Month: January 2013
The Iran nuclear cliff
It isn’t often that Washington reaches a consensus on Iran, but that seems to be what is happening. Patrick Clawson urges a generous offer to Iran, to test definitively whether a deal stopping it short of nuclear weapons can be reached. Suzanne Maloney sees 2013 as the make or break year:
Dennis Ross, Trita Parsi, and Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett had long ago come to the conclusion a big package was needed to woo Tehran from its nuclear ambitions, from widely varying premises.
2013 is the make or break year for the same reason we faced a “fiscal cliff” crisis at the end of the last Congress: Washington has set itself up for a big decision. Either we get a deal that prevents Iran from getting nuclear weapons, or the Administration (with ample Congressional support) has committed the United States to go to war. Suzanne is surely correct that the American people are not “there” yet, but I see that as a good thing: it gives the Administration maximum negotiating leeway. Maximum but not infinite: Congress (Democrats and Republicans) will have to lift sanctions if a deal is reached. It won’t happen unless the majority is satisfied that the deal blocks Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state.
International Atomic Energy Agency officials are in Tehran today trying to gain access to an Iranian site thought to have been used in the past for nuclear weapons research. The Americans regard Iran coming clean on those activities as vital to any deal that lets Iran off the sanctions hook. It is unlikely we’ll have a quick answer to the many questions about Iran’s past activities, but the talks today are important to opening the door.
At the same time, the P5+1 (5 permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) are haggling with Tehran over a date to continue the political-level nuclear talks, which are supposed to convene this month. The main issue seems to be whether sanctions relief will be on the agenda. The Americans in particular have wanted to reserve all but the smallest sanctions relief (parts for aircraft) for later on, after seeing real progress on nuclear questions. The Iranians want sanctions relief up front.
The emerging consensus in Washington in favor of a big package to test Iran’s intentions and reach a definitive conclusion could end years of uncertainty and haggling. But it also raises the very real possibility of going over the Iran nuclear cliff to war.
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This isn’t pretty either
These are the 2010 videos of now-President Morsi that the New York Times cites this morning:
There are several things that strike me about these videos:
- Morsi is a remarkably uninspiring speaker.
- He says a lot of things others in Egypt say about “the Zionists.”
- Some Israeli politicians say similar things about Arabs (may they never become president!).
- Morsi isn’t saying these things in public any longer.
I would prefer that the president of Egypt never have stooped to this kind of hate speech. It reflects badly on him. But contrary to what Washington Institute colleagues suggest today, the important thing now is what Arabs and Israelis do, not only what they say (or said a couple of years ago). The jury is still out on what Morsi will do vis-a-vis Israel. It is unfortunately all too clear what Prime Minister Netanyahu intends to do about expanding settlements.
PS: Apparently President Obama shares my sentiments on Netanyahu.
PPS: Morsi is trying to defuse the flap, and leading U.S. members of Congress seem to be buying it.
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The EU is still a powerful magnet
My friends at tacno.net, where Milan Marinkovic has landed, have published this interview today in Serbian:
In a recent interview for „Anadolia“ (AA) news agency, you said that even „armed conflict cannot be ruled out“ following Belgrade’s platform for „normalizaion of relations with Kosovo“. If such a conflict really occurred, on what scale and of what intensity would you expect it to be, and what implications could it have for the rest of the region?
– It is difficult to talk about the possibility of armed conflict without readers thinking you are advocating it. I am not. But when a country claims territory it does not rightfully control, and refuses to recognize the authorities who do have a right to control it, that is a situation that can obviously lead to armed conflict. As KFOR is drawn down, Pristina and Belgrade need to make diplomatic arrangements that give both confidence no armed incursion will occur. Otherwise, they need to both make defensive military preparations, which would be excessively expensive and potentially destabilizing.
I don’t think a big war is possible in the Balkans any longer: no one has the force and sustainment capability any longer. Nor would it benefit any country in the Balkans to initiate hostilities. But bad things do happen, and war in the Balkans has always been more about violence against civilians than against other armed forces. We should not forget the 1990s.
