Month: September 2012
This week’s peace picks
There is far too much happening Monday and Tuesday in particular. But here are this week’s peace picks, put together by newly arrived Middle East Institute intern and Swarthmore graduate Allison Stuewe. Welcome Allison!
1. Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Political Progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Monday September 10, 10:00am-12:00pm, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, The Bernstein-Offit Building, 1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 500
Speaker: Patrick Moon
In June 2012, the governing coalition in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had taken eighteen months to construct, broke up over ratification of the national budget. In addition, there has been heated debate over a proposed electoral reform law and the country’s response to a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights. Party leaders are once again jockeying for power, and nationalist rhetoric is at an all-time high in the run-up to local elections in early October.
Register for this event here.
2. Just and Unjust Peace, Monday September 10, 12:00pm-2:00pm, Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs
Venue: Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs, 3307 M Street, Washington, DC 20007, 3rd Floor Conference Room
Speakers: Daniel Philpott, Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Lisa Cahill, Marc Gopin
What is the meaning of justice in the wake of massive injustice? Religious traditions have delivered a unique and promising answer in the concept of reconciliation. This way of thinking about justice contrasts with the “liberal peace,” which dominates current thinking in the international community. On September 14th, the RFP will host a book event, responding to Daniel Philpott’s recently published book, Just and Unjust Peace: A Ethic of Political Reconciliation. A panel of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish scholars will assess the argument for reconciliation at the theological and philosophical levels and in its application to political orders like Germany, South Africa, and Guatemala.
Register for this event here.
3. The New Struggle for Syria, Monday September 10, 12:00pm-2:00pm, George Washington University
Venue: Lindner Family Commons, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Room 602
Speakers: Daniel L. Byman, Gregory Gause, Curt Ryan, Marc Lynch
Three leading political scientists will discuss the regional dimensions of the Syrian conflict.
A light lunch will be served.
Register for this event here.
4. Impressions from North Korea: Insights from two GW Travelers, Monday September 10, 12:30pm-2:00pm, George Washington University
Venue: GW’s Elliot School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Room 505
Speakers: Justin Fisher, James Person
The Sigur Center will host a discussion with two members of the GW community who recently returned from North Korea. Justin Fisher and James F. Person will discuss their time teaching and researching, respectively, in North Korea this Summer and impressions from their experiences. Justin Fisher spent a week in North Korea as part of a Statistics Without Borders program teaching statistics to students at Pyongyang University of Science and Technology. James Person recently returned from a two-week trip to North Korea where he conducted historical research.
Register for this event here.
5. America’s Role in the World Post-9/11: A New Survey of Public Opinion, Monday September 10, 12:30pm-2:30pm, Woodrow Wilson Center
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004, 6th Floor, Joseph H. and Claire Flom Auditorium
Speaker: Jane Harman, Marshall Bouton, Michael Hayden, James Zogby, Philip Mudd
This event will launch the latest biennial survey of U.S. public opinion conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and is held in partnership with them and NPR.
RSVP for this event to rsvp@wilsoncenter.org.
6. Transforming Development: Moving Towards an Open Paradigm, Monday September 10, 3:00pm-4:30pm, CSIS
Venue: CSIS, 1800 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20006, Fourth Floor Conference Room
Speakers: Ben Leo, Michael Elliott, Daniel F. Runde
Please join us for a discussion with Mr. Michael Elliot, President and CEO, ONE Campaign, and Mr. Ben Leo, Global Policy Director, ONE Campaign about their efforts to promote transparency, openness, accountability, and clear results in the evolving international development landscape. As the aid community faces a period of austerity, the panelists will explain how the old paradigm is being replaced by a new, more open, and ultimately more effective development paradigm. Mr. Daniel F. Runde, Director of the Project on Prosperity and Development and Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis, CSIS will moderate the discussion.
RSVP for this event to ppd@csis.org.
