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Levant maelstrom

“Truce” – A caricture by world-renowned Syrian cartoonest Ali Farzat who once had his fingers crushed by Syrian security forces

The Eid al Adha truce broke down yesterday afternoon in Syria, with activists reporting 292 breaches by regime forces, who allegedly killed 116 people.  Anti-regime demonstrations numbered 332.  Damascus saw one big blast and many clashes.  This strikes me as a particularly comprehensive list of reasons why the ceasefire could not last, with obvious bias towards the rebellion.  Who wouldn’t be biased in that direction after 19 months of watching the regime kill its own people?

What now?

First there is the blame game.  Regime and rebels will seek to pin the quick breakdown of the ceasefire on the other side.  Neither will want its backers to react by cutting off arms, money and other support.  The regime has little to worry about.  The Russians and Iranians seem to be firm in supporting Bashar al Assad.  The insurgents have more reason to be concerned.  Turkey is getting wobbly.  Washington is preoccupied until November 7 (and maybe for a few months after, if Romney wins).  Saudi Arabia and Qatar are supplying ample arms and money but not seeing clear results.  Extreme Islamists are increasingly prominent in the armed rebellion.

Brahimi will try hard to reinstate the ceasefire, arguing that each side should show restraint and police its own forces.  This will work only if the rebels and the regime figure there is not much to be gained by continuing to fight.  Even if they decide they have reached the “mutually hurting stalemate” that provides an opportunity for a ceasefire, it is difficult to see how it can work without third-party monitoring.  Given the fate of the Arab League and UN observers earlier in the year, who would want to field another monitoring group?

I fear we are headed further into the abyss.  With Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey increasingly at risk from spillover, the Levant may be condemned to a maelstrom of conflict whose eventual consequences could include assassinations, collapsed states, sectarian and ethnic war, economic implosion and safe haven for terrorists.  Spread of the violence to the Gulf could make things worse.  This cannot be ruled out.  Even if Iran does not encourage it, Shia sentiment in Iraq, Bahrain and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia could significantly increase sectarian tensions.

The longer this goes on, the worse it is likely to get.  Whoever wins the American presidency on November 6 needs to be thinking quickly about how to restore a modicum of order in the Levant.  There are many options, none of them obvious winners:

1.       Heavy arms for the (relative) good guys

2.       No-fly zone  (all of Syria or part)

3.       Safe area inside Syria along the Turkish border

4.       Political, economic and military support to liberated “ink spots” within Syria

5.       Indictment of Bashar al Assad

6.       Regime decapitation

7.       Diplomatic push on the opposition to go to negotiations with the regime

These could also be mixed and matched.  I’m sure there are other ideas out there as well, but this will do for a start.  The important thing is block the descent into a regional maelstrom that will last for years and cause untold damage.

PS:  The Red Cross on the humanitarian situation:

PS, October 29:  Did I get Brahimi right?