Month: January 2013
Hagel needs Hegel
I don’t often write about Israel/Palestine issues. There are many other well-informed and intelligent people devoting their professional lives to what is euphemistically known as the Middle East “peace process.” It hasn’t gone anywhere for years, and expert opinion generally suggests it is not going anywhere anytime soon.
But that doesn’t mean there aren’t interesting developments. Neither facts nor opinion stand still just because negotiations are going no place. There is a growing inclination among right-wing Jews (Israelis and Americans) to think that they can annex the West Bank without incurring the risk that Arabs will outnumber Jews in this Greater Israel. Either the Arabs will be governed separately and won’t have political rights within Israel, or the Israelis will pay them to leave and go to Jordan, where the Hashemite monarchy is looking shaky anyway.
Let me be clear: either of these solutions is a heinous proposition, the first for an apartheid regime and the second for ethnic cleansing, even if accomplished by financial incentives rather than force. But there are apparently substantial numbers of Israeli Jews (nowhere near a majority yet) willing to consider these propositions rather than the now more commonly accepted two-state solution, which would maintain the Jewish majority in Israel by allowing a Palestinian state to govern the West Bank and (in the traditional proposition) also Gaza. Prime Minister Netanyahu is arguably among those who appear to find a one-state proposition attractive.
A Palestinian Linked-in colleague asked these questions the other day:
1- if Israel have Any intention of an honest and fruitful dialogue to negotiate for a two state solution, why are they still granting new permissions to build hundreds of illegal units in the illegal settlements built on Palestine occupied land?
2- The withholding of the Palestinian Tax funds by the Israeli government which is leaving over 116 thousand Palestinian employees without salaries
Is that a collective punishment? How long Israel think that the Palestinian will remain cross handed ?
These are perfectly good questions, but I fear the answer is all too obvious: the Israelis building in the settlements and withholding tax revenue from the Palestinian Authority are not interested in the two-state solution. They are pursuing their BATNA: best alternative to a negotiated solution, which is one state without Palestinian votes (or possibly without Palestinians).
The question is how Americans and Palestinians should react to this situation.
As for the Americans, President Obama’s nomination of Chuck Hagel as Secretary of Defense seems to me a correct response, though it is presumably being done for many other reasons as well. Hagel is a determined two-stater. I hope this will be backed up by a substantial portion of the American Jewish community, most of which understands perfectly well that holding on to the West Bank would some day end Israel’s identity as a Jewish state. The big problem in the United States is not the Jews, who voted overwhelmingly for President Obama, but rather evangelical Christians, who appear to have convinced a lot of Republican members of Congress that Hagel ‘s two-state approach betrays inadequate support for Israel.
I cannot speak for Palestinians, but their choices are clear: a re-opened negotiation, a new intifada or a non-violent uprising of a sort that has not been seen so far. A re-opened negotiation is unlikely, since Palestinian President Abbas has, understandably but unfruitfully, insisted on an end to settlement activity as a pre-condition.
It is hard for me to imagine in the wake of the violence that has prevailed recently in the Arab spring that the next rebellion in the Palestinian territories will be nonviolent, much as I believe that would be more effective. It is far more likely that Israel’s growing interest in holding on to the West Bank will generate another violent uprising. But that won’t help the Palestinians to make the case that their state already exists, as they and the UN General Assembly would like to claim. Nor will it convince the Israelis to go back to the bargaining table.
Is there an alternative? Avner Cohen proposes an unlikely one: Asma Aghbarieh-Zahalka, the Arab leader of a non-sectarian, non-ethnic Jewish and Arab political party. Would that life were like that. The sad fact is that Israeli politics will be driven for the foreseeable future by Prime Minister Netanyahu and his increasingly nationalist allies.
I’m afraid the bottom line is that things aren’t likely to go anywhere anytime soon, but Hagel will have a rough time in his confirmation hearing on Israel/Palestine issue. He is going to need some of Hegel’s ability to reconcile the irreconcilable.