7. Campaign 2012: War on Terrorism, Monday September 10, 3:30pm-5:00pm, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Falk Auditorium
Speakers: Josh Gerstein, Hafez Ghanem, Stephen R. Grand, Benjamin Wittes
With both presidential campaigns focused almost exclusively on the economy and in the absence of a major attack on the U.S. homeland in recent years, national security has taken a back seat in this year’s presidential campaign. However, the administration and Congress remain sharply at odds over controversial national security policies such as the closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. What kinds of counterterrorism policies will effectively secure the safety of the United States and the world?
On September 10, the Campaign 2012 project at Brookings will hold a discussion on terrorism, the ninth in a series of forums that will identify and address the 12 most critical issues facing the next president. White House Reporter Josh Gerstein of POLITICO will moderate a panel discussion with Brookings experts Benjamin Wittes, Stephen Grand and Hafez Ghanem, who will present recommendations to the next president.
After the program, panelists will take questions from the audience. Participants can follow the conversation on Twitter using hashtag #BITerrorism.
Register for this event here.
8. Democracy & Conflict Series II – The Middle East and Arab Spring: Prospects for Sustainable Peace, Tuesday September 11, 9:30am-11:00am, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, ROME Building, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speaker: Azizah al-Hibri, Muqtedar Khan, Laith Kubba, Peter Mandaville, Joseph V. Montville
More than a year and a half following the self-immolation of a street vendor in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, Arab nations are grappling with the transition toward sustainable peace. The impact of the Arab Spring movement poses challenges for peaceful elections and establishing stable forms of democratic institutions. This well-versed panel of Middle East and human rights experts will reflect on the relevance and role of Islamic religious values and the influence of foreign policy as democratic movements in the Middle East negotiate their futures.
Register for this event here.
9. Israel’s Security and Iran: A View from Lt. Gen. Dan Haloutz, Tuesday September 11, 9:30am-11:00am, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036, Falk Auditorium
Speakers: Lt. Gen. Dan Haloutz, Kenneth M. Pollack
While Israel and Iran continue trading covert punches and overheated rhetoric, the question of what Israel can and will do to turn back the clock of a nuclear Iran remains unanswered. Some Israelis fiercely advocate a preventive military strike, while others press just as passionately for a diplomatic track. How divided is Israel on the best way to proceed vis-à-vis Iran? Will Israel’s course put it at odds with Washington?
On September 11, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host Lt. Gen. Dan Haloutz, the former commander-in-chief of the Israeli Defense Forces, for a discussion on his views on the best approach to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Brookings Senior Fellow Kenneth Pollack will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.
After the program, Lt. Gen. Haloutz will take audience questions.
Register for this event here.
10. Montenegro’s Defense Reform: Cooperation with the U.S., NATO Candidacy and Regional Developments, Tuesday September 11, 10:00am-11:30am, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins Carey Business School, 1625 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 211/212
Montenegro has been one of the recent success stories of the Western Balkans. Since receiving a Membership Action Plan from NATO in December 2009, in close cooperation with the U.S. it has implemented a series of defense, political, and economic reforms, which were recognized in the Chicago Summit Declaration in May 2012 and by NATO Deputy Secretary General Vershbow in July 2012. Montenegro contributes to the ISAF operation in Afghanistan and offers training support to the Afghan National Security Forces. In June 2012 it opened accession talks with the European Union.
Register for this event here.
11. Inevitable Last Resort: Syria or Iran First?, Tuesday September 11, 12:00pm-2:00pm, The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
Venue: The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 901 N. Stuart Street, Arlington, VA 22203, Suite 200
Speakers: Michael S. Swetnam, James F. Jeffrey, Barbara Slavin, Theodore Kattouf, Gen Al Gray
Does the expanding civil war in Syria and its grave humanitarian crisis call for immediate international intervention? Will Iran’s potential crossing of a nuclear weapon “red line” inevitably trigger unilateral or multilateral military strikes? Can diplomacy still offer urgent “honorable exit” options and avoid “doomsday” scenarios in the Middle East? These and related issues will be discussed by both practitioners and observers with extensive experience in the region.
RSVP for this event to icts@potomacinstitute.org or 703-562-4522.
