A state in search of itself

Laurentina Cizza, the second of my Middle East Institute interns this semester, makes her peacefare.net debut with this piece on Libya:

The environment of near-anarchy in Libya is expected to get worse before it gets better. That was the general conclusion of Thursday evening’s Middle East Policy Forum at George Washington University, “Libya: a state in search of itself,” moderated by Ambassador Edward “Skip” Gnehm.

The Library of Congress’ Chief of the African and Middle Eastern Division, Mary Jane Deeb opened with a theoretical overview of the current situation in Libya. She focused on one question in particular: How do we categorize Libya today? A mere political ouster? A civil war? A proper revolution? She argued for the last: Libya is currently undergoing phase two of Huntington’s conception of the western revolution. With the fall of the Jamahiriya and the emergence of new political actors, Libya has done away with the old political institutions and produced new political actors who promise to build a new order.

She categorized Libya’s current political actors in three, not necessarily mutually exclusive, groups:  (largely urban) youth, tribes, and Islamists. She expressed optimism for Libya’s long-term prospects. Young Libyans span across the political spectrum, but they represent the most educated generation in Libyan history (under Qadhafi, Libya boasted some of the highest literacy rates in North Africa). Libya’s current chaos represents a side effect of the new political actors’ struggle for equilibrium.  But Deeb also forecasted that the instability would continue. After all, the establishment of any self-respecting political order takes time. Bottom line:  from an academic standpoint, Libya is exactly where political scientists expect it to be.

Karim Mezran, a Senior Fellow at Atlantic Council’s Rafiq Hariri Center for the Middle East, opened his commentary with this disclaimer: “Being both Italian and Libyan prevents me from being optimistic.” Having set the tone, he focused on two questions: How was the revolution possible and what are the revolution’s chances today?

Regarding the first question, he distinguished between an official and an unofficial narrative of the revolution. The sardonic unofficial narrative postulates that Western powers hold more of the credit for the success of the Libyan revolution than the Libyan people, and not only for NATO’s role. An intensive four-day Al Jazeera campaign did more to prompt Sarkozy’s condemnation of Qadhafi as a war criminal than a 40-year record of human rights violations. Western powers’ withdrawal of support for Qadhafi did more damage than a protracted struggle between the regime and rag-tag rebels ever could. Case in point: Syria. He also took care to acknowledge that Libya’s revolution was also a civil war. Qadhafi had his supporters, who are now a marginalized portion of the population that is all but twiddling its thumbs as the new government struggles to its feet.

Regarding the prospects of the Libyan revolution, time is of the essence. The government’s inability to ensure security is breeding a climate amenable to militias, terrorist networks and criminal organizations. Mezran described the eastern part of the country, the site of Ambassador Stevens’ death, as “near-anarchy.” The current delay in the constitutional process is countering the progress made by the smooth General National Council elections. As instability continues, political tensions boil and the risk of the constitutional process exploding into violence increases.  He offered two solutions:

1) That Libya recognize the importance of Western support, particularly in training of security forces and dealing with the militias;

2) An international agreement or treaty providing security for the southern border, which is porous to terrorist and criminal networks.

While a theory-oriented Deeb focused on the promising long-term, a realist-oriented Mezran focused on the painful short-term. Libya has to get through the latter before it enjoys the former.