Day: November 28, 2012
Negotiating the Arab spring
The Arab Spring is most often regarded through a conflict lens: among contestants for power, between Old and New orders, between differing visions of the state. But it can also be viewed through a negotiation lens: even when there is sustained civil war (as in Syria and Libya), the many interactions between and within contending forces amount to negotiation. Although it is premature to talk of Arab Spring outcomes, the process so far reveals distinct patterns useful for policymakers, as the appropriate reaction to each of these patterns is different.
I’ll be moderating a discussion of policy options for negotiating the Arab spring 4:30 pm December 4. Bill Zartman, Fen Hampson and colleagues from Clingendael will be presenting the conclusions from recent research efforts. Here’s the program:
The SAIS Conflict Management Program
in conjunction with the
Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Processes of International Negotiations (PIN) Program
and the
Institute for the Empirical Study of Governance
invite you to
Negotiating the Arab Spring – Policy Options
Fen Osler Hampson
Distinguished Fellow and Director of Global Security Centre for International Governance Innovation
I William Zartman
Professor Emeritus, Conflict Management Program Paul H Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
Ellen Laipson President, Stimson Center
Regina Joseph
Discussant
Instituut Clingendael/ The Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Floor Janssen
Discussant
Instituut Clingendael/ The Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Daniel Serwer
Moderator
Professor, Conflict Management ProgramPaul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
Tuesday, December 4
4:30pm
Rome Auditorium
1619 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
RSVP: itlong@jhu.edu
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“Nobody has any idea what to do about it”
I’ve never met Laura Seay, except briefly in cyberspace. All I know is that she is @texasinafrica, a Morehouse professor and smart. Her 2009 analysis of the breakdown of governance in “what to do in the congo” holds up well today, but her proposed solutions aren’t happening: the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) aren’t getting any better and the UN force (now called MONUSCO) isn’t able to handle the situation the way she suggests. When I queried her about the need for an update, she answered: “Nobody has any idea what to do about it.” We should all be so clear and concise.
Washington is nevertheless sending its “top Africa diplomat.” That’s Assistant Secretary of State Johnny Carson, a veteran of great virtues. But his means are very limited. To show disapproval of support for the M23 rebels who have taken the provincial capital Goma in Eastern Congo, the United States has suspended $200,000 in military assistance to Rwanda, which has repeatedly supported rebellions across its western border. That’s pocket change even in Kigali, probably intended to support military education for Rwandan officers in the United States. Cutting it off isn’t likely to have much impact.
Meanwhile M23 is wreaking havoc on a mineral-rich area that has already seen several decades of conflict. some of Laura Seay’s suggestions from 2009 are still apropos:
- …the root causes of the conflict – land disputes and citizenship rights – need to be sorted out. This means getting the courts functioning and creating an enforcement mechanism for implementing court decisions about land claims. It also means guaranteeing the citizenship rights of Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese, which should involve a massive public education campaign. This won’t solve all of the problems, but it would be a start.
- In the provision of public goods other than security, the international community needs to work with local organizations who are already providing efficient, quality services rather than pretending that government institutions are the best entities with which to cooperate. Most government health and education institutions are already being run by third parties (in particular, churches and mosques). International donors should work with these communities to implement positive, locally conceived solutions to seemingly intractable problems.
- Local solutions, proposed by community leaders and the victims of violence, should be privileged in conversations about what needs to be done on almost every issue. Goodness knows the army of international experts (myself included) who pontificate on the DRC have proven that we don’t know how to solve the country’s problems. Let’s give people who might a chance, and let’s take their suggestions seriously for once.
This all makes eminently good sense to me, but none of it is likely happen unless some semblance of stability emerges. I purposely did not say “is reimposed,” as none of the forces in Eastern Congo seem strong enough to definitively dominate the others. The best one can hope for is a balance of forces that is relatively nonviolent and allows the local population to fend for itself.
This will disappoint another of my Twitter acquaintances, Doudou Kalala (@kalala), a Congolese citizen and MA in Human Security and Peacebuilding from Royal Road University, Victoria BC. He is currently volunteering with Cuso International in Jamaica. He argues that DRC is a classic intractable conflict that requires a major, multi-facted, long-term international intervention. In his words:
The point I am trying to make is that, the solution to the conflict in the Congo is a long process that should start now and lead to building administrative infrastructure, accountability, justice, social and intellectual capital, army, police through EDUCATION and research…
The trouble is I don’t see any prospect of that any time soon. Even a balance of forces that allows the local population to fend for itself may be too much to hope for. So let’s wish Johnny Carson good luck. He is going to need it.
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From Zion’s den
Bombing does not cow an enemy population either. The obvious exception is the use of atomic weapons against Japan to end World War II in the Pacific. But in a non-nuclear situation, dissatisfaction often rises after the dust settles on the ruins. Once the euphoria of perceived victory wears off and the impact of the destruction on daily life becomes clear, Hamas’s current popularity bump may well fade.
Other apparent exceptions prove the rule: land invasion, not bombing, is what turns the tide of war. In Bosnia, the NATO bombing brought an end to the war, but only because the Bosniak and Croat forces on the ground were taking territory rapidly from previously impregnable Serb forces. The Serb population inside Bosnia rallied to the cause even as those forces were retreating rapidly. Likewise in Kosovo, the Serbian population (and prominent opposition politicians) supported Slobodan Milošević during the bombing.Belgrade yielded only after the Americans made it clear a ground assault was imminent. Weeks of bombingbefore the Gulf War in 1991 produced no visible popular dissatisfaction with Saddam Hussein. The American air war against the Taliban in Afghanistan succeeded only because of on-the-ground efforts of the Northern Alliance. Hamas, and Gaza’s population, have good reason to be happy that a land invasion was averted.
Dissatisfaction with the powers that be is more likely after bombing, not during it. With even a few weeks to see the damage done—when the pace of reconstruction inevitably disappoints—people begin to feel the pain. By the summer of 1999, just a few weeks after the Kosovo war had ended, Milošević was facing serious unrest in the Serbian heartland of Šumadija. Isolated politically and diplomatically, he suffered electoral defeat in the fall of 2000.
There is no guarantee that something like this will happen in Gaza, where the bombing has strengthened Hamas’s claim to leading the “resistance,” drawn it a higher international profile and given it an excuse to crackdown on even small signs of opposition. Hamas faces nothing like the mostly unified opposition that brought down Milošević in the aftermath of the NATO bombing. But I’ll be surprised if Gazans are feeling as good about this war or about Hamas a month or two from now as they do today.
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