkey against the PKK, there is no reason for Turkey not to enjoy a good relationship with relatively secular (but still Muslim) Kurdistan. There is a lot of money to be made from investment opportunities in Kurdistan, and from trade across the border, including in oil. Baghdad has a choice: it can resist the development of close Turkey/Kurdistan relations, or it can jump on that
bandwagon and enhance its own relations with Ankara. I wish they would do the latter.
Q. Has Turkey miscalculated given the increasing armed Kurdish activity on
Syrian border?
A. I don’t think so. Turkey has known that opposition to the Asad regime would bring retaliation from Damascus in the form of encouragement to extremist Kurds to attack inside Turkey. That is one of the risks Turkey decided to run when it supported the Syrian opposition. Turkey will eventually want the Syrian Kurds to do what the Iraqi Kurds have done: help restrain the more radical Kurds and open up to Turkish trade and investment. There is no reason that can’t happen in a post-Asad Syria.
Q. The US wants the Arab states to engage Maliki, would that help in making him less dependent on Iran?
A. Of course the Sunni Arab states should engage Maliki, but I don’t think they are ever going to be completely comfortable with Maliki, whom they don’t trust. The most important factor in Iraq’s international alignment is the route by which its oil is exported. If it continues to be exported through the Gulf within range of Iranian guns, Tehran will have enormous influence in Iraq. If the Iraqis wisely begin to diversify and export more oil to the north and west, via pipelines that will have to be built in the future, then
Iraq will be tied more tightly to the West.
Q. If the Syrian regime falls, how do you see that impacting politics inside Iraq?
Any new regime in Syria will be less aligned with Iran and more aligned with the Sunni Arab states. That will create initially some strains with Maliki, but there will still be a lot of common interests, including I hope the prospect of exports of oil from Iraq through Syria to the Mediterranean.
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