12. Elections, Stability, and Security in Pakistan, Tuesday September 11, 3:30pm-5:00pm, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speakers: Frederic Grare, Samina Ahmed
With the March 2013 elections approaching, the Pakistani government has an opportunity to ensure a smooth transfer of power to the next elected government for the first time in the country’s history. Obstacles such as a lack of security, including in the tribal borderlands troubled by militant violence, and the need to ensure the participation of more than 84 million voters threaten to derail the transition. Pakistan’s international partners, particularly the United States, will have a crucial role in supporting an uninterrupted democratic process.
Samina Ahmed of Crisis Group’s South Asia project will discuss ideas from her new report. Carnegie’s Frederic Grare will moderate.
Register for this event here.
13. Islam and the Arab Awakening, Tuesday September 11, 7:00pm-8:00pm, Politics and Prose
Venue: Politics and Prose, 5015 Connecticut Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008
Speaker: Tariq Ramadan
Starting in Tunisia in December 2010, Arab Spring has changed the political face of a broad swath of countries. How and why did these revolts come about–and, more important, what do they mean for the future? Ramadan, professor of Islamic Studies at Oxford and President of the European Muslim Network, brings his profound knowledge of Islam to bear on questions of religion and civil society.
14. Beijing as an Emerging Power in the South China Sea, Wednesday September 12, 10:00am, The House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Venue: The House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2170 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515
Speakers: Bonnie Glaser, Peter Brookes, Richard Cronin
Oversight hearing.
15. The Caucasus: A Changing Security Landscape, Thursday September 13, 12:30pm-4:30pm, CSIS
Venue: CSIS, 1800 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20006, B1 Conference Center
Speakers: Andrew Kuchins, George Khelashvili, Sergey Markedonov, Scott Radnitz, Anar Valiyey, Mikhail Alexseev, Sergey Minasyan, Sufian Zhemukhov
The Russia-Georgia war of August 2008 threatened to decisively alter the security context in the Caucasus. Four years later, what really has changed? In this conference, panelists assess the changing relations of the three states of the Caucasus — Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan — with each other and major neighbors, Russia and Iran. They also explore innovative prospects for resolution in the continued conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the possibility of renewed hostilities over Nagorno-Karabakh. This conference is based on a set of new PONARS Eurasia Policy Memos, which will be available at the event and online at www.ponarseurasia.org. Lunch will be served.
RSVP for this event to REP@csis.org.
16. Author Series Event: Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Little Afghanistan: The War Within the War for Afghanistan”, Thursday September 13, 6:30pm-8:30pm, University of California Washington Center
Venue: University of California Washington Center, 1608 Rhode Island Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speaker: Rajiv Chandrasekaran
In the aftermath of the military draw-down of US and NATO forces after over ten years in Afghanistan, examinations of US government policy and efforts have emerged. What internal challenges did the surge of US troops encounter during the war? How was the US aiding reconstruction in a region previously controlled by the Taliban?
Rajiv Chandrasekaran will discuss his findings to these questions and US government policy from the perspective of an on-the-ground reporter during the conflict. This forum will shed light on the complex relationship between America and Afghanistan.
Register for this event here.
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GOP critique: Israel and Syria
This is the fourth installment of a series responding to the Romney campaign’s list of ten failures in Obama’s foreign and national security policies.
Failure #5: A Damaged Relationship With Israel And A Moribund Peace Process
No question: the peace process is moribund and the relationship with Israel damaged. The question is who is responsible? Do you blame President Obama, who tried to halt Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank in order to create space for negotiation, or Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who refuses to halt the settlements and shows little sign of being interested in the two-state solution that would be the objective of renewed negotiation?
I’d fault Netanyahu, but there are wrinkles here. Obama’s insistence on a full settlement freeze was a bridge too far. His insistence on starting negotiations with the 1967 lines as the basis for land swaps was not. Netanyahu, who made a tremendous stink about this last year, within months dropped his opposition.
That Obama does not like Netanyahu is clear, but the exchange the Republicans cite with French President Sarkozy is ambiguous and unimportant.
