Month: December 2012
Recognition is the beginning, not the end
Reuters published my piece today, under the title, “Washington’s next steps on Syria”:
The United States has officially recognized the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people. It has also designated al Qaeda in Iraq-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra, which often leads the fighting effort in Syria, as a terrorist organization, thus making it illegal for anyone to buy it even a cup of tea. This double-barreled political action, after months of hesitation, is intended to convey the message that Washington supports the relative moderates of the Syrian opposition wholeheartedly but wants to exclude from its ranks Sunni extremists.
The trouble is both moves come late in the game. At this point, U.S. influence may not be sufficient to accomplish the objectives.
A lot depends on the Syrians themselves. Most Syrians do not want to see sectarian slaughter following the current civil war. The question is whether they will be willing and able to restrain the Sunni extremists in their midst. It will take courage and commitment for today’s revolutionaries to speak up and protect Alawites, Christians, Druze and Shia who are suspected of supporting the Assad regime. Mass atrocity in the aftermath of political upheaval is more the rule than the exception. There is little sign that the international community will be able to mount a serious protection effort.
Jabhat al-Nusra would not hold the leading position it does today except for its relative effectiveness both on the battlefield and in providing services to liberated areas. The moderate Syrian opposition needs to get better at both if it is to compete effectively for mass support. It is trying. It has welcomed the Kurdish National Council into the Coalition and formed a new, more unified military command that excludes Jabhat al-Nusra. There was a meeting this week in Istanbul of the Civil Administration Councils from liberated areas in Syria. They need funds. A lot depends on their ability to provide food and shelter, pick up the garbage, open the schools, restore law and order. And it all has to be done in a fair and transparent way that avoids rumors of corruption and nepotism.
Much also depends on what Washington does to follow through. Once it recognizes as legitimate a government other than the one presided over by Bashar al-Assad, Washington can respond to that government’s requests for assistance. Humanitarian assistance is a no-brainer, but it will take patience and fortitude to get at least some of it delivered through the Coalition’s still primitive governing mechanisms. Political help is also desperately needed: the civil administration councils as well as the Coalition itself will need to construct a governing apparatus that is seen as both legitimate and competent, no easy task while bombs are falling around you.
The question of military assistance is still an open one. There are reports of military training in Jordan for Syrians preparing to try to secure Assad’s chemical weapons and to shoot down regime aircraft. An internationally enforced no-fly zone would be a major step, one that would tilt the battlefield in the revolutionary direction. Yet the Obama administration, anxious to avoid getting too deeply involved and not wanting to provoke the Assad-friendly Russians, is still hesitating.
On the economic front, Syria is in desperate condition. It is more akin to Egypt, which likewise has limited oil and gas, than Libya, a wealthy country with less than one-third of Syria’s population. Economic policy and Syria’s limited natural resources reside with whoever controls Damascus, so the liberated areas in other parts of the country will be doubly impoverished. The liberated areas need major and quick infusions of international funding.
Social conditions are appalling. More than 500,000 people are refugees, mostly in neighboring Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon. While the regime has been cooperating more with international relief efforts in recent weeks, there are likely several million people displaced internally, which makes for an enormous burden in providing food, shelter, sanitation and health care, even at the most basic level.
It is a good thing that Washington is recognizing both the virtues of the Coalition it helped to construct and the vices of Jabhat al-Nusra. But this is the beginning, not the end.
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Who’s afraid of North Korea?
The North Korean launch of a satellite has spooked the experts. Many thought the rocket wasn’t ready or anticipated its failure. Things seem to have gone quickly and smoothly, a stark contrast to previous attempts.
Lots of countries can launch satellites. All the other current nuclear weapons states can do it. Why so much concern about North Korea? There are two reasons:
- North Korea is North Korea;
- the UN Security Council has prohibited Pyongyang from testing long-range missiles.
Pyongyang has repeatedly shown itself ready and willing to use force, mainly against South Korea, which is pretty much the only enemy it can reach with its current arsenal. Preoccupied with its own survival, the regime is bellicose and provocative towards not only the South but also towards Japan and the United States.
Even paranoids have enemies. Tokyo and Washington are no friends of Pyongyang and would be delighted to see the regime there tumble. Short of that, they would like to see it constrained. They have been successful twice in convincing the Security Council to levy tough requirements on North Korea.
