Month: September 2012
The unlikely parade
According to Serbia’s constitution, all citizens have the right to a peaceful demonstration. Homosexuals appear to be exempt from the rule. Even though LGBT activists announced several months in advance their plan to stage the Gay Pride events, including the parade, September 30-October 7. Serbian prime and interior minister Ivica Dačić recently stressed that the demonstration could be banned if the police assess the security risks as too high. Dačić added that he basically supports human rights of all people, including homosexuals, but is not going to risk the lives and safety of his policemen and potential participants of the parade.
Last year the Pride Parade was banned at the eleventh hour. The official explanation was that far right extremists were planning terrorist actions. No further information has been released since, nor has anyone been arrested in connection with these allegations. Organizers now fear the government will use the security risks as an excuse to ban Pride once again.
The issue is weightier than a few demonstrators in Belgrade. Now a candidate for EU membership, Serbia is hoping to get a date to start accession talks, which brings with it substantial financing. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Phillip Reeker was among the first foreign diplomats to state public support to the Pride organizers. Several EU officials – including Jelko Kacin, the European parliament rapporteur for Serbia – have confirmed their attendance. While this year’s Gay Pride may not be crucial for Serbia’s further progress toward EU membership – at least not to the extent that improvement in relations with Kosovo is – the Europeans will certainly take it into account when deliberating on whether the country merits the date.
The first attempt by LGBT organizations to hold the parade was in 2001. The event ended in chaos, with participants brutally battered by football hooligans and militant ultranationalists. The organizers accused the police of deliberately failing to protect them. Scenes from television reports suggest they may well have been right.
Frightened of violence, LGBT activists were not even thinking of organizing the parade again until 2009, but the government eventually decided to disallow it. The decision has been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court only recently, which gives the LGBT community some hope that this year the tide might be turned.
In 2010, hundreds of Serbian lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transexuals were finally allowed to occupy a strictly enclosed area of the capital for about an hour, completely surrounded by cordons of police. Whether the demonstration was a success is debatable however. While the participants suffered no attack during the rally thanks to the immense security presence, the rest of the town saw a series of clashes between hooligans and riot police, who were ordered to show as much restraint toward rioters as possible. Belgrade was trashed. Of about 200 injured, a large majority were policemen. The government was believed to have allowed the demonstration only to improve its chances of getting EU candidate status.
Serbia is a conservative society and people generally oppose the gay parade. Although most of them disapprove violence against the LGBT population, they also believe that homosexuals should not express their sexual identity in public places. Homophobia is mainly present among younger generations. Teenagers are the most violent members of extreme nationalist and football hooligan groups.
In addition to the issue of human rights in general and gay rights in particular, the government’s hesitancy raises the question of Serbia’s institutional capability to guarantee its citizens an elementary level of safety. There is a widespread belief that the militant far right groups consist entirely of “kids” from the margins of society who use violence merely as a way to express frustration. While that may be true for some of the low-level operatives, the bulk of their leaders – especially of football hooligan groups – are well situated individuals with criminal records that involve serious offenses such as armed robberies, drug trade, extortion, murder attempts and so on.
Despite their criminal activities, most of these extremists have rarely, if ever, been brought to justice. The support they enjoy from the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC), which is the most popular and influential institution in the country, helps them gain legitimacy among ordinary people and portray themselves as the “ultimate guardians of the Serb Orthodoxy and heroic tradition.” Outgoing Russian ambassador Aleksandr Konuzin – who is almost as popular here as SPC – was photographed with members of far right groups on several occasions, including his visit to the Serbs from northern Kosovo.
Militant ultranationalists were most privileged during the prime ministry of former conservative nationalist prime minister Vojislav Koštunica of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), which ended in 2008 after an attack on the U.S. embassy building in Belgrade amid riots against Kosovo’s declaration of independence. The order for security forces to withdraw could not have been issued except by a top police or government official, but even four years later it still remains a mystery who was in command that day.