As for funding UNESCO, the implication that Obama is planning to violate U.S. law in order to fund the organization even though it admitted Palestine as a member is nonsense. The Administration has made it clear it may seek a waiver under the law, not violate it. In any event, UN bodies do not recognize states; only states can recognize states. Palestine is recognized by over 100 states, which makes it no surprise that it is able to garner the votes to enter international organizations. The only way to deal with this issue without damaging important U.S. interests is to prevent Palestine from applying for membership (or delaying a vote). That is what the Administration has been doing, so far successfully.
Far more disturbing though than these relatively small issues is the big one: Mitt Romney has not pronounced himself in favor of a two-state solution. Nor can he, as he receives ample funding from Sheldon Adelson and other supporters who oppose the two-state solution, want Israel to hold on to the West Bank and support settler efforts to hold onto what they term “Samaria and Judea.” This is an extremist position guaranteed to lead to strained relations between the United States and all Arab countries.
Failure #6: No Coherent Policy To Stem The Humanitarian And Strategic Disaster In Syria
The Republican claim is this:
President Obama has implemented no coherent policy to shape events in this vital region, wasting over a year and a half as the situation has grown worse and options are being foreclosed. Some 20,000 people have been killed, the region is in turmoil, malign powers and actors have greater influence over the situation than the United States does, and Syria’s stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons are at risk of falling into the wrong hands.
But Romney puts forward no alternative. His declared approach is virtually identical to Obama’s:
Mitt Romney believes the United States should pursue a strategy of isolating and pressuring the Assad regime to increase the likelihood of a peaceful transition to a legitimate government. We should redouble our push for the U.N. Security Council to live up to its responsibilities and impose sanctions that cut off funding sources that serve to maintain the regime’s grip on power. We should work with Saudi Arabia and Turkey to call on Syria’s military to protect civilians rather than attack them. This effort would aim to drive a wedge between Assad and his military, minimize violence, and increase the possibility that the ruling minority Alawites will be able to reconcile with the majority Sunni population in a post-Assad Syria. And we should make clear that the United States and our allies will support the Syrian opposition when the time comes for them to forge a post-Assad government.
The only real difference with Obama is that Romney fails to mention non-lethal material aid to the Syrian opposition, which the Administration is providing, along with encouraging lethal assistance from Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
The sad fact is that there are no good options out there, but if Romney wants to oppose Obama he should choose one: arm the opposition, no-fly zone, safe area, provisional Syrian government. If he is unwilling to do that, but instead states a policy identical to Obama’s, he should admit that he supports the Administration’s approach, ineffectual though it has been. Citing Democrats critical of the Administration but not supporting their policy prescriptions–or something else distinct from the Administration’s approach–is disingenuous.
I happen to agree with the Republicans that “when America doesn’t lead, instability and danger grow.” But there is no bipartisan consensus on what to do beyond what is already being done, and Romney knows it. If he is not suggesting something more than what we are doing already, he should say so.
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GOP critique: leaks and cuts
This is the third installment of a series responding to the Romney campaign’s list of failures in Obama’s foreign and national security policies.
Failure #3: “Unconscionable” Leaks Of Classified Counterterror Information From The White House That Have Been “Devastating”
Here I find myself in agreement with the Republicans: there have been too many leaks of apparently classified information. The trouble is this complaint comes from people who never said a word about leaks during the Bush administration. So to give the complaint more credibility, I think I’ll just reproduce word for word the main allegations, without the partisan hyperbole:
The damaging leaks include:
- Operational details about the Osama Bin Laden raid.
- Existence of a Pakistani doctor who assisted the United States in finding Bin Laden and who was later arrested and jailed in Pakistan.
- Revelation of a covert joint U.S.-Israeli cyber operation to undermine Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
- The existence of a double-agent who was key to unraveling the second underwear bomb.
- The White House’s process for determining the targets of drone strikes.
The Republican memorandum also cites Democratic concern:
- John Brennan, President Obama’s own counterterror chief and Deputy National Security Adviser, has called the leaks “unconscionable,” “damaging,” and “devastating.”
- Senator Dianne Feinstein, the Democratic Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, has criticized the leaks and stated that they are coming from the White House. She said, “Each disclosure puts American lives at risk, makes it more difficult to recruit assets, strains the trust of our partners, and threatens imminent and irreparable damage to our national security in the face of urgent and rapidly adapting threats worldwide.”