The military threat to the United States from North Korea is not the principal problem. Even with this successful missile launch, it will be decades before Pyongyang is capable of seriously threatening any of its neighbors other than Seoul. The United States is safe from North Korean nuclear weapons for a good while into the future.
But North Korea’s belligerence is destabilizing regionally. Between North Korean belligerence and Chinese nationalism, Tokyo is not wrong to think about how it needs to beef up its defense capabilities. Even the Chinese have objected to the satellite launch, which most experts believe is a thinly veiled missile test.
Also important is the weight and prestige of the UN Security Council. There are many countries that do not stick to the letter of what the UNSC decides. But the (Chapter VII) resolutions on North Korea are unusually explicit and forceful on the ballistic missile issue:
- 1718 (2006) “Demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile”;
- 1874 (2009) “Demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology.”
Note that slight shift in language, obviously intended to include something like a satellite launch, which uses ballistic missile technology even if some might say a launch vehicle is not a “missile.” North Korean defiance, which extends also to many other aspects of these two resolutions, risks convincing others that the UNSC is a paper tiger.
So now it is up to the Security Council to respond. I imagine it will find a way to tighten sanctions or other measures against Pyongyang, an approach that has not worked overly well in the past but still checks the “we did something” box. It is in fact hard to think of anything else to do. No one should today be afraid of North Korea except South and North Koreans, who suffer mightily under the Kim regime. They may have to suffer more now that the regime boasts longer-range missiles with which to frighten its neighbors.
PS: For the Korean speakers among you (translations welcome), here is the official announcement (via @shanghaiist):
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Keep pedaling
My friends in Macedonia will expect me this morning to share their fury at the European Council, which yesterday once again postponed a decision on when accession talks with Skopje can begin. Spyros Sophos* wrote to colleagues and friends:
the Brussels outcome is shortsighted and disgraceful. It has the potential to undermine the stability of Macedonia and to reward the forces of nationalism and hatred in all the countries and communities involved.
He is right.
But I am not going to join the chorus denouncing the European Union, which ironically collected its Nobel Peace Prize this week. Instead, I am going to ask, what is this all about? what can be done to solve the problem?
It is about identity more than anything else. Macedonians claim to be distinct: to have their own language, culture and history. Bulgaria, one of the two countries blocking an EU consensus to open accession talks, has a problem with this. Sofia wants Skopje to acknowledge the common history, culture and language of the two now separate countries.
Greece, the other country blocking an EU consesnsus, has a different identity problem. It claims that Macedonia has no right to use an unqualified appelation that belongs to Greece, historically, culturally and linguistically. It also fears, or some in Athens say they fear, Macedonian claims to Greek territory. While I have seen no evidence for that claim, it is certainly true that Skopje would like Greece to acknowledge the existence of a Macedonian minority within Greece. That is not the only minority Athens refuses to acknowledge, as it claims its citizens are Greek, tout court. No hyphens in the land of Alexander.
For this American (unhyphenated by the way), all this is pretty indigestible and hard to take seriously when there is death and destruction in Syria, a satellite launch by North Korea, constitutional chaos in Egypt, progress towards nuclear weapons in Iran, a stalled Middle East peace process and several dozen other current problems that seem far more important. But that is precisely the point: however intractable Balkans identity problems may be today, they are not deadly to large numbers of people, as they were in the past. The EU is maddeningly slow and ponderous, but it has also managed to dampen the fighting spirits that generated war and slaughter only a decade or two ago.
The charm may not last. The bicycle analogy is pertinent: only forward motion keeps the Balkans from falling over into violence. The EU’s non-decision will generate nationalist passions inside Macedonia, strain relations with its large Albanian minority and further exacerbate relations with Bulgaria and Greece. If you ignore people because they don’t resort to violence, they might just learn the wrong lesson.
To continue to merit its Nobel Peace Prize, the EU needs to get beyond the current stalemate. I hope it can do that in six months time, when Macedonia comes up for consideration once again. The necessary instrument is lying close at hand: the Interim Accord that Athens and Skopje agreed in 1995 should allow Skopje to enter NATO as “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and to begin EU accession negotiations with that name. This is acceptable to Skopje and is not, it seems to me, offensive to either Bulgaria or Greece, which the International Court of Justice has found in violation of the accord.
Please, EU, keep pedaling to prevent the Balkans bicycle from falling over. The time for a definitive solution will come with Skopje’s accession.