Serbian Prime minister Ivica Dačić has warned on several occasions in the past couple of weeks that the police will remove, using force if necessary, a monument built in the south Serbian town of Preševo by the municipal Albanian-majority government in honor of fallen combatants from the former LAPBM, should the Albanians fail to remove it themselves by January 17. Local Albanians have so far rejected Dačić’s ultimatum, ignoring at the same time a compromising proposal by Western ambassadors to Serbia that the monument be moved from the town centre to another location. If the monument remains in its place after the deadline set by Dačić, he will find himself under considerable pressure from Serbian nationalists, including his own supporters, to fulfill the promise and remove the monument. Do you see any possibility that a middle groung could be found between Belgrade and local Albanians within these few days, which would help to relieve the tension?
– It is clearly preferable that this issue be resolved by compromise. I don’t know the situation well enough to judge whether the Western ambassadors’ proposal is one that will work. But it would make no sense for Serbia to destroy a monument to people whose comrades in arms were amnestied 10 years ago, thus reigniting a conflict that has largely died down. At the same time, Albanians have to appreciate that Serb lives were lost as well. I would note that in Sarajevo recently the government has decided to put up a monument to Serbs killed by Bosniak forces during the war. These problems are not insoluble.
Last November, during the celebration of the Albanian national holiday, the Day of Flag, Albanian and Kosovo prime ministers, Sali Berisha and Hashim Thaci respectively, hinted at the desire of Albanians who live across the region to unify into a single nation state. This raised some eyebrows in neighbor countries, especially Serbia. Although this type of rhetoric is not unusual in the Balkans on such occasions, Ilir Deda, a prominent expert from Kosovo, said that it should be taken seriously. Mr Deda warned that the idea is likely to gain ground over the coming years if Kosovo remains in limbo in terms of European integration and UN membership. There is a palpable fear that Serbian nationalists would use it as a perfect excuse in their attempts to revive the project of greater Serbia, primarily through secession of RS from Bosnia. If the idea of pan-Albanian unification became part of Albanian leaders’ official agenda at some point, what position would Washington be likely to take on the issue?
– Washington will oppose pan-Albanian unification, just as it opposed pan-Serbian unification. It regards the current borders in the Balkans as fixed. The next phase is EU membership. Once the Balkans states join the EU, borders won’t matter much. I’d be surprised if Albanians from Albania preferred pan-Albanian unification to EU accession. I doubt Serbs from Serbia would prefer pan-Serbian unification to EU accession. And let’s be clear: changing borders in the Balkans would lead to violence.
Let’s now move to Bosnia. In addition to enduring divisions along ethnic lines, the overall socio-economic situation is steadily deteriorating, not to mention people’s growing dissatisfaction with high levels of corruption, street crime and violence of various sorts. The EU, for its part, has managed to preserve the status quo in the sense that the country has not broken apart, but will it be enough to prevent destablization internally, given domestic politicians’ obvious inability to carry out meaningful reforms that would improve people’s lives in the foreseeable future?
– Bosnia and Herzegovina has a democratic system. It is up to its citizens to vote to fix what ails it. The EU and the U.S. have been extraordinarily generous. The incentives are there. And the EU will keep its door ajar for when the Bosnians decide to do the right things. Until then, they will have to live with the governments they elect.
A general assumption is that most important for stability of the Western Balkans is that Serbia and Croatia, as two major regional players, maintain good relationship. Serbian president Tomislav Nikolić has given a few undiplomatic statements since he assumed the office, provoking a negative reaction on the part of Zagreb. Meanwhile, Prime minister Dačić has been looking to arrange a meeting with his Croatian counterpart Zoran Milanović in order to sort things out, but some analysts are warning that Croatia’s looming accession to the EU might make the country become less interested in its future relationship with Belgrade. What is your view? How will Croatia’s EU membership affect Zagreb’s policy toward neighbors, especially Serbia?
– My general impression is that EU membership has improved relations between new member states and their neighbors. Certainly Slovenia has played a very positive role in the Balkans generally over the past 20 years or so. Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria have also been more part of the solution than part of the problem. There are historical problems between Croatia and Serbia, but so far as I know relatively few big current issues. Croatia’s economic benefits from the EU will echo throughout the Balkans.