The remedy the Republicans suggest is the right one:
Despite the damage done, President Obama has refused to support the appointment of a special counsel to investigate these leaks and hold those responsible accountable. The special counsel mechanism is designed for just such circumstances where the impartiality of normal prosecutors may be compromised because someone in the high chain of command in the White House may be implicated.
Holding people accountable for leaks of truly valuable classified information is a vital component of protecting national security.
Failure #4: “Devastating” Defense Cuts That Will Cede Our Status As A “Global Power”
I confess that my wonkiness does not really extend to budget, which I find fiendishly complicated even if arithmetically simple. The “massive cuts” President Obama has allegedly instituted to the defense budget are all cuts from projected increases, not cuts in the present budget. The Republicans cite two “cuts” in 2011: one of $78 billion and one of $400 billion. But they neglect to mention that the former would take place over 5 years and the later 10 years. They also neglect to mention the massive Pentagon increases over the previous ten years. Then they hold Obama responsible for the $500 billion in cuts (over 10 years) not yet made but scheduled for the January “sequester” if Congress does not pass a budget.
How is President Obama exclusively responsible for the sequester agreement passed in both Houses of Congress? Not clear, but Governor Romney is alleged to have opposed the agreement, which is easy enough since he is not a member of Congress. The President however failed to “steer” the Congressional super-committee to an agreement and has not accepted the Ryan budget plan:
In short, the Commander in Chief is holding our national security and our commitment to veterans hostage to his agenda of tax increases.
It would be at least as correct to say that the Republicans are holding our economy hostage to their agenda of tax cuts.
In all this budget talk, some fundamental facts are lost: the United States spends more on defense than the next 17 countries in the world combined, and all but a handful of those are allies or friends. There is little sign on the horizon of any conventional military threat to the United States for at least 20 years. The only immediate potential military challenge other than the war we are finishing in Afghanistan is the Iranian nuclear program, which is a war we or ally Israel will initiate. The Republicans know this, and the Ryan budget actually proposes a cut in Defense spending for fiscal year 2013, which starts on October 1:
Conventional military challenges may be few, but there are lots of non-conventional and largely non-military challenges in today’s world: weak and failing states, states transitioning to democracy, regional instability in the Middle East and East Asia, terrorist havens, economic collapse, pandemic disease…. The Pentagon budget is not going to help a lot with these challenges, and for many it is the most expensive, not the most cost-effective, way to go. Romney supports the Ryan budget, which makes massive cuts in the kind of civilian foreign affairs spending that would help us to meet those challenges.
The Republicans complain that the only program Obama is all too willing to cut is our military. This is not true. As the GOP never tires of pointing out, he has proposed (and convinced the Congress to pass) $716 billion in cuts to Medicare. The defense budget is by far the largest discretionary slice of Federal spending. There is not credible way to cut Federal expenditures and leave it untouched, much less pay for the increases that the Ryan budget plan proposes in the out years.
Obama’s purported defense budget “cuts” made so far would not cut the defense budget at all, but only slow its increase. The GOP allegation that the president is pursuing a policy of unilateral disarmament is false, as is the allegation that he has sent a message of weakness abroad, leading our friends to question our staying power and emboldening our adversaries. Our allies and friends in Europe and Asia are sticking close by and our adversaries–if you count as such al Qaeda, Iran, and North Korea–have a good deal to fear from an administration that has been tough-minded about tightening the screws.
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My Kosovo, past and future
Friends in Pristina asked me for a personal reflection on Kosovo’s past and future on the occasion of the end of supervised independence, to be marked tomorrow. I prepared this:
I first saw Kosovo sometime in 1998. It was at war. Less than 15 years later, it is not only at peace but also an independent state capable of fulfilling the complex and difficult requirements of the Comprehensive Peace Settlement that Belgrade rejected but Pristina accepted. How did Kosovo get from there to here, and where does it go next?
