Day: January 4, 2013
Syria needs a good negotiated settlement
I have generally appreciated the work of Andrew Tabler and his colleagues on Syria. It is hard-hitting, clever and up to date. But their piece on “No Settlement in Damascus,” which opposes a negotiated solution, is not up to standard.
Bilal Saab and Andrew Tabler reject the idea of a negotiated outcome, ignoring the nature of that outcome. They implicitly discount the possibility that at some point Bashar al Assad will decide he has had enough. If that day arrives, in my view it will be far preferable for him to negotiate his exit and a turnover of power than to depart from the country, leaving the state to collapse and the country to find its own equilibrium.
A negotiated solution does not necessarily mean a power-sharing arrangement, as Saab and Tabler assume, though inclusivity is an important characteristic of regimes that survive over the long term. A surrender is also a negotiated outcome, one that the Americans unwisely did not bother obtaining in the most recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Syrian revolutionaries would be making a serious mistake not to accept a negotiated transfer of power that genuinely leads to Assad’s ouster and the end of the regime.
Saab and Tabler are unimpressed with the record of negotiated settlements in civil wars. Their appreciation of the examples they cite is faulty. I know the Balkans ones best. Negotiated settlements in Bosnia and Macedonia (both power-sharing arrangements) have certainly been frustratingly difficult to implement, but they saved both countries from almost certain fragmentation and much more death and destruction. They also cite renegotiation of settlements in Africa as evidence of failure. While power-sharing does not correlate with post-election peace in Africa, renegotiation of agreements does.
Their description of the reasons for preferring no negotiated outcome includes this:
At a time when no legitimate government and no legal institutions exist to enforce a contract, warriors are asked to demobilize, disarm, and prepare for peace. But once they lay down their weapons, it becomes almost impossible to enforce the other side’s cooperation or survive attack. Adversaries simply cannot credibly promise to abide by such dangerous terms.
In fact, warriors are not always asked immediately to demobilize and disarm in a negotiated agreement. Good agreements have often recognized the need to allow belligerents to keep their arms, at least for a transition period. This is something that a thorough-going defeat at the hands of their enemies will not allow and a principal reason why belligerents will sometimes negotiate.
Saab and Tabler offer a flat statement about rebel victories:
More durable than negotiated solutions are rebel victories. Monica Duffy Toft, an associate professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, has argued that rebels typically have to gain significant support from fellow citizens in order to win. Once in government, rebels are also more likely to allow citizens a say in politics to further bolster their legitimacy.
Tell that to the Rwandans, or to anyone living in a country where the rebels or the government takes on a sectarian or ethnic tinge. In Syria you are going to have a hard time convincing the Alawites and other die-hard supporters of Bashar al Assad that their say in politics will be greater after this revolution. There are losers in revolution–the question in this one is whether they will be slaughtered en masse or get a chance to survive.
The specific issues Saab and Tabler raise with respect to Syria are not, unfortunately for their argument, only issues that arise in negotiated settlements:
- Assad may well escape rather than be captured or killed, so the complete victory the rebels seek may be frustrated even without a negotiated settelement.
- Trust will be hard to come by, but that is going to be true in the absence of a negotiated settlement as well.
- Enforcement of a negotiated settlement is a big issue, and I entirely agree that 10,000 UN peacekeepers are unlikely to be sufficient. But who is going to prevent atrocities in the aftermath of a rebel victory?
- Yes, a negotiated settlement would require allowing Iran a place at the table, but that will be necessary without a negotiated settlement too, witness Iraq and Afghanistan.
The main trouble with their argument is that Saab and Tabler simply don’t acknowledge the very real horrors that are likely to occur without a political settlement. I’d definitely want one that ends the regime and definitively removes Bashar al Assad from power and from Syria. But so long as it does, a negotiated settlement is far preferable to the violence absence of one will bring.
