Month: December 2012
Bashar al Asad’s apocalypse
I published a daring series of predictions at the end of last year. Very few were correct. The only two that came close were these:
Balkans: Serbia gets candidacy status for the EU but that fails to save President Tadic’s Democratic Party from a parliamentary election defeat. Kosovo meets all the requirements but continues to be denied the European Union visa waiver. Bosnia gets a new government but no constitutional reform.
United States: Republicans nominate Mitt Romney. Economy continues slow recovery. Barack Obama is reelected, by a smaller margin than in 2008. Al Qaeda succeeds post-election in mounting a non-devastating suicide bombing.
Even then, you’ll need to ignore the part about Kosovo meeting all the requirements (it hasn’t yet) and that last part about a successful Al Qaeda bombing in the U.S. (that hasn’t happened yet either). Is it an accident that the two places I know best were also the subject of my most accurate predictions?
I’ll rely on other people for my next big prediction: Andrew Tabler and Jeff White, who know Syria much better than I do, were at the Washington Institute yesterday predicting the end of the Asad regime within weeks, at most a few months. Even if the Mayan apocalypse hasn’t happened, Bashar al Asad’s will.
According to Jeff, the regime’s military capacity to defend itself is way down. Its air power, artillery and Scuds are little avail. Its large-scale maneuver capacity is declining, as are its numbers. There is fighting in 12 of 14 provinces. Regime armor and mechanized infantry can no longer move freely. The only potential major game changers out there are Hizbollah, Iran and chemical weapons. Iran and Hizbollah are not likely to risk more than they already have.
Rebel offensive performance is improving. They are taking objectives and interrupting lines of communication. They appear to be self-sustaining now in arms, their numbers are still growing, and they are capable of more sustained and coordinated action. The Islamists are playing an increasing role. Rebel losses are up, especially among commanders, but their recruitment stream is still strong.
Jeff suggest five possible endgames:
1. Province by province dismantlement of the regime, which has already begun.
2. Chaotic collapse of the regime.
3. Controlled regime contraction to Damascus or the coast.
4. A headlong rush to the coast.
5. Regime recovery, which looks unlikely.
Possible indicators the end is near: there may be desperate pleas for a ceasefire, evacuation of Russian nationals, senior defections or flight, military units abandoning the regime, a coup attempt and last (but not entirely in jest) burning papers at the Iranian Embassy.*
Andrew agreed. There is a marked deterioration in the humanitarian situation, with food in short supply, refugee and displaced people camps overcrowded and ill-equipped. The revolution is turning in an Islamist direction, in part because of U.S. unresponsiveness to its needs. Anti-Western sentiment is strong. It was a mistake to designate Jabhat al Nusra as a terrorist organization before recognizing the Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.
The Coalition remains badly divided by sect, class, rural/urban and by personality. While the military and civilian leaderships have met and issued a joint statement, how the two insurgent efforts will be combined at various levels is not at all clear. The armed rebellion, with which the U.S. is not well-connected, is likely to be in the lead once Bashar falls. The U.S. should be sending arms, more to gain influence than anything else, as they are no longer needed as much as once they were for military purposes. We need to be ready also with civilian assistance, which has been too slow. The aid should be overt and direct, not covert and indirect, if we want to gain influence over the outcome. Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia may well move faster than we do, as they have with arms, with consequences for our interests.
It is clear Syria will need a lot of help once this is over. Post-war reconstruction has stumped the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it has boots on the ground, which isn’t going to happen in Syria. Working through and with the Coalition, which we’ve now recognized as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, to produce a decent outcome is going to be an an enormous challenge. Failure could ignite a broader conflict in Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Jordan. Success would damage Hizbollah and Iran. This one is worth a candle.
*This morning I would add use of cluster bombs.
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Blame game
My publication yesterday of the Serbian platform for negotiations with and on Kosovo has attracted a great deal of attention. I don’t have a lot to add to what I’ve already said, but sleeping on it made me wonder whether the backward-looking platform is best viewed as part of a internal political game in Serbia.