Several other cases have also clearly illustrated the strength of Serbian far right militants. During the 2010 gay parade, they demonstrated not only surprisingly high organizational capabilities, but also considerable knowledge of guerrilla tactics in their battle with police. Last year evidence appeared in some media of young Serbs attending Russian camps to learn military skills. Perhaps the most notable example was a few years ago, when leaders of a football hooligan group managed to wiretap police communications prior to a derby match and thus learn about police plans to prevent them from fighting with rival fans.
The overal number of militant extremists in Serbia is estimated to be between ten and fifteen thousand. Most, if not all, of them are well known to the police and intelligence agencies. Professor Zoran Dragišić, a prominent security expert, has asserted that it would have taken the Gendarmerie no more than seventeen minutes to arrest the vast majority of violent militants. So far there has been no indication of political will to order such a nationwide police operation. It’s high time.
PS from Daniel Serwer 2 October: Milan is not the only Serbian citizen who sees possible cancellation of the parade as reflecting badly on the security services.
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It’s not only Libya
A lot of people seem to be surprised that Libyans have taken up the cudgels against the Benghazi militias thought to have attacked the U.S. consulate there, killing the American ambassador and three of his colleagues. Readers of peacefare.net will not be so surprised, as I’ve repeatedly described the situation there as evolving in a positive direction, with a lot of appreciation for what the United States and NATO did to defeat Muammar Qaddafi. I wrote to friends Thursday just before the news of the uprising against the militias broke:
I’ve been there (in both Benghazi and Tripoli) twice in the last year. I certainly have never had a warmer reception as an American in an Arab country. Most Libyans, especially Benghazis, understand perfectly well that the U.S. and NATO saved them from Qaddafi. And they appreciate it. I drove repeatedly through demonstrations in Benghazi during the election period–there was zero hostility to Westerners. Ditto at the polling places. And ditto last September right after Qaddafi fled Tripoli, when I enjoyed a great Friday evening celebration in Martyr’s (Green) Square.
The Libyan transition has been going reasonably well, on a time schedule they themselves have set, with resources that are overwhelmingly their own. Yes, the militias are a problem, but they are also part of a temporary solution. There would be no order in Libya today without them. They guarded all the polling stations during the elections and eventually reestablished control over the consulate compound after the attack.
We’ll have to wait for the incident report to know, but I would bet on the attack having been a planned one (contra Susan Rice) by armed extremists associated with opposition to the elections and possibly with secession of Barqa (Cyrenaica)….The Libyan [political science professor] Chris Stevens met with the morning he was killed gave me an account of these small extremist groups, mainly headquartered in Derna, the evening after the elections [in July 7]. The state has, however, lacked the organization and force necessary to mop them up, which might in fact be a difficult operation. They are wise not to try until they know they can succeed.
They will now have to do it. We should be helping them where they need help.
It would be a mistake to take the uprising against the extremist militias as the final word. There is likely to be retaliation. What has happened so far is not law and order. It is more lynch mob, though no one seems to have been killed. We should not take much satisfaction from retribution. What is needed is justice, which requires a serious investigation, a fair trial and an appropriate punishment.
Also needed are reliable, unified and disciplined security forces: police, army, intelligence services. This is one of the most difficult tasks in any post-war, post-dictatorship society. Demobilization of the militias really is not possible until the new security institutions are able to start absorbing at least some of their cadres. Reform of security services and reintegration of former fighters are two sides of the same coin: establishing the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
It is astounding that the United States, after 20 years of demand from weak and failing states in the Balkans, Middle East and South Asia, still lacks adequate institutional means to assist in establishing foreign security forces that behave properly towards their citizens. We are especially weak on police, whose training and equipping is largely contracted to private companies that hire individuals who have never previously worked together and may have dramatically different ideas about what a proper police force does. The Americans are also weak in assisting interior ministries, since we don’t use them ourselves. I have little idea what we do assisting foreign intelligence services, since the effort is classified and has attracted little journalistic or academic attention. We have some significant experience and capacity to help with military services and defense ministries, but we could use a good deal more.
