Preventing violent conflict after Asad

This is a paper I prepared for USAID, which hosted a discussion last week.  The questions are theirs, the answers mine:

1. What is the map of conflict? What is the recent history of the Syrian conflict, including the divisions and connections within Syrian society?

Geographically, the best I’ve seen recently mapping areas of (relative) control is this, from the Institute for the Study of War.  But these sharply delineated areas do not convey the complexity of the situation.  Confrontation lines are not well defined.  Large parts of the north are nominally in rebel hands, or Kurdish hands, or no-man’s land, including most or all of the border points with Turkey.  But the regime is still capable of striking, at least from the air, in these areas, and the rebels are capable of striking within regime-held areas.  There are neighborhoods within regime-controlled towns that are rebel-held, and vice versa.  The most up to date unclassified picture I’ve seen is “Cities and towns during the Syrian civil war” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cities_and_towns_during_the_Syrian_civil_war).  They offer this picture of the situation in Aleppo on November 23, 2012 (they have more recent pictures, but I was unable to lift them into this document):

This fluid, confused, overlapping and uncertain pattern of control among at least three distinct forces (rebels, Kurds and government) will make the post-war period particularly hazardous, as regime and rebel forces jockey for position both before and after a ceasefire, if one is every agreed.

Syria is a diverse society.  Pre-war, religious and ethnic groups were more or less distributed this way.   Many areas included people belonging to other than the dominant group.  This will decline.  With more than 2 million displaced and half a million refugees in neighboring countries, towns and neighborhoods will tend to homogenize.  People will seek refuge more often than not among their own sect or ethnic group.  Individuals in mixed areas may try initially to protect them from ethnic and sectarian cleansing, but some minorities, especially in majority Sunni areas that come under Islamist rebel control, will leave.  Syria will have fewer mixed communities and neighborhoods at the end of the civil war than it had at the beginning.

2.  What are the vital grievances or interests, how do they threaten other groups, and how may that lead to future violence even after the regime changes?

The main overtly expressed grievance at this point is the persistence in power of the regime, which the unarmed opposition and the armed rebels regard as criminally oppressive, illegitimate and self-enriching.  The revolution has been fought in the name of dignity and freedom.  It has not on the whole been fought on sectarian grounds, but some of its adherents are Islamist extremists who regard the Alawites and other minorities with hostility, disdain or worse.

There is widespread resentment of the Alawites for their support to the regime, the privileges some of them have acquired over four decades of the Assad regime, their loyalty to Assad during the revolution and the behavior of their militia (Shabiha) towards non-Alawites.  Few Alawites have joined the rebellion, whose adherents (like Syria itself) are mainly Sunni.  Very few of the defectors from the regime are Alawite.  There is also a periphery vs. center conflict:  people from rural and suburban areas have attacked town centers, poorer neighborhoods have given haven to rebels while wealthier neighborhoods have tended to remain more loyal to the regime.

While many Kurds dislike the regime and the Kurdish National Council has formally joined the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, Kurdish forces have sometimes clashed with rebels and will expect a federal Syria to emerge post-war, with clearly defined and locally governed Kurdish areas.  This will be a challenge even under the best of circumstances, given the distribution of Kurds and their relatively small numbers (under 10%?).

Christians, Ismailis and Druze have split, some supporting the regime and others opposing.  But some extremist Islamist fighters will view them as adversaries.  The (patently false) secularist claims of the regime have garnered it significant support among minorities, who fear Islamist extremists.  Both the minorities and secularism are in for a rough ride after the revolution.

The civil war itself will generate new grievances.  It has uprooted a large number of people (the total could easily reach 4 million), destroyed vast amounts of property and killed upwards of 60,000 Syrians.  When and if people are able to return to their homes and other property, they may find them destroyed, looted or seized by others.  Property disputes are likely to be common.  Revenge killing in the absence of a viable police force and justice system will occur.  Its scale and extent could amount to mass atrocity.

3.  Who are the key actors in the Syrian conflict? i.e., who are the likely conflict mobilizers, Peace builders, and neutral players? Who and which are the individuals or institutions that give societal grievances structure and direction to continue the current violence?

There are lots of people trying to stay out of the line of fire, but there are few playing the role of neutrals.  The warring parties are the regime and its opponents, not all of whom are advocates or perpetrators of violence.  The armed rebels are still not unified.  Many in the opposition have not wanted to see militarization of the conflict, and non-violent demonstrations have continued.

At the retail level, almost anyone aggrieved may become a conflict mobilizer, and that will mean almost everyone.  But mass mobilization for violence requires more than individuals.  Some of the main suspects for larger scale mobilization of violence belong to the former warring parties:

• Regime forces, especially Shabiha and elite forces (Republican guard, for example), who fear revenge or have been instructed to continue resistance (remember the Saddam fedayeen!).
• Rebel armed groups seeking to enlarge their areas of control, enforce discipline and seize property.  Jabhat al Nusra, the Al Qaeda affiliate that the United States has declared a terrorist group, and other armed Sunni Islamists will try to dominate the post-war scene.
• Intelligence operatives of both warring parties (including non-Syrians) and others seeking to escape or cover their previous misdeeds.

Some of these potential sources of violence can also play a mitigating role, provided they get an adequate political settlement and are brought under civilian control (witness February 17 and other militias in Libya in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, for example).