Here is how I put it to Politika, a leading Belgrade outlet:
I’m not sure it really is a hardening of position so much as a revelation of what the real position is. I also suspect that it was done partly because of inside Belgrade politics: [Prime Minister] Dacic has been given the difficult issue of Kosovo and was handling it in a way that looked as if it might produce results; now [President] Nikolic has given him a platform guaranteed to fail.
I imagine this is the real position, that is one that reflects what Belgrade would really like. It makes the negotiations far more difficult, since now Belgrade will have to explain to its public any deviations from what it said it wanted. The Serbian constitution already made the position of the Serbian negotiator almost impossible. There is virtually nothing in this newly revealed proposition that is worthy of discussion, but I do hope the talks continue. The mediators should set the agenda, not the parties.
I would add that it is well worth reading Florian Bieber’s account of some of the details in the proposal, in particular their relationship to the Ahtisaari plan. He makes the point that much of the Serbian platform is consistent with the Ahtisaari plan. I wouldn’t quarrel with anything that falls in that category. The only discussion of those items should be about implementation. But not all of what Serbia proposes is consistent with the Ahtisaari plan. The proposals on justice, police and parliament are really deal breakers.
So too of course is the proposition that all of Kosovo remain formally an autonomous province within Serbia, even if only nominally. Some see this as implicitly abandoning Belgrade’s partition hopes. That is little comfort. Belgrade may want some fig leaf solution that enables it to claim that Serbia has permitted Kosovo sovereignty, but sovereignty and territorial integrity there will have to be if Serbia wants to put this issue behind it. There is no “normal” relationship between neighbors without that. If Serbia wants to maintain its claim of sovereignty over the entire territory or a part of it, Kosovo will have to equip itself accordingly.
But back to the original point of this post: the Serbian proposal tells us more about Serbia than about Kosovo. And what it tells us, I suspect, is that the major political figures there are playing the blame game.
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There is no safe
It was State’s fault. That’s the journalistic version of the Accountability and Review Board (ARB) unclassified report on the killing of Ambassador Stevens and three of his colleagues in Benghazi last September. State has been quick to react: Hillary Clinton accepts the report and is asking Congress to transfer $1.3 billion from funds that had been allocated for spending in Iraq. This includes $553 million for additional Marine security guards; $130 million for diplomatic security personnel; and $691 million for improving security at installations abroad.
I accept without question the ARB’s conclusions about the Benghazi incident. They know better than I do when they say officials in Benghazi and Tripoli reacted appropriately and bravely, the facility had inadequate physical security (including a minimal guard force), there was no intelligence suggesting an attack was imminent, and different parts of the State Department failed to provide leadership and collaborate in providing the resources required.
It is on the broader issue of how to protect American diplomats (and other civilians who work abroad on behalf of the United States government) that I would fault this report. The Board recognized the basic problem:
…the ARB has examined the terrorist attacks in Benghazi with an eye towards how we can better advance American interests and protect our personnel in an increasingly complex and dangerous world….the United States cannot retreat in the face of such challenges, we must work more rigorously and adeptly to address them…American diplomats and security professionals, like their military colleagues, serve the nation in an inherently risky profession. Risk mitigation involves two imperatives – engagement and security – which require wise leadership, good intelligence and evaluation, proper defense and strong preparedness and, at times, downsizing, indirect access and even withdrawal. There is no one paradigm. Experienced leadership, close coordination and agility, timely informed decision making, and adequate funding and personnel resources are essential.
But that is the last we hear of the need for agility. The paradigm reflected in the report, and in the State Department’s quick reaction, is to pile on more of the same, not to change the way we do things.
Mine is a hard argument to make. Arguably, Ambassador Stevens was doing exactly what I think is often safer: moving without too much security, engaging in ways that gave him intimate knowledge of the local situation and not building up a high profile of fixed security investment that makes so many of our facilities obvious targets and limits the mobility and engagement of our diplomats. The ARB notes:
The Ambassador did not see a direct threat of an attack of this nature and scale on the U.S. Mission in the overall negative trendline of security incidents from spring to summer 2012. His status as the leading U.S. government advocate on Libya policy, and his expertise on Benghazi in particular, caused Washington to give unusual deference to his judgments.
