Month: October 2012
Fat chance
I generally shy away from trumpeting my son’s fine writing over at Mother Jones, but this graphic from his latest post caught my eye:
For those who may wonder what the relationship is between American presidents and attacks on U.S. diplomatic targets, that’s just the point: there is none, even if it looks to me as if the numbers might support the thesis that democratic administrations suffer fewer such attacks on average than their predecessors. But the Romney campaign is claiming its man would prevent such attacks by projecting strength. Fat chance.
Note to Paul Ryan: Marine guards are not trained to protect ambassadors. Their primary responsibility is to protect the information in the embassy. In a crisis, they help protect the embassy itself, but primary responsibility for that lies with the host government. If host government protection is inadequate, the embassy beefs up private security guards and the ambassador gets a personal security detail of people trained for that purpose (usually private contractors), not marine guards.
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A dangerous place
Yesterday’s circus in a House hearing on the killing of U.S. officials last month in Benghazi was barely over when news reached Washington that Al Qaeda had assassinated the Yemeni security chief at the U.S. embassy in Sanaa. No doubt these incidents will continue to provide grist for the American political mill, where candidate Romney is trying to pin blame on the Administration and portray America as besieged.
We are not besieged on most days, but we are at risk. The thousands of our fellow civilians who serve abroad cannot do what they are there to do without running risks. You can build fortress embassies, as we have in Baghdad, and provide personal security details. But nothing reduces the risks to zero.
Some of the security measures we take inhibit achievement of the mission. Andrew Exum tweeted to me this morning:
It’s what the military refers to as the false balance between the men and the mission. In the end, the mission must come 1st.
Diplomats and aid workers need to be out on the street talking with people, monitoring projects, taking the pulse of local communities, giving speeches, engaging with the press and civil society generally. Law enforcement officials need to be consulting closely with their police and interior ministry counterparts. There is no use in an embassy or consulate that incarcerates and warehouses our civilian presence abroad, which is what the euphemistically named “diplomatic security” part of the State Department likes to do.
We need to get smarter about how to protect our people, while recognizing that there are no risk-free formulas. Anonmity and changing daily patterns is a lot better protection for many diplomats than a personal security detail. Spreading our people out, and moving them around frequently, is a lot safer than concentrating them in one hardened place. Relying on properly trained and equipped local security forces is often better than using highly visible Americans, who become easy targets.
Our four colleagues in Benghazi were killed in a fortress-like facility guarded principally by Americans. They–or someone else–might suffer the same fate using the approach I am suggesting. We need to ensure that we don’t have more people abroad than we really need. We also need to make sure they are undertaking efforts that are worth the risk to life and limb that they necessarily entail.
Congress is likely to move in quite a different direction. It will provide more funding for higher and thicker walls, and more American protection, as it does from time to time. Then it cuts that funding after a few years of quiet, leaving the State Department with an enormous capital infrastructure but without the means to maintain it.
The pointy end of the diplomatic spear is a dangerous place. Let’s get smarter and more agile about wielding it.
PS: I stumbled on this after drafting the above. So I’m not alone in my devotion to the mission.
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Why riot?
You don’t have to be a foreign affairs expert to see that there are political reasons for the Innocence of Muslims-inspired protests around the Muslim world in what has been termed “the video incident.” America’s recent wars in predominantly Muslim countries have heightened tensions. U.S. support for Israel also contributes.
But this can’t be just about politics. The video offended Muslim sentiments. If these protests were really about politics, why were they not more widespread and why did they not take on a more explicitly political guise?
Americans find it difficult to understand the religious justification for these protests. Either they are reduced to cultural relativism (“things are different in the Muslim world”) 0r they wonder if Muslims are so weak in their faith that any offense to their prophet pushes them to mass violence. Neither produces interesting answers.
What Westerners fail to appreciate is the cultural milieu in which Islam originated and propagated. Islam emerged from a pre-existing oral tradition of poetry. The influence is apparent in the Holy Qur’an, which often reads like poetry:
Say, “I seek refuge in the Lord of mankind,
The Sovereign of mankind,
The God of mankind,
From the evil of the retreating whisperer –
Who whispers [evil] into the breasts of mankind –
From among the jinn [spirits] and mankind.” (Surat an-Nas 114)
Recitation of the Qur’an is art, and those with the Qur’an memorized are respected. In early Islam, that was the only way to experience the Qur’an. It is believed Muhammad was illiterate, so when he received the Qur’an from the Angel Gabriel he memorized it and taught it to his followers. The sunnah, or the large body that encompasses the words and actions of the Prophet and some of his close followers, was also initially memorized and passed along orally.
