Month: November 2012
Easier said than done
Hillary Clinton is on her way from Cambodia to Jerusalem. This is precisely the opposite direction from the one President Obama intends for American foreign policy: his announced intention is to pivot American attention from the Middle East to Asia. His visit to Asia just a few days after re-election was meant to underline that message.
The current Middle East crisis is over Gaza, where rocket launches against Israeli targets have precipitated a ferocious response, so far mainly from the air (though there have also been sea and land artillery barrages). Israel has mobilized ground forces, which appear ready for a land incursion into Gaza. Hamas, which governs Gaza (but does not necessarily launch all the rockets), has attracted support from Turkey, Qatar and Egypt, which is seeking to mediate a ceasefire.
This is a pretty clear cut case of the urgent taking priority over the important. Even in the Middle East, there are things going on that are more important to vital U.S. interests than the highly regrettable Hamas/Israel conflagration. The civil war in Syria above all requires more attention than it has gotten, even if Obama’s hesitancy to get more deeply involved is understandable when you look at the array of unappealing options available. Iran’s nuclear program continues to produce 20% enriched uranium. If diplomacy does not produce an end to its nuclear weapons ambitions in the next few months, military action by both the U.S. and Israel becomes likely. The fight against al Qaeda in Yemen isn’t working well–the drone war seems to produce more terrorists than it kills. Let’s not even mention the sometimes faltering revolutions in Tunisia and Libya, or the apparent extremist takeover of northern Mali.
Whatever. For the moment Gaza is at the top of America’s to do list. The immediate problem is a ceasefire, but Ehud Yaari argues that a broader arrangement is really what is needed. This would entail high-level political agreements between Egypt and Israel on blocking arms smuggling to Hamas, clamping down on extremists in Sinai and opening the border crossing between Egypt and Gaza to both trade and people.
The problem with these ideas is that they tie Hamas-governed Gaza more closely to Egypt and loosen its already attenuated ties to the West Bank, where the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) governs. If there is any sense at all in Israel’s right-wing efforts to block Palestinian statehood and the two-state solution the rest of the world favors, it lies precisely in a scheme to separate Gaza and the West Bank, returning the former to Egypt’s suzerainity and the West Bank to Jordan.
But that does not mean Yaari’s ideas are bad, only that what I take to be their unintended consequences should not be allowed to block Palestinian unity. It is an added irony that the main obstacle at the moment is the Palestinians themselves, who have not managed to reconstitute a united polity despite many efforts to do so. It will be interesting to see if the Israeli air attacks sharpen the differences between Gaza and the West Bank or narrow them. Palestinian unity, like the pivot to Asia, is easier said than done.
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Normalization
Two recent meetings between prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo have opened a political-level dialogue aimed at “normalization.” What does that mean?
We know it does not mean what is really needed: mutual recognition and exchange of ambassadors. That is the “normal” relationship between sovereign states. Virtually all the problems between Kosovo and Serbia would be easier to solve if they accepted each other as such. But neither Belgrade nor Pristina would recognize the other tomorrow, Belgrade because it objects to what it terms Kosovo’s “unilaterally declared” (but in fact thoroughly coordinated) independence and Kosovo because Belgrade has designs on its territory, in particular the Serb-controlled north.
Diplomats deal with issues like this by starting a process, in this case a sui generis one called “normalization.” But it is not obvious what that really means. Where does it begin? What stages does it proceed through? How does it end? Here is my personal idea of what normalization might entail:
1. Belgrade and Pristina should resolve left-over issues from the war they fought in the late 1990s. Foremost among these is missing people. Neither side has given a full account of what it knows about people who were killed during and after the war. The latest figure I’ve seen is 1775 people unaccounted for. This is far too many 13 years later.
But there are other issues as well, including the difficult question of pensions Belgrade cut off in 1999, when the United Nations took over administration of Kosovo. The European Court of Human Rights has now ordered Serbia to pay these pensions, with interest. The total owed could be substantial. There are other property issues as well: state property and privately owned property for which owners have not received proper compensation.