*Apologies to Spyros Sophos: in the first posting, I mistakenly attributed this quote to someone else.
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Are Islamist victories avoidable?
“If democracy is to triumph in the Middle East, then Islamist victories are unavoidable and essential.” This was the resolution debated in the opening panel of last Thursday’s event on “Dictators and Dissidents: Should the West choose sides?” hosted by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Reuel Marc Gerecht of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Brian Katulis of the Center for American Progress affirmed the resolution and Rob Satloff of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Bret Stephens of the Wall Street Journal opposed it. Though there were two teams, four different positions emerged.
Gerecht argued that democracy takes time and we should have faith in the democratic process. We may not know what the ultimate outcome of a democratic process, but we do know what will happen with the alternative. Dictators in the Middle East did not move their countries any closer to democracy. They created an environment that gave rise to al Qaeda.
Stephens responded arguing that the democratic process will not be successful when those participating, Islamists in his example, are opposed to democracy. Democratic process cannot be conflated with democracy. Stephens added that sometimes we have to make difficult choices, like supporting a dictator if we think the outcome will be more democratic than a democratic process in the same area would yield. Gerecht equated this with Kemalism, which he called “enlightened despotism.”
Satloff denied the inevitability of Islamist victories. In reality, Islamists rarely win – they almost never get more than 1/3 of the popular vote. What really happens is that non-Islamists lose because of in-fighting and lack of coherent vision. Ahmed Shafiq won 48% of the popular vote even though he was associated with Mubarak suggesting desire for non-Islamist leadership. A capable non-Islamist candidate from an organized party would have had a good shot. To believe that people in the Middle East will often elect Islamists is to fall victim to what Satloff calls the “bigotry of low expectations.” We should believe that people in the Middle East are capable of making reasonable decisions and as such, will not elect Islamists every time.
Katulis argued the opposite point. He said debating this resolution is like debating gravity. Islamists are winning. When they do win, he believes they will have to moderate their ideals and policies, which might be the best antidote to extremism.
It was unclear who won the debate. It seems like the root question is about how much faith one has in the democratic process. Election outcomes don’t matter if your faith is strong.
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The street called straight
It would be a mistake for anyone to extrapolate from the current situation in Syria to an outcome. It is, after all, in Damascus that the once main street (الشارع المستقيم) is only called straight. But we are now approaching a denouement, however many more deviations may still occur.
The indicators are both internal and external. You know your regime is in trouble when you can’t get to the capital’s main airport without going through rebel checkpoints, most of the border crossing points with Turkey and several important northern army bases are also in insurgent hands and the revolutionaries have grounded or destroyed something like 100 of your air force’s planes and helicopters. It’s also trouble when the Americans start talking about the consequences if you use weapons of mass destruction and Jim Dobbins publishes a piece in the Financial Times suggesting ways in which intervention could be justified. UN Envoy Brahimi’s recent tête-à-têtewith the Russian Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State should also give you pause.
Washington and Moscow are now concluding that they really do share a common interest in preventing a radical Islamist takeover in Syria. It’s about time. Moscow has been unwise to continue to bank on Bashar al Asad as a bulwark against Sunni extremism. Washington has been unwise to think it could steer the revolution in Syria in a democratic direction without making any major commitment in arms or military action. If they can find common cause now, they may still have time and influence enough to prevent the worst from happening.
Pretty much the only important political document Moscow and Washington have agreed on since the Syria rebellion began is last June’s “action group” communiqué. That will be at least part of the basis for the current talks. It foresees a Syrian state that
• Is genuinely democratic and pluralistic, giving space to established and newly emerging political actors to compete fairly and equally in elections. This also means that the commitment to multi-party democracy must be a lasting one, going beyond an initial round of elections.
• Complies with international standards on human rights, the independence of the judiciary, accountability of those in government and the rule of law. It is not enough just to enunciate such a commitment. There must be mechanisms available to the people to ensure that these commitments are kept by those in authority.
• Offers equal opportunities and chances for all. There is no room for sectarianism or discrimination on ethnic, religious, linguistic or any other grounds. Numerically smaller communities must be assured that their rights will be respected.
How to get there from here is hard to picture, but the goal is admirably clear. The action group statement is also admirably clear on the steps to be taken to achieve a transition to such a state:
• The establishment of a transitional governing body which can establish a neutral environment in which the transition can take place. That means that the transitional governing body would exercise full executive powers. It could include members of the present government and the opposition and other groups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent.
