The Gaza war in regional context

While the news media is mainly focused on the exchanges of rocket and air attacks between Israel and Gaza, my guess is that the broader regional picture will be decisive in determining the course and outcome of this latest outbreak of war in the Middle East.  Here is a rundown of that broader picture:

1.  Egypt:  Cairo is trying to broker a ceasefire, with rhetorical support from the Arab League, but the Egyptian Prime Minister’s visit to Gaza Friday made it clear that the Muslim Brotherhood-led government will be more sympathetic to Hamas than Hosni Mubarak.  Still, Egypt is in a tight spot:  continuation of the war will attract militants to Gaza and the Sinai as well as send an already weak Egyptian economy into a tailspin.  While Hamas has roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, a democratic regime in Egypt has to worry that Egypt’s citizens, sympathetic as they are to the plight of the Palestinians, will not want to sacrifice too much on their behalf.  A ceasefire could restore Egypt’s role as a key regional player.

2.  Syria:  There has already been an exchange of artillery fire between the Syrian regime and Israel, something that hasn’t happened in a long time.  Bashar al Asad may well look to military action on the Golan front in an effort to rally his remaining support and try to divert attention from his war against the Syrian revolution, now more than a year and a half old.  The Syrian army won’t have a lot of spare capacity to challenge Israel, but it won’t want to be left out of the fight if the war continues.

3.  Jordan:  The protest movement against the rule of King Abdullah has intensified.  The monarchy will not want to divert security forces to a fight against Israel, with which it maintains good if not warm relations.  If the protests are successful, the king will be weakened further.  A more constitutional monarchy might well be less friendly to Israel, but still unwilling to risk conflict.

4.  Hizbollah:  On the Lebanese front, Hizbollah is the main military force.  It is already heavily engaged fighting against the revolution in Syria, but it could presumably make Israel’s situation more difficult by joining in the rocket barrage.  Its record fighting Israeli ground forces is significantly better than Hamas’, so the Israelis would hesitate to engage on both fronts.  But Hizbollah will be reluctant to aid Hamas, which has fallen out with the Syrian regime Hizbollah is supporting.

5.  Gulf Cooperation Council:  The Saudis and the other GCC states have not generally engaged directly against Israel, but the visit last week of the Emir of Qatar to Gaza (and his promise of financing) suggest that they may play a behind the scenes role bankrolling Hamas and others willing to challenge Israel.  This could significantly attenuate the quiet but growing accommodation between Israel and the Sunni Arab world.

6.  Turkey:  Turkey and Israel seemed headed for rapprochement that would cure the 2010 rift over the Israeli attack on a Turkish aid flotilla headed for Gaza.  This now seems much less likely.  Turkey’s Islamist government will have to give at least verbal support to Hamas and hesitate to appear to paper over its differences with Tel Aviv.

7.  Iran:  Many of the larger rockets in Hamas’ arsenal come from Iran, which must be enjoying watching the Israelis engage in Gaza rather than carrying out the threat to destroy Tehran’s nuclear facilities.  Iran will no doubt provide Hamas, Hizbollah and Syria as much assistance as it can spare in its sanctions-weakened state, hoping to keep the Israelis preoccupied.

8.  The wider Arab world:  Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Yemen and Sudan all have their own problems that preclude more than rhetorical engagement in the Palestinian cause.  Marc Lynch notes that mobilization in the Arab world so far is limited but could well intensify.  The Arab street, which presumably has a louder voice today than before the Arab awakening, is certainly sympathetic to the Palestinians.   And it is far more likely to support Hamas’ more aggressive military approach to Israel than the Palestine Liberation Organization’s diplomatic push for membership for membership in the United Nations.

Bottom line:  Egypt likely has the decisive role in determining whether this war remains, like the one in 2008/9, a bilateral affair or turns into a wider conflict with more permanent consequences.  But Iran, Hizbollah, and Turkey are also important players.  If Israeli ground action lines up all the regional forces in favor of Hamas, the unintended consequences could be dramatic.