Memorization and oral transmission were the privileged modes of gaining and disseminating knowledge. How was it to be determined whose oral transmission was legitimate? What would be done if two people remembered something differently? In the case of the sunnah an incredibly complex system developed for evaluating the legitimacy of different ahadith (pieces of the sunnah, particular stories about things the Prophet said or did). Was it possible that a certain transmitter could have had contact with another in order to pass along a hadith? Did both transmitters live in the same era and were they known to have traveled in the same region?
The issue of legitimacy also brought into question each transmitter’s character. Ignoring other variables, one might trust what one transmitter said the Prophet did over another if the first had a reputation for honesty while the second was known to lie. The legitimacy of the information a transmitter passed along was intimately connected to the transmitter’s reputation: how honest he was, how often he prayed, whether his teachings were consistent. Character is vital to legitimacy in the Islamic tradition.
The connection between the legitimacy of the content and the character of the content’s originator or transmitter implies that criticism of the latter calls the former into question. If a transmitter is not of high moral standing, there are implications for whether the ahadith he transmitted are considered legitimate. Insulting the Prophet, the original transmitter, calls into question his message, or all of Islam.
In the Shi’i tradition a religious leader’s character is very important, especially in a Muslim’s choice of Ayatollah. Because of the occultation of the last imam, Ayatollahs are selected to demonstrate how a Muslim should live her life until the last imam returns. The importance of an Ayatollah modeling good character is captured in the title given to a well-respected Ayatollah, marja-e-taqlid, which translates as “source of emulation.”
This is strange from the Judeo-Christian perspective, which privileges text. Jews are exigent about error-free copying of the Torah. Western culture worries about plagiarism. Improperly expropriating text undermines an author’s credibility and may call into question everything she has written. We have little need to worry about an author’s character to decide whether a text is valid or not.
It is therefore not surprising that the Judeo-Christian tradition includes insulting, teasing, or at least recognizing the faults of religious leaders without it negatively reflecting on their mission. In the Jewish tradition, many of the prophets are far from moral perfection, but their character flaws do not affect the sanctity of their purpose. Most Christians had a good laugh at the late-night TV jokes about Jesus’ possible wife. The ancient Greeks often mocked the gods.
There is of course no justification for the killings associated with the recent demonstrations. But the importance of transmitters in preserving the Islamic tradition provides some insight into the anger a number of Muslims are feeling around the world, an anger that so many in the West cannot begin to understand.
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I agree with Dačić
If anyone still doubted Belgrade’s continuing determination to partition Kosovo, Prime Minister Dačić’s horrified reaction to mention of Kosovo’s territorial integrity in a European Union report on enlargement should remove all doubt. The EU made an almost banal remark:
Addressing the problems in northern Kosovo, while respecting the territorial integrity of Kosovo and the particular needs of the local population, will be an essential element of this process.
Dačić responded:
I am fairly upset with this statement, since it could close the Belgrade-Priština dialogue, instead of helping (re)start it. Perhaps it would have been more honest to ask Serbia to recognize Kosovo than to recognize (its) state integrity.
He’s right: the EU is insisting on Serbian acknowledgement of Kosovo’s territorial integrity, which is a step towards recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign state. Dačić and President Nikolić have been trying to duck this issue for months. They have been hoping against hope that the EU will not state bluntly what Belgrade has been told repeatedly by Germany, Sweden, the UK and other EU members: the boundary between Kosovo and Serbia will not be moved to accommodate ethnic differences. Serbia will have to recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity before it can hope to enter the EU. Belgrade has taken what comfort it could from the notion that the EU itself has never before said it.
Now the EU has. That should not be surprising: UN Security Council resolution 1244, which ended the NATO/Yugoslavia war, is absolutely clear in referring to Kosovo as a single, undivided entity from which all Yugoslav (now Serbian) security forces were to be removed. That never happened, hence the current struggle over north Kosovo, where Serbia still rules in clear violation of the UN Security Council resolution to which Belgrade constantly appeals in its claim to sovereignty over (you guessed it) all of undivided Kosovo.
For those who will object that borders have been changed in other parts of the Balkans, let me preempt: the status of the republic borders of former Yugoslavia (and of the federal unit known as Kosovo) has been changed from internal boundary to international border, but the lines have not been moved to accommodate ethnic differences.
For others who may think Cyprus represents a model the EU might want to follow (allowing Serbian accession with a territorial dispute unresolved), forget about it. No one in the EU wants to repeat that mistake.
I agree with Dačić. There is really no point in reopening the dialogue with Pristina, much less at a political level, unless Serbia is prepared to commit itself to cooperating on the reintegration of the north with the rest of Kosovo. This is the sine qua non of the talks. Without it, the EU should be prepared to wait to give Serbia a date for opening negotiations on accession. Anything softer than that risks destabilizing Macedonia, Bosnia and, by the way, Cyprus.
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Is there a political solution in Afghanistan?