All former communist states of eastern and southern Europe are either already members of or aspirants to membership in NATO. The only exception is Serbia, and the reason is well known: most Serbs refuse to even consider joining NATO, largely because of the air campaign against Serbia in 1999. While some analysts believe that NATO membership would have no particular effect on Serbia’s EU prospects, arguing that these are two completely separate processes, others claim that it could be of great importance, helping Belgrade look more credible among its Western partners. Which argument is closer to your line of reasoning and why?
– I’m not sure Serbia’s hesitation about NATO is caused only by the 1999 bombing. Some in Serbia are attached to its friendship with Russia and nostalgic for its non-aligned status during the Cold War. It also knows it cannot become a member of NATO without changing its attitude on Kosovo.
Partly for these reasons, no one in NATO is campaigning for Serbian membership. Belgrade has a good deal of credibility in the West, but if it wants to become a full-fledged Western state it will need to adjust its foreign policy. This is not just a matter of “good neighborly relations” or “normalizing relations.” NATO is not going to bring the Kosovo issue into its membership. It has to be solved, completely, first. There is no use in pretending otherwise.
Contrary to a widespread belief of local conspiracy theorists, the Balkans are nowhere among U.S. foreign policy priorities. The ongoing economic crisis, which is becoming increasingly political, has caused EU membership to lose some of its attractiveness in the eyes of people both in EU member states and aspiring countries, which could make it more difficult for Brussels to keep us dedicated to the eurointegration process. If the crisis in Europe continues to deepen, leading eventually to resurgence of aggressive nationalism in the Balkans as a serious threat to already fragile peace, what is the breaking point at which Washington would begin to consider a stronger engagement in our troubled region?
– There are triggers that would motivate stronger engagement: widespread violence against minorities or interstate conflict, for example. But it is very difficult to picture anything that would precipitate the kind of heavy military intervention we saw in the 1990s.
Even in its current weakened state, the EU is a powerful magnet. And the financial crisis in Europe will not last forever. Anyone who doubts the attractiveness EU membership should just visit one of the nearby members and compare the standard of living. Skip Greece, as its crisis is profound, but self-induced.
After all, should we hope that ex-Yugoslavian countries could begin to view one another as major strategic partners rather than rivals any time soon, apart from mere rhetoric aimed at satisfying Brussels’ demand for good neighborly relations?
– I think you already see Slovenia taking that attitude, and I sometimes hear it also from Croatia, Montenegro and Macedonia. It will be hard for some of those who are lagging in the EU regatta to see the advantages of improved relations with their neighbors, but with time I think it will happen.
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Damsel in distress
France has answered a call from Bamako to stop an Islamist insurgent move southward. Their quick march towards the capital of Mali against an army led by American-trained officers has
left observers struggling to distinguish between fact, spin, and falsehood.
I won’t be surprised if we discover that the story is more complicated than the narrative so far, which is more or less “damsel in distress” and runs along these lines: Northern Mali is already in the hands of Sunni extremists affiliated with Al Qaeda and responsible for destroying Sufi shrines and documents. They were intending to move south to take over the capital, which appealed to France for help. The Brits and Americans are said to be in supporting military roles.
Just who made the appeal, and who is really in power in Bamako, is not clear to me, and no one seems to be asking. Instead they are rushing to do something. The UN Security Council will reportedly meet today. It had already in December approved an ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) military mission of doubtful capabilities to retake the north, but assembling that and deploying it was going to take months. ECOWAS is said to be accelerating its effort.
These military moves may be absolutely necessary. Damsels do sometimes have to be rescued, even if they are not without blemish in precipitating their distress. Mali’s military has played a dubious role in bringing on this crisis. Still, stopping an extremist takeover of Mali sounds like a pretty good idea to me. It is certainly preferable to fighting entrenched extremists for years, as in Yemen.