PS: Here’s a message sent by a Syrian colleague:
This arrived as a link attached to following message:
Last year was full of tragedies for me, as I lost some of my closest friends when they were killed by Assad soldiers. I was also detained and tortured, my house was destroyed, and my family was forcibly displaced. I dreamed that the end of the year would bring a glorious freedom to the Syrian people, the freedom for which I and my people have sacrificed a lot. Instead, the end of the year brought new massacres, which should not occur in the 21st century.
Despite all this, I recall some bright aspects in the past year, among them getting to make many friends around the world who may not share my race, religion, or language. However, they share with me common human values for which we started our Revolution in Syria.
I am very proud to have met each one of you, and what I have seen of you of compassion to help my people and to promote the common noble human values in which we believe. I hope you had a Merry Christmas and wish you a happy new year filled with joy. However, please do not forget your brothers and sisters in humanity who are dreaming of being able in the coming year to restore basic rights, to which you have already gotten. They desperately need your help and support.
My Fantasyland
I gather the Serbian parliament will not actually approve the Fantasyland platform for Kosovo but will instead pass a resolution containing some basic principles to which its negotiators will adhere in the future political-level talks. This inspires me to suggest a few basic points that, if adopted, would go a long way to ensuring that peace and stability are maintained in the Balkans and that Serbia gets an early date to start negotiations on EU accession. This is my Fantasyland. No, I don’t expect Belgrade to listen to me, but here it is anyway:
Serbia hereby acknowledges the evil that was done in its name during the Milosevic regime. We have prosecuted criminals involved and delivered all the international indictees to the Hague Tribunal. Our current government is a democratic one that understands sovereignty cannot be maintained over a province in which human rights were so grossly violated. Milosevic lost sovereignty over Kosovo in 1999. Democratic Serbia cannot regain it.
Nor would we want to: governing a young and rapidly growing population of more than 1.6 million Albanians, many of whom no longer speak Serbian, is simply not what we want to be doing. They can and should govern themselves.
But we expect proper treatment of Serbs and other minorities there. This is Serbia’s primary concern: to ensure the safety, security and prosperity of its citizens who live in Kosovo, as well as the protection of Serbian monuments, churches, monasteries and other property, both religious and secular. For these purposes, Serbia accepts the Ahtisaari plan, whose letter and spirit were intended to provide real protection. We cannot accept pro forma implementation but will insist on substantial guarantees of the rights and privileges provided therein, which we negotiated for in good faith. This will be the main subject of discussion in our talks with the Pristina authorities.
The Pristina institutions are distasteful to us because they include people who have done deadly harm to Serbs in Kosovo. But we understand that they are the product of an internationally sponsored state-building process and represent the will of the majority population of Kosovo. We will respect and cooperate with these institutions as we do others legitimately elected and empowered, so long as they respect the human rights of the Serb population.
Despite our pleas, the International Court of Justice has advised that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not breach international law. Once the Ahtisaari plan has been fully and faithfully implemented to our satisfaction, we will reconsider whether we can recognize and establish diplomatic relations with the Pristina government.
In the meanwhile, we will seek for Serbs in Kosovo governing arrangements comparable to what we are willing to provide Albanians and other minorities within Serbia, particularly in the south. We understand that these contiguous populations will one day, like the Serbs in northern Kosovo, enjoy the privileges of citizens of the European Union, including the disappearance of the borders that now temporarily divide them from their co-nationals. We look forward to, and seek to hasten, that day.
We have sought a status-neutral approach to international community relations with Pristina. We will continue to be status-neutral ourselves, meaning that we will no longer claim Kosovo is a province of Serbia. But we understand that about half the members of the UN have now recognized the Pristina institutions as sovereign and independent. We will no longer oppose such recognitions and will ask that Russia allow Kosovo to enter the General Assembly. This will help ensure that the Pristina institutions feel the full weight of responsibility for maintaining peace and stability as well as the security and welfare of all their citizens.
What a fine day that would be, eh? This is not entirely fantasy. I know lots of Serbs in Belgrade who would sign up to something like this. The issue is not whether this is beyond imagination, but rather whether Serbia’s current leadership can bring itself to break with an approach that is causing both Serbia and Kosovo unnecessary pain. Unfortunately, it cannot.