Balkans progress, at risk of slowing

My blogging hiatus since Wednesday morning was not planned.  But I flew Wednesday overnight to Pristina, where I found myself Thursday afternoon and Friday in a conference where the internet connection did not work.  This turned out to be fortunate, as unbeknownst to me the conference was mostly off the record.  My intended live blogging would have violated the rules.  But I’ll try here to convey some of the gist of the public opening as well as the session on “a post-American Europe?,” respecting Chatham House rules.

The Foreign Ministry/European Council on Foreign Relations event aimed to showcase Kosovo’s success and demonstrate that its experience and interests extend well beyond its narrow borders.  My notes on the President’s and Foreign Minister’s presentations–which were on the record–disappeared into the ether,  but they were at pains to underline that Kosovo has completed its period of supervised independence, welcomed the recent visit of Secretary of State Clinton and European Union High Representative Ashton and is now engaged seriously in a political-level dialogue with Belgrade, which was renewed earlier in the week in a meeting between the Serbian and Kosovo prime ministers.

The Europeans and Americans present welcomed these developments, naturally.  No one dissented from the view that Europe and America need to act together in the Balkans.  The hypotheses of a post-American Europe and a post-European America were both roundly denounced.  The EU, because it is not united on issues like recognition of Kosovo and the Macedonia “name” question, cannot handle the Balkans alone.  The U.S. should not expect to be able to turn its attention entirely to Asia. It has an indispensable role in southeast Europe.

The common American and European objective is EU membership for all the Balkan states, and NATO membership for those who want it.  This will require not just dialogue but “normalization” of good neighborly relations between Pristina and Belgrade.  The Ashton/Clinton visit was a symbol of joint understanding and common objectives: integration of the Balkans into the Euro-Atlantic community, support for the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, no change of borders in the Balkans.  There is even reason to hope that the five non-recognizers of Kosovo are rethinking and might change their minds.

Europe is going through a difficult economic patch, but longer-term optimism is justified.  Neither the euro nor EU is going away.  U.S./European trade and investment is gigantic (55% of U.S. foreign investment is in Europe).  The security relationship is vital.  The U.S. is far from forgetting about the Balkans, because it needs them integrated into a stronger Europe that can partner with Washington in other parts of the world.

The 2014 NATO Summit will include enlargement, with Macedonia (if it can get past its problems with Greece) and Montenegro the prime candidates.  Others will join later.  Only Serbia has doubts, but Belgrade may well come on board once it sees all its neighbors in the Alliance.  A Serbian alliance with Russia is not a serious alternative.  The future of the Balkans lies in what it can contribute to resolving global issues, which can best be done through the EU and NATO.

The Macedonia “name” issue, on which Athens and Skopje have recently exchanged notes, will be resolved, but it is not clear when.  Giving Macedonia a date at the EU Summit in December for opening negotiations for EU membership would help.  All Macedonian politicians acknowledge that the issue has to be fully resolved before Skopje’s entry into the EU.  The states in the Balkans need to take more responsibility for solving their own problems.   Otherwise they risk facing not only enlargement fatigue but also Balkans fatigue.

Some would like to see the EU open accession negotiations with all the remaining Balkans non-members of the EU in 1914, marking the 100^th anniversary of World War I.  Others rejected this idea, underlining that the accession process is merit-based and clear criteria have to be met.  The EU is now front-loading rule of law and governance issues (including corruption and organized crime), to avoid the problems it faced after accession of Bulgaria and Romania.

The tedious merit-based EU process  creates a credibility gap:  people in the Balkans are finding the prospect of membership too distant to create meaningful incentives for reform.  The EU needs to find ways of providing intermediate incentives, as well as ways of keeping the U.S. engaged.  Otherwise, the Balkans may slide back into their usual pathologies:  ethnic nationalism, state control of the economy, organized crime and political stagnation.