But I have no confidence that the north can be retaken by purely military means or that Bamako can be held without dealing with whatever brought on this crisis. Mali has had a pretty good reputation for sustaining democratic processes, but clearly something went awry. A few French bombs are not going to set things straight, even if they do discourage the Islamists from moving south.
For those interested in the deeper issues, this event at USIP in December is a good place to start. Those who imagine that civilian instruments of foreign policy can be jettisoned with the withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, or that military means alone will solve the challenges we face, had better think again. These damsels will keep turning up where we least expect to find them. We don’t need to rescue them for their sake. What difference does it make if Malians elect their leaders or not?
We rescue governments, democratic or not, for our own sakes: fragile or collapsed states in the hands of extremists have a way of generating explosive packages on international flights, capturing tourists for ransom and investing heavily in the drug trade and human trafficking. These evils in Mali are far more likely to affect Europe in the near term than the United States, so it is a good thing that Europeans are taking the lead. But if they lead only with military means and ignore civilian requirements, whatever they do won’t last long or work well.
PS: @joshuafoust points out that @tweetsintheME (Andrew Lebovich) has elucidated at least some of the ethnic, religious and other background to the conflict. For some of the musical context, click here.
PPS: Jennifer Welsh reviews the legal basis for the French military intervention.
PPPS: The counter-narrative of enemy-producing Western intervention hasn’t taken long to emerge.
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This week’s peace picks
The holiday season has ended. Monday is particularly busy:
1. A Bleak Winter: Providing Needed Aid to Those Fleeing Conflict in Syria, Monday January 14, 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM, Migration Policy Institute
Venue: Migration Policy Institute, 1400 16th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, Suite 300 (third floor), MPI Conference Room
Speakers: Mort Abramowitz, George Rupp, Fadi al Khankan, Kathleen Newland
The humanitarian crisis in and around Syria is intensifying as more people are forced to flee their homes in the face of continuing violence. More than half a million Syrians have left the country, at least two million are internally displaced, and many more have seen their normal lives and livelihoods destroyed. As winter sets in, stocks of food and fuel are dwindling. The strain on neighboring countries is testing their ability to keep borders open to Syrian refugees and international assistance is not keeping up with the growing needs. No one seems to expect an early end to the displacement, even if the Assad regime falls in the near future.
A delegation of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) visited Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq in late November to discuss the humanitarian crisis with refugees, officials from host and donor governments, representatives of international humanitarian organizations and local nongovernmental agencies; and to get a firsthand look at the work of IRC partners and staff who are directly involved in providing assistance to the refugees and to Syrians trapped inside the country.
Please join MPI and IRC on January 14 to discuss the delegation’s report, augmented by the perspective of Dr. Al Khankan, representing the Syrian Expatriates Organization, an organization of Syrian professionals who are raising funds, sending critically needed supplies, and providing direct humanitarian assistance within Syria. The discussion will be moderated by MPI’s Kathleen Newland, who is an IRC overseer and was a member of the delegation that produced the report.
Register for this event here.
2. Conference on Israel’s 2013 Election, Monday January 14, 10:00 AM – 3:30 PM, Georgetown University
Venue: Georgetown University, 37th and O Streets NW, Washington, DC 20057, Copley Hall, Copley Formal Lounge
Speakers: Moran Stern, Natan Sachs, Natasha Mozgovaya, Ghaith Al-Omari, Dennis Ross, Dan Schueftan, Robert Lieber, David Makovsky, Robert Wexler
A conference examining the upcoming general election in Israel, scheduled for January 22, 2013. Experts will discuss the issues that will be factors influencing Israelis as they prepare to go cast their ballots.
This all-day conference in Copley Hall’s Formal Lounge will feature three panels examining domestic politics, regional politics, and Israel-US relations.
Domestic Politics, 10:00 am-11:30 am
Moran Stern (Georgetown, moderator); Natan Sachs (Saban Center at the Brookings Institution); Natasha Mozgovaya (Haaretz Daily Newspaper)
Regional Politics, 11:40 am-1:00 pm
Moran Stern (Georgetown, moderator); Ghaith Al-Omari (American Task Force on Palestine); Amb. Dennis Ross (Georgetown); Dan Schueftan (Georgetown); Gunol Tol (Middle East Institute)
Israel-US relations, 2:00 pm-3:30 pm
Robert Lieber (Georgetown, moderator); David Makovsky (Washington Istitute for Near East Policy); The Honorable Robert Wexler (S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace).