2. Pristina and Belgrade should implement the agreements they have already reached. The most important of these is supposed to be implemented next month, with the start of “integrated border management” procedures on the boundary/border between Kosovo and Serbia, in accordance with EU standards. This is an important step, both because it will cut down on smuggling and because it will require serious cooperation between Kosovar and Serbian officials. Also largely unimplemented is the agreement for Belgrade to provide Pristina with copies of property (cadastral) records, taken from Kosovo at the end of the war to reinforce Belgrade’s claim to be the sovereign power even though its officials are no longer present on most of its territory.
If further agreements are reached on electricity and telecommunications, as is rumored, they should be implemented without the lengthy delays that characterized the earlier agreements. Normal relations means quick and cooperative implementation.
3. With the prime ministers meeting, it is time for others to meet as well. The political-level dialogue reached an agreement in principle to extend the Albania/Kosovo highway completed this year to its intended terminus near Nis. This won’t happen without Transport Ministers, Environment Ministers and Interior Ministers concerting their efforts to make it a reality. The road has tremendous potential to increase commerce and provide Serbia with an additional and possibly preferable outlet to the sea (the road to Thessaloniki is longer and lower quality).
With European integration the common goal of the two countries, there is every reason for the people responsible for preparing for EU accession to meet and compare notes. And there is good reason for ordinary citizens to meet and discuss mutual interests: commerce, professional cooperation, anti-corruption efforts, health and environmental standards–there is no lack of grist for the mill. The best way to ensure this kind of dialogue would be liaison offices in each others’ capitals. I am hearing that the plan is liaison offices in Brussels. That would at best be a step in the right direction, but insufficient to ensure the kind of continuous communication needed.
4. Belgrade should end its diplomatic campaign against Kosovo. Serbia has conducted a concerted campaign to prevent Kosovo from entering international organizations and block other states from recognizing it. This is unseemly at best, self-defeating at worst. More or less half the UN General Assembly now recognizes Kosovo. More will gradually do so. The five non-recognizers in the European Union are beginning to understand that non-recognition encourages partition proposals that are anathema to them. Some are accepting Kosovo passports and developing strong bilateral relations with Pristina. Serbia lost its battle Friday to prevent Kosovo entry into the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Does it really want to lose many more battles, or would it be preferable to accept the inevitable?
Still, the Serbian campaign, which Belgrade has conducted with unwarranted intelligence and vigor, has prevented Kosovo from participating in the Olympics (one of its athletes also had an Albanian passport and joined its team), the Fédération Internationale de Football Association and the Eurovision Song Contest. This is inat, which is best defined by a joke all Balkans ethnicities tell about others. A farmer, offered three wishes by a genie, says his first is that his neighbor’s cow should die. “What good will that do you,” the genie asks? None, the farmer says, but it will make my neighbor really unhappy. Kosovo’s participation in international fora of all sorts should be an important part of normalization. It cannot be constructed on a foundation of inat, which has a way of becoming mutual.
5. Northern Kosovo needs to be reintegrated with the rest. At the end of the NATO/Yugoslavia war of 1999, Serbian security forces were supposed to be removed from all of Kosovo. They remained in the territory north of the Ibar river, where the population is majority Serb. It is difficult to say who really controls that territory now: certainly not Pristina or the internationals, but even the Serbian police and secret services are not in full control of an area that is tainted with smuggling and organized crime (with the police and secret services implicated but not necessarily in full control).
Belgrade and Pristina will need to cooperate intensively on reintegrating this territory back into Kosovo, with a large measure of self-governance provided by the internationally sanctioned Ahtisaari plan. This will involve some movement of former non-Serb residents of the north back to their homes. Some Serbs will be unlikely to want to stay in the north, even under the Ahtisaari plan provisions. Where they go and how they are accommodated are important issues on which Belgrade’s cooperation will be vital. Whatever happens with the north will be taken as a precedent for Serbs south of the Ibar and for Albanians in the Presevo area of southern Serbia. It will take wisdom and care to ensure that the reintegration conditions do not destabilize these areas.
6. Defense ministers and chiefs of staff should meet to consider how they can maintain the kind of transparency and mutual confidence that will ensure peace and stability. NATO-led (KFOR) forces have protected Kosovo since the 1999 war. It is unlikely they will still stick around in another five years. Both the U.S. and Europe want to move their troops to higher priorities. Kosovo will begin to arm its still largely unarmed “security forces” beginning in July.