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This week’s peace picks
A light week as Washington gets back into the swing of things after the holidays.
1. Crux of Asia Conference, Thursday January 10, 9:30 AM – 4:15 PM, Carnegie Endowment
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speakers: Jessica Matthews, Kurt Campbell, David Shambaugh, Frederic Grare, Ashley Tellis, Xia Liping, Srikanth Kondapalli, Daniel Blumenthal, Shen Dingli, Bharath Gopalaswamy, Kevin Pollpeter, Zha Daojiong, Sunjoy Joshi, Sean Mirski
The rise of China and India as major world powers promises to test the established global order in the coming decades. If history is any indication, Beijing, New Delhi, and Washington may all have different visions for this new international system. China and India’s many developmental similarities belie their deep strategic rivalry, which shapes their competing priorities on major global issues. As both states grow, their views on the international system will become increasingly relevant for their relationship, for the United States, and for the world as a whole.
Register for this event here.
2. Discussion with Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction on Challenges Facing the US, Thursday January 10, 2:30 PM – 4:00 PM, Stimson Center
Venue: Stimson Center, 1111 19th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, 12th Floor
Speakers: John Sopko, Ellen Laipson
In light of plans to transfer security responsibility for Afghanistan to its government by the end of 2014, the United States has a two year window of opportunity to overcome challenges presently facing its reconstruction efforts. Many of those challenges have been identified by audits and investigations conducted by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Most recently its contributions include chronicling “persistent delays in instituting basic anti-money laundering procedures” at the Kabul Airport, detailing the Afghanistan National Security Forces’ difficulties in assuming responsibility for their operations and maintenance costs, and auditing the US’ Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund in response to schedule slips and inadequate sustainability plans.
Afghanistan’s struggles with insecurity and corruption are likely to continue well past the 2014 transition. Meanwhile the US has entered an era of fiscal austerity that will limit resources available to the Pentagon, State Department, and other government agencies involved in reconstruction. Sustainability has become one of the foremost issues for reconstruction investments as a consequence.
Mr. John Sopko’s address at the Stimson Center is his first on-the-record, public speech since taking office in July 2012, and he will use it to comment on the factors that underpin these challenges. Ellen Laipson, Stimson’s President and CEO, will moderate a panel discussion to follow, adding some additional perspectives about reconstruction efforts. We hope this event will provide a useful public forum to consider the US role in Afghanistan’s reconstruction, through 2014 and beyond.
Register for this event here.
3. Overkill: The Case for Reevaluating the U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Thursday January 10, 6:30 PM – 10:00 PM, Cato Institute
Venue: Cato Institute, 1000 Massachusetts Avenue Northwest, Washington, DC 20001
Speaker: Christopher Preble
The United States has far more nuclear weapons and delivery systems than deterrence requires. The triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and bomber aircraft reflects bureaucratic Cold War planning, not strategic vision. Can the United States achieve an effective nuclear program which makes us safer, while adapting to the need for a smaller defense budget? Join us as Christopher Preble, the Vice President of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, discusses U.S. nuclear strategy, and the need to bring it into the 21st century.
Register for this event here.
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Alas, poor Bashar
Today’s “sermon” by President Asad, delivered it is said at the Damascus Opera House, is worth a glance. It tells us something about the mindset and current thinking of a man who has led his country into the slaughter of more than 60,000 of its citizens.
Bashar views Syria–which he implicitly identifies with himself–as the victim of foreign intervention. Takfiris and the Western powers are together attacking his country. Sure some Syrians have joined those efforts, but basically this is an international conspiracy against Syria’s independence and territorial integrity.
He continues to imagine that reforms he initiates will meet the legitimate demands of Syrians:
Such war is confronted through defending the homeland in parallel with a reform that is necessary to all of us, which may not change the reality of war, yet it strengthens us and reinforces our unity in the face of the war…Reforms without security is like security without reform. No one will be successful without the other…Those who keep parroting that Syria has opted for a security solution do not see or hear…We have repeatedly said that reforms and politics go in one hand and eliminating terrorism in the other.
