Normalization

Two recent meetings between prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo have opened a political-level dialogue aimed at “normalization.”  What does that mean?

We know it does not mean what is really needed:  mutual recognition and exchange of ambassadors.  That is the “normal” relationship between sovereign states.  Virtually all the problems between Kosovo and Serbia would be easier to solve if they accepted each other as such.  But neither Belgrade nor Pristina would recognize the other tomorrow, Belgrade because it objects to what it terms Kosovo’s “unilaterally declared” (but in fact thoroughly coordinated) independence and Kosovo because Belgrade has designs on its territory, in particular the Serb-controlled north.

Diplomats deal with issues like this by starting a process, in this case a sui generis one called “normalization.”  But it is not obvious what that really means.  Where does it begin?  What stages does it proceed through?  How does it end? Here is my personal idea of what normalization might entail:

1.  Belgrade and Pristina should resolve left-over issues from the war they fought in the late 1990s.  Foremost among these is missing people.  Neither side has given a full account of what it knows about people who were killed during and after the war.  The latest figure I’ve seen is 1775 people unaccounted for.  This is far too many 13 years later.

But there are other issues as well, including the difficult question of pensions Belgrade cut off in 1999, when the United Nations took over administration of Kosovo.  The European Court of Human Rights has now ordered Serbia to pay these pensions, with interest.  The total owed could be substantial.  There are other property issues as well:  state property and privately owned property for which owners have not received proper compensation.

2.  Pristina and Belgrade should implement the agreements they have already reached.  The most important of these is supposed to be implemented next month, with the start of “integrated border management” procedures on the boundary/border between Kosovo and Serbia, in accordance with EU standards.  This is an important step, both because it will cut down on smuggling and because it will require serious cooperation between Kosovar and Serbian officials.  Also largely unimplemented is the agreement for Belgrade to provide Pristina with copies of property (cadastral) records, taken from Kosovo at the end of the war to reinforce Belgrade’s claim to be the sovereign power even though its officials are no longer present on most of its territory.

If further agreements are reached on electricity and telecommunications, as is rumored, they should be implemented without the lengthy delays that characterized the earlier agreements.  Normal relations means quick and cooperative implementation.

3.  With the prime ministers meeting, it is time for others to meet as well.  The political-level dialogue reached an agreement in principle to extend the Albania/Kosovo highway completed this year to its intended terminus near Nis.  This won’t happen without Transport Ministers, Environment Ministers and Interior Ministers concerting their efforts to make it a reality.  The road has tremendous potential to increase commerce and provide Serbia with an additional and possibly preferable outlet to the sea (the road to Thessaloniki is longer and lower quality).

With European integration the common goal of the two countries, there is every reason for the people responsible for preparing for EU accession to meet and compare notes.  And there is good reason for ordinary citizens to meet and discuss mutual interests:  commerce, professional cooperation, anti-corruption efforts, health and environmental standards–there is no lack of grist for the mill.  The best way to ensure this kind of dialogue would be liaison offices in each others’ capitals.  I am hearing that the plan is liaison offices in Brussels.  That would at best be a step in the right direction, but insufficient to ensure the kind of continuous communication needed.

4.  Belgrade should end its diplomatic campaign against Kosovo.  Serbia has conducted a concerted campaign to prevent Kosovo from entering international organizations and block other states from recognizing it.  This is unseemly at best, self-defeating at worst.  More or less half the UN General Assembly now recognizes Kosovo.  More will gradually do so.  The five non-recognizers in the European Union are beginning to understand that non-recognition encourages partition proposals that are anathema to them.  Some are accepting Kosovo passports and developing strong bilateral relations with Pristina.  Serbia lost its battle Friday to prevent Kosovo entry into the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  Does it really want to lose many more battles, or would it be preferable to accept the inevitable?

Still, the Serbian campaign, which Belgrade has conducted with unwarranted intelligence and vigor, has prevented Kosovo from participating in the Olympics (one of its athletes also had an Albanian passport and joined its team), the Fédération Internationale de Football Association and the Eurovision Song Contest.  This is inat, which is best defined by a joke all Balkans ethnicities tell about others.  A farmer, offered three wishes by a genie, says his first is that his neighbor’s cow should die.  “What good will that do you,” the genie asks?  None, the farmer says, but it will make my neighbor really unhappy.  Kosovo’s participation in international fora of all sorts should be an important part of normalization.  It cannot be constructed on a foundation of inat, which has a way of becoming mutual.

5.  Northern Kosovo needs to be reintegrated with the rest.  At the end of the NATO/Yugoslavia war of 1999, Serbian security forces were supposed to be removed from all of Kosovo.  They remained in the territory north of the Ibar river, where the population is majority Serb.  It is difficult to say who really controls that territory now:  certainly not Pristina or the internationals, but even the Serbian police and secret services are not in full control of an area that is tainted with smuggling and organized crime (with the police and secret services implicated but not necessarily in full control).

Belgrade and Pristina will need to cooperate intensively on reintegrating this territory back into Kosovo, with a large measure of self-governance provided by the internationally sanctioned Ahtisaari plan.  This will involve some movement of former non-Serb residents of the north back to their homes.  Some Serbs will be unlikely to want to stay in the north, even under the Ahtisaari plan provisions.  Where they go and how they are accommodated are important issues on which Belgrade’s cooperation will be vital.  Whatever happens with the north will be taken as a precedent for Serbs south of the Ibar and for Albanians in the Presevo area of southern Serbia.  It will take wisdom and care to ensure that the reintegration conditions do not destabilize these areas.

6.  Defense ministers and chiefs of staff should meet to consider how they can maintain the kind of transparency and mutual confidence that will ensure peace and stability.  NATO-led (KFOR) forces have protected Kosovo since the 1999 war.  It is unlikely they will still stick around in another five years.  Both the U.S. and Europe want to move their troops to higher priorities.  Kosovo will begin to arm its still largely unarmed “security forces” beginning in July.

Neither Kosovo nor Serbia should want to get into an arms race, which would be costly to their budgets and destabilizing to the neighborhood.  But no democratically elected politician can hope to stay in office if he or she is unable to defend the population and territorial integrity of the state. If an arms race is to be avoided, Belgrade and Pristina have to give each other mutual assurances.  The EU has asked that Serbia accept Kosovo’s territorial integrity.  If Belgrade fails to do that, Pristina will have to find ways to protect itself from the threat of a Serbian armored incursion.  NATO may also need to provide guarantees.

Bottom line:  This is already a big agenda, and I’m sure I’ve missed some things.  It would all be far easier if recognition and exchange of ambassadors came first.  I trust that will become apparent as Pristina and Belgrade make their way through it.  But if they prefer to do it ass backwards, “normalizing” a relationship between two capitals that do not accept each others’ sovereign authority, so be it.  There is a lot of hard work ahead.