Neither Kosovo nor Serbia should want to get into an arms race, which would be costly to their budgets and destabilizing to the neighborhood. But no democratically elected politician can hope to stay in office if he or she is unable to defend the population and territorial integrity of the state. If an arms race is to be avoided, Belgrade and Pristina have to give each other mutual assurances. The EU has asked that Serbia accept Kosovo’s territorial integrity. If Belgrade fails to do that, Pristina will have to find ways to protect itself from the threat of a Serbian armored incursion. NATO may also need to provide guarantees.
Bottom line: This is already a big agenda, and I’m sure I’ve missed some things. It would all be far easier if recognition and exchange of ambassadors came first. I trust that will become apparent as Pristina and Belgrade make their way through it. But if they prefer to do it ass backwards, “normalizing” a relationship between two capitals that do not accept each others’ sovereign authority, so be it. There is a lot of hard work ahead.
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Justice does not always mean convictions
The acquittal at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) last week of two Croatian generals responsible for Operation Storm in 1995 has occasioned a lot of annoyance among Serbs. Belgrade has downgraded cooperation with the Tribunal. I got some pretty ugly tweets, because somehow I am responsible for what ICTY decides. Anti-Semitic tirades accused me of being a Nazi.
So I decided to read the judgement, which I imagine few of my expletive-wielding antagonists had done. I am not a lawyer, but the appeals panel that made the split decision to reverse a lower chamber’s conviction did not, in my layman’s view, exonerate the generals. What it did was to find the trial chamber’s decisions faulty and indict the prosecution’s case as weak and ill-founded. This distinction is important. Courts do not exonerate. They find guilty, or not guilty. Not guilty does not mean innocent. It means everything from innocent to insufficient evidence to poorly argued to logically inconsistent to incorrectly processed. This gives the accused the benefit of doubt, which some of them are able to exploit to get off the hook (in this case only after Gotovina had spent seven years in prison). That is inherent in a modern court system, which seeks to avoid false convictions.
The main rational objection to the Tribunal in Serbia is that it is biased against Serbs. I find this assertion hard to credit. Certainly ICTY has indicted more Serbs (94 of 161) than Croats, Bosniaks and Albanians, who were the main ethnic groups involved in the Balkans wars of the 1990s. There are many possible reasons for that: Serbs were certainly involved in more wars (they fought against each of the other three ethnic groups), they may have engaged in more criminal activities, and even if they did not there may be more evidence available against them, including more witnesses willing to testify. Belgrade did not help by refusing to cooperate with ICTY for years. The number of indictments and convictions is not a reliable indicator of bias.
It is really very difficult, given the varied make-up of the Tribunal’s judges and staff, to imagine how any systematic bias could be at work. And this particular decision was a close call: 3 to 2. It is far more likely that the Tribunal’s critics simply don’t accept that certain acts are criminal according to the laws of war. Whenever someone objects to a conviction on grounds that the acts involved were provoked by another ethnic group, or were not as bad as what another ethnic group did, the critic simply does not understand what application of law to war means. The Tribunal judges individuals (and their joint action), not ethnic groups.
Personally, I don’t have much doubt that the way in which the generals conducted their offensive against Serb-held areas in Croatia was indiscriminate, inconsistent with their obligation to protect civilians and unlawful. My opinion is that they intended to displace the civilian population by force. I’d have preferred that they be held criminally responsible for it.
But I don’t envy the judges who sit at ICTY on trials and appeals, or the prosecutors that try them. The facts of these cases are horrendous. The evidence is often less than fulsome. Procedures and standards (the main issue in this case) are not always as well-defined. There will never be justice for most of the victims, who are heard only faintly through the often muted voices of survivors. Bad guys certainly get off. But to my knowledge ICTY has a good record of avoiding false convictions. That is very much to its credit.
I understand Serbs are offended that the Croatian generals whom Belgrade holds responsible for ethnic cleansing got off. The unseemly celebrations in Zagreb irritated an old wound. But it would be unwise to promise that everyone who committed crimes would be convicted. Nor is it reasonable to expect that ICTY will go easy on Serbs to compensate for the Croatian acquittals. Justice is an individual, not an ethnic, issue.
