Negotiating the Arab spring
The Arab Spring is most often regarded through a conflict lens: among contestants for power, between Old and New orders, between differing visions of the state. But it can also be viewed through a negotiation lens: even when there is sustained civil war (as in Syria and Libya), the many interactions between and within contending forces amount to negotiation. Although it is premature to talk of Arab Spring outcomes, the process so far reveals distinct patterns useful for policymakers, as the appropriate reaction to each of these patterns is different.
I’ll be moderating a discussion of policy options for negotiating the Arab spring 4:30 pm December 4. Bill Zartman, Fen Hampson and colleagues from Clingendael will be presenting the conclusions from recent research efforts. Here’s the program:
The SAIS Conflict Management Program
in conjunction with the
Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Processes of International Negotiations (PIN) Program
and the
Institute for the Empirical Study of Governance
invite you to
Negotiating the Arab Spring – Policy Options
Fen Osler Hampson
Distinguished Fellow and Director of Global Security Centre for International Governance Innovation
I William Zartman
Professor Emeritus, Conflict Management Program Paul H Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
Ellen Laipson President, Stimson Center
Regina Joseph
Discussant
Instituut Clingendael/ The Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Floor Janssen
Discussant
Instituut Clingendael/ The Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Daniel Serwer
Moderator
Professor, Conflict Management ProgramPaul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
Tuesday, December 4
4:30pm
Rome Auditorium
1619 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
RSVP: itlong@jhu.edu
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I consider it a scandal that there are no negotiations in the Arab Spring:
– Obama was so eager for regime change in Libya that he blocked any talks with Gaddafi. The result: an unnecessary bloody civil war that killed 30,000.
– in Syria we see the same thing happening. The US consistently tried to isolate opposition leaders in Damascus who wanted to talk with Assad. Ambassador Ford went so far that he went to Hama to make some extremist in order to obstruct talks between Assad and the opposition that were planned a few days later. Annan was blatantly partial: asking for Assad’s departure and sanctions against Syria. The man seemed to have forgotten that a mediator is supposed to be neutral.
Brahimi is only little better. You cannot have an armistice as long as you don’t have talks between the parties where they can sort out the inevitable violations. But Brahimi is from the Ahtisaari-Annan school of “mediation” where there is no place for real talks between the parties and instead the mediator imposes a plan that must be accepted by the parties – if necessary under heavy Western diplomatic pressure.