Month: January 2013
I didn’t have to wait long
I suggested last week that Jews might make comments as odious as Egyptian President Morsi’s, which I posted. I didn’t have to wait long for a sample. Here is Jeremy Gimpel, a right-wing candidate for the Israeli parliament, suggesting how overjoyed Jews would be if someone blew up the Dome of the Rock, the mosque that stands in Jerusalem on one of Islam’s holiest sites. Worse: he suggests that the Jews would then rebuild the Temple that stood there 2000 years ago and, to add insult to injury, that Jews would want to build Christian churches as well.
No, it’s not the same as calling Jews sons of pigs, but it is hate speech nevertheless, and delivered with a good deal more conviction than Morsi’s, who has been backpedaling. Will Gimpel do likewise?
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Another step forward
On January 17, the fourth round of talks on normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo was held in Brussels. Maja Kocijančić, the spokesperson for EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, who mediates in the dialogue, told media that the meeting lasted about five hours and was constructive.
The main focus was on how to distribute the customs revenue collected at recently established border checkpoints. The sides agreed that the money should be used for development projects in majority-Serb municipalities in northern Kosovo. Kosovo Prime minister Hashim Thaci said it would be done through a fund managed jointly by Priština, a Serb representative from the north and the EU.
The issue of parallel Serb institutions in northern Kosovo also was discussed for the first time as an official topic. While no conclusive agreement has been made, there are some grounds for optimism. Ivica Dačić, Serbian prime minister, said that whatever solution will be found in the end, it must be acceptable both to the Serbs and Priština. His Kosovo colleague, Hashim Thaci, announced that once the illegal institutions in the north are dissolved, local Serbs will choose their legitimate representatives in elections organized by Priština.
Perhaps more interesting is what the two prime ministers told media before the meeting. Thaci stated that the dialogue should result in Kosovo getting a seat in the UN. Dačić replied that everything can be discussed, provided that Priština is willing to make certain concessions in return. The response enraged hard-line nationalists in Serbia, and the opposition Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), the only openly anti-EU force in Parliament, immediately demanded that Dačić resign because of „treason“.
Similar was the reaction of Kosovo „Self-determination“ movement to Thaci’s announcement that customs revenue would be invested in development of Serb-dominated northern Kosovo municipalities, as they accused the prime minister of unconstitutionally giving „special autonomy“ to the north.
But something more worrying took place in Priština just a few hours after the meeting in Brussels was concluded. Three explosions burst almost concurrently at different locations, destroying three government-owned vehicles. A heretofore unheard-of organization called „Dissatisfield“ has claimed responsibility for the incident. In a message to newspaper „Express“, the group said it was a warning to the government, which they believe is „giving northern Kosovo over“.
So, what can be inferred from this available information? That the two prime misters have made another step forward in negotiations, as they did in each of the previous rounds. After Serbia’s – or, rather, President Nikolić’s – much criticized platform for Kosovo, it may be regarded as a somewhat unexpected achievement. At the same time, negative – at times even excessive – reactions from radical elements on both sides, who seek to thwart any effort at normalization between the countries, are indicative of how big the pressure is that the negotiators have to withstand. That is something that both western partners and domestic observers should be aware of when evaluating the results.
The next round of the dialogue is planned for the second half of February. There is a lot of speculation, mostly in the yellow press, that premature elections could be held in Serbia this year. The speculators believe Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić will try to capitalize on his growing popularity as the leader of anti-corruption campaign to win a larger share of power for him and his Serbian Progressive Party. I hope Vučić will wait at least until Dačić and Thaci accomplish what they have begun.
P.S: I’ve learned that Sunday, in the early morning, Serbian Gendarmerie removed the monument in the south Serbian town of Preševo, which the local Albanian-majority government recently put up in honor of fallen combatants from the former Liberation Army of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa (LAPBM). The action was swift and went without incidents. The Kosovo government has condemned the move, but also called on the local Albanians not to react to the provocation, warning that such behavior by Belgrade is putting the dialogue at risk.