Police of course are not much use unless you’ve got courts and prisons to process the accused, along with judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys and prison guards. Not to mention laws, implementing regulations, legal education, bar associations and the ineffable but important “culture of law.” Installing a modern system for rule of law is a 10 or 20 year project.
The Libyans are facing a challenge similar to what we have seen in Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Haiti, South Sudan and likely several more places I’ve omitted. There are pressing rule of law challenges in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen as well as obvious needs in Bahrain, Algeria, Jordan, Pakistan, Nepal, and Burma (Myanmar). When will we recognize that we need a permanent capacity to respond comprehensively and appropriately?
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Less bang, fewer bucks
“Violence is not the way to resolve political disputes,” declared GlobalSolutions.org President Bob Enholm at yesterday’s event, co-sponsored with Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping, about the need for U.S. engagement in peacekeeping operations. This statement set the tone for the panel, which featured three experienced peacekeepers including Lynn Holland, the first American woman to participate in a UN peacekeeping operation. The speakers focused on the advantages of peacekeeping and reasons the U.S. should increase its participation.
Holland, now at PAE, came to peacekeeping through police work in the United States. She volunteered to join for two weeks a project in Haiti that would train police personnel. After six months, she decided that she could not go back to writing tickets in the U.S. so she followed what she described as a “calling” into several other countries as a peacekeeper, including Bosnia, Kosovo and Liberia. From this she learned that peacekeeping operations must be tailored to each situation and comprehensive. It only creates problems to train more police officers without also training judges and corrections personnel. Holland believes there are advantages to using women peacekeepers. After she negotiated a ceasefire in Kosovo, one of the protagonists told UN personnel that the effort would not have been successful if it had been led by a man.
William Stuebner of IDS International listed the reasons the U.S. should be more involved in UN peacekeeping operations. Successful peacekeeping work quarantines conflict, saves money, and depoliticizes responsibility. Additionally, Stuebner argued that it is just the “right thing to do,” though he acknowledged this argument carries little weight in Washington.
Deborah Owens, who has served in Somalia, Rwanda, and the Balkans, emphasized that peacekeepers live “close to the ground” getting their hair cut at local salons, visiting local restaurants, and staying in normal apartments, which allows them to understand the local issues in a more nuanced way. Finally, peacekeeping missions have established a presence in conflict zones that would be hard for other countries to enter without inciting violence.
As for what the U.S. could do to help more, Stuebner pointed to training, assisting with transportation, intelligence and special troops. The U.S. should also continue to pay its assessed dues. It is a misconception in the U.S. that we contribute a significant number of peacekeepers when in reality, on the list of countries that contribute the most blue berets (UN peacekeepers) we were number 58 as of August.
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The closer
We hear a lot more about international intervention missions opening than we do about their closing. This is not as it should be. While some of them are conceived as holding operations without clear end-states, most these days are intended to achieve something. Then they should close.
Four and a half years after Kosovo declared independence, Pieter Feith stopped by Washington to report on what his International Civilian Office (ICO), which closed last week, achieved in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Settlement (Athisaari plan) and consider what still needs to be done. This is Pieter’s second closing: he also implemented an Ahtisaari plan for Acheh in Indonesia, closing the European Union mission there in 2006.
To make a long story short, the Albanians accepted the Ahtisaari plan for Kosovo independence but the Serbs rejected it. The Kosovars declared independence anyway, in coordination with supporters like the United States and most of the European Union, as well as its immediate neighbors. That support was conditional on implementing the Ahtissari plan, under the supervision of the ICO.