He then presents a confusing (at least in English) series of numbered steps focused on national dialogue to produce a new constitution approved in a referendum, followed by elections and formation of a broadened government.
Of course something like this is precisely what the opposition in Syria is asking, but it will not accept doing it with Bashar al Asad still in power. Therein lies the giant anomaly. By his use of the security forces to try to repress the rebellion, Bashar has made himself the main issue in Syria. Of this he seems unaware, though he clearly is not feeling cheerful:
…out of the womb of pain, hope should be begotten and from the bottom of suffering the most important solutions rise, as the dark cloud in the sky conceals the sun light, but it also carries in its layers rain, purity and hope of welfare and giving….These feelings of agony, sadness, challenge and intention are huge energy that will not get Syria out of its crisis unless it turns this energy into a comprehensive national move that saves the homeland from the unprecedented campaign hatched against it.
The notion that Syrians will accept him as the leader of a “comprehensive national move” is so far-fetched that it hardly bears notice, except as evidence of the self-delusion still ensconced at the top of the regime.
Bashar’s appeal to Syrian nationalism is, I think, as sincere as it is delusional. He imagines that the war he is fighting will strengthen Syria:
The blood of martyrs protected and will protect the homeland and the region, and will protect our territorial integrity and reinforce accord among us, while at the same time purify our society of disloyalty and treason, and keep us from moral, human and cultural downfall, which is the strongest victory…When the homeland triumphs, it does not forget those who sacrificed for its sake.
There follows after this the requisite thanks to his armed forces.
So this is the thinking of the Syrian president after nearly two years of using his military and security services to kill his citizens and destroy their homes: we are purifying our society and will be stronger for it. He will not compromise, but if his opponents will lay down their arms he offers to lead a process of reform that will broaden political participation, but implicitly not so far as to affect his powers.
I don’t expect the opposition, which is doing well militarily, to agree to anything except Bashar al Asad’s departure from power. He is not only a dead man walking, but one unlikely to walk much farther. Alas, poor Bashar:
a fellow
of infinite jest, of most excellent fancy….now, how
abhorred in my imagination it is! my gorge rims at
it. Here hung those lips that I have kissed I know
not how oft. Where be your gibes now? your
gambols? your songs? your flashes of merriment,
that were wont to set the table on a roar? Not one
now, to mock your own grinning? quite chap-fallen?
PS: State Department was no more impressed with the speech than I was, though they failed to quote Shakespeare in response.
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Syria is getting what Assad wants
A Syrian reader, Hashem al Shamy (whom I know only as an occasional commenter on peacefare.net) writes (with some small edits by me):
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Submitted on 2013/01/05 at 9:44 am
Dear Mr Serwer, Thanks a lot for taking the time to respond to my comment, which I hope you did not find aggressive. I only wanted to point out what I think of your blog which brings the experience of a seasoned diplomat to the realm of international relations. The fact that I am Syrian should not discredit my dispassionate analysis, since covering the political risk and violence in Syria is part of my job. However, my experience as a Syrian is still valuable because I attended Syrian schools, studied its heavily propagandist curriculum, wore the green uniform to school, had to chant for the late President and the Baath Party. I also was a senior member of the Youth Lead Vanguard of Revolt Council in my high school, and a member of the Baath Party, and worked with senior government officials until six months before the start of the unrest. Unfortunately, I have lost many friends since the start of the unrest in Syria because of their support of the grass roots movement, providing shelter and medicine to fleeing civilians and opposing the regime’s policy publicly. Recently, two of my friends have been referred to the “Terrorism Court” set up by the regime last year after remaining incommunicado for months, which most likely [will] culminate in their execution on charges of undermining the authority of the state and supporting terrorists. I dont want to summarise the events of the past 22 months, which I am sure you are fairly acquainted with. I just would like to clarify some misconceptions that have been distorting the narrative of the Syrian conflict, including some comments posted by your readers. The Assad dynasty since it took power in 1970 The people on the other hand knew very well the limitless repression and the heavy