Ambassador Stevens was handling things the way he thought best. It did not make him safe.
But that is just the point. There is no “safe.” The Ambassador retreated, in accordance with State Department practice, to a hardened “safe haven.” It wasn’t safe because the attackers set the building in which it was located on fire. I’ll get in trouble for this, but the Arabic-speaking Chris Stevens might have been safer walking out the back door of the compound and knocking on the first Libyan door he came to. The odds are 99 in 100 that he would have been welcomed and made comfortable while he awaited rescue.
I do know something about the environment in Benghazi, which I have visited twice since Qaddafi fell. It is profoundly friendly towards Americans, who are credited with saving the city from a massacre. I have run along the harbor in Tripoli. I have driven through demonstrations outside the court-house in Benghazi repeatedly at a snail’s pace, revolutionary flags draped over the windshield and happy Libyans giving the obvious foreigners the thumbs’ up sign.
But there are bad guys in Benghazi as well, and no serious police force, as the ARB report notes. That’s why the Benghazi facility depended on a militia group for its guard force (with which however the Americans were in a labor dispute, according to the ARB). Chris Stevens knew all about both the militia and the radicals, as he talked with a Libyan the morning he was killed who had recounted to me a two months earlier the order of battle of extremist groups in Derna, a hotbed of radicalism to the east. He would certainly have asked his interlocutor (that’s diplomatese for the person you talk to) about extremist groups and the militias.
There are extremist groups just about everywhere these days. So the State Department reaction is understandable: raise the barriers to successful penetration of our facilities. The trouble is there is no guarantee that makes you any safer, and it certainly inhibits engagement. There is always some level of force that can overcome defenses. Only a fully capable and committed host government can make a diplomatic facility relatively safe. An embassy or diplomatic office in a conflict zone soon after a revolution cannot be 100% safe. Once we have acknowledged that, we should have a serious discussion about what makes it “safer,” and less safe.
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Fantasyland
Anyone who thought, as The Economist and others have reported, that Serbia was softening its position on Kosovo and would yield to sweet reason has to be disappointed today. The Belgrade platform for negotiations on Kosovo represents a giant step backwards in Serbia’s position, as it pretends to meet international community demands for dismantling of illegal Serbian institutions in Kosovo by legalizing and unifying them, with the entire “autonomous” province under Serbian sovereignty. Serbs in Kosovo would gain not only separate and equal institutions, but also a legislative veto, their own justice and police systems and many other powers. This would apply not only to the northern bit of Kosovo still under Serbian control, but also south of the Ibar river to communities that have at least partially accepted and integrated into Kosovo government institutions.
What Belgrade has failed to do is come to terms with the independence and sovereignty of Kosovo. This is not surprising, but it is still important: it means that Kosovo will need to equip itself for a future in which Serbia continues to claim sovereignty over the entire territory. I don’t envy Pristina. To my knowledge, no two countries that fail to recognize each other and establish a clearly demarcated border have an untroubled relationship. Serbia is Kosovo’s most powerful and threatening neighbor, its largest potential market and its historical metropole. Good neighborly relations would be a big plus for Kosovo. It isn’t going to happen based on the platform Belgrade has written for itself.
Belgrade has also failed to apply a simple but critical equity test to its own propositions: how much of what it proposes would it be ready and willing to offer to Albanians in southern Serbia or Bosniaks in Sandjak? Almost none of it. It is profoundly sad, and risible, that Belgrade claims for Serbs who have left Kosovo (including their descendants) the right to return when such rights have been blatantly violated by Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I’ve heard few in Belgrade bemoaning that (I hasten to add that those few are wonderful people).
International community reaction at this point is important. There will be an enormous temptation for the European Union and the United States, having waited long for this platform and no doubt tried to influence its contents, to try to see at least parts of it in a favorable light, or at least as a basis for negotiation. That would be a mistake. This platform stops just short of a declaration of war on Kosovo’s institutions and on the international community’s at least partially successful efforts to build a democracy in Kosovo. There is precious little in it that I would advise Pristina to discuss. Washington and Brussels should be profoundly disappointed and say so.