My memories of that first visit to Kosovo are now hazy. But it would be hard to forget visiting the Council for Human Rights and Freedoms, where our U.S. Institute of Peace delegation was shown documentation of human rights abuses. We also visited the Serbian administration of the province, which denied the abuses and refused our invitation to visit the Council less than 200 meters away. We drove out to Malisheva, where there had been vicious attacks by both Albanians and Serbs. We ran into a Kosovo Liberation Army contingent as well as the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM).
After the war, I would focus on restoring relationships: first among Albanians at Lansdowne in 1999, then between Kosovo and Belgrade Serbs at a meeting in Sofia in 2000, and later between Serbs and Albanians in Gjilan/Gnijlane and other municipalities as well as at the Kosovo-wide level (Airlie House). Throughout I had the support of both Serbs—several of whom were senior fellows at USIP—and Albanians. The Bajraktari brothers worked for me in the 2000s, got masters’ degrees at Princeton and Harvard and now serve as U.S. government officials in the White House and Defense Department.
Later I would go back to the same building in which I had met the Serb administrators to see Jock Covey, Gary Matthews, Bernard Kouchner and Hans Haekkerup, the UN administrators. Michael Steiner, with whom I worked at Dayton, had moved to a different building, now being renovated for the Kosovo Foreign Ministry. I don’t remember having had the pleasure of seeing Soren Jessen-Petersen in Pristina, but he would come for private chats from time to time in Washington, as did Kai Eide, Nebojsa Covic, Dusan Batakovic, Father Sava, Bishop Artemije, Ramush Haradinaj, Veton Surroi, Rada Trajkovic, Hashim Thaci, Alush Gashi and many others. On visits to Pristina I would call on Ibrahim Rugova, who served Coke and loaded my pockets with rocks—they are still here in my office.
Gradually, it became far more important to talk with Kosovans (I gather that is the dissonant but accepted non-ethnic term for those who regard Kosovo as their home) than with internationals. Today the American Ambassador still carries great weight in Kosovo, but she will be the last of the internationals to trump the locals. Pieter Feith, who had “Bonn”-type powers to legislate and remove officials, wisely never used them. The termination of his International Civilian Office is a sign of real progress, even if some see the glass as half empty. The UN Mission in Kosovo has only a minor role. EULEX, the European Union Rule of Law Mission, still provides international prosecutors and judges, but its overstaffing is now being reduced. The Organization for Security and Cooperation Europe (OSCE) will likely be one of the last pillars standing among the internationals, as its democratization efforts are all too obviously needed to support free and fair elections, free media and an open society.
There is real progress in Kosovo, but it is not enough to satisfy me. I have two concerns: international and internal.
The ninety-odd international recognitions that Kosovo rightly vaunts have not been easy to get, but the country needs more. The Belgrade campaign against recognition and UN membership is unworthy of a good neighbor, but it has been more successful than many of us expected and is likely to continue. Rather than entering easily into the General Assembly without many bilateral recognitions, as so many new states do, Kosovo is going to have to accumulate the 130 or so recognitions required for a 2/3 majority. Even then, the problem of the Russian veto will make approval in the UN Security Council a matter for high-level diplomacy.
The internal problems are also important. There can be no doubt about the legitimacy of Kosovo’s institutions for the overwhelming majority of the population. No one even proposed a referendum on independence because the outcome was so obvious. But legitimacy has to be maintained, not just won once. There are two sets of issues, one old and declining, the other newer and growing. The first is among the Serbs. The second is among the Albanians. The issues are related. Both also affect the question of international legitimacy.
Few Serbs welcomed Kosovo independence, but many south of the Ibar river have accepted it. They enjoy their rights to self-governance under the Ahtisaari plan and participate in Kosovo institutions, but there are too few of them. Belgrade never hesitates to cite the low numbers of returns and the high, often exaggerated, numbers of refugees still in Serbia proper, but of course it does not encourage returns because that would legitimize the Kosovo institutions.