price they will pay once they openly declare their opposition to the regime. When I was asked after my return from Syria in February 2011, one month before the start of the uprising, about the prospects of a similar movement to the ones in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, I was dismissive of any potential event. The reasons were the overconfidence of the regime and the firm grip of its security apparatus on the country, the absence of a grass roots effort to mobilise people on the ground, the division of the political opposition, and most importantly the capability of the regime to inflict a very heavy price on civilians and entire cities. Nevertheless, I never imagined that the regime would write off whole cities and region and would be willing to inflict catastrophic damage on the country as a whole to preserve its power. In your response, you said that focusing on the community level is a crucial factor which is widely overlooked. The regime, from day one, made its policy to target peaceful demonstrators and their leaders. They embarked on a policy of detaining activists calling for non-violent protests, torturing them and returning them dead to their communities to intimidate people, create a vacuum of potential community leaders, and give prominence to extremism on the streets. This is exactly what happened, when the increasing level of bloodshed accompanied by increasingly brutal techniques of the regime generated a reaction of violent response and emphasized demands of revenge and proactive killings in order to save civilians. This dynamic brought the “opposition” to the regime’s turf where it will be able to set the terms of the game and generate a spiral of violence to scare everyone off. On top of that, the regime has always been good at creating divisions and then exploiting them to create a fertile ambiance of uncertainty to advance its policy. Domestically, it allowed the existence of regime-sanctioned opposition groups who called for regime-led reform. Their job was to invalidate the external opposition rather than focusing on the regime’s performance and actions. It also labeled the protestors and later the rebels as “Islamists, extremists and terrorists” to present minorities with an existential threat and lock them into “us or Fundamentalists” narrative. When the regime had failed to quell the protests, turning into an armed insurrection, it sought to involve regional rivals as it usually does to increase the stake for regional countries for its potential demise. Banking on its initial portrayal of protestors as extremist fundamentalists, it exploited the increasing friction between Sunnis and Shiites in the region. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey on the side of “the opposition” and Iran, Iraq and Lebanon on the side of the government. This strategy unleashed the latent forces in the region and managed to blemish the opposition even more as being aided by countries whose sole aim is to destroy “modern and secular” Syria and replace it with stalwarts of the monarchies in the Gulf. The intense Post-Cold War divisions between the US and Russia have helped the Regime keep the international community paralysed over its response to the Syrian crisis. The US, under the Obama Administration, has sought from the beginning to engage with the “Reformist” Bashar Al-Assad, giving him a maneuvering space when protests broke out. Russia, on the other hand has no interest in dropping a faithful country since the 1960s for the sake of promoting democracy. The triple veto at the UNSC has been a convenient pretext for major countries not to intervene and to blame the international stalemate on the rogue behaviour of Russia and Iran. These dynamics have given the Syrian regime the sense of impunity and the ability to make rational decisions to intensify its response and destroy entire cities, knowing that no one will limit its free hand. The convenient illusion and wishful thinking that the regime will negotiate its own demise and exit (the ultimate departure of the President is imminent) have produced a negative response to ending the Syrian conflict. In conclusion, if the regime is not presented with a “credible threat” there will be no change in the regime’s behaviour and more lives and cities will be destroyed, making Syria ungovernable Post-Assad, which is exactly what the regime wants. Any solution that maintains Assad in power will be highly unsuccessful both in the medium and long term. I have so many much to say, but I just wanted to give a brief overview of how the Regime has properly evaluated its environment and gradually pushed the red lines in the sand to keep itself in power at the expense on Syria as a nation. Best, Hashem Alshamy |
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Syria needs a good negotiated settlement
I have generally appreciated the work of Andrew Tabler and his colleagues on Syria. It is hard-hitting, clever and up to date. But their piece on “No Settlement in Damascus,” which opposes a negotiated solution, is not up to standard.