So what now? Belgrade is unhappy with the technical talks that it pursued with Pristina for more than a year, as they view them as having encroached on political issues. They are correct. While Belgrade celebrated each and every agreement as a Serbian triumph, the technical talks were gradually establishing Belgrade and Pristina as equal negotiating partners. That was the intention in both Brussels and Washington. But the talks were also reaching the limit of what could be achieved without deciding on Kosovo’s status: is it an autonomous province of Serbia, as Belgrade continues to want to claim, or is it a sovereign state, as half the UN General Assembly now recognizes? There really is no doubt about the answer to this question, but the EU has to tiptoe around it because of its five members who don’t recognize Kosovo.
Pristina should of course continue to be willing to meet with Belgrade on an equal basis and expect all agendas to be reciprocal in both letter and spirit. If Belgrade wants to discuss governance in northern Kosovo, it has to be willing to discuss governance in southern Serbia. That’s a non-starter, so there is no need for Pristina to discuss Kosovo’s own internal political arrangements with Belgrade. They are spelled out clearly in the Ahtisaari plan for a Comprehensive Peace Settlement that both the EU and the U.S. adhere to. Pristina has shown good faith in trying to implement them.
A note to non-recognizers of Kosovo: if you thought that your non-recognition was in any way helping to soften Belgrade’s stance or promote a negotiated solution, Belgrade’s platform for the negotiations should be enough to convince you otherwise. The best possible response to this gross overreach is to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with Pristina.
A note to Albanians: I can well imagine how angry this Serbian document will make those of you who have worked hard to establish serious democratic institutions capable of treating Serbs and other minorities correctly. The right response is a peaceful one, no matter how strong the passions. Anything else will play into Belgrade’s narrative that the Balkans won’t be safe from violence if Kosovo is sovereign and independent.
A note to Serbs: Kosovo is lost to Belgrade’s sovereignty. Protection of Serbs in Kosovo is still a legitimate interest. That’s what the talks with Pristina should be about, not about Kosovo’s status, which has been decided in a political process foreseen in UN Security Council resolution 1244. You did not like the result, but that will not change it. You can block UN membership for Kosovo, but it would be a mistake to try to change the facts on the ground. The effort to ensure that Serbs are governed only by Serbian majorities on their own territory has led Belgrade into war several times in the past. It is a profound error to stick with it. Go visit Kosovo: see for yourselves the reality. Then come back and tell me whether you want to continue living in Fantasyland.
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A soap balloon bursts
Pristina Friday and over the weekend saw violence against those promoting equal rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people. The Ministry of European Integration on behalf of government issued a strong statement. Deputy Foreign Minister of Kosovo (and Member of State Commission of Religious Freedoms) Petrit Selimi (@petrit) also commented. The US Embassy in Pristina joined in condemning the attack, also praising the swift reaction of the government. This is an edited version of Petrit’s comments, originally published in Albanian in the Pristina-based Express:
By now you ought to have heard the story. A Kosovo magazine called Kosovo 2.0, a seasonal publication, announced that its next issue will be dedicated to sex and sensuality. The magazine organized civic debates on the issues of gender and sexual identity, with special focus on the sensitive topic of the LGBT community in Kosovo and Balkans. The magazine is sponsored by, among others, the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy and Norwegian Foreign Ministry, both entities helpful in supporting democratization of Kosovo, even if some projects have a distinct anti-government line.
The planned event was accompanied by a concert and DJ’s, as well as guests attending a parallel event of Prishtina Youth Summit organized by Youth Initiative for Human Rights. A few days earlier, a “student” organization and some people pretending to be football fans of Prishtina FC (Plisat) started making noise on social networks about “a night of orgies” and “immorality”. On top of that, in some Kosovar mosques, some imams used (what one can freely call) hate-speech and called “Xhemat” [the believers] for “action” to “stop immorality” and “propagation of whoredom” (a direct quote from one such statement of one so-called religious leader).