Register for this event here.
3. A Kingdom’s Future: Saudi Arabia Through the Eyes of its Twentysomethings, Monday January 14, 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM, Wilson Center
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004, 5th Floor
Speaker: Caryle Murphy
The “Arab Awakening” has focused the world’s attention on young people in the Arab world, where they have been agitating for political reform. But what about young Saudis, who have not taken to the streets like many of their peers? Have they been affected by the “Arab Awakening?” A Kingdom’s Future: Saudi Arabia Through the Eyes of Its Twentysomethings explores the self-image of young Saudis and what they want when it comes to education, marriage, politics, religion, and personal liberties. It is based on research during Murphy’s three-year reporting tour in the kingdom, as well as scores of interviews while a public policy scholar at the Wilson Center.
Register for this event here.
3. Turkey Rising: Challenges and Prospects for the New Administration, Monday January 14, 12:30 PM, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Venue: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, Suite 1050, Stern Library and Conference Room
Speakers: Ross Wilson, James F. Jeffrey, Soner Cagaptay
With a booming economy and improving ties with the United States and NATO, Turkey now has a real chance to become a regional power. Yet formidable challenges remain, such as resolving the Kurdish issue, competing with Iran, and easing domestic political friction. To assess these issues and their impact on U.S. policy, The Washington Institute invited Ambassador Ross Wilson, Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, and Soner Cagaptay to address a Policy Forum luncheon in Washington, DC, on Monday, January 14, 2013, starting at 12:30 p.m. EST. The speakers will also discuss Dr. Cagaptay’s new report on Turkey.
Register for this event here.
4. What’s Next for Syria: Humanitarian and Political Perspectives, Monday January 14, 2:00 PM – 3:30 PM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1774 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Falk Auditorium
Speakers: Ross Wilson, James F. Jeffrey, Soner Cagaptay
With a booming economy and improving ties with the United States and NATO, Turkey now has a real chance to become a regional power. Yet formidable challenges remain, such as resolving the Kurdish issue, competing with Iran, and easing domestic political friction. To assess these issues and their impact on U.S. policy, The Washington Institute invited Ambassador Ross Wilson, Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, and Soner Cagaptay to address a Policy Forum luncheon in Washington, DC, on Monday, January 14, 2013, starting at 12:30 p.m. EST. The speakers will also discuss Dr. Cagaptay’s new report on Turkey.
Register for this event here.
5. The International Development Assistance Ecosystem of the U.S.: A Development and Foreign Policy Strategic Asset, Monday January 14, 3:00 PM – 5:00 PM, CSIS
Venue: CSIS, 1800 K Street NW, Washington DC, 20006, B1 Conference Room
Speakers: Carol Lancaster, Paul O’Brien, Tessie San Martin, Susan Reichle, Asif Shaikh, Daniel Runde
Since the end of the Cold War, the method by which the United States delivers foreign aid to the developing world has changed considerably. During this time, as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) saw large-scale staff reductions coupled with an increase in programs, a large base of U.S for-profit and nonprofit organizations grew up to implement projects and programs in the developing world. Although the budgetary situation reversed beginning in 2002, staffing levels at USAID remained low and a need to engage the U.S. implementer community continues. Concurrently, a broader discussion occurred over the effectiveness of development assistance by major donors. This effort, which resulted in the Paris Declaration of 2005 and later agreements at Accra in 2008 and Busan in 2011, enshrined the notion of country ownership—that the developing world must drive its priorities to ensure sustainability. The Obama administration launched its USAID Forward agenda to re-establish USAID as the premier development agency in the world. A central aspect of this agenda are reforms designed to reduce the Agency’s dependence on contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements with U.S. development implementers and shift to a greater use of government to government support and local organizations.
