Sugar-coated Kosovostan

The European parliament rapporteur expects a “flexible” resolution on Kosovo from the Serbian parliament.  What he’ll get is a sugar-coated resolution intended for European and American consumption and a hard-core “rationale”  (OBRAZLOŽENJE) that betrays the inflexible core of Serbian policy.

The resolution itself rules out recognition of the “unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosovo.”  That is Belgrade’s traditional position.  In my view, it doesn’t mean much.  As the International Court of Justice advised, the declaration of independence is an expression of political will that breached no international law.  Sovereign states recognize other states as sovereign.  So far as I know, Britain never “recognized” America’s July 4, 1776 declaration of independence (please correct that if I am wrong).  The resolution also, quite properly, declares Belgrade’s intention to

discuss the creation of conditions that the Serbian community and other ethnic communities throughout Kosovo and Metohija are able to strengthen, grow and live in peace and security.

Declaring itself willing to implement agreements already reached (no great concession, but necessary since there is a new government in place), Belgrade then makes it clear it expects the EU to make any further progress worthwhile:

any agreement that is reached should contribute to Serbia’s EU integration.

Of course for this to happen Belgrade has to show flexibility:

The Republic of Serbia is willing to make further concessions in order to overcome the current state of relations between the Serbian and Albanian people.

But not too much:

At the same time, the Republic of Serbia is unwilling to make further concessions that could jeopardize its state and national interests.

The justification that follows continues the uncompromising approach of the initial draft, which we published here three weeks ago.  Kosovo is treated as a province of Serbia.  Belgrade will grant it autonomy, keeping the governance of all the Serbs (north and south of the Ibar river) under Serbia’s control to a very large degree.  This formula would deny both sovereignty and territorial integrity to Kosovostan. If there are important differences between the current version and the previous draft, I haven’t found them yet and will be grateful to readers if they point them out.

Bad ideas of the Kosovostan sort are having a minor resurgence in today’s world:  some in Israel would like the West Bank to have this sort of status.  It isn’t going to work as a solution in Palestine, and its analogy won’t work as a solution in Kosovo.

Both the Palestinians and Kosovars have limited means to respond to propositions that would essentially make them non-citizens of a country that doesn’t want them (and in particular does not want them to vote).  The authorities in Pristina will (and should) go to the next meeting with Belgrade (I understand scheduled for January 17).  There they will presumably say a loud “no” to the proposition that their status be decided by Belgrade.  More or less half the UN General Assembly has already recognized Kosovo as a sovereign state.  But unless they are able to begin to bring something home that looks better than Kosovostan, they are going to face increasing radicalization of their domestic politics, where a substantial opposition party (Vetvendosje) would like to hold a referendum on union with Albania.  Radicalization of Albanian nationalist sentiment within Serbia and Macedonia is also a likely outcome with potentially disastrous consequences.

Washington and Brussels would do well to realize that their pressure on Belgrade to ante up has not yet had the desired effect.  They’ve been offered a sugar-coated but still bitter pill.  They should make it clear this medicine will not cure what ails Belgrade’s European ambitions.  Their other problems will make American and European diplomats try to low-key the Balkans portfolio, but they need to do better than Kosovostan.