If someone has evidence that ICTY is systematically biased against Serbs, I’ll be glad to have a look at it. If not, it is time to put the ethnic feelings to one side and accept the fact that some of those who committed heinous crimes will be convicted and others not. Justice does not always mean convictions.
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This week’s peace picks
A very light holiday week comes as a break after the flurry of post-election events.
1. America and China in the Aftermath of Election and Succession: Paths and Pitfalls, Monday November 19, 9:15 AM – 12:00 PM, Brookings
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Falk Auditorium
Speakers: Jonathon D. Pollack, Cheng Li, Kenneth G. Lieberthal, J. Stapleton Roy, Alan Romberg, Jeffrey A. Bader, Michael Swaine
The reelection of President Barack Obama and the convening of China’s 18th National Congress only days later highlight converging political calendars that may set the contours of U.S.-China relations and East Asian politics for years to come. However, uncertainties remain, with China’s political, economic and strategic trajectories subject to major internal and external pressures. At the same time, the United States confronts a daunting, long deferred set of fiscal challenges that could reshape U.S. foreign and security policy options.
Register for this event here.
2. Militancy and the Arab Spring, Monday November 19, 12:15 PM – 1:45 PM, New America Foundation
Venue: New America Foundation, 1899 L Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, Suite 400
Speakers: Peter Bergen, Leila Hilal, Souad Mekhennet
The deaths of four American diplomats in Benghazi, Libya in September, along with the reports of militant jihadists’ participation in the Syrian conflict, have given rise to serious concerns about the role of Islamist extremists in the various theaters of the “Arab Uprising.” Al-Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist groups have suffered severe blows since 9/11, but the chaos and confusion surrounding the revolutions that have roiled the Arab world could provide such organizations with fertile ground for recruiting new members.
Register for this event here.
3. U.S.-India Military Engagement, Tuesday November 20, 10:30 AM – 11:30 AM, CSIS
Venue: CSIS, 1800 K Street NW, Washington DC, 20006, B1 Conference Room
Speakers: Karl F. Inderfurth, S. Amer Latif, Walter Doran
Bilateral military cooperation has deepened substantially between the U.S. and India over the past decade. The next challenge is to see whether military relations can transition to engagement that is more normal, routine, expected. Join the CSIS U.S.-India Chair and guest panelist Admiral (ret.) Walter Doran — who is featured in our October newsletter — for a discussion of the findings, recommendations, and conclusions of our latest report, entitled “U.S.-India Military Engagement: Steady as They Go.”
Register for this event here.
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The Gaza war in regional context
While the news media is mainly focused on the exchanges of rocket and air attacks between Israel and Gaza, my guess is that the broader regional picture will be decisive in determining the course and outcome of this latest outbreak of war in the Middle East. Here is a rundown of that broader picture:
1. Egypt: Cairo is trying to broker a ceasefire, with rhetorical support from the Arab League, but the Egyptian Prime Minister’s visit to Gaza Friday made it clear that the Muslim Brotherhood-led government will be more sympathetic to Hamas than Hosni Mubarak. Still, Egypt is in a tight spot: continuation of the war will attract militants to Gaza and the Sinai as well as send an already weak Egyptian economy into a tailspin. While Hamas has roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, a democratic regime in Egypt has to worry that Egypt’s citizens, sympathetic as they are to the plight of the Palestinians, will not want to sacrifice too much on their behalf. A ceasefire could restore Egypt’s role as a key regional player.
2. Syria: There has already been an exchange of artillery fire between the Syrian regime and Israel, something that hasn’t happened in a long time. Bashar al Asad may well look to military action on the Golan front in an effort to rally his remaining support and try to divert attention from his war against the Syrian revolution, now more than a year and a half old. The Syrian army won’t have a lot of spare capacity to challenge Israel, but it won’t want to be left out of the fight if the war continues.
3. Jordan: The protest movement against the rule of King Abdullah has intensified. The monarchy will not want to divert security forces to a fight against Israel, with which it maintains good if not warm relations. If the protests are successful, the king will be weakened further. A more constitutional monarchy might well be less friendly to Israel, but still unwilling to risk conflict.