Allison Stuewe writes:
The members of yesterday’s panel hosted by the Middle East Institute believed that a political solution is desirable but concluded nevertheless that the question of whether or not one is possible is harder to answer than it seems. The panel was more inclined to raise additional questions than provide definitive answers.
Marvin Weinbaum of the Middle East Institute, the event’s moderator, introduced some of the questions: Is a political solution possible? Are there incentives that would facilitate an agreement among all interests involved in the Afghan conflict? What will the U.S. or other participants in the peace process have to sacrifice to reach a negotiated solution? Has the opportunity for productive U.S. involvement in conflict resolution passed? Or should we still be pushing for a political solution? Are we failing to see the possibilities? Will U.S. government efforts to find a political solution be viewed in the region as a gesture of desperation for an easy exit?
Ambassador Omar Samad, previously Afghanistan’s ambassador to France and Canada and currently a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, structured his presentation around two questions that must be addressed in the peace process. First, he asked, what is the Afghan conflict? Is it an insurgency, civil war, or proxy-driven conflict? Is it about resources, ethnicity, geopolitical rivalries, anti-terrorism, or historical narratives? From the Afghan perspective, which looks at the conflict with history in mind, it is all of these.
In the 1960s, the country was stable, with a constitutional and democratic order. The communist coup and subsequent Soviet invasion ended three generations of peace and destroyed the government, infrastructure and human capital while killing over a million Afghans. The U.S.-backed resistance was successful in defeating the Soviets, but when the Soviets left and the United States lost interest, a void remained. Radical Islam thrived. As it became clear an agreement would not be reached between the powers that emerged after the Soviet defeat, the interests of external players became more pronounced. Pakistan and Iran had their own political agendas and used Islamic extremism to achieve their own ends.
9/11 was a game changer. The tragedy showed the world that there are consequences to ignoring conflict in Afghanistan. Previous mistakes should not be repeated in the current attempt at conflict resolution. The Bonn Agreement creating what Arif Rafiq, scholar at the Middle East Institute, views as a consociational government pointed in the right direction. There are divisions between Afghans based on ethnicity, language, and religion, but these divisions are shallow and reflect only part of Afghanistan’s history. Ambassador Samad believes there is an Afghan national identity, history and sense of belonging to the same state. It is unlikely that Afghanistan will collapse. What it needs is an inclusive political system.
Ambassador Samad’s second question was about the meaning of a “political solution.” Does this mean an intra-Afghan, regional, or international solution? From the Afghan perspective, all three are critical to ensuring future stability. A peace plan must be Afghan-inspired and include input from regional interests, but these imperatives will be hard to accomplish without international support. There will be a transition in 2014 when President Karzai concludes his term and much of the United States and NATO presence is withdrawn. We have between now and the end of 2014 to address security issues, ensure citizens will be able to vote, plan for legitimate elections, and invite the Taliban to participate in politics as equal citizens of the Afghan state.
Shamila Chaudhary of the New American Foundation (but previously at the National Security Council) contributed a former policymaker’s perspective.
American politics have hindered the search for a political solution. At the beginning of the war, the U.S. treated the Taliban and al-Qaeda as essentially the same terrorist organization and refused to negotiate on principle. We know now that there were divisions in the Taliban even over the 9/11 attack and that the U.S. government ignored some of what might have been indications that Taliban members were willing to talk. The military’s “fight, talk, build” strategy has made negotiation difficult. Congress is angry that it has not been consulted more. Despite Administration efforts, many members are unwilling to acquiesce to two Taliban requests: the transfer of Guantanamo detainees associated with the Taliban and the recognition of a Taliban office outside of Afghanistan. The rise in “green-on-blue” attacks, the Taliban attack on Camp Bastion in September and last year’s attack on the Embassy Kabul have made negotiation with the Taliban harder for the Americans, who won’t be able to engage seriously until after the U.S. election.
The second obstacle Chaudhary identified was Pakistan. Pakistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Hina Rabbani Khar spoke in Washington last month, clarifying Pakistani goals: an Afghan-led political solution that is satisfactory to Islamabad, no further destabilization in the border areas and the return of Afghan refugees still residing in Pakistan. Pakistan is in a bind because it does not have sufficient Afghan partners to guarantee these interests. Pakistan wants to curb pro-Indian sentiment and block moves towards an independent Pashtunistan in the border areas. Islamabad relies heavily on the Haqqani network, a group associated with the Afghan Taliban that could turn on Pakistan at any time. A productive agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan would include acceptance of the Durand line, limits on India’s security presence in Afghanistan and assurances that the border areas will not become an anti-Pakistan, pro-Indian hotspot.
