Day: February 5, 2013
Finitiatives
Ammar Abulhamid writes:
Not too long ago, Assad issued a “Finitiative,” that is, an initiative to end all initiatives, calling, allegedly, for dialogue with the opposition. Now, opposition leader Moaz Alkhatib has repaid Assad in kind by issuing his own “Finitiative” calling, purportedly, for dialogue with the regime. Both finitiatives were clearly designed for purposes other than those declared and were meant primarily as acts of continued defiance, even if some failed to detect the defiance involved in Alkhatib’s finitiative
….Assad’s finitiative was meant to rally troops and consolidate support and control rather than enter into any real dialogue with the opposition, Alkhatib’s came as a revolutionary act meant to break a political stalemate in the ranks of the international community and to push for a real policy to help resolve the situation in Syria in a way commensurate with the expectation of the majority of average Syrians from all communal and political backgrounds. Assad’s finitiative was, then, a defensive act, a last stand of sorts. But Alkhatib’s finitiative marked the opposition’s first real offensive on the political front.
This makes a lot of good sense to me as an interpretation of what is happening, but Khatib’s challenge is greater than Asad’s: to hold the opposition together as he undertakes his “finitiative.” The regime, so far at least, has had relatively little difficulty maintaining cohesion, at least at its core. The cracks are many. But I’ve seen some ancient vases with a lot of cracks and no real breaks.
The opposition seems less intact, because it never was united. Khatib’s initiative took at least some people by surprise, which is not a good way of maintaining support from people who might already be less inclined than desirable to follow your lead. It is still not clear whether Khatib’s move will weaken or strengthen his position, but the uncertainty is itself debilitating.
As for the international community, it still looks unlikely that a breakthrough is imminent. Despite much chest beating, Washington seems as committed as ever to not taking military action. The Russians and Iranians seem wedded to Bashar, even if they claim it isn’t true. Brahimi is active, but so far to no good effect.
The war drags on, with something like 200 civilians killed each day. Atrocities are documented but not prevented. The regime is still able to use its air force to disrupt areas outside its control. The revolutionaries are likewise able to strike in Damascus and other areas of regime dominance. Fatigue–absolutely vital to the “mutually hurting stalemate” that opens up the possibility of successful negotiation–is setting in for many. But neither the regime nor the most avid of the revolutionaries appears to have concluded that they can gain more by talking than by fighting.
A lot of people in the middle concluded that long ago. The Khatib and Asad initiatives are designed to appeal to them. But it is the guys with guns who get to determine what happens. They still seem content to battle on.
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Reform or else
Laurentina Cizza reports on last week’s discussion at the Middle East Institute:
Jordan’s King Abdullah had three main objectives for the January 23 election: to increase the integrity of the election process in response to heavy criticisms of the previous one, increase voter turnout in the face an Islamist boycott, and to usher in reform, or at least give Jordanians that impression. A Middle East Institute discussion last week on the challenges ahead suggested that the King made some progress on the first two counts but fell short of meaningful reform. The upheavals in Egypt, Syria and Libya have bought King Abdullah some time, but he needs to deliver more substantive reform before his luck runs out.
Recently returned National Democratic Institute election observer, Leslie Campbell argued the January 23 election was better run than last time. An Independent Election Commission (rather than the Ministry of the Interior) used a pre-printed standardized ballot. This was a significant improvement over the previous blank pieces of paper, which opened the door to fraudulent practices. The standardized, numbered ballots made cheating more difficult. For the first time authorities assigned voters to polling stations, making tracking of individuals easier. The improved technical organization of the elections increased the credibility of the results.
However, the King’s failure to deliver on more profound reforms reduced these technical adjustments to little more than cosmetic changes. The combination of unequally sized districts and the single non-transferable vote in multiple-member constituencies served to prevent ideological cohesion and to amplify family, clan and tribal cleavages. Candidates in Jordan run as individuals, not on party lists. This renders political parties irrelevant. Strong family and ethnic ties compel individuals to vote for the candidate with shared family ties, not shared ideology.
In addition, The West Bank origin portion of the Jordanian population is disadvantaged relative to the King’s traditional East Bank powerbase. Campbell offered an extreme example: while a candidate running in the 1st district of Amman (majority Palestinian-origin population) needed 19,000 votes, a candidate running in the rural, tribal area of Ma’an needed a mere 1,600 votes to be elected.
A truly national legislative body cannot develop under these conditions. The unequal distribution of districts and the single-vote system over-represent the rural areas, amplify ethnic divisions, and hinder the development of ideologically cohesive political actors. A parliamentary system with no ideological blocks does not lead to effective coalition building, but rather to a system that sees the King fully in charge as the parliamentarians squabble for something to unite over.
Campbell remained optimistic nevertheless. Improvements in the process could move Jordan in the right direction. This round of elections 34 candidates of Palestinian origin made it to Parliament versus 19 last time. Only 33 incumbents made it back into parliament this time around.
Election observer Danya Greenfield of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East focused on what new insights the elections could provide. Islamic Action Front (IAF) appeals to boycott the elections fell flat. Only 2,000 people showed up to protest, and only 2-5% of Jordanian voters refrained from voting with the express purpose of boycotting the elections. Turnout was better than in the last elections, though the statistics indicate that Jordanians still feel apathetic about politics. Turnout of