Month: December 2012
Prevent what?
Most of us who work on international affairs think it would be much better to use diplomacy to prevent bad things from happening rather than waiting until the aftermath and then cleaning up after the elephants, which all too often involves expensive military action. But what precisely would that mean? What do we need to prevent?
The Council on Foreign Relations survey of prevention priorities for 2013 was published last week, just in time to be forgotten in the Christmas rush and New Year’s lull. It deserves notice, as it is one of the few nonpartisan attempts to define American national security priorities. This year’s edition was in part crowd-sourced and categorizes contingencies on two dimensions: impact on U.S. interests (high, medium, low) and likelihood (likely, plausible, unlikely).
Syria comes out on top in both dimensions. That’s a no-brainer for likelihood, as the civil war has already reached catastrophic dimensions and is affecting the broader region. Judging from Paul Stares’ video introduction to the survey, U.S. interests are ranked high in part because of the risk of use or loss of chemical weapons stocks. I’d have ranked them high because of the importance of depriving Iran of its one truly reliable ally and bridge to Hizbollah, but that’s a quibble.
CFR ranks another six contingencies as high impact on U.S. interests and only plausible rather than likely. This isn’t so useful, but Paul’s video comes to the rescue: an Israeli military strike on Iran that would “embroil” the U.S. and conflict with China in the East or South China seas are his picks to talk about. I find it peculiar that CFR does not treat what I would regard as certainly a plausible if not a likely contingency: a U.S. attack on Iran. There are few more important decisions President Obama will need to make than whether to use force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Certainly it is a far more challenging decision than whether to go to war against China in the territorial disputes it is generating with U.S. allies in Pacific. I don’t know any foreign policy experts who would advise him to go in that direction.
It is striking that few of the other “plausible” and high-impact contingencies are amenable to purely military responses:
- a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure
- a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
- severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attack
It is not easy to determine the origin of cyberattacks, and not clear that a military response would be appropriate or effective. The same is also sometimes true of mass casualty attacks; our military response to 9/11 in Afghanistan has enmired the United States in its longest war to date, one where force is proving inadequate as a solution. It is hard to imagine any military response to internal instability in Pakistan, though CFR offers as an additional low probability contingency a possible U.S. military confrontation with Islamabad “triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations.”
In the “moderate” impact on U.S. interests, CFR ranks as highly likely “a major erosion of security in Afghanistan resulting from coalition drawdown.” I’d certainly have put that in high impact category, as we’ve still got 100,000 troops in Afghanistan and a significant portion of them will still be there at the end of 2013. In the “moderate” impact but merely plausible category CFR ranks:
- a severe Indo-Pakistan crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by a major terror attack
- a severe North Korean crisis caused by another military provocation, internal political instability, or threatening nuclear weapons/ICBM-related activities
- a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
- continuing political instability and emergence of a terrorist safe haven in Libya
Again there are limits to what we can do about most of these contingencies by conventional military means. Only a North Korea crisis caused by military provocation or threats would rank be susceptible to a primarily military response. The others call for diplomatic and civilian responses in at least a measure equal to the possible military ones.
CFR lets two “moderate” impact contingencies languish in the low probability category that I don’t think belong there:
- political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
- renewed unrest in the Kurdish dominated regions of Turkey and the Middle East
There is a very real possibility in Riyadh of a succession crisis, as the monarchy on the death of the king will likely move to a next generation of contenders. Kurdish irredentist aspirations are already a big issue in Iraq and Syria. It is hard to imagine this will not affect Iran and Turkey before the year is out. Neither is amenable to a purely military response.
Most of the contingencies with “low” impact on U.S. interests are in Africa:
- a deepening of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo that involves military intervention from its neighbors
- growing popular unrest and political instability in Sudan
- military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
- renewed ethnic violence in Kenya surrounding March 2013 presidential election
- widespread unrest in Zimbabwe surrounding the electoral process and/or the death of Robert Mugabe
- failure of a multilateral intervention to push out Islamist groups from Mali’s north
This may tell us more about CFR and the United States than about the world. Africa has little purchase on American sentiments, despite our half-Kenyan president. All of these contingencies merit diplomatic attention, but none is likely to excite U.S. military responses of more than a purely emergency character, except for Mali. If you’ve got a few Islamist terrorists, you can get some attention even if you are in Africa.
What’s missing from this list? CFR mentions
…a third Palestinian intifada, a widespread popular unrest in China, escalation of a U.S.-Iran naval clash in the Persian Gulf, a Sino-Indian border crisis, onset of elections-related instability and violence in Ethiopia, unrest in Cuba following the death of Fidel Castro and/or incapacitation of Raul Castro, and widespread political unrest in Venezuela triggered by the death or incapacitation of Hugo Chavez.