The result is a state with its critical institutions in place: not only a constitution with ample protection for minorities as well as a parliament and executive with guaranteed minority representation, but also a constitutional court that has taken some courageous decisions, a privatization agency, a property claims commission, judicial and prosecutorial councils, a Serbian-speaking radio and television channel, a Kosovo Security Force about to be declared fully operational by NATO, ample decentralization, five new majority Serb municipalities (with Serb mayors and police chiefs). The border with Macedonia, long a source of friction, has been demarcated. Those who say, and some do, that Kosovo hasn’t made any progress are talking nonsense.
Kosovo now has a single legal framework. The Ahtisaari plan is history. All the provisions that could be implemented by Pristina acting alone have been passed in parliament. But there are some things that are beyond Pristina’s reach, most notably control of the northern bit of Kosovo, which is still in Serb hands (though whose is sometimes uncertain). The best Pristina has been able to do so far is establish a municipal administrative office for the north that is providing services (business permits, drivers’ licenses) as well as initiating infrastructure and other projects. Going farther will require developing a strong consensus among the political parties in Kosovo on a common platform for the north.
The division of the north from the rest of Kosovo cannot be allowed to continue, creating a new and interminable “frozen conflict” and possibly opening a Pandora’s box of destabilization (of Macedonia and Bosnia in particular). Pristina needs to reach out to the north, with help from the EU, KFOR (the NATO force that still has 5-6000 soldiers in place) and EULEX. Decentralization will be part of the solution, as it has been in the rest of Kosovo. The health and education sectors have to continue to have close relations with Belgrade, but these should be made transparent. The EU, in particular the Germans, will insist on progress in the north as a condition for proceeding towards Serbian and Kosovar membership.
The EU, guided by the Stabilization and Association process and eventually by the accession process, will now be the main international engine in Kosovo, emphasizing rule of law (its EULEX mission at its peak had 2000 employees), transitional justice and reconciliation. This last is of particular importance and requires a grassroots effort that is regional in scope. REKOM, Natasa Kandic’s project, merited particular mention. The EU will also be strong on regional integration of transportation and energy systems. There will be no grand EU Marshall plan or other “leap of imagination” in Kosovo.
The American role is still strong. It will need to gradually diminish, allowing the Kosovo institutions to take on more responsibility. The EU will be the main monitor of implementation in Kosovo, as it prepares for the visa waiver, a Stabilization and Association agreement and eventual membership.
On lessons learned, Feith offered a savvy few:
1. Missions need to focus on exit strategy from the beginning (“achieve and leave” was the motto in Kosovo). Providing support is good, local ownership is better.
2. Combined European and American support for ICO gave it leverage.
3. Lack of UN Security Council approval and Belgrade agreement to the Ahtisaari plan was a serious hindrance, but not an insurmountable one.
4. Partly to avoid the implication that Kosovo was not fully sovereign, the ICO never used its “corrective” powers to veto legislation or fire officials (though it did appoint officials). This was useful for gaining local ownership.
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Entitlement at home and abroad
The Mitt Romney video has set me thinking about entitlement. I have sat at a lot of fancy dinner tables in fabulous digs with the wealthy and powerful on several continents. The conversation is remarkably similar: success often breeds self-confidence and disdain for the powerless.
I do know people who feel we should all be entitled to food, housing and healthcare, not to mention education, free speech, equal opportunity and other things that even the right would agree with. But I know many more people who want to work for those goodies. As Mitt Romney so cleverly tried to turn it around yesterday, most people want to earn enough to pay income tax. In fact, the reason Repubican administrations have generally favored lowering taxes on the poor–even giving them subsidies–is to encourage them to work.
More interesting are the people in the video, whose clinking silver and china are a fitting accompaniment to Romney’s Ayn Randish refrain. They are the ones who seem to me to feel entitled: to their wealth, to their privilege and to their influence. Few of them likely pay more than Mitt Romney’s 14-15% in income tax. Folks with $50k to spend on dinner have smart lawyers and accountants who keep them well under a working person’s tax rate. Romney’s comment that he would be better off running for president as a Latino betrays this profound sense of entitlement: he imagines himself as a Latino with the same inherited wealth and privilege he in fact grew up with, not one who had to work his way up, as did his once welfare-receiving father.