 4. What does the future of Syria look like? How is the current violence setting the stage for future conflict or peace? What are the trends or triggering events that will create vulnerabilities to violence?

 The future of Syria is bleak.  Whenever the civil war ends, its economy will be a shambles, its government will be eviscerated, its military will be disgraced, its population will be impoverished, displaced and heavily armed.  Outside powers, which have fought a proxy war inside Syria for almost two years already, will jockey for position post-war, each favoring its surrogates and seeking to ensure its vital interests.

Given the uncertainty of where the confrontation lines lie, it would be a miracle if this civil war ended without chaos, internecine fighting, looting and sectarian revenge killing.  Little will be required to trigger violence.  The main question is the next one:  what can be done to stop it.

5.  What are the opportunities for reducing conflict? What have we learned from similar conflict in the region?

In the absence of vigorous efforts to mitigate conflict, it will occur and may lead to mass atrocities, chaos and renewed civil war.  Main options (not mutually exclusive) for preventing this from happening include the following:

• A clear, well-constructed and well-communicated end to the Assad regime, agreed by the main players, including as broad a spectrum of revolutionary and regime forces as possible, with a roadmap to a future democratic regime that will respect minority rights.
• Implementation of the roadmap under the supervision of an international body that includes the main international powers with influence (neighbors and major powers).
• A strong, legitimate international intervention force of both police and military to separate warring parties, establish a safe and secure environment and protect minorities.
• Tangible outreach by the new leaders to communities that have not supported the revolution, reassuring them and providing credible guarantees of security, possibly using foreign forces (UN, Arab League or other).
• A well-articulated plan of action for holding a clearly defined and limited number of senior regime figures accountable for abuses, as well as a broader effort to give victims an opportunity to voice grievances and seek eventual redress.
• Reconfiguration, retraining and reform of security forces that can reestablish a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence accepted by both former regime elements and rebels.
• Quick stabilization of the economy and infusion of vital humanitarian assistance that is distributed fairly and transparently.
• A well-targeted reconstruction effort that local communities help plan and monitor (like the National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan).
• Establishment of a relatively quick administrative procedure for settlement of disputes and recovery of private property, in particular real estate.
• Funding and empowerment of grassroots people and organizations (including in particular the revolutionary local administrative councils) committed to a democratic outcome and organized across sectarian and ethnic lines.
• Creation of safe havens for particular minorities.

This last item is distasteful to many (including me), but it has often been used and has sometimes worked, at least temporarily.  This is what the Americans did when they constructed T-walls around distinctly Sunni and Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad during 2006/7.  The French army did it in northern Kosovo in 1999.  It is what some believe Alawites will try to do by retreating to the western littoral, where they traditionally are a higher percentage of the population than in the rest of the country.  The Kurds may also attempt to create distinctly Kurdish areas, in preparation for the federalization of Syria they will seek in the post-war constitution.

There are pros and cons to each of these options, but this much is clear:  in the absence of a concerted effort to prevent violence post-Assad, Syria is likely to suffer a chaotic episode of horrific blood-letting and state collapse (possibly even fragmentation) that may make the civil war seem tame.  Those who seek to prevent this need to plan quickly, secure the necessary resources and gain broad international support for an expensive and challenging effort.

6.  What are the implications for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts?

Humanitarian assistance provided to civilians inside Syria in the current confused situation, with no stable, clear lines of confrontation between opposing forces and little humanitarian access, is difficult.  The upwards of 2 million internally displaced people are a priority.  Whatever channels are used—UN and its agencies, Syrian Red Crescent, ICRC, Western and Islamic nongovernmental organizations—it will be challenging to verify that assistance is going to vulnerable people and is not diverted for political or military purposes.  Aid agencies should try to ensure that impartiality in evaluating needs and in delivering commodities.  But it would be better to flood Syria with humanitarian assistance, especially this winter, than to worry too much about who will receive it.  The $210 million provided by the U.S. in 2012 and so far in 2013 will have to increase sharply if the current level of hostilities continues, as seems likely.  U.S. humanitarian assistance so far appears to be reaching most of the areas affected by the war.

Reconstruction assistance is different.  The United States, though not a belligerent, has chosen to support the rebellion.  Providing reconstruction assistance to the Syrian government while it fights a war against its civilian population is not only inappropriate but harmful and counter-productive.  Helping some of the liberated communities, especially in the north, begin to provide basic services would however be a positive contribution.  This should be done only with a good understanding of the local situation:  through what channels is the assistance being provided?  Are they legitimate representatives of the local community?  How do we know?  How can reasonable standards of accountability and transparency be met?  Are there groups in the community not represented?  How will providing assistance affect relations between ethnic or sectarian groups?  Will it encourage conflict or otherwise do harm?  Is the overall balance of assistance equitable?  Do the recipients and potential recipients agree?  There are groups like the Civil Administration Councils that can help to answer these questions.

Relatively little real reconstruction will get done during the fighting.  The main thrust now should be planning.  This should be done in close cooperation with the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, which is expected in the near future to name a government, including a ministry for reconstruction.  Ensuring a tight nexus between international assistance and the new government’s plans is vital.  Failure to do so would undermine its authority and legitimacy and make the intended transition to a democratic state far more difficult.