• It is for the Syrian people to determine the future of the country. All groups and segments of society in Syria must be enabled to participate in a National Dialogue process. That process must not only be inclusive, it must also be meaningful—that is to say, its key outcomes must be implemented.
• On this basis, there can be a review of the constitutional order and the legal system. The result of constitutional drafting would be subject to popular approval.
• Once the new constitutional order is established, it is necessary to prepare for and conduct free and fair multi-party elections for the new institutions and offices that have been established.
• Women must be fully represented in all aspects of the transition.
It is that first step in the process that is both crucial and problematic: the establishment of a transitional governing body with full executive powers. What this suggests is an interim government fully empowered even with Bashar al Asad still in Damascus, as this “action group” transition plan makes no reference to his stepping aside (a key demand of the Syrian opposition and source of friction between Washington and Moscow). This is not only hard to picture, but so far as I am aware has never been successfully attempted in the past. I asked a knowledgeable person recently: he could not think of an example. The best I can come up with is the current coalition arrangements in Zimbabwe, where President Mugabe is still in place but a good deal of governing authority is in opposition hands. That is not an encouraging precedent.
There are other problems with the idea of a negotiated transition. Jebhat al Nusra, the Al Qaeda in Iraq franchise that operates in Syria, will not be interested in one. They have two strong points: lots of weapons and a reputation for fighting the regime (and avoiding exploitation of the population) that appears unequaled. It will be hard for the Washington-favored Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces to compete with the more radical Sunni extremists who have been in the vanguard of the fight against Asad, using weapons paid for by wealthy Saudis and Qataris.
One thing might level the playing field: an international intervention force, which the UN is just beginning to think about. That is what was lacking in Libya, allowing extremists a much freer hand there than has been healthy either for American diplomats or the political transition. But who would be willing to send troops into Syria at the end of this horrendous civil war, when revenge killing, the struggle for power and disorder will be at their peak? Qatar and Saudi Arabia have been willing to pump money and arms to their favorites, but they are hardly suitable as impartial peacekeepers. Turkey and Iran are viewed as protagonists within Syria, the former in favor of the rebellion and the latter against it. Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Tunisia are hardly in a position to embark on a difficult foreign venture. Europe and the United States do not want their own boots on the ground and will oppose Russian and Chinese troops in Syria.
As it has from the beginning, Syria poses far more problems than the international system can answer. The guys with guns will control the transition in Syria, with consequences that could take the country far from the democratic transition that the action group would prefer. Moscow and Washington will need to cooperate and exert a lot of influence to prevent that from happening.
PS: Having violated my general rule of always reading Mike Eisenstadt before publishing, the best I can do now is cite his piece on what a hard fall might look like.
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This week’s peace picks
Our suggested events begin and end with Egypt, but on Tuesday there are four overlapping discussions of Afghanistan. Thoughtless think tanks?
1. Revolution in Progress: Will There be a Democratic Egypt?, Monday December 10, 1:00 PM – 2:30 PM, U.S. Capitol Visitor Center
Venue: U.S. Capital, U.S. Capitol Visitor Center, Congressional Meeting Room North, Washington, DC 20510
Speakers: Nancy Okail, Steven Cook, Charles Dunne
With President Mohammad Morsi claiming widespread new powers leading to massive public protests the future of Egyptian democracy remains in the balance. Bitter fights continue over the distribution of authority. NGO workers, including those of Freedom House, continue to face prosecution for their work. The role of human rights, women, and religion in the new Egypt remain unclear. And these defining struggles are taking place in a near-institutional vacuum, in which the law, the constitution, and the relations between branches of government are all up for grabs. How these issues are settled will determine Egypt’s future— and its relationship with the United States.
Register for this event here.
2. Muslim-Majority Constitutions and the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief, Monday December 10, 6:00 PM – 7:30 PM, Karamah
Venue: Karamah, 1420 16th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speakers: Elizabeth Cassidy, Mohamed Abdel Aziz Ibrahim, Knox Thames
A representative from the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and an expert on Muslim constitutions will present and discuss USCIRF’s recent report entitled, “The Religion-State Relationship and the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitutions of Majority Muslim Countries and Other OIC Members.” At this time when many nations are rewriting their foundational documents, the report provides a comparative analysis of religious freedom provisions in the constitutions of majority Muslim countries and other members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
Register for this event here.