The report argues that the current U.S. ecosystem of international development assistance should be treated as a strategic asset that plays an important role in meeting U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. As with all systems, it can and should be improved; however, it should be strengthened, not weakened. This system, while imperfect, delivers a level of accountability and transparency for the U.S. government that is vital to continued political support for foreign assistance. The development implementers must do more to evolve to meet the changing nature of how the U.S. government sees development and the broader trends in the field. However, there are significant risks associated with USAID’s proposed reforms, which, if fully implemented, may not achieve the results desired.
Please join us for a panel discussion of this timely report. Copies will be available at the meeting and online the day of the event.
RSVP for this event to ppd@csis.org.
6. Two Years Later: Assessing Tunisia’s Progress since the Jasmine Revolution, Monday January 14, 5:30 PM – 7:30 PM, Johns Hopkins University
Venue: Johns Hopkins University, Bernstein Offit Building, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 500
Speakers: Leila Chennoufi, Eamonn Gearon, Stephen McInerny, Samia Msadek, Mohamed Malouche, Daniele Moro
On January 14, 2011, Ben Ali was forced to leave Tunisia by a popular uprising commonly known as the Jasmine Revolution. This historic event triggered mass protests that would sweep the Arab world, forcing other longstanding authoritarian leaders from power and potentially transforming the region. Since that time, Tunisia has witnessed the country’s first free and fair elections, the emergence of new political parties and coalitions, and the many difficulties of maintaining stability amid an uncertain political transition. On the second anniversary of this historic moment, it is important to assess Tunisia’s progress in its difficult transition to democracy and examine the prospects and challenges that lie ahead.
Register for this event here.
7. U.S. Grand Strategy in the Middle East: Is There One?, Wednesday January 16, 9:30 AM – 12:00 PM, Rayburn House Office Building
Venue: Rayburn House Office Buidling, Washington, DC 20515, Gold Room (2168)
Speakers: Chas W. Freeman Jr., William B. Quandt, Marwan Muasher, John Duke Anthony, Thomas R. Mattair
The Middle East Policy Council invites you and your colleagues to our 71st Capitol Hill Conference. Live streaming of this event will begin at approximately 9:30am EST on Wednesday, January 16th and conclude around noon. A questions and answers session will be held at the end of the proceedings. Refreshments will be served.
RSVP for this event to info@mepc.org.
8. The Iran Nuclear Challenge: Explore Policy Options, Wednesday January 16, 12:30 PM – 1:30 PM, American Security Project
Venue: American Security Project, 1100 New York Ave, NW Washington DC, Suite 710W, Conference Room E
Speakers: William Fallon, Frank Kearney, Lawrence Wilkerson, Stephen Cheney
Join us for a discussion with retired military leaders on U.S. military options towards Iran. The discussion will begin promptly at 12:30 p.m. Please arrive by 12:15 p.m. for registration.
We hope you can join us.
RSVP for this event to events@americansecurityproject.org.
9. Freedom in the World 2013 Launch, Wednesday January 16, 1:30 PM – 3:00 PM, Council on Foreign Relations
Venue: Council on Foreign Relations, 1777 F Street NW, Washington DC, 20006
Speakers: David Kramer, Mark Lagon, Arch Puddington, Jill Dougherty, Larry Diamond, Tamara Wittes
Please join us as we release the findings of Freedom in the World 2013, the latest edition of Freedom House’s annual assessment of political and civil rights. This event will feature an in-depth discussion of advances and setbacks in freedom over the past year and the challenges these trends pose for American foreign policy.
Register for this event here.
10. The Way Forward in Afghanistan, Friday January 18, 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM, Heritage Foundation
Venue: Heritage Foundation, 214 Massachusetts Avenue NE, Washington, DC 20002, Lehrman Auditorium
Speakers: Lisa Curtis, Thomas Donnelly, Bill Roggio, Steven Bucci
The United States is moving into a new phase of engagement with Afghanistan as it draws down its combat presence in the country. During last year’s presidential campaign, President Obama declared a goal of bringing American troops home and focusing instead on “nation building” here in the U.S. But a hasty U.S. troop withdrawal and a failure to remain seriously engaged with the Afghans in other ways risks sacrificing everything the U.S. has fought for over the last decade.
