Footnote to a footnote

Some of my readers will remember **********************************************, as well as a follow-up post on the question of how Kosovo is to be identified at international meetings in Europe when Serbia is present.  I am pleased to note that Belgrade reportedly has seen the light on this one and no longer insists that the entire footnote be reproduced on Kosovo’s nameplate, but rather in documentation following the meeting.

The footnote references UN Security Council resolution 1244, which foresees a political process leading to a decision on Kosovo’s final status, as well as the International Court of Justice decision advising that Kosovo’s declaration of independence breached no international law.  As these items condition Serbia’s sovereignty more than Kosovo’s, I see no particular harm in them, even if Belgrade continues to assert that the footnote distinguishes Kosovo from other sovereign states.  The asterisk really belongs to Serbia*.

Kosovo is however different from other sovereign states, because it has lived under a regime of limited sovereignty imposed as a condition of its independence by the internationally supported Comprehensive Settlement Proposal (the Ahtisaari plan).  An important component of the limitations is to be lifted September 10/11, when the International Civilian Office (ICO) in Kosovo terminates its work supervising the implementation of the Ahtisaari plan.  This is one of those rare moments when an international mission manages to work itself out of a job, completing what it set out to do.  Credit is due to Pieter Feith, the Dutch head of the ICO, who is repeating:  he also completed an EU mission in Aceh, Indonesia, some years ago.  I’ll be interested in seeing which mission he gets to close next.

Some of my friends think the ICO’s termination is not a good thing, since it is the one international organization in Kosovo clearly associated with the country’s independence.  I, too, would rather see some of the other organizations, especially UNMIK, disappear, but that isn’t going to happen without Belgrade’s concurrence.  The best that can be hoped for is that it withers away, which is pretty much what is happening.

The state-building process in Kosovo is not finished once ICO disappears and UNMIK withers.  Only the formal international supervision of Ahtisaari plan implementation has reached an end.  There are many other ways in which Kosovo remains without the full attributes of sovereignty.  It still lacks security forces that can defend its territory.  This restriction is scheduled for reevaluation in 2013.  It has international prosecutors and judges in its court system.  These I understand Kosovo will extend, along with the EU rule of law mission EULEX, until 2014.  While my friends at KIPRED have catalogued the many ways in which Kosovo remains under international constraints, in my view a new state does well to move cautiously in claiming its sovereign powers, if only because that will enable it to attract significant support from the international community.

The day is coming though when the five EU members that have not yet recognized Pristina (even if they all I believe maintain diplomatic representation there) should drop their reluctance and accept Kosovo as sovereign and independent.  Their failure to do so has prolonged Belgrade’s resistance and given some there to hope for partition, which would encourage similar moves in Bosnia and Cyprus.

The EU needs to insist that Belgrade give up its de facto domination of northern Kosovo in favor of the decentralized governance guaranteed by the Ahtissari plan.  That can be done by a single EU member acting alone to block a date for Serbia’s accession talks to begin.  I expect Germany will do that if necessary.  But the EU would do much better to act as 27.  That would be no footnote.  It would deserve an ! rather than a *.