peacefare.net

Redlines

The publication last week of a five-step peace process roadmap to 2015 allegedly prepared by Afghanistan’s High Peace Council reopens the issue of whether a negotiated settlement with the Taliban–or parts thereof–is possible.  American efforts led first by Richard Holbrooke and more recently by Marc Grossman have failed.  With an American drawdown of troops proceeding and Afghan forces all too clearly not yet capable of taking over, it would not be surprising to see the Afghans make another stab at a deal.

But anyone who thinks this plan was prepared in Dari or Pashto is kidding themselves.  This document reads to me like an American plan, written in good diplospeak, warmed over.  It foresees an increase in Pakistan’s role in the negotiations, but it also includes all the American red lines (admittedly at the very end):

Any outcome of the peace process must respect the Afghan Constitution and must not jeopardize the rights and freedoms that the citizens of Afghanistan, both men and women, enjoy under the Constitution.  As part of the negotiated outcome, the Taliban and other armed opposition groups must cut ties with Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups and verifiably renounce violence.

The timeline for the plan began in early 2012.  Some of the action items concerning release of prisoners and assurance of safe passage for negotiators seem to have been fulfilled.  But a critical step, announcement that the Taliban are cutting their ties to al Qaeda, to my knowledge has not been taken (the deadline was March 2012).  The Taliban have denied media reports to that effect.  I know of no credible evidence that the Taliban have softened their position on education and participation of women, though they may have gotten savvier about (not) attacking girls’ schools.  Nor have they renounced violence.

The devil, as always, is in the details.  The roadmap proposes that in the second half of 2013 the negotiating parties

…agree on the modalities for the inclusion of Taliban and other armed opposition leaders in the power structure of the state, to include non-elected positions at different levels with due consideration of legal and governance principles.

I wrote about this for the Washington Post more than two years ago, when I first heard rumors of State Department officials looking for a settlement that would give over a large portion of southern Afghanistan to Taliban governance in exchange for cutting their ties with al Qaeda and laying down their arms.  It is still a distasteful proposition.

But less so than two years ago because American and Afghan efforts have failed to install anything like functioning governance in much of Afghanistan outside urban centers.  The Northern Alliance opponents of the Taliban may not like it, but the Americans will find it easier to twist their arms than those of the Taliban.  The alternative to a negotiated settlement with the Taliban might just be their military success in the countryside, where they are doing relatively well.

It is reasonable under current conditions to pursue a plan like the one McClatchy uncovered.  But those redlines are important.  If the Taliban don’t break with al Qaeda and accept women as human beings, we’ll regret a settlement that brings them into Afghanistan’s governing structures.  So will Pakistan.