I’d add intensification of the global economic slowdown (high probability, high impact), failure to do more about global warming (also high probability, delayed impact), demographic or financial implosion in Europe or Japan (and possibly even the U.S.), Russian crackdown on dissent, and resurgent Islamist extremism in Somalia. But the first three of these are not one-year “contingencies,” which shows one limit of the CFR exercise.
I would also note that the world is arguably in better shape at the end of 2012 than ever before in history. As The Spectator puts it:
Never has there been less hunger, less disease or more prosperity. The West remains in the economic doldrums, but most developing countries are charging ahead, and people are being lifted out of poverty at the fastest rate ever recorded. The death toll inflicted by war and natural disasters is also mercifully low. We are living in a golden age.
May it last.
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Fewer words
Regular readers of peacefare will know that Serbia’s draft platform on Kosovo has aroused me and my readers to comment extensively. Marko Somborac says it in pictures and little text in Blic: “Look Toma, a platform for Kosovo should undergo some changes,” “RIIIP! Zing!” That’s President [Toma] Nikolić, Prime Minister and Interior Minister Dačić in the policeman’s hat and Defense Minister Alexander Vučić with the lighter.
With gratitude to Marko Somborac for the permission to republish! Apologies for the fuzziness–my computer skills are insufficient to clarify. And even more gratitude for this version, in English (and with a credit to a mystery Dr Spasojevic, from whom the idea came):
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Faith in humanity restored
Unfortunately the departure of Bashar al Asad from power is not the reason for the title. It refers to this video:
Of course faith in humanity is not quite the meaning of today’s holiday, but it will have to do for ecumenical reasons. And the Bashar al Assad part, if not true today, I hope will be true tomorrow. I also hope the sequelae will be peaceful.
Wishing you all–Christian or (like me) not–the very best for the holidays and the new year!
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Enough time
After the progress Serbia recently made toward improving its relationship with Priština, the country’s political leadership has brought forward an unrealistically ambitious platform for its future Kosovo policy. Even a superficial glance at the document suggests that Belgrade is looking to create another Republika Srpska with the potential to destabilize Kosovo at any time. Unsurprisingly, the Kosovo government has dismissed the platform as unacceptable; the Europeans for now seem to be rather cautious.
One reason for the ambitious platform is the praise that Serbian prime minister Ivica Dačić has received from the West for his pragmatic conduct in the negotiations with Hashim Thaçi. Encouraged, Belgrade is likely hoping that Brussels and Washington could be willing to put pressure on Priština to consider at least some of the ideas outlined. A difference compared to the usual practice is that in this platform Kosovo Serbs who live south of the Ibar river have for the first time been taken into account by a Serbian government.
Parts of the platform can be understood as an attempt to somehow accommodate divergent views and interests of various stakeholders. One of these is undoubtedly the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC), whose leadership has already blasted the government for Dačić’s constructive approach to his ongoing talks with Thaçi. Given the level of influence and popularity that SPC enjoys among Serbs, domestic politicians would hardly dare to openly defy it.
The platform also helps two main parties of the ruling coalition – the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and Dačić’s Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) – create the impression that they are not going to “surrender without fight.” While they are both nominally pro-EU, a large portion of their voters are opposed to European integration.
Serbian opposition parties have reacted to the platform in a more or less expected fashion. Dragan Đilas, the new president of the formerly ruling Democratic Party (DS), considers most of its content to be out of touch with reality. Vojislav Koštunica of the conservative nationalist Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) is basically satisfied with the platform, albeit with some reservation. The clearly pro-Western Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) insists that the government must finally “tell people the truth about Kosovo” instead of prolonging the agony.
Unlike the Church, politicians, media and far-right extremists, ordinary people appear to have for the most part remained unmoved. This is potentially good news for leading government figures, allowing them to remove a number of controversial elements from the paper. Dačić has already stressed that the platform is not a “Holy Writ” and therefore can be amended. Likewise, SNS first deputy prime minister Aleksandar Vučić stated shortly after the platform was announced that Serbia must at all costs remain on the path of European integration if it is to avoid economic disaster.
The next round of talks between Dačić and Thaçi is scheduled for January 17. There is time for the platform to undergo revision before then, but a lot will depend on dynamics within the government itself. Judging from their recent statements, Dačić and Vučić are anticipating changes will be made in time.
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Five more years
Egypt’s opposition has lost its fight against President Morsi’s proposed constitution. The margin in favor will be well over 60% once the votes in the second round are made official next week. The overall picture is not good for those who hoped to challenge Morsi. He greatly increased his margin compared to the presidential election, and turnout in the referendum was much lower:
Bassem Sabry nevertheless sees some hope for the secularists, who have now united in the National Salvation Front (NSF) led by former IAEA chief Mohammed El Baradei. If it manages to bring into coalition more moderate Islamists as well as more acceptable “remnants” of the Mubarak regime, it could begin to look like a serious counterbalance to Morsi’s excesses.