It is the duty of the loyal Kosovar to try to repair this situation by making it clear that Serbs are welcome to return. This means treating them properly, protecting them from abuse and respecting their rights. I understand that for some people this is difficult, because of the bad treatment of Albanians under the Serbian administration. But it is the right thing to do, and the best thing for the sake of Kosovo and international recognition. No one in Madrid is going to consider recognizing Kosovo if there is even a hint of Serbs being mistreated there.
There is a second problem among Albanians. The Kosovo state is independent, but it is still limited in some respects. I see the glass as half full. Some of the limitations most people in Kosovo welcome—I don’t know anyone who wants NATO to leave. It is very convenient to have international prosecutors and judges in the Kosovo judicial system, so that inter-ethnic cases can be handled and the constitutional court can make difficult decisions. But other restraints are perceived by many Kosovars as unjust. Some would even resort to violence to change the situation, for example in the north. Others might like Kosovo, in contradiction of its constitution, to give up on independence and join Albania.
Apart from the international constraints, there is also a strong feeling in parts of the Albanian population that the Kosovo state has not created sufficient economic opportunity and is corrupt. As a foreigner who does not have investments in Kosovo, it is hard for me to know how bad the situation is, but when a prominent lawyer suggests to me that no prisoner can hope to get an easy sentence without paying a bribe, I get worried. I worry too about rumors of trafficking in people and drugs, about reports of nepotistic hiring, about apparent irregularities in government procurement.
Let me be clear. Do I know that things are worse in Kosovo than in Serbia, Macedonia or Albania? I do not. Years ago when I complained to a Serbian deputy prime minister about corruption in Kosovo he replied: don’t kid yourself, all the organized crime bosses are still in Belgrade. But Kosovo is still a new and not yet firmly established state, one that desperately needs international recognition. To get what it wants, Kosovo needs to show that it can clean its own house.
I speak bluntly. It is my way. But I also dream big.
My dream is that Kosovo, having worked itself out of international supervision, continues to do the right things: it treats Serbs correctly and gets more of them back to their homes, it protects the churches and monasteries, it conducts a serious effort against corruption and organized crime, it cleans up its elections, it finds a way to cooperate with Belgrade in implementing the Ahtisaari plan and establishes the rule of law on its entire territory. Foreign investment pours in, factories and call centers go up, agriculture thrives. The Kosovo security forces, finding little role for themselves at home, begin to deploy in NATO operations. Kosovo joins Partnership for Peace, becomes a candidate for NATO and EU membership and gets a date to begin EU negotiations.
Time flies. It is 2020. Kosovo is now a member of NATO, which has withdrawn KFOR. Pristina has accelerated its preparations for European Union membership and is now catching up with Belgrade. The two presidents decide to meet EU demands for good neighborly relations by recognizing each other and establishing diplomatic relations. The American ambassador, respected but no longer a viceroy, is surprised but pleased. Some aging Kosovar politicians insist on a referendum on EU membership and on recognition of Serbia, which passes overwhelmingly. Membership is scheduled for 2022. I’d like to be in Pristina for that!
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GOP critique: Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan
This is the second installment of a series responding to the Romney campaign’s list of failures in Obama’s foreign and national security policies.
Failure #1: No Results In Slowing Or Stopping Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program
True: Iran’s nuclear program has not stopped. Iran is enriching uranium at an accelerating pace, albeit likely slower than whatever pace it would have managed without the Stuxnet virus, sanctions and other measures. Romney claims Iran is “on the cusp of nuclear weapons capability.” Assertions of this sort have been made many times in the past. As of February, American officials believed Tehran had not made a decision to proceed to nuclear weapons. You can be sure we’d have heard about it if the situation has changed.
Iran is certainly closer to nuclear weapons than four years ago, but what Mitt Romney would or could have done about it isn’t clear. Certainly George W. Bush did nothing but threaten regime change, which likely redoubled Tehran’s determination. We don’t know what Romney would do, as he has refused to say, but his critique of Obama suggests at a minimum the following:
- No engagement with Iran. The unproductive multilateral talks would presumably be ditched.
- Support for the Green Movement and other efforts at regime change.
- Stronger sanctions, including no waivers for importers of Iranian oil.
- Stronger commitment to missile defense.