4. Hizbollah: On the Lebanese front, Hizbollah is the main military force. It is already heavily engaged fighting against the revolution in Syria, but it could presumably make Israel’s situation more difficult by joining in the rocket barrage. Its record fighting Israeli ground forces is significantly better than Hamas’, so the Israelis would hesitate to engage on both fronts. But Hizbollah will be reluctant to aid Hamas, which has fallen out with the Syrian regime Hizbollah is supporting.
5. Gulf Cooperation Council: The Saudis and the other GCC states have not generally engaged directly against Israel, but the visit last week of the Emir of Qatar to Gaza (and his promise of financing) suggest that they may play a behind the scenes role bankrolling Hamas and others willing to challenge Israel. This could significantly attenuate the quiet but growing accommodation between Israel and the Sunni Arab world.
6. Turkey: Turkey and Israel seemed headed for rapprochement that would cure the 2010 rift over the Israeli attack on a Turkish aid flotilla headed for Gaza. This now seems much less likely. Turkey’s Islamist government will have to give at least verbal support to Hamas and hesitate to appear to paper over its differences with Tel Aviv.
7. Iran: Many of the larger rockets in Hamas’ arsenal come from Iran, which must be enjoying watching the Israelis engage in Gaza rather than carrying out the threat to destroy Tehran’s nuclear facilities. Iran will no doubt provide Hamas, Hizbollah and Syria as much assistance as it can spare in its sanctions-weakened state, hoping to keep the Israelis preoccupied.
8. The wider Arab world: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Yemen and Sudan all have their own problems that preclude more than rhetorical engagement in the Palestinian cause. Marc Lynch notes that mobilization in the Arab world so far is limited but could well intensify. The Arab street, which presumably has a louder voice today than before the Arab awakening, is certainly sympathetic to the Palestinians. And it is far more likely to support Hamas’ more aggressive military approach to Israel than the Palestine Liberation Organization’s diplomatic push for membership for membership in the United Nations.
Bottom line: Egypt likely has the decisive role in determining whether this war remains, like the one in 2008/9, a bilateral affair or turns into a wider conflict with more permanent consequences. But Iran, Hizbollah, and Turkey are also important players. If Israeli ground action lines up all the regional forces in favor of Hamas, the unintended consequences could be dramatic.
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Stay tuned
With Hamas rockets striking near Jerusalem and Israel bombing Gaza and mobilizing ground forces, it looks as if another Gaza war is in the offing. It is hard to understand how this will benefit either Palestinians or Israelis, but I credit foreignpolicy.com with trying to provide answers. On the Israeli side, the answer comes in an interview with former general Shlomo Brom, who sees the answer in deterrence:
What I mean by deterrence is manifesting to Hamas and other armed groups that the costs they will pay much outweigh the benefits that they are deriving from the launch of these rockets. And for that, you need from time to time a Cast Lead Operation.
Cast Lead was the name of the last Gaza ground invasion, in the winter of 2008/9.
On the Hamas side, the answers come from Hussein Ibish:
The [rocket] attacks are part of the case for the transfer of paramount leadership away from the exiles and to the Hamas political and military leadership in Gaza, which portrays itself as doing the ruling and the fighting.
He adds:
If the PLO goes forward with its initiative at the United Nations [to push for membership] and Israel and the West react with significant punitive measures, Hamas is better positioned than ever to be the direct political beneficiary. Indeed, it will never have been closer to its cherished aim of seizing control of the Palestinian national movement — and possibly even the PLO itself — from its secular nationalist rivals.
So what we’ve got here is an Israeli need to restore credible deterrence in the lead-up to a January 22 election and a Hamas Gaza interest in gaining political ground, vis-a-vis both its own “external” leadership and the PLO.
War rarely goes according to plan. The current situation in nearby parts of the Middle East is so fluid and volatile–especially in Egypt, Syria and Jordan–that it is easy to anticipate that there will be unexpected consequences. Already we’ve seen two supposed taboos–against rocket attacks on Jerusalem and against Syria firing into Israel–violated. There may be a lot more surprises in store, not only for Israelis and Palestinians but also for Americans and Europeans. Stay tuned.
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