I don’t know what in Serbia’s legislation might have served as the legal foundation for the government to remove the monument, but I do know that Serbia has formally amnestied members of LAPBM as far back as 2002, recognizing them as a legitimate party in the peace negotiations at the time. But although this could affect the further course of the negotiations to some degree, it is very unlikely to terminate the process completely.
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Patience is a virtue
I’m in Pristina, so friends and colleagues are assuming I know something about the talks Thursday between Serbian Prime Minister Dacic and Kosovo Prime Minister Thaci. The truth is I know nothing I wouldn’t know in Washington DC, except that the few people I’ve talked with here are skeptical of any agreement on the northern bit of Kosovo not under Pristina’s control and concerned that the young Kosovo state may get snookered. I imagine that mirror-image concerns exist in Serbia.
Complicating the situation here are three more or less simultaneous bombs that went off Thursday evening targeted at parked government cars. “Dissatisfied” claimed the bombings, which appear not intended to kill anyone but rather to warn the government not to give in on the north.
Vetëvendosje! (Self-determination), a Kosovo opposition political party that opposes the dialogue, has accused Thaci of violating the constitution by offering “special” autonomy to the north. That’s rich, since Vetëvendosje! itself has an anti-constitutional platform calling for a referendum on union with Albania (which is prohibited in the Kosovo constitution). If Thaci were to give away the north, it would benefit Vetëvendosje! more than the government.
The simple fact is that we don’t have enough data on either what was agreed in Brussels or who was behind the bombings to even begin to speculate on the implications. Patience is a virtue. We should give both Dacic and Thaci the benefit of the doubt. They are risking their political careers trying to resolve one of the last remaining war and peace problems in the Balkans, with a lot of help and pressure from their European and American colleagues. Dacic is getting flak in Serbia for suggesting that Kosovo might get UN membership if a satisfactory agreement can be reached on the north. Thaci is getting flak in Pristina for supposedly agreeing that customs revenue collected in the north will go at least temporarily to development projects in the north, in a scheme jointly administered by the Kosovo government, a Serb from the north and an EU representative. Neither of these alleged offenses sounds capital to me, but I’m suspending judgment until we know more.
Let’s wait and see what has really been agreed and how it will be implemented. In the meanwhile, is it too much to ask that all political parties in Kosovo renounce violence and wait for the Prime Ministers to report to their respecctive parliaments on what happened in Brussels?
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Frugal superpower puts on airs
With Senate hearings scheduled for January 24 for former Senator John Kerry as Secretary of State and January 31 for former Senator Charles Hagel as Secretary of Defense, the American press is wondering what their nominations portend. Will there be big changes in policy? Or will there be more continuity?
At least one of my colleagues worries that Hagel’s nomination will be seen as undermining President Obama’s commitment to preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons, but Hagel will also have a great deal of credibility the day he tells the Iranians the deal they’ve been offered is the very best they can expect. Even on Iran, I anticipate more continuity in attitude than abrupt change in direction. That is partly because Obama is still in charge. Hagel will not only conform what he says to the Administration’s policy, he will also want to maximize the chances for success in blocking Iran from getting nuclear weapons. That necessarily means making the military option credible, even if in private life he was inclined against it.
But for other issues circumstances may not remain constant. In particular the budget challenge is likely to be greater than in the past. The government ran on continuing resolutions throughout Obama’s first term, to the dismay of conservatives. That gives government departments relatively decent financing, compared to what they would get if Congress triggers the sequester or if the House Republicans get the dollar cut in expenditures for every dollar increase in the budget ceiling that they are demanding. If instead of continuing current expenditure levels, we head in the direction of big cuts, both Defense and State are likely to get hammered.
Defense, bloated after years of doubling its budget even without counting Iraq and Afghanistan war spending, can afford it better than State, though State (and USAID) are relatively flush as well. The problem is that both institutions have far-flung capital commitments to bases and embassies that are essentially fixed costs. Even if you cut back on personnel presence overseas, you can’t turn off the heat and electricity. It will take time and effort to de-accesssion unneeded facilities. Bureaucrats at both State and Defense will be more inclined to keep the heat and lights on, hoping for budget increases in the future.