- Talk up the effectiveness and advisability of military options in order to reestablish the credibility of the military threat.
The trouble with this approach is that it was tried under George W. Bush and failed. That’s why Obama is trying something else. We may well have to go back to an “axis of evil” approach to Iran, but insofar as it threatens regime change it risks accelerating Tehran’s push for nuclear weapons. The Iranians regard nukes as a guarantee of regime survival, one that is needed more the greater the threat.
The notion that the military threat is necessarily more credible under Romney than under Bush is unconvincing. Obama hasn’t been shy about using military force. There is strong support across the political spectrum in the U.S. that Tehran not be permitted to get nuclear weapons. Iran will need to reckon with a military threat after November 6 whoever wins the election.
Failure #2: Endangering Our Mission In Afghanistan And Weakening Our Relationship With Pakistan
While giving credit to Obama for killing Osama, the Republicans claim the President is planning a withdrawal from Afghanistan by a date certain, without regard to conditions on the ground. This is at best inaccurate. What is planned is the turnover of primary security responsibility to the Afghans and withdrawal of a substantial portion, but not all, U.S. troops. The Republicans further claim that these decisions were not only unwise but also politically motivated and make it harder to ensure “that Afghanistan never again becomes a launching pad for terror like it was on 9/11.”
I don’t give presidents demerits for politically motivated decisions. Americans want out of Afghanistan. Obama is giving them as close to that as he thinks prudent before the end of 2014. Republicans complain that President Obama “has led our Afghan and Pakistani partners to doubt our resolve and hedge their bets rather than fully cooperate with us.” If hedging their bets means building stronger Afghan security forces and reaching a political settlement with the Taliban that meets the key American red line–no return of al Qaeda to Afghanistan–we shouldn’t be too concerned.
The Republican complaint that Obama failed to ensure a clean Afghan presidential election in 2009 is patently spurious. It was President Karzai’s responsibility to ensure a clean election. It was ours to try to prevent a dirty one and recognize one when it happened, which is what Washington and allied capitals did. The complicated story that ended in Karzai’s challenger, Abdullah, withdrawing would vitiate this Republican claim. Nor is it clear what Romney would do differently.
The Republicans also complain that the Obama administration is negotiating with the Taliban while they are killing U.S. troops and “know President Obama wants a deal more than they do.” I don’t really know how much the Taliban want a deal. Michael Semple, who knows about as much about Afghanistan and Pakistan as anyone on earth, believes that important elements of the Taliban do want a deal. It would be criminally negligent for the administration not to try its best to negotiate an early end to the conflict.
It is true that Obama is responsible for frayed relations with both Afghanistan and Pakistan. He has criticized Karzai, including for corruption as well as the election mess the Romney campaign points to, and conducted drone strikes inside Pakistan whenever the opportunity to kill al Qaeda militants presents itself. Those moves aren’t going to make you friends in Kabul and Islamabad. The Republicans attribute bad relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan to “the lack of resolute leadership from President Obama.” It would be closer to the truth to attribute bad relations to his stalwart pursuit of U.S. interests in both places.
Next up:
Failure #3: “Unconscionable” Leaks Of Classified Counterterror Information From The White House That Have Been “Devastating”
Failure #4: “Devastating” Defense Cuts That Will Cede Our Status As A “Global Power”
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Taking the Romney critique seriously
- If the Republicans really thought Obama had failed at foreign and national security policy, they would have mentioned it at their Tampa convention.
- The memo gives precious little detail on what Romney would do differently but instead blames Obama for the way the world turns.
- No one is paying attention to foreign and national security policy in an election focused on the domestic economy.
Still, it’s a thoughtful memo, even if harsh, and merits serious consideration. Caveat emptor: I am an Obamista, though I hope a thoughtful one. The memorandum is long, so I am going to deal with it in pieces, over the next week or two (I hope).
President Obama’s failure on the economy has been so severe that it has overshadowed his manifold failures on foreign policy and national security. An inventory of his record shows that by nearly all measures, President Obama has diminished American influence abroad and compromised our interests and values. In no region of the world is the U.S. position stronger than it was four years ago.
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