The event was reported to the police, as were the threats that organizers received. Police did send a patrol to be present at the actual opening of the event. Possibly, the risk-assessment by both the organizer as well as police was not the best, as those 4-5 policemen did give their honest best, but couldn’t stop a few dozen hooligans and religious extremists who were chanting “Allahu Akber”, “Faggots Faggots”, “Whores Whores” while entering and demolishing the stage of Youth and Sports Center where the lecture were planned to take place. You can see the recordings on YouTube.
Very promptly, special police units come to the scene to stop a more serious incident unfolding.
Shocked by the phone calls I received from friends stuck inside the center who didn’t dare come out, as soon as I landed home from Zagreb (where Adriatic Charter meeting took place), I went there to witness scenes one usually sees far from Pristina. A hundred guys or so were cursing, throwing items while a big number of police was escorting the participants from the Sports and Youth Center. Naturally, as many of these participants were guests of Republic of Kosovo for the Prishtina Youth Summit (including members of family of Nelson Mandela as well as diverse journalists) the entire event had a potential to bring a serious blow to our reputation. We, different from Serbia and despite the extremist discourse found online, are not known to have public shows of violence against freedom of speech and sexual minorities. This illusion burst as a soap balloon when I recall the scenes from Friday.
What’s worse, some of these hooligans also showed up with baseball bats in several coffee-shops “looking for faggots” like a moral militia that “protects the feelings of majority.” Some individuals who were not even part of the organization of events also received threats from these groups. In social networks we witnessed a rapid explosion in hate-speech. The same goes for local news portals, which readily become a disgusting source of uncontrollable hate by allowing publication of online comments that threaten human dignity and integrity. For these websites, gaining clicks is more important than checking the discourse.
Some groups and institutions must give us some answers:
1. Kosovo police and courts must act swiftly and without a doubt. OSCE has reacted. Samuel Zbogar on behalf of EU reacted. The European Parliament through Ulrike Lunacek reacted. The Ombudsperson of Kosovo reacted. The Government of Kosovo reacted through a strong statement issued by Prime Minister Thaci, EU Minister Vlora Citaku, Minister of Interior Rexhepi. Mrs Citaku reacted first because she coordinates all efforts for Kosovo to fulfill all criteria from the Feasibility Study, including freedom of speech. Interior Minister Bajram Rexhepi and Justice Minister Hajredin Kuci and country’s prosecutors must act addressing this issue in the weeks ahead. This work has to be visible and without a shred of doubt in its seriousness. On this issue, political points and electoral politics should be forgotten, as we are part of Europe. The EU will not let this issue drop from attention. Extremism will not disappear by ignoring it. The evil has to be cut at its roots. In Kosovo we still have ample space to be firm against these groups.
2. The Islamic Community of Kosovo (ICK) will have to distance itself from the imams who use a discourse of violence and hate. If the Islamic Community is advocating with the government to introduce religious lessons in schools to be taught by ICK staff, then they have to understand that with these kind of behavior these people will never, I repeat never, be allowed anywhere close to school buildings. The Wahabi style of extremism demands a clear response by ICK. I fully understand that ICK, as well as the Catholic Church and other faith organizations do not appreciate homosexuality. This is not a subject of discussion here. The truth is that some mosques have been used to recruit “moral” militia who seek to curtail freedom of speech based on gender or sexual orientation. What happens when one of these “believers” commits a murder, inspired by what he hears in a mosque? Does he go to Hell or Heaven? I believe the answer is known by the religious leaders and since you know the answer, your reaction has to be based on the teaching of The Book, which is a book of love and peace and not hate and violence.
3. An answer is needed from the leaders of Prishtina football fans as well. In my younger days, being a “Plis” meant to be proud of the city club, being proud of the diversity and urban spirit of the capital city compared to all the other cities. It meant being proud of civic culture. So I plead with my friends, Minister of Agriculture Blerand Stavileci and Minister of Sports Memli Krasniqi, who are both active participants of the sports landscape and who both have credit for the successes of the Prishtina football and basketball clubs to distance themselves from the fake representatives of the capital city’s sports clubs. These people are using the cover of Plisat fans to promote an extremist agenda. This reaction is especially important now after FIFA’s decision to allow for [our] clubs to play international football. We should not allow our fans to blacken the image of our country, as Serbia’s hooligans do.
