Bashar al Asad’s apocalypse

I published a daring series of predictions at the end of last year.  Very few were correct.   The only two that came close were these:

Balkans: Serbia gets candidacy status for the EU but that fails to save President Tadic’s Democratic Party from a parliamentary election defeat. Kosovo meets all the requirements but continues to be denied the European Union visa waiver. Bosnia gets a new government but no constitutional reform.

United States: Republicans nominate Mitt Romney. Economy continues slow recovery. Barack Obama is reelected, by a smaller margin than in 2008. Al Qaeda succeeds post-election in mounting a non-devastating suicide bombing.

Even then, you’ll need to ignore the part about Kosovo meeting all the requirements (it hasn’t yet) and that last part about a successful Al Qaeda bombing in the U.S. (that hasn’t happened yet either).  Is it an accident that the two places I know best were also the subject of my most accurate predictions?

I’ll rely on other people for my next big prediction:  Andrew Tabler and Jeff White, who know Syria much better than I do, were at the Washington Institute yesterday predicting the end of the Asad regime within weeks, at most a few months. Even if the Mayan apocalypse hasn’t happened, Bashar al Asad’s will.

According to Jeff, the regime’s military capacity to defend itself is way down.  Its air power, artillery and Scuds are little avail.  Its large-scale maneuver capacity is declining, as are its numbers.  There is fighting in 12 of 14 provinces.  Regime armor and mechanized infantry can no longer move freely.  The only potential major game changers out there are Hizbollah, Iran and chemical weapons.  Iran and Hizbollah are not likely to risk more than they already have.

Rebel offensive performance is improving.  They are taking objectives and interrupting lines of communication.  They appear to be self-sustaining now in arms, their numbers are still growing, and they are capable of more sustained and coordinated action.  The Islamists are playing an increasing role.  Rebel losses are up, especially among commanders, but their recruitment stream is still strong.

Jeff suggest five possible endgames:

1.  Province by province dismantlement of the regime, which has already begun.

2.  Chaotic collapse of the regime.

3.  Controlled regime contraction to Damascus or the coast.

4.  A headlong rush to the coast.

5.  Regime recovery, which looks unlikely.

Possible indicators the end is near:  there may be desperate pleas for a ceasefire, evacuation of Russian nationals, senior defections or flight, military units abandoning the regime, a coup attempt and last (but not entirely in jest) burning papers at the Iranian Embassy.*

Andrew agreed.  There is a marked deterioration in the humanitarian situation, with food in short supply, refugee and displaced people camps overcrowded and ill-equipped.  The revolution is turning in an Islamist direction, in part because of U.S. unresponsiveness to its needs.  Anti-Western sentiment is strong.  It was a mistake to designate Jabhat al Nusra as a terrorist organization before recognizing the Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.

The Coalition remains badly divided by sect, class, rural/urban and by personality.  While the military and civilian leaderships have met and issued a joint statement, how the two insurgent efforts will be combined at various levels is not at all clear.  The armed rebellion, with which the U.S. is not well-connected, is likely to be in the lead once Bashar falls.  The U.S. should be sending arms, more to gain influence than anything else, as they are no longer needed as much as once they were for military purposes.  We need to be ready also with civilian assistance, which has been too slow.  The aid should be overt and direct, not covert and indirect, if we want to gain influence over the outcome.  Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia may well move faster than we do, as they have with arms, with consequences for our interests.

It is clear Syria will need a lot of help once this is over.  Post-war reconstruction has stumped the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it has boots on the ground, which isn’t going to happen in Syria.  Working through and with the Coalition, which we’ve now recognized as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, to produce a decent outcome is going to be an an enormous challenge.  Failure could ignite a broader conflict in Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Jordan.  Success would damage Hizbollah and Iran.  This one is worth a candle.

*This morning I would add use of cluster bombs.