Jus post bellum?

Just war tradition includes questions of jus ad bellum, reasons for going to war, and jus in bello, rules of war, but what about jus post bellum?  This question motivated Eric Patterson to write Ending Wars Well:  Order, Justice, and Conciliation.  Patterson summarized the argument of his book at last week’s event at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs.  He wrote the book to provide all parties involved in post-war reconstruction with a basic framework:  order, justice and conciliation.  It is meant to transcend the divisions between just war and peace theories, political science and philosophy/ethics, and theory and practice.

For Patterson, war is not linear but cyclical.  Post-war peace and state-building efforts are part of this cycle.  He cited conflict in Rwanda as an example.  The genocide sparked in 1994 by the assassination of the president came in the aftermath of the civil war initiated by the invasion of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a group of Tutsi rebels, in 1990.  Countries should think of the whole cycle of the war before they get involved and while they are fighting.

How is the war cycle broken?  Patterson suggested a focus on establishing order by privileging security and the functioning of basic government institutions.  Order is the foundation of work to “end wars well.”

Patterson acknowledged that many think order is not enough, but it is better than what many face.  In some conflicts, maybe 20-30%, justice is also possible.  He defines justice as “incurring what one deserves.”  This is a narrow definition, which is ideal because one must be modest in demands for justice, and it implies that justice must be targeted.  In 1991 Iraq, America sought justice through sanctions, an effort that punished the citizens without targeting the political leaders at fault.  In 2003 Iraq, the people punished their former leader with targeted justice in a trial that was legal by the laws of their own country.

In rare cases, about 10%, conciliation is also achievable.  Conciliation means that enemies put aside their animosity and imagine a shared future, if not a warm one.  This is rare because it only happens when it is in the interest of all parties.  For this reason, Patterson believes conciliation is not possible with the Taliban.  It is not in their interest to work for a shared future with other Afghans.  The peace deal between Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Egyptian President Sadat in 1979 exemplifies conciliation because of a shared interest in peace.

After Patterson presented, John Gallagher, assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, raised an important question:  what if order is not possible?  Patterson acknowledged that a shared interest is essential for conciliation, but the same might be true for order.  When violence is based on a narrative that equates fighting with a struggle for moral superiority, achieving order (ending killing, establishing a single legitimate authority, strengthening basic government institutions) may not be achievable.  A new narrative is required, but how do you get to the point that those involved in the violence are exhausted enough to change to a narrative of peace?

Patterson responded with what he called “raw pragmatism”:  there must be a decisive victory.  An audience member pressed Patterson on this point in the question and answer period.  If the victors successfully “crush” their opponents, might that push both parties past the point where conciliation is possible and, in the case of warfare that is not force on force, only strengthen the narrative of a losing side, enabling it to recruit new adherents to the cause?  Patterson cited David Kilcullen’s The Accidental Guerrilla:  only a few fighters are adherents to a vision or narrative. Most fighters are involved in the conflict for other reasons and will respond reasonably when it is in their interest to make peace.

Patterson’s book is another call for a clear, simple, and cohesive strategy for all, but the debate suggests it may not fulfill its promise.