Egypt off course, again
Unrest in Egypt on the January 25 second anniversary of the revolution that overthrew Hosni Mubarak was easy to predict. Many who supported the revolution are disappointed with the results, the economy is in a tailspin and President Morsi is proving himself more autocrat than democrat. But what happened Saturday is nuts.
Friday the protests were pretty much as expected: large and marred by clashes with the security forces. Saturday was far worse, especially in Port Said. A judge (sitting in Cairo) sentenced 21 of its al Masri football fans to death for an incident last February in which 74 people died in a clash with fans of Cairo’s al Ahli. The rioting Saturday in Port Said took at least two dozen more lives. Unrest is continuing this morning. The soccer clubs and their fans are protagonists in both the Egyptian revolution and tensions between the periphery and Cairo.
Egypt’s secularist/liberal National Salvation Front is now threatening to boycott elections unless five demands are met:
- A neutral investigation of the violence.
- Immediate amendment of the constitution.
- Formation of a new “national salvation” government.
- An end to President Morsi’s attacks on the judiciary.
- Clear legal status for the Muslim Brotherhood.
These may all be perfectly reasonable things to ask for, but to link participation in the elections to their immediate fulfillment is not. The April parliamentary elections, to quote myself, are
the secularist liberals’ last, best chance of gaining political traction for the next four years. If they fail, as seems likely, Egypt will experiment with a constitution that leaves a lot of room for Islamist maneuvering in a society that is more interested in economic results than theocratic correctness.
With failure likely, it is understandable that the opposition might prefer to sit out the elections, but it would be unwise. Even a relatively small minority position in parliament will provide a channel through which to counter Morsi’s worst instincts. Trying to do so exclusively through street demonstrations won’t work for long. Egyptians are tired of disorder and want a return to stability. Morsi will have little problem repressing an extra-parliamentary opposition if he aligns himself with the “party of the couch” (aka the silent majority) in imposing law and order. Most Egyptians don’t want, and can’t afford, continuing disorder.
The National Defense Council is calling for a “national dialogue” and considering a curfew. Morsi has more than once tried to convene national dialogues (in place of any meaningful change of direction), which the opposition generally boycotts. This time there is a suggestion that neutral figures will do the convening. Are there any left? Egypt is now thoroughly polarized along many different axes: religious/secular, Muslim Brotherhood/Salafists, center/periphery, revolution/old regime remnants, young/old, rich/poor, Muslim/non-Muslim, urban/rural. Not to mention al Ahli/al Masri.
If dialogue fails, as it has repeatedly in the past, Morsi will no doubt try to use the security forces to impose order. That may succeed, but the outcome is far less likely to be democratic.