4. An answer has to be provided by political parties as well, especially those that pretend to speak on behalf “of the people” and who advocate for “direct democracy of the majority.” One easily forgets that there is a fundamental problem with the concepts of “rule of majorities” as in those ideologies one seldom finds space for the minority. An uneducated guy can’t be closer to these parties than the much respected Igballe Rugova, a Kosovo icon of social activism who was the focus of the planned magazine launch on Friday. She has given a personal contribution for Albanians, for Albanian woman, for the 20,000 raped women of the war and she frequently criticizes the Government on the challenges of the contemporary social and economic situation. According to those extremists that have taken the mantle of deciding who is Albanian and who not by their standards of morality (aided by those that support such populist, radical and anti-system discourse), Mrs. Rugova should be lynched. I don’t have to hide my disgust when I think of how she’s been treated. Also, misogynist attacks on Minister Vlora Citaku and women in politics from some of the members of such political parties have undoubtedly contributed to creation of a landscape prone to violence and intolerance. From a word uttered the path to action taken is very short and radicals know this. De facto they love this, as by provoking violence they hope they can change the system. But the system will not fall. They should forget this scenario before someone looses a life.
5. Civil society organizations should also speak out loud against these bandits with baseball bats who have an issue with sex. I have a bad taste in my mouth when some of them say “we have bigger problems to tackle such as corruption, rule of law or Mitrovica.” Some of world’s worst theocracies have little corruption and no problem with rule of law. Rule of Law is not an aim in itself but a means to reach the type of society that we aim. Our Constitution projects that societal consensus. Until we change our Constitution, as it stands, the category of religious identity such as being Catholic, Buddhist or, as over 90% of Kosovars say, Muslim is exactly the same as the ethnic category, or indeed sexual orientation. One cannot raise voice in protest for protection of rights of Albanians in northern Kosovo but stay silent on rights of gays in central Prishtina. I repeat myself – I am not entering a debate on the values – I’m merely basing this column on the existing legal and constitutional framework. The relativist explanations by some that “both sides are to be blamed” and that “it’s all governments fault as they don’t provide employment” are weak, meek and basically cynical, closing our eyes in front of darkness that stares at us.
With some of those that were threatened on Friday and the subsequent weekend, I have strong political disagreements and we often debate in the media. Some of them support radical political options just because they share common policies against this government. This type of flirtation based on temporary daily political needs makes them forget the fundamental difference between the ethnic and civil concepts of the state. Such a political chimera was bound to eat the hand that fed it.
There are many people, many more then those frustrated hooligans, who believe in rules and laws and believe that we deserve to be Europe; that we are Europe; that we want an economy entrenched in Europe and personal freedoms like those in Europe. These are innumerable islands that must be connected in an archipelago of civic resistance and coalitions beyond the political party divisions and personal fights.
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This week’s peace picks
Slowing for the holidays, but still some interesting events.
1. The World in 2013 – Admiral Mike Mullen and Jessica Matthews, Monday December 17, 12:30 PM – 2:00 PM, U.S. Carnegie Endowment
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speakers: Mike Mullen and Jessica Matthews
How will President Obama use American power in 2013? Will the United States ever restore its fiscal health? And how can Obama ensure the U.S. rebalance toward Asia succeeds? Join us for an in-depth conversation between Admiral Mike Mullen and Carnegie’s Jessica T. Mathews as they discuss the foreign policy landscape confronting the president in 2013.
Register for this event here.
