Fin de regime

My guess is that we are finally in the waning days of the Asad regime in Syria.  UN envoy Brahimi was in Damascus yesterday and will talk with the Russians this weekend.  His is sounding like a last ditch effort.  Moscow has made it clear that it will no longer prop up Asad.  Now they have to be convinced to give him a shove in the right direction.  It shouldn’t be all that hard.  Bashar’s military police chief has famously absconded, joining his foreign ministry spokesperson.  The regime is cracking, though not yet crumbling.

This is a delicate moment in which a great deal is at stake.  The devil is in the details.  Brahimi is still pressing for a solution that jibes with last June’s Geneva agreement, which Moscow and Washington both endorsed, on formation of a fully empowered government with Bashar still in place.  I doubt the revolutionaries will accept it.  They want him out before agreeing to a ceasefire.  Provided that condition is met, a negotiated transition of power to some sort of “unity” government (which means it would include a “remnant” of the Asad regime) with a guarantee of a future transition could be a good thing, provided it genuinely puts Syria on a democratic path and extracts it from the violence now on going.  But it could also sell the Syrian revolution short by putting a new autocrat in place and creating conditions for renewed violence.

There will be precious little real international support for a true transition to democracy.  The Saudis and Qataris, who have provided the bulk of the arms and money to the revolutionaries, are not much interested in anything beyond getting Asad out and installing a Sunni (preferably Islamist) regime, democratic or not.  The Russians, Iranians and Iraqis will fear that outcome and want to preserve a secular regime, whether democratic or not.  The Americans and Turks will want a secular democracy, but they are not in a position to insist on it.   The Americans have been reluctant to get too involved.  Only if Turkey decides to put its boots on the ground inside Syria will it have the kind of clout required.  Even then, it may fail to get what it wants.

The Syrians hold the key to the outcome.  But of course they point in many different directions.  There are lots of Syrians who would prefer a secular democracy, but they are stronger among the nonviolent protesters than among the revolutionary military forces deciding the outcome.  The Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, now recognized internationally as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, is trying to project a unified and moderate image.  But the results so far are rudimentary:  a few press statements, not always on the most pressing issues.  There is still no transition government.

Jabhat al Nusra, a leading Islamist group among the fighters, is producing more substantial results.  Rejecting the Coalition, it is anti-Western, Islamist, socially conservative and hard-fighting.  The United States has designated it a foreign terrorist organization.  Washington’s primary concern is its links to al Qaeda in Iraq, which Jabhat al Nusra denies.  But I’ve also heard that the designation was done in part to please the Russians, who are genuinely (and justifiably) concerned with Syria becoming a source of Islamist extremism that could infect parts of Russia.  Baghdad is also worried about a Sunni extremist regime in Syria that would try to counter Prime Minister Maliki’s increasingly Shia (and autocratic) drift in Iraq.

Few in Syria want the state to collapse or divide territorially.  The revolution has not been fought on ethnic or sectarian grounds, even if it has exposed ethnic and sectarian divisions.  Only Syria’s Kurds lean in the direction of federalism, inspired and supported by their confrères in Iraq.  But I see no real plan on the horizon to prevent revenge killing, despite the very real likelihood it will happen.  If there is extreme violence against the Alawites or other minorities thought to have supported the regime, collapse and division become more likely.

All decisions that depend on the will of a single individual, as Bashar’s to step aside does, are inherently unpredictable.  There is of course the possibility he will refuse and hang on for a while, even defying the Russians to do so.  A Google search for “fin de regime” turns up a lot of hits concerning Syria, in 2011.  The longer this goes on, the worse it will be in the end.