Blame game

Posted in Uncategorized - December 20, 2012 - 14 Comments

My publication yesterday of the Serbian platform for negotiations with and on Kosovo has attracted a great deal of attention.  I don’t have a lot to add to what I’ve already said, but sleeping on it made me wonder whether the backward-looking platform is best viewed as part of a internal political game in Serbia.

Here is how I put it to Politika, a leading Belgrade outlet:

I’m not sure it really is a hardening of position so much as a revelation of what the real position is.  I also suspect that it was done partly because of inside Belgrade politics:  [Prime Minister] Dacic has been given the difficult issue of Kosovo and was handling it in a way that looked as if it might produce results; now [President] Nikolic has given him a platform guaranteed to fail.

I imagine this is the real position, that is one that reflects what Belgrade would really like.  It makes the negotiations far more difficult, since now Belgrade will have to explain to its public any deviations from what it said it wanted.  The Serbian constitution already made the position of the Serbian negotiator almost impossible.  There is virtually nothing in this newly revealed proposition that is worthy of discussion, but I do hope the talks continue.  The mediators should set the agenda, not the parties.

I would add that it is well worth reading Florian Bieber’s account of some of the details in the proposal, in particular their relationship to the Ahtisaari plan.  He makes the point that much of the Serbian platform is consistent with the Ahtisaari plan.  I wouldn’t quarrel with anything that falls in that category.  The only discussion of those items should be about implementation.  But not all of what Serbia proposes is consistent with the Ahtisaari plan.  The proposals on justice, police and parliament are really deal breakers.

So too of course is the proposition that all of Kosovo remain formally an autonomous province within Serbia, even if only nominally.  Some see this as implicitly abandoning Belgrade’s partition hopes.  That is little comfort.  Belgrade may want some fig leaf solution that enables it to claim that Serbia has permitted Kosovo sovereignty, but sovereignty and territorial integrity there will have to be if Serbia wants to put this issue behind it.  There is no “normal” relationship between neighbors without that.  If Serbia wants to maintain its claim of sovereignty over the entire territory or a part of it, Kosovo will have to equip itself accordingly.

But back to the original point of this post:  the Serbian proposal tells us more about Serbia than about Kosovo.  And what it tells us, I suspect, is that the major political figures there are playing the blame game.

 

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14 thoughts on “Blame game”

    1. If you do read the article, be sure to read the first few comments on it – asking that the government stop trying to inflate kids’ fights to the level of international tensions.

  2. Danas today has an article containing the preamble intended for the domestic audience that was omitted from the version of the non-document supplied to the foreign ambassadors – http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/politika/verzija_za_strance_bez_patriotskog_uvoda.56.html?news_id=253218. The preamble focuses a great deal more on protecting the rights of Serbia in Kosovo than the Serbians living there, and suggests that the permanent solution they are seeking is only temporary until the situation shifts in Serbia’s favor, while they continue to work to keep Kosovo out of the UN. (And, of course, the reason Serbia is in an unfavorable position now is due to the errors of the preceding government.) True, this is only a preamble, but look how Serbian governments have used the preamble to Resolution 1244 all these years to convince Serbs that they have been and are being continually defrauded of promised rights.

    The government might once have presented such a document as a basis for negotiations if they had won the war, but since they lost it, and their position in the new country is being constantly weakened, it seems they are merely engaging in an extended effort at self-protection. They surely can’t be serious in trying to get the blessing of the international community to Serbia’s claim to any form of sovereignty over Kosovo when half the members of the UN recognize it as an independent state.

    1. “The preamble focuses a great deal more on protecting the rights of Serbia in Kosovo than the Serbians living there, and suggests that the permanent solution they are seeking is only temporary until the situation shifts in Serbia’s favor, while they continue to work to keep Kosovo out of the UN”.

      This is exactly a basis of the “strategy” (if one can call it so at all) Belgrade has been pursuing for more than a decade now, in one way or another. The platform perfectly fits that pattern. Serbia bases its Kosovo – and, in a broader sense, regional – policy on a vague hope that the U.S. and leading European powers will lose their dominant position in the international arena to Russia, China and other non-western players, whereafter the situation regarding Kosovo – as well as Bosnia/RS, for that matter – will dramatically change in Serbia’s favor. The current global dynamics, with particular emphasis on the crisis in Europe, are only intensifying such an expectation on the part of Serbia. To put it directly, the dilemma vexing Belgrade is this: if we definitely give up Kosovo for EU, and EU meanwhile breaks apart, then we will be double losers; but then again, if we instead abandon European integration, it obviously will not bring Kosovo back to us, while our socio-economic hardship is only going to worsen even further.

      1. Ivica Dacic, as the man who is supposed to present these cockamamie ideas to Tadic in the coming round of talks, is backing away from them quickly – they are, he’s saying, not Holy Writ, after all. Things can be changed … Apparently he likes being treated as an important person who has to be dealt with respectfully, and Tadic hasn’t shown the slightest intention of taking this document seriously. The international community should encourage them both by piling ridicule on these outdated ideas (now apparently available only to Serbian citizens in English.) Polite compliments for having come up with something in writing are not what’s called for here. Just think of all the suffering that could have been avoided if Western diplomats had made a few honest threats when talking to Milosevic rather than treating him as a serious player and partner for peace in the region.

        1. You wrote “Tadić”, but I guess you meant Thaci?

          Never mind. More important here is that even the very authors of the platform are aware that most, if any, of it has no chance of being accepted by Priština, let alone implemented, but are presumably hoping that Thaci and his government might be willing to at least give some thought to some of its parts, possibly with pressure from the West given that Belgrade has already received a lot of praise for Dačić’s constructive attitude in negotiations, which Serbia is now looking to capitalize on.

