What can go wrong?

I am a great fan of Fred Hof’s Seven Key Points on Syria elaborated yesterday at the Atlantic Council.  While I might quarrel on particular points, he lays out clearly what he thinks has to be done to make Syria come out reasonably well from the American perspective.  What he recommends would also be good for the vast majority of Syrians.

But of course that means he also implies the inverse, all the things that can go wrong.  They are at least as many as his seven points:

1. The end of the Asad regime could still take a long time.  This would mean not only more death and destruction, but also more polarization and radicalization.  The Syrian state might well fail if this goes on for weeks, never mind months, more.
2. Since there is no silver bullet, we are going to have to do a lot of things at the same time to hasten the regime’s end.  Sanctions tend to erode with time.  Even if they are maintained, the regime will learn how to evade and exploit them.  Washington has to try to get the Russians on board, even as we work with Friends of Syria to do things that will offend Moscow.  The Americans also have to manage Iran–stopping its nuclear program is arguably more important to Washington than winning the day in Syria.
3. The new Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces will need to get an alternative government up and running quickly.  It is hard to picture much more difficult conditions in which to do this.  The opposition is still politically fractious, large parts of it are lacking in funds, communications are difficult and it will need to incorporate many new faces as the regime starts to crumble.
4. If guns decide the outcome, extremists are likely to come out on top.  They will not only have earned in combat the admiration of parts of the population.  They will also be in a position to distribute resources and intimidate opposition.
5. The Americans are late supplying arms.  Even if they move expeditiously now, they are behind the curve.  And Washington will want to provide arms only to those who offer guarantees in return that they will not be used against the civilian population or transferred to extremists.  Conditions, however justified, will slow the process and make it far less efficient than Saudi and Qatari distribution of hard cash.
6. The messiness of the post-Asad period will make it hard to understand what is going on and also hard to mobilize resources.  Parts of the state–the secret services in particular–are likely to collapse, sectarian sentiment will run high, revenge killings will happen, the international community will be slow out of the gate and the political horizon will be cloudy.  It is difficult to picture where the troops for an international stabilization force would come from.  Hof’s suggestion that Turkish forces protect the Alawites may be unwelcome both in Istanbul and Latakia.
7. Resources are not likely to arrive quickly.  They rarely do, and Syria is a poor country (more like Egypt than like Libya in terms of natural resources).  The standards for accountability and transparency that the international community levies will not be easy to meet.

This is not a pretty picture.  A collapsed state with extremists on top, sectarian warfare in many places and inadquate resources from the international community could make Syria look something like Iraq in 2006.

I am an enthusiast for the Syrian opposition, which has been through difficult trials and always bounces back fighting.  They are going to succeed in toppling Bashar al Asad.  But success in bringing down Asad quickly and the subsequent transition will require a much more concerted effort than we have seen thus far by the Syrians, and by the international community.