What are the best options for the pace and scope of withdrawal over the next two years? What level and type of U.S. troop presence should remain in Afghanistan post-2014 to ensure the country does not revert to its previous status of terrorist safe haven? What are the realistic possibilities for reconciling with the Taliban in a way that preserves democratic and human rights gains?
Join us as a distinguished group of experts addresses these and other questions related to the future of U.S. engagement with Afghanistan.
Register for this event here.
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Negotiating Afghanistan
Rarely have political and professional evaluations differed more than in Afghanistan today. While Presidents Obama and Karzai are upbeat about accelerating the turnover of security responsibility to the Afghan security forces this spring, the Pentagon’s own progress report suggests lots of reasons for caution. The difference lies in part in different definitions of what the Americans’ mission will be. But even taking that into account, there is a big spread between the 30,000 or so some think needed after the end of 2014 and the minimum 3000 that the American commander is said to have recommended. The President is said to be considering zero. What’s going on here?
In a word: negotiations. Karzai wants the Americans out faster and fewer to remain. Obama wants the same, plus immunity for whatever troops remain. The two presidents seem to have reached a modus vivendi: Obama gets immunity, Karzai gets faster drawdown. This will disappoint the thinktankers who want professional opinion to prevail. But war is politics by other means. It is not wrong for commanders in chief to make the ultimate decisions, so long as they are prepared to take responsibility for the consequences.
Obama has concluded that we are getting diminishing returns in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda there is pretty well devastated. He seems inclined to leave just enough troops to clobber them if they come back, or more likely to discourage them from returning. He has decided not to worry about how well or badly Afghanistan is governed. If that mattered to him, accelerating the withdrawal now, when little progress has been made on governance, would not make sense. Besides, worrying about Al Qaeda in Afghanistan isn’t a top priority when the greater threat seems now to be in Yemen, or possibly Mali. The President has many times expressed his preference for nation-building at home. He intends to live by what he says.
Karzai has concluded that he too is getting diminished returns from the American presence in Afghanistan. He worries less about Al Qaeda and more about the Taliban. He wants them inside the political process and appears willing to turn over at least some governance in the south to their dubious talents. He may even hope that the Taliban will support him, as a fellow Pushtun, despite their decade-long antagonism. But to get them into the political process he has to show that he can get the Americans down to minimal troop levels focused not on them but on Al Qaeda. That will also make him more popular with many Afghans (as well as with the Pakistanis) and benefit him in other ways: it will reduce the salience and visibility of the corruption the foreigners complain too much about and enable him to manipulate the electoral process in 2014, when he is supposed to step aside. He may do that, but he’ll want to be sure that whoever takes his place will not be too unfriendly to his and his family’s interests.
The problem here is that both Karzai and Obama may have under-valued the big risks: collapse of the Afghan security forces and a return of the country either to civil war or to Taliban domination of a large part of its territory (or, eventually, both). The latter is difficult to picture. Most Afghans hate the Taliban more than they hate the Americans. Kabulis are not going to welcome them with open arms. Neither will Tajiks and Uzbeks in the north. But a return of the country to civil war is not so hard to picture, especially now that its mineral spoils, including oil, are more apparent than they once were.
I admit to a good deal of discomfort leaving Afghanistan to whatever governance the Afghans can manage to sustain once the Americans draw down. Even in Iraq, where we arguably did a bit better job and the state was in any event a bit stronger to begin with, withdrawal has undermined the institutions we hoped would enable something like democracy to thrive. We’ve done a lousy job building the Afghan state. There are a lot of brave Afghans and Americans who have sacrificed a great deal in the effort to improve the situation, but the “effect,” as the military would call it, has been minimal. Afghanistan “good enough,” which is what the Administration calls its current state-building efforts, may be Afghanistan ripe for renewed civil war.
But the Presidents have decided that they will both gain if the effort is curtailed sooner rather than later. Only time and consequences will tell whether the outcome of their negotiation was wise or foolish.
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