There is a similar sense of entitlement among Romney and the guests when it comes to foreign affairs. Romney says it is difficult to imagine a Palestinian state because then the Palestinians would control the border of the West Bank with Jordan and even an airport. It is a short logical leap to the conclusion that Israel should continue the occupation of the West Bank without accepting the Palestinians as citizens, thus institutionalizing permanently the privileges of occupation. If this is not entitlement, I don’t know what is.
The Republicans’ favorite Israeli leader, Benyamin Netanyahu, betrays a similar sense of entitlement when he demands that the president of the United States specify a “red line” for Iran’s nuclear program. It apparently hasn’t occurred to the man David Gregory crowned “leader of the Jewish people” that the president of the United States is first and foremost accountable to the American people. I want a president who does what is best for America, even if I am Jewish. Obama has made it clear he will not permit Iran to get nuclear weapons. The American political system will hold him accountable to that commitment. The notion that a president might specify a trigger for going to war in order to satisfy a foreign leader is truly distasteful to me.
Romney and Netanyahu should have a look in the mirror. It is the privileged who too often feel entitled. Most of the underprivileged do not. Palestinians or poor Americans, most want equal rights and opportunity. It would be a lot smarter to offer them something substantial than to expect them to vote for you if you don’t.
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Who will make you safer?
The big news of the past two days is the Romney video that has him dissing 47% of the electorate and giving up on Middle East peace. Where did that famous resolve go? He seems to have channeled it entirely into the “no apology” policy, which apparently applies as much to offensive comments about half the American electorate as it does to killing people by mistake in Pakistan.
This would all be really funny except that it is dead serious. Dismissing the possibility of reaching an Israel/Palestine peace agreement has consequences. The Palestinians will never take Romney seriously as an interlocutor (that is what diplomats call someone they talk to). He’ll be seen, quite rightly, as someone who gained office with massive support from Sheldon Adelson, who actively opposes the two-state solution (the Romney campaign simply fails to mention it).
Whereas it is perfectly obvious that Middle East peace requires American pressure on Israel, Romney says
The idea of pushing on the Israelis to give something up to get the Palestinians to act is the worst idea in the world.
There is, in the end, a certain backwards consistency here. If you don’t want to push the Israelis, it is true that you will not get any progress on Middle East peace. But the flip side is also true: no progress on Middle East peace, combined with continuing American support (often military) for autocratic monarchs, leaves the Arab and Muslim worlds alienated and angry. I don’t need to elaborate on the consequences of that.
Romney’s foreign policy campaign has so far sown far more confusion than enlightenment. “Unforced errors” are the leitmotif. Gaffes are commonplace. What he would actually do is unclear. Romney couldn’t even pull off a visit to London without offending the locals by criticizing preparations for what turned out to be spectacularly successful Olympic games.
My colleague Eliot Cohen here at SAIS asks the debatable question, “Are you safer now than you were four years ago?” There is of course no way to answer this question until we know what happens in the next four years. What we know now is that the numbers of Americans succumbing to terrorist attacks worldwide is small (17 in 2011 to be precise). We know that Romney supports the same time schedule for ending the U.S. combat role in Afghanistan as Obama. We know that Obama has put in place the strongest ever American and multilateral sanctions against the Iranian nuclear program, and that Romney agrees with Obama on the objective of preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. We know that Romney has criticized Obama for not acting more vigorously on Syria, but we have no idea what the Republican candidate would actually do as president, because he hasn’t bothered to say.
The real question is whether you will be safer with Obama as president or with Romney as president. Each of us will have to decide. I for one will prefer whoever gives me confidence that he has the interests of all Americans at heart, not just the 53% of them whose votes he covets, and will pursue peace with as much vigor as he pursues war. You can guess who that is.
PS: If you haven’t yet enjoyed the video, here it is:
If you are real glutton for punishment, you can view the rest too.
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