Senator Kerry visited Rome once when I was Charge’ d’affaires ad interim there. He wondered why we needed 800 people in the diplomatic mission to Italy. I said we didn’t, but that 36 different agencies of the U.S. government had made separate decisions that put them there. He threatened to cut the Embassy budget. I noted that would leave more than 90% of the staff still screaming for State Department services–their salaries and benefits were paid by the mostly domestic agencies that put people in Rome.
None of this will be discussed in the confirmation hearings, which are conducted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC). It has no budgetary responsibility–that is the purview of the appropriations subcommittees in both House and Senate. SFRC will focus not on budget and overseas presence but rather on “policy” issues. Right now that likely means the Benghazi murder of U.S. diplomatic personnel (Hillary Clinton will appear in Congress a day before Kerry’s hearing to testify on that unforgiving subject), the Al Qaeda push in Mali, the hostage crisis in Algeria, Iran’s nuclear program, maybe a bit of Syria and Egypt and a quick look at Asia (rising China, nuclear North Korea, America’s treaty obligations). My order of priority might be different, but that’s because I’ve got a 3-5 year time frame. The Congress has more like a one week-one year time frame.
There is little doubt that Hagel and Kerry will be confirmed. The question is how far they will have to go to satisfy Congressional critics in committing the United States to military action in Iran, Syria and Mali. The President seems determined to keep his powder dry for Iran, but there is a good deal of agitation for more military support to the Syrian opposition and for assisting the French intervention in Mali. Neither budgets nor domestic politics will warrant much more than that, even if the Senators give eloquent speeches advocating it. We are in the era of the frugal superpower, but you won’t know it from the upcoming hearings.
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Middle East: less grand, more strategy
Middle East Institute intern Aya Fasih, recently arrived from Cairo, writes in her debut on peacefare:
With the re-election of President Obama and massive transformations ongoing in the region, the Middle East Policy Council’s 71st Capitol Hill Conference focused Wednesday on “U.S. Grand Strategy in the Middle East: Is There One?” Related questions included:
- Is it even possible to formulate a grand strategy for the region amidst all the turbulence it is witnessing?
- Were past U.S. grand strategies for the region successful in achieving their objectives?
The prestigious panel, comprised of Chas Freeman Jr., William Quandt, Marwan Muasher and John Duke Anthony (moderated by Thomas Mattair), identified five main points of discussion: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran, the Arab uprisings, the Syrian crisis, and the political-economic security of the Gulf Cooperation Council states.
Chas Freeman Jr., Chairman of Projects International, former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and President of the Middle East Policy Council, said the two main U.S. policies in the Middle East, unconditional support to Israel and strategic partnership with pre-revolutionary Egypt and the rentier Gulf states, were contradictory and therefore precluded any grand strategy. Freeman underscored the costs associated with U.S. support and protection of Israel; he said that U.S. support for irresponsible and immoral policies of Israel has undermined U.S. strategic interests in the region and potential cooperation with the region’s other powers:
America may have Israel’s back, but no one has America’s back.
Continuation post-revolution of an American-Egyptian partnership is in doubt. In the aftermath of the Iraq war, Afghanistan, and “abandonment” of the peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians, the U.S.-Saudi relationship has weakened and become more “transactional.” It should no longer be taken for granted. In Freeman’s view, U.S. policies preclude formulation of grand strategies and leave room for only limited cooperation.