2. Book Event: U.S.-China Relations After the Two Leadership Transitions: Change or Continuity?, Monday December 17, 4:00 PM – 6:00 PM, CSIS
Venue: CSIS, 1800 K Street NW, Washington DC, 20006, B1 Conference Room
Speakers: Andrew J. Nathan, Andrew Scobell, David M. Lampton, Randy G. Schriver, Bonnie S. Glaser
Leadership transitions have brought new leaders to office in China while confirming President Obama in a second term: do these events portend change or continuity in U.S.-China relations? In their new book, China’s Search for Security, Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell argue that the key to understanding China’s foreign policy is to grasp its geostrategic challenges: despite its impressive size and population, economic vitality, and drive to upgrade its military capabilities, China remains a vulnerable nation surrounded by powerful rivals and potential foes. Even as the country grows and comes to dominate its neighbors, challenges remain, foremost among them, in the eyes of China’s leaders, the United States. The Obama administration, for its part, looks set to continue its policy pivot to Asia. The authors will discuss their book, analyzing China’s security concerns and how the U.S. can protect its interests in Asia without triggering a confrontation with China.
Register for this event here.
3. What is in Store for a Post-Asad Syria?, Tuesday December 18, 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM, Center for National Policy
Venue: Center for National Policy, One Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20001, Suite 333
Speakers: Gregory Aftandilian, Mona Yacoubian, Joseph Holliday
With the end finally nearing for the Assad regime, the question of what type of government will emerge in Syria looms over the horizon. Will it be inclusive and tolerant of minority groups? Will it prevent retribution killings of Alawites? Will the Syrian state remain whole or will some minority groups like the Kurds and the Alawites try to carve out separate statelets? Join CNP’s Senior Fellow for the Middle East, Gregory Aftandilian, and a panel of experts to discuss these timely issues.
Register for this event here.
4. Is Peace Possible?, Wednesday December 19, 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM, New America Foundation
Venue: New America Foundation, 1899 L Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, Suite 400
Speakers: James Zogby, Lara Friedman, Yousef Munayyer, Peter Beinart
The Arab American Institute and the New America Foundation’s Middle East Task Force invite you to the launch of a critical public opinion survey on what Palestinians and Israelis want in a peace deal and their thoughts about the prospects for achieving it.
During the month of September, 2012, Zogby Research Services conducted a comprehensive, unprecedented survey of Israeli Jews and Arabs; Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem; Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan; and the American Jewish community. The poll was conducted for the Sir Bani Yas Forum in the UAE. Join us for the survey’s public release and a discussion of what Palestinians and Israelis really think about peace.
Register for this event here.
5. Strengthening the Global Partnership Against the Spread of WMD, Thursday December 20, 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM, Hudson Institute
Venue: Hudson Institute, 1015 15th Street NW, Washington, DC 20005, 6th Floor
Speakers: Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, Andrew Semmel, Richard Weitz
Recent years have seen several nuclear smuggling incidents and revelations regarding the extensive scope of past illicit WMD proliferation activities. An effective international nuclear security strategy requires a broad network of stakeholders to gather knowledge and secure nuclear weapons-related materials and technologies; prevent their misuse; and reduce the risks caused by their availability.
What steps can the United States and other countries take to strengthen nuclear material security in coming years? Please join us to discuss the lessons learned, critical challenges, and the path forward for the G8 Global Partnership in the 21st century.
Register for this event here.
6. The Future of U.S.-Taiwan Relations: Impressions from CNP’s 2012 Scholars Delegation, Thursday December 20, 12:00 PM – 1:15 PM, Center for National Policy
Venue: Center for National Policy, One Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20001, Suite 333
Speakers: Malou Innocent, Jacqueline N. Deal, Michael Breen, Scott Bates, Anthony Woods, John Garafano, Michael Auslin, Andrew Lavigne
Less than a month after the November reelection of President Obama, CNP sent a U.S. Scholars Delegation comprised of current and next generation policy experts and decision makers to meet with Taiwanese officials, trade experts and academics, to examine the future of U.S.-Taiwan relations. Join CNP President Scott Bates and members of the delegation as they offer views on their recent visit to Taipei.
Register for this event here.
7. Benghazi Attack, Part II: The Report of the Accountability Review Board, Thursday December 20, 1:00 PM, House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Venue: House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2170 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515
Speaker: Hillary Rodham Clinton
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