Bilal Saab and Andrew Tabler reject the idea of a negotiated outcome, ignoring the nature of that outcome. They implicitly discount the possibility that at some point Bashar al Assad will decide he has had enough. If that day arrives, in my view it will be far preferable for him to negotiate his exit and a turnover of power than to depart from the country, leaving the state to collapse and the country to find its own equilibrium.
A negotiated solution does not necessarily mean a power-sharing arrangement, as Saab and Tabler assume, though inclusivity is an important characteristic of regimes that survive over the long term. A surrender is also a negotiated outcome, one that the Americans unwisely did not bother obtaining in the most recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Syrian revolutionaries would be making a serious mistake not to accept a negotiated transfer of power that genuinely leads to Assad’s ouster and the end of the regime.
Saab and Tabler are unimpressed with the record of negotiated settlements in civil wars. Their appreciation of the examples they cite is faulty. I know the Balkans ones best. Negotiated settlements in Bosnia and Macedonia (both power-sharing arrangements) have certainly been frustratingly difficult to implement, but they saved both countries from almost certain fragmentation and much more death and destruction. They also cite renegotiation of settlements in Africa as evidence of failure. While power-sharing does not correlate with post-election peace in Africa, renegotiation of agreements does.
Their description of the reasons for preferring no negotiated outcome includes this:
At a time when no legitimate government and no legal institutions exist to enforce a contract, warriors are asked to demobilize, disarm, and prepare for peace. But once they lay down their weapons, it becomes almost impossible to enforce the other side’s cooperation or survive attack. Adversaries simply cannot credibly promise to abide by such dangerous terms.
In fact, warriors are not always asked immediately to demobilize and disarm in a negotiated agreement. Good agreements have often recognized the need to allow belligerents to keep their arms, at least for a transition period. This is something that a thorough-going defeat at the hands of their enemies will not allow and a principal reason why belligerents will sometimes negotiate.
Saab and Tabler offer a flat statement about rebel victories:
More durable than negotiated solutions are rebel victories. Monica Duffy Toft, an associate professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, has argued that rebels typically have to gain significant support from fellow citizens in order to win. Once in government, rebels are also more likely to allow citizens a say in politics to further bolster their legitimacy.
Tell that to the Rwandans, or to anyone living in a country where the rebels or the government takes on a sectarian or ethnic tinge. In Syria you are going to have a hard time convincing the Alawites and other die-hard supporters of Bashar al Assad that their say in politics will be greater after this revolution. There are losers in revolution–the question in this one is whether they will be slaughtered en masse or get a chance to survive.
The specific issues Saab and Tabler raise with respect to Syria are not, unfortunately for their argument, only issues that arise in negotiated settlements:
- Assad may well escape rather than be captured or killed, so the complete victory the rebels seek may be frustrated even without a negotiated settelement.
- Trust will be hard to come by, but that is going to be true in the absence of a negotiated settlement as well.
- Enforcement of a negotiated settlement is a big issue, and I entirely agree that 10,000 UN peacekeepers are unlikely to be sufficient. But who is going to prevent atrocities in the aftermath of a rebel victory?
- Yes, a negotiated settlement would require allowing Iran a place at the table, but that will be necessary without a negotiated settlement too, witness Iraq and Afghanistan.
The main trouble with their argument is that Saab and Tabler simply don’t acknowledge the very real horrors that are likely to occur without a political settlement. I’d definitely want one that ends the regime and definitively removes Bashar al Assad from power and from Syria. But so long as it does, a negotiated settlement is far preferable to the violence absence of one will bring.
PS: Here’s a message sent by a Syrian colleague:
This arrived as a link attached to following message:
Last year was full of tragedies for me, as I lost some of my closest friends when they were killed by Assad soldiers. I was also detained and tortured, my house was destroyed, and my family was forcibly displaced. I dreamed that the end of the year would bring a glorious freedom to the Syrian people, the freedom for which I and my people have sacrificed a lot. Instead, the end of the year brought new massacres, which should not occur in the 21st century.