3. Is America Still Exceptional? Foreign Policy over the Next Four Years, Monday December 10, 8:00 PM – 9:30 PM, Marvin Center Ampitheater
Venue: Marvin Center Ampitheater, 800 21st Street NW, Washington, DC 20037
Speakers: Henrey Nau, Daniel Deudney, James Goldgeier
This event features a debate between Henry Nau (GWU) and Daniel Deudney (JHU) on the future of American foreign policy. Moderated by James Goldgeier, Dean of AU’s School of International Studies.
Register for this event here.
4. Syria in Transition: An Insider’s View, Tuesday December 11, 12:15 PM – 1:30 PM, New America Foundation
Venue: New America Foundation, 1899 L Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, Suite 400
Speakers: Mohammed Ghanem, Ilhan Tanir, Leila Hilal
While fears of chemical weapons and of an impending “failed state” dominate discussions on Syria, a narrative is being largely lost: civil leaders inside Syria who are taking matters into their own hands.
Civilian administrative councils have emerged throughout Syria in so-called “liberated zones.” Civilians are organizing for purposes of administering basic municipal services and law and order as they prepare for a post-Assad future.
What do these pockets of self-governed territory look like and how can they be sustained? What is the relationship between the civilian councils and the military brigades? How can the United States most effectively help civilian units prepare for a post-Assad future?
Please join the New America Foundation’s Middle East Task Force for a conversation with Ilhan Tanir, Washington correspondent for Vatan, and Mohammed A. Ghanem, senior political advisor at the Syrian American Council, who has just returned from Syria. Ghanem and Tanir will discuss how Syrian civilians are creating a government of their own and how this movement may impact the country’s future.
Register for this event here.
5. Elections, Reconciliation, and the Final Two Years of Afghanistan’s Transition: Perspectives from the International Community, Tuesday December 11, 1:00 PM – 4:30 PM, USIP
Venue: United States Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037
Speakers: Steve Coll, Jim DeHart, Thomas Lynch, Clare Lockhart, Thomas Ruttig, Francesc Vendrell, Scott Warden, Scott Smith, Andrew Wilder
As the clock winds down on the final two years of Afghanistan’s security transition, where does the accompanying political transition stand?
The main elements of the political transition are the 2014 presidential elections and the attempt to forge a political reconciliation with the Taliban. These issues are interrelated. Some say that there can be no effective elections unless a reconciliation process can first ensure adequate security conditions. Others say that reconciliation is impossible until there is a newly elected government in Kabul.
Both processes are affected by Afghanistan’s many uncertainties. Yet some recent developments have settled some questions and opened new opportunities. The re-election of President Obama has settled the question of who is responsible for US policy. The recent release of Taliban leaders by Pakistan could indicate a willingness on the part of Islamabad to play a more active role in supporting a negotiation. The consolidation Salahuddin Rabbani as the Chairman of the High Peace Council may yield greater progress in talks with the armed opposition. The setting of the election date by the Independent Election Commission fulfilled a longstanding demand by the political opposition, but also raised questions about the feasibility of holding elections.
The press of time will force the international community to take a number of positions on a number of complex issues in Afghanistan. Please join USIP for two panel that will look at both processes of the political transition.
Register for this event here.
6. Afghanistan: Endgame or Persisting Challenge with Continuing Stakes?, Tuesday December 11, 2:00 PM – 3:30 PM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Speakers: Martin Indyk, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Ronald E. Neumann
After more than a decade of great effort and sacrifice by the United States and its allies, the Taliban still has not been defeated, and many Afghans believe that a civil war is coming. In 2014, foreign forces will complete the handover of security responsibility to their Afghan counterparts, international financial flows will radically decrease, and Afghanistan’s presidential elections will intensify political uncertainties. These challenges are mounting at a time when Afghanistan is dealing with rising insecurity, dysfunctional governance, rampant corruption and ethnic factionalization, while the regional environment is not easily conducive to stability in the country. With the U.S. and international publics tired of the war, fundamental questions about any remaining stakes in Afghanistan and the efficacy of any persisting stabilization efforts are increasing.