It will have to happen quickly. Parliamentary elections are due two months after the new constitution comes into force. A new electoral law is needed. The one under which the previous elections were held was a mess. Presumably Morsi will dictate what he wants, as he holds all legislative powers at the moment.* The time for campaigning could, I guess, be significantly less than two months. The shorter the better for the well-organized and motivated Muslim Brotherhood (which contests elections as the Freedom and Justice Party).
Morsi has already announced his choices for one-third of the members in the upper house (Shura Council), with sparse representation of liberals, women and Christians. Morsi seems no better at compromise than John Boehner, who stiffed President Obama last week and then couldn’t even convince the Republican caucus to back his alternative. By contrast, Morsi’s control of Freedom and Justice seems absolute, and he has kept the Salafists and military content enough so that they have not tried to challenge him forcefully.
Egyptians are tired of revolution. They want stability and a return to normality. For the vast majority, this means eking out a living, difficult even in better times. Islam appears to offer answers to many problems, not least the corruption and venality of the old regime. Dignity, the ideal for which the revolution was fought, means something quite different to poor and illiterate Egyptians than it does to the less numerous and better educated secular liberals. Morsi, though amply well-educated at the University of Southern California, has a far better understanding of this difference than many middle class Egyptians, who too often view the lower classes as ignorant and unworthy of choosing how the country should be run.
Egypt’s polity is going to end up tilted heavily in the direction of the Islamists unless the opposition gets its act together quickly and at least blocks them from gaining a two-thirds super majority in the lower house. Morsi has four years in office from the time of his election in June. If I read the constitution correctly, he cannot succeed himself. The new parliament will have five years from the time it convenes. While it can be dissolved, the process is a tortuous one. Whatever happens in the parliamentary elections is going to set Egypt’s direction for a long time to come.
I am wishing the secularist liberals all the votes they can scrounge up. They will need them if the next five years are going to be tolerable to non-Islamists in Egypt.
*PS: I gather he intends to hand over legislative power to the Shura Council, see below.
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Redlines
The publication last week of a five-step peace process roadmap to 2015 allegedly prepared by Afghanistan’s High Peace Council reopens the issue of whether a negotiated settlement with the Taliban–or parts thereof–is possible. American efforts led first by Richard Holbrooke and more recently by Marc Grossman have failed. With an American drawdown of troops proceeding and Afghan forces all too clearly not yet capable of taking over, it would not be surprising to see the Afghans make another stab at a deal.
But anyone who thinks this plan was prepared in Dari or Pashto is kidding themselves. This document reads to me like an American plan, written in good diplospeak, warmed over. It foresees an increase in Pakistan’s role in the negotiations, but it also includes all the American red lines (admittedly at the very end):
Any outcome of the peace process must respect the Afghan Constitution and must not jeopardize the rights and freedoms that the citizens of Afghanistan, both men and women, enjoy under the Constitution. As part of the negotiated outcome, the Taliban and other armed opposition groups must cut ties with Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups and verifiably renounce violence.
The timeline for the plan began in early 2012. Some of the action items concerning release of prisoners and assurance of safe passage for negotiators seem to have been fulfilled. But a critical step, announcement that the Taliban are cutting their ties to al Qaeda, to my knowledge has not been taken (the deadline was March 2012). The Taliban have denied media reports to that effect. I know of no credible evidence that the Taliban have softened their position on education and participation of women, though they may have gotten savvier about (not) attacking girls’ schools. Nor have they renounced violence.
The devil, as always, is in the details. The roadmap proposes that in the second half of 2013 the negotiating parties
…agree on the modalities for the inclusion of Taliban and other armed opposition leaders in the power structure of the state, to include non-elected positions at different levels with due consideration of legal and governance principles.
I wrote about this for the Washington Post more than two years ago, when I first heard rumors of State Department officials looking for a settlement that would give over a large portion of southern Afghanistan to Taliban governance in exchange for cutting their ties with al Qaeda and laying down their arms. It is still a distasteful proposition.
But less so than two years ago because American and Afghan efforts have failed to install anything like functioning governance in much of Afghanistan outside urban centers. The Northern Alliance opponents of the Taliban may not like it, but the Americans will find it easier to twist their arms than those of the Taliban. The alternative to a negotiated settlement with the Taliban might just be their military success in the countryside, where they are doing relatively well.
It is reasonable under current conditions to pursue a plan like the one McClatchy uncovered. But those redlines are important. If the Taliban don’t break with al Qaeda and accept women as human beings, we’ll regret a settlement that brings them into Afghanistan’s governing structures. So will Pakistan.
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