Sugar-coated Kosovostan
The European parliament rapporteur expects a “flexible” resolution on Kosovo from the Serbian parliament. What he’ll get is a sugar-coated resolution intended for European and American consumption and a hard-core “rationale” (OBRAZLOŽENJE) that betrays the inflexible core of Serbian policy.
The resolution itself rules out recognition of the “unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosovo.” That is Belgrade’s traditional position. In my view, it doesn’t mean much. As the International Court of Justice advised, the declaration of independence is an expression of political will that breached no international law. Sovereign states recognize other states as sovereign. So far as I know, Britain never “recognized” America’s July 4, 1776 declaration of independence (please correct that if I am wrong). The resolution also, quite properly, declares Belgrade’s intention to
discuss the creation of conditions that the Serbian community and other ethnic communities throughout Kosovo and Metohija are able to strengthen, grow and live in peace and security.
Declaring itself willing to implement agreements already reached (no great concession, but necessary since there is a new government in place), Belgrade then makes it clear it expects the EU to make any further progress worthwhile:
any agreement that is reached should contribute to Serbia’s EU integration.
Of course for this to happen Belgrade has to show flexibility:
The Republic of Serbia is willing to make further concessions in order to overcome the current state of relations between the Serbian and Albanian people.
But not too much:
At the same time, the Republic of Serbia is unwilling to make further concessions that could jeopardize its state and national interests.
The justification that follows continues the uncompromising approach of the initial draft, which we published here three weeks ago. Kosovo is treated as a province of Serbia. Belgrade will grant it autonomy, keeping the governance of all the Serbs (north and south of the Ibar river) under Serbia’s control to a very large degree. This formula would deny both sovereignty and territorial integrity to Kosovostan. If there are important differences between the current version and the previous draft, I haven’t found them yet and will be grateful to readers if they point them out.
Bad ideas of the Kosovostan sort are having a minor resurgence in today’s world: some in Israel would like the West Bank to have this sort of status. It isn’t going to work as a solution in Palestine, and its analogy won’t work as a solution in Kosovo.
Both the Palestinians and Kosovars have limited means to respond to propositions that would essentially make them non-citizens of a country that doesn’t want them (and in particular does not want them to vote). The authorities in Pristina will (and should) go to the next meeting with Belgrade (I understand scheduled for January 17). There they will presumably say a loud “no” to the proposition that their status be decided by Belgrade. More or less half the UN General Assembly has already recognized Kosovo as a sovereign state. But unless they are able to begin to bring something home that looks better than Kosovostan, they are going to face increasing radicalization of their domestic politics, where a substantial opposition party (Vetvendosje) would like to hold a referendum on union with Albania. Radicalization of Albanian nationalist sentiment within Serbia and Macedonia is also a likely outcome with potentially disastrous consequences.
Washington and Brussels would do well to realize that their pressure on Belgrade to ante up has not yet had the desired effect. They’ve been offered a sugar-coated but still bitter pill. They should make it clear this medicine will not cure what ails Belgrade’s European ambitions. Their other problems will make American and European diplomats try to low-key the Balkans portfolio, but they need to do better than Kosovostan.
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The British recognized American independence in the Treaty of Paris negotiated by, among others, Ben Franklin. Gaining international recognition was not quick or easy, for the same reason many countries hesitate today to recognize Kosovo – the danger it posed as a precedent. (And they were right! Not that all those countries in Latin America thank us much for it.) One of the first recognizers, by the way, was Russia – John Adams (a local boy) lobbied the tsar intensively for it. And this by the way is one of the reasons I view Kosovo’s current diplomatic problems calmly – we went through much the same thing, when we were comparably weak and defenseless. Like Serbia, Britain did not completely accept the idea that we were no longer a colony for some time, thus the War of 1812, which is why I remain suspicious of Serbia’s un-admitted forces in northern Kosovo and its special operations troops inside Serbia itself. Whom are they planning to attack? – obviously, not NATO.
As for as the sugar-coating of the current Serbian resolution, it’s pretty much irrelevant – the Platform that forms their long-term strategy – until Russia and China supplant the West – and the basis for their negotiating tactics is supposed to remain secret. (Can your friends help here?) It all sounds much like the old formula of “more than autonomy, less than independence,” and why Kosovo would accept that now – with 98 recognitions by UN members and counting – is beyond me. Can anyone really see Kosovo’s diplomats around the world contacting the local governments to say “by the way, we’ve changed our minds – we’re moving back in with Serbia”? Maybe the Serbian government just hopes that the West is getting sick of the problem and will jump at any offer that allows them to declare a negotiating victory and go home. Unfortunately for that idea, there’s always the precedent of Munich.
Unadmitted forces in Northern Kosovo?
Those are some serious allegations. I hope you have at least something that looks like a proof.
Special forces in Serbia? What, we should disband our army? NATO sure looks like a flower arrangement company nobody should fear.
It seems that NATO/KFOR is weaker and more useless then we thought, to not be able to find those “un-admitted forces” all these years in a stretch of land 30 by 50 kilometers big. Figures.
For me this is quite obvious attempt of Serbia to gain some time or to negotiate certain concessions towards EU integration. They still think they are important regional player so it might be usefull if someone (USA, EU) reminds them that these days are over.
Well, Serbia is an “important regional player”, but only in the sense that it is the major regional troublemaker. But that, of course, is not enough for any of the concessions Serbia is probably hoping for. Even if Serbia managed to get some extraordinary concessions for Serbs in northern Kosovo, it could happen only if Belgrade is prepared to give the same rights to Albanians in southern Serbia (Preshevo Valley).
I do not see Serbia as a major regional troublemaker at the moment. I really think they want to resolve this and that they are trying to find a way.
Serbia’s strategy: Let me in EU now and I’ll fix the problems later, reminds me of the empty promises of China to WTO. To this day we’re witnessing the Chinese aggressive play disregarding the rules of the game.