On December 11, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host the launch of a new book, Aspiration and Ambivalence: Strategies and Realities of Counterinsurgency and State-Building in Afghanistan (Brookings, 2012), by Brookings Fellow Vanda Felbab-Brown. Aspiration and Ambivalence analyzes the past decade of U.S. and international efforts in Afghanistan and offers detailed recommendations for dealing with the precarious situation leading up to the 2014 transition and after. In her book, Felbab-Brown argues that allied efforts in Afghanistan have put far too little emphasis on good governance, concentrating too much on short-term military goals to the detriment of long-term peace and stability. Felbab-Brown will be joined by Ronald E. Neumann, president of the American Academy of Diplomacy and former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan (2005-07). Vice President Martin S. Indyk, director of Foreign Policy, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.
After the program, panelists will take questions from the audience.
Register for this event here.
7. The United States and South Asia After Afghanistan, Tuesday December 11, 3:30 PM – 5:00 PM, Carnegie Endowment
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Root Room A/B/C
Speakers: Alexander Evans, Husain Haqqani, Karl F. Inderfurth, Cameron Munter, Wendy Chamberlin
U.S. interests in South Asia are evolving. An intense focus on counterterrorism and Afghanistan since 9/11 is giving way to a broader range of interests. Washington takes India’s global status seriously and is working closely with New Delhi on a range of regional and global issues. China’s rise, often neglected as a factor in South Asia policy, is encouraging a more strategic U.S. approach to Asia policy as a whole. As a result, a significant opportunity now exists to rethink U.S. South Asia strategy.
An upcoming report by Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Fellow Alexander Evans draws on over 90 interviews with a range of current and former U.S. policy practitioners from the State Department, National Security Council, Congress, and the intelligence community to consider how the United States can achieve an integrated South Asia policy following the 2014 military drawdown in Afghanistan. The report, which benefits from the expertise of the Asia Society Advisory Group on U.S. Policy toward South Asia, includes recommendations for better incorporating expertise into policy planning.
In conjunction with the report’s release, please join us for a discussion on the prospects for achieving a strategic U.S. approach to South Asia and the hard choices an incoming Administration will need to make to get there. An event will also take place in New York on December 12, Islamabad, Pakistan on December 18, and New Delhi, India on December 20.
RSVP for this event to AsiaDC@AsiaSociety.org.
8. Prescriptions for Peaceful Transitions: Is Democracy Mandatory?, Tuesday December 11, 4:00 PM – 5:30 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Bernstein-Offit Building, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 500
Speakers: Carl Gershman, Cynthia Irmer, Marina Ottaway, William Zartman
Carl Gershman, president of the National Endowment for Democracy; Cynthia Irmer, special assistant in the Office of the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Humans Rights at the U.S. Department of State; Marina Ottaway, senior associate in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and I. William Zartman, SAIS professor emeritus, will discuss this topic.
RSVP for this event to RSVP@ipsinstitute.org.
9. Finish the Job: Jump-Start Afghanistan’s Economy – A Handbook of Projects, Tuesday December 11, 5:30 PM – 7:00 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Nitze Building, 1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Kenney Auditorium
Speakers: S. Fredrick Starr, Adib Faradi, Geoffrey Pyatt,
S. Fredrick Starr, CACI chairman; Adib Faradi, CACI visiting scholar and former deputy minister of Commerce for Afghanistan; and Geoffrey Pyatt, principal deputy assistant secretary of the U.S. Department of State’s South and Central Asia Affairs Bureau, will discuss CACI’s new report, “Finish the Job: Jump-Start Afghanistan’s Economy.” Note: A reception will precede the event at 5 p.m. Members of the media who want to cover this event should contact Felisa Neuringer Klubes in the SAIS Communications Office at 202.663.5626 or fklubes@jhu.edu.
RSVP for this event to saiscaciforums@jhu.edu.
10. Egypt on the Brink (Again), Friday December 14, 12:30 PM, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Venue: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, Suite 1050
Speakers: Steven Cook, Shalom Cohen, Eric Trager
Nearly two years after throngs filled downtown Cairo to demand the ouster of Hosni Mubarak, tens of thousands are back demanding the ouster of his elected successor, Muhammad Morsi. For the ruling Islamists, winning the planned December 15 national referendum on a new constitution would be the turning point that ends the current crisis; for their opponents, the hastily scheduled referendum only stokes more fury at a democratic transition gone terribly awry.
To discuss the fast-moving events in Egypt and their implications for U.S. policy and regional security, The Washington Institute invited Steven Cook, Shalom Cohen, and Eric Trager to address a Policy Forum luncheon in Washington, DC, on Friday, December 14, 2012, from 12:30-2:00 p.m. EST.
Register for this event here.
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