William Quandt, Professor at the University of Virginia and former staff member of the National Security Council, started by expressing suspicion of grand strategies. The Bush 41/Clinton dual containment of Iraq and Iran failed, as did the Bush 43 strategy of replacing certain Arab regimes, starting with Iraq, with pro-Western ones. Quandt, like the other three fellow panelists, thought the U.S. needs to revise its policies, starting with the realization that “we are not all-powerful.” A revised strategy should include:
- an end to U.S.-Iran animosity, which would avoid a dangerous war and benefit Iraq, Syria and Lebanon;
- maintenance of positive relations with NATO ally Turkey, which will also benefit Iraq and Syria;
- friendly relations with Egypt because of its geo-strategic importance and influence over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
- greater attention to Saudi Arabia, which faces a difficult generational transition;
- a negotiated end to the Syrian conflict;
- a renewed effort to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
John Duke Anthony, Founding President of the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, discussed mainly the six Gulf Cooperation Council states, highlighting the vital strategic importance of the GCC for the region’s security and U.S. energy supplies.
Marwan Muasher, Vice President for Studies at Carnegie Endowment and former Jordanian Foreign Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, and Ambassador to the United States, highlighted how the U.S. must change its approach by assessing the new governments and players in the region not based on their ideology but rather on their performance. U.S. influence will not be decisive in the process of transition. Events on the ground and competition for power among local actors will determine the outcomes. It is crucial that the US start differentiating between different Islamist actors and parties and realize that serious differences exist among them. The clock is ticking on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Unless the U.S. chooses to sponsor it now, peace may never be an option again.
All four panelists agreed that U.S. policies toward the vital region must undergo serious reassessment if the U.S. wants to secure its strategic interests. The U.S. should exert extraordinary effort to solve the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, re-engage with Iran and work quickly to ensure a negotiated settlement in Syria.
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If Mali matters, what doesn’t?
Op/eds on why Mali matters and why we must help save it are sprouting this winter just as fast as the Islamist rebels move south towards Bamako. What they don’t tell us is what we should bump off the priority list. Syria? Egypt? Afghanistan? Yemen? Maybe Iraq, which we aren’t paying much attention to anyway? Nor do they acknowledge the obvious: Mali didn’t seem to matter much a couple of weeks ago, when the threat of Islamist extremists might have been met cheaply and easily; why does it matter now, when it will cost much more in (mostly French) treasure and (mostly Malian) lives to fix?
I doubt Mali really does matter more than a lot of other places: neighbors Mauritania and Niger as well as nearby Nigeria for starters. Some argue its location makes it particularly important. I might argue that its isolation and forbidding topography and climate make it an ideal place to keep an eye on Islamic extremists. Secretary of Defense Panetta is saying we have to prevent them from establishing a base in Mali. Why? Without easy access to an international airport, it would be hard for Al Qaeda to use Mali as a base for attacking the United States or even Europe. I much prefer they be there, under watchful eyes, than plotting out of sight in Munich (or Boston).
Their presence in “ungoverned” space panics the Defense Department. Certainly their trafficking (drugs and people) and kidnapping enterprises are troublesome, especially to any Westerners in the neighborhood (witness what is going on nearby in Algeria). But such spaces are only ungoverned if you ignore the people who live there. The indigenous tribes will have their own forms of governance, which may be better adapted to the topography and demography than the Western-style governance Bamako has been trying to assert–with negative results–for many years. We’d do well to recognize that traditional governance really is governance and worry about getting its mechanisms on our side. That is going to be difficult with the French shooting up the countryside.
While Mali’s democracy is not holding up well under pressure from Tuareg rebels and radical Islamists in the north, there is no reason to believe that the population is interested in harboring Al Qaeda or other extreme groups. Malian women and music are not going to readily conform to Islamist requirements. French troops, who will provide the Islamists with a rallying cry against foreign intervention, may be necessary to blunt an immediate threat, but a far more nuanced approach is needed to win the war. All those displaced people are not necessarily going to blame the Islamists for the humanitarian crisis that is rapidly emerging.
Mali is the West’s next test: can we act earlier, smarter and with appropriate tools to discourage Islamist radicalization? It is not more important than other places, just more urgent because of our own failure to respond appropriately to a threat that was well known. There are political and economic equations to be solved, not just a military one. We failed to act quickly enough, when it would have been cheaper and easier. Now let’s see if we can react smartly, with civilian as well as military responses.
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