Despite all this, I recall some bright aspects in the past year, among them getting to make many friends around the world who may not share my race, religion, or language. However, they share with me common human values for which we started our Revolution in Syria.
I am very proud to have met each one of you, and what I have seen of you of compassion to help my people and to promote the common noble human values in which we believe. I hope you had a Merry Christmas and wish you a happy new year filled with joy. However, please do not forget your brothers and sisters in humanity who are dreaming of being able in the coming year to restore basic rights, to which you have already gotten. They desperately need your help and support.
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My Fantasyland
I gather the Serbian parliament will not actually approve the Fantasyland platform for Kosovo but will instead pass a resolution containing some basic principles to which its negotiators will adhere in the future political-level talks. This inspires me to suggest a few basic points that, if adopted, would go a long way to ensuring that peace and stability are maintained in the Balkans and that Serbia gets an early date to start negotiations on EU accession. This is my Fantasyland. No, I don’t expect Belgrade to listen to me, but here it is anyway:
Serbia hereby acknowledges the evil that was done in its name during the Milosevic regime. We have prosecuted criminals involved and delivered all the international indictees to the Hague Tribunal. Our current government is a democratic one that understands sovereignty cannot be maintained over a province in which human rights were so grossly violated. Milosevic lost sovereignty over Kosovo in 1999. Democratic Serbia cannot regain it.
Nor would we want to: governing a young and rapidly growing population of more than 1.6 million Albanians, many of whom no longer speak Serbian, is simply not what we want to be doing. They can and should govern themselves.
But we expect proper treatment of Serbs and other minorities there. This is Serbia’s primary concern: to ensure the safety, security and prosperity of its citizens who live in Kosovo, as well as the protection of Serbian monuments, churches, monasteries and other property, both religious and secular. For these purposes, Serbia accepts the Ahtisaari plan, whose letter and spirit were intended to provide real protection. We cannot accept pro forma implementation but will insist on substantial guarantees of the rights and privileges provided therein, which we negotiated for in good faith. This will be the main subject of discussion in our talks with the Pristina authorities.
The Pristina institutions are distasteful to us because they include people who have done deadly harm to Serbs in Kosovo. But we understand that they are the product of an internationally sponsored state-building process and represent the will of the majority population of Kosovo. We will respect and cooperate with these institutions as we do others legitimately elected and empowered, so long as they respect the human rights of the Serb population.
Despite our pleas, the International Court of Justice has advised that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not breach international law. Once the Ahtisaari plan has been fully and faithfully implemented to our satisfaction, we will reconsider whether we can recognize and establish diplomatic relations with the Pristina government.
In the meanwhile, we will seek for Serbs in Kosovo governing arrangements comparable to what we are willing to provide Albanians and other minorities within Serbia, particularly in the south. We understand that these contiguous populations will one day, like the Serbs in northern Kosovo, enjoy the privileges of citizens of the European Union, including the disappearance of the borders that now temporarily divide them from their co-nationals. We look forward to, and seek to hasten, that day.
We have sought a status-neutral approach to international community relations with Pristina. We will continue to be status-neutral ourselves, meaning that we will no longer claim Kosovo is a province of Serbia. But we understand that about half the members of the UN have now recognized the Pristina institutions as sovereign and independent. We will no longer oppose such recognitions and will ask that Russia allow Kosovo to enter the General Assembly. This will help ensure that the Pristina institutions feel the full weight of responsibility for maintaining peace and stability as well as the security and welfare of all their citizens.
What a fine day that would be, eh? This is not entirely fantasy. I know lots of Serbs in Belgrade who would sign up to something like this. The issue is not whether this is beyond imagination, but rather whether Serbia’s current leadership can bring itself to break with an approach that is causing both Serbia and Kosovo unnecessary pain. Unfortunately, it cannot.
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