          But the primary reason why the platform is, for the most part, highly unrealistic lies in an obvious attempt to somehow reconcile divergent views and interests of various players, including: the Church (SPC) and its satellite far-right movements, both conservative and moderate nationalist parties, pro-Western liberals and, finally, major international players (which is why the platform was first presented to the ambassadors of Russia, China and Great Britain).

          But apart from the platform, I am still happy that it is precisely Dačić that has been handed the “hot potato” of dealing with Thaci. Because if there is a politician in Serbia today who is shrewd enough to make meaningful progress on the issuse without much risk to his own popularity, it is definitely Dačić.

          1. Thaci – Tadic: – yes, of course (I knew I was going to mix those names up someday). Thaci says no way to any of this, and Dacic is walking away from it as fast as he can. Their shared disgust for it will give them something to bond over in Brussels.

  3. Much of what Belgrade proposes would indeed fit within the Ahtisaari Plan and what doesn’t could be accommodated with just a few – if significant – tweaks: http://www.transconflict.com/2011/11/ahtisaari-plan-north-kosovo-011/

    It is also interesting that Belgrade accepts the principle of Kosovo Serb participation in central government organs.

    But the key here is that Serbia has now put on the table a version of the only real alternative to partition other than renewed conflict and violence. The northern Kosovo Serbs have made clear they will not accept any form of interference in their local life from Pristina and that use of force by NATO, the EU or Kosovo Albanian police can’t make them. This essential ground truth limits the options for peaceful settlement in the same way that refusal of Kosovo’s Albanians to be ruled by Serbia made independence the only peaceful path forward for them. A negotiated agreement between Serbia and Kosovo will be along these lines or there probably can’t be one. The Quint maybe now understands this?

  4. No recognition, ever; no let up on efforts to prevent Kosovo from joining the EU or UN (Pakistan is making it 98) – both may be only in the Preamble, but we know how Serbs feel about preambles. No armed force, just Albanian and Serbian police (and the Serb army sitting across the border, waiting for Kostunica or his equivalent to be elected); control of (local?) mines – Trepca? – to Serbs; no implementation of any part of the agreement until there’s agreement on everything…

    The opposition in Belgrade isn’t buying it – neither Cedo nor Kostunica, and according to newspaper reports, the relevant diplomats are strongly (but silently, until there’s a final text) against it. The posters at the (Serbian) B92 comment pages at least are enjoying the story and the chance to be witty at the government’s expense – it’s gone over the EU’s head and is appealing directly to Santa Claus is the most topical.

    1. Three points Amer(ican)

      1. Trepca is already divided with the K-Albanians taking everything south of the Ibar and the Serbs holding what’s north.

      2. Hard to credit anyone who believes the Serbian army will one day seek to take back 1+ million independent Kosovars.

      3. Ever hear of a bargaining position?

      1. I’m hardly the only one who doesn’t see the value of this effort – Dacic certainly isn’t supporting it and the government may not bring it before parliament, or even discuss it – Danas seems to have the best source(s) on this (http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/politika/platforma_mozda_ni_pred_vladom_ni_u_skupstini_.56.html?news_id=253275 – “The Platform may not be presented to the Government nor to the Skupstina”).

        Dacic is the one who would be in charge of the bargaining, and he doesn’t sound like he considers this is viable even as a bargaining position.

        The only ones who do seem in favor of this Platform so far are the northern Kosovo Serb leaders, although Kostunica is offering what Jaksic calls “constructive ideas.” (Clarifying that Kosovo has autonomy within Serbia’s borders.)

        As for the military option, I doubt it’s realistic – but then I remember that feeling of utter disbelief when I first saw images of Yugoslav/Serb tanks rumbling down a peaceful Slovenian village street. This time they’d probably use Special Ops forces, though. With drones, the tanks are out.

  5. Well, we can just cut the jibberish talk here (no offence please). We all know that all these quasi-solutions are going to be either accepted or denied accordingly to big players intentions (first USA, Russia). This new plans and platforms are here just to mask the true state of things to poor Serbian citizens. Serbian and Kosova politicians are just pawns in a game between great powers. So, lobyists for one side vs. those for other side can just endlesly argue about whether the border should be here or there or wherever when whole Balkans is economically devastated, has no perspective under the EU whatsoever, criminal and corruption are enormous etc.

    Since there is no true political will to end conflicts (conflicts are generated as much from outside as they are from inside), the elites of both sides will continue to propose some weak platforms and no long-term solution will be found. We know that we are periphery of Europe that’s just serving for a kind of ‘experiment’ to developed countries, and it’s a shame that the things are standing like that.

    Best regards from Belgrade.

  6. Daniel Serv(er) maybe you should start talking about rights of serbian refugees. You serve to New Roman Empire that is USA. We will never give up of our land especially Kosovo and Metohia. KosMet belongs to us much more and longer than America to Americans.

    1. Nobody denies rights of Serbs into going back to Kosovo. Even today all of Kosovo Serbs are in voters list. Nobody excluded them even though many of them did not visit Kosovo in past 13 years.

      You may “give up” Kosovo or may not. Its absolutely your problem but just try to keep Serbia itself: according to Dacic, Serbia loses each year some 40,000 people due to the excess of deaths over births while as much as 30,000 migrate definitely to other countries. In total Serbia loses more than 70,000 people annually. If that continues Serbia itself will become something different.

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