Arif Rafiq thought a political solution possible but was pessimistic about the likelihood of one happening. He listed many reasons for his doubts: the Bonn framework is slowly unraveling. President Karzai, once respected as a leader from a prominent family, is now a divisive figure. Though he has said he will step down as planned, it appears he is working to consolidate his power and choose a successor who will allow him to continue to influence politics. He faces real challenges: Mullah Muhammad Omar’s Afghan Taliban does not want Karzai to be a part of peace talks and the opposition National Front not only opposes President Karzai but also envisions a constitutional overhaul to establish a federalized parliamentary democracy.
The surge is over and it did not accomplish what it set out to do. The Afghan army is not ready to take over primary security responsibility for the whole country. If anything, the surge emboldened militia groups and resulted in a huge influx of weapons. The insurgency is alive even if fragmented (there are divisions between Mullah Omar’s Taliban and Gulbiddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami). The Taliban did not participate in the Bonn talks of December 2011. “Exploratory” talks among the Taliban, President Karzai and the U.S. have been on hold since March. There is no indication that Mullah Omar’s Taliban intends to participate in elections. The NATO-led coalition of the willing is fraying.
Rafiq did note some reasons for optimism. The U.S. helped build a functioning, if not fully effective, Afghan parliament . Pakistan needs the U.S. presence in Afghanistan to limits cross-border risks. It might be possible to exploit splits in the Taliban, some of whom are looking for the international legitimacy they lacked when they ruled most of Afghanistan. Most Afghans reject the emirate that the Taliban advocate.
The panel agreed time is running out. Political transition in Washington, Islamabad and Kabul is eating into the time available. Despite the Taliban’s motivations and goals, all participants noted that any political solution has to be open to all citizens. A political solution requires an Afghan state that balances the center and periphery and meets the bottom line goals of the neighbors and the major international powers. It is not going to be easy to solve this equation.
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Who cares about Vojvodina?
Branislav Despotovic, a native of Vojvodina, writes about Serbia’s northern province:
Nationalists are now firmly in charge in Belgrade. Tomislav Nikolic is president. He is a long-time associate Vojislav Seselj, on trial at the Hague Tribunal for the crimes against humanity. Ivica Dacic, once spokesman of Slobodan Milosevic’s party, has become prime minister. There is a lot of discussion these days in Serbia and beyond about the attitude of the new Serbian leaders towards European Union, towards Serbia’s neighbors, and especially towards Kosovo, which official Belgrade still regards as the southern Serbian province.
Most people forget that Serbia has another, northern province, Vojvodina, which has its own unresolved issues with Belgrade. The inhabitants of Vojvodina don’t want to separate from Serbia, but they also don’t want to tolerate the humiliation and deprivation that began more than 20 years ago.
Vojvodina was one of the most developed parts of Yugoslavia until 1988 when Milosevic, with help from Nikolic and Seselj’s nationalists, abolished the province’s autonomy and put it under direct rule of the Serbian government. Prior to 1988, on average one new factory was built each year, hundreds of miles of roads and rail tracks were constructed, bridges and hospitals opened. Around 90% of the money earned in Vojvodina stayed in Vojvodina, unemployment barely existed, and public safety was at the highest level in Europe.
Today, more than two decades later, the Serbian government controls every aspect of life in Vojvodina, even though the region has its own legally elected institutions. The province is underdeveloped for the first time in its recent history, villages are dying and young people are moving abroad. Crime and unemployment have increased. Vojvodina has regained some of the authority it once had, but only on paper. It didn’t get back the right to manage its own finances.
According to the 2006 Serbian Constitution, Vojvodina should get 7% from the Republic budget each year, but that has never happened. In reality, Vojvodina has been contributing 35%-40% of national budget annually, while receiving less than its constitutional 7%. Over the last 6 years, Vojvodina has been shorted 600 million euros. This is a significant amount of money in a country where the most successful company, Oil Company of Serbia, was sold to the Russians for 400 million euros. The government of Vojvodina has appealed to the constitutional court for protection.
Even the Democratic party, which governed Serbia after the fall of Milosevic, wasn’t in a hurry to give Vojvodina back the rights Milosevic took away in 1988. But it was partially done in 2008. Then, on the same day that the new nationalist government was formed this summer, the Serbian constitutional court decided that 22 sections of the law returning rights to Vojvodina are unconstitutional, effectively prohibiting the province from having its own capital in Novi Sad, establishing a provincial agricultural policy, operating an office in Brussels or financing the work of Academy of Sciences and Arts of Vojvodina.
In a 2011 poll, nearly half of the citizens of Novi Sad said the current status of Vojvodina within Serbia was not satisfactory. Five per cent thought that Vojvodina should be independent. With nationalists now in power in Belgrade and democrats in Novi Sad, the situation can be expected to deteriorate. The nationalists will want Vojvodina to have as little authority as possible and remain dependent on Belgrade. The citizens of Vojvodina will be looking for their rights.
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