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What difference does it make?

Presidents Nikolic of Serbia and Jahjaga of Kosovo will meet in Brussels Wednesday.  This is a first since Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence.  But the prime ministers have met several times in Brussels since last fall.  Official talks have been ongoing since 2011.  What difference does a meeting of the presidents make?

Likely not much on the substantive side, though we’ll see soon if enough progress has been made on resolving issues in Serb-controlled northern Kosovo to warrant sealing a deal.  As my friends over at Transconflict have been anxious to note, the main issues there are between the local Serbs and Belgrade.  Once those are resolved in a way that meets German concerns about parallel institutions, a deal with Pristina should not be difficult, provided Serbia forgets about the ludicrous platform it put forward recently still claiming sovereignty over all of Kosovo.  An announcement on exchanging liaison officers, to work out of EU missions in the respective capitals, is another possibility.

But even without specific outcomes, the presidents’ meeting is significant symbolically.  Serbia has been careful in its dealings with Kosovo to try to preserve its own symbols of sovereignty and deny any to the Pristina authorities.  That’s what silly quarrels about Kosovo license plates (whether they can have an “R” on them for “Republic”) and Kosovo* (that’s how Serbia wants Kosovo identified at regional meetings) are really about.

I am not privy to the preparations for Wednesday’s meeting, but I imagine that the Kosovo authorities will be exigent in insisting on reciprocity and symmetry in every aspect of the meeting.  I don’t really think symbolism is all that important, but the Serbs do.  Atifete Jahjaga is the living symbol of Kosovo statehood, independence and sovereignty.  She should insist on nothing less than full respect for those hard-won attributes from Tomislav Nikolic, who is himself the living symbol of Serbia’s statehood, independence and sovereignty.  Yes, also independence:  ridding itself of Kosovo is vital to Serbia’s future as a European state.

Tim Judah, surely one of the most experienced analysts of Serbia, Kosovo and the Balkans in general, sees the current avowedly nationalist Serbian leadership as continuing to normalize relations with Kosovo, like its allegedly liberal predecessor.  Surely there has been progress in the EU-sponsored talks under Nikolic, but let’s be clear about why:  it is the German insistence on settling the issues in northern Kosovo that is driving Belgrade in the direction of rapprochement with Pristina.  Serbia wants a date for EU accession negotiations to begin, in part because the date will bring money intended to fund the adjustments required as Belgrade makes its way through the 35 chapters of the acquis communitaire, to which it must conform its laws and practice before becoming an EU member.

Serbia, whose economy is in doldrums linked to the European financial crisis, needs that money.  Kosovo, while less developed economically than Serbia, is in better financial shape:  it has borrowed little and invested heavily in infrastructure, while keeping overall government expenditure relatively tight.  Its population is much younger than Serbia’s, which makes its pension burden far lighter.

There is another big difference:  Kosovo’s population is 90% committed to NATO and EU membership.  Serbia’s is negative on NATO and not much better than that on the EU (plurality, not majority, support).  The irony of course is that NATO and the EU are much more interested in Serbia than in Kosovo.  That’s another reason the meeting of the two presidents is important.  Jahjaga, a former deputy chief of the much-respected Kosovo police, is the picture of propriety and rule of law.  She polishes Kosovo’s image in Europe, the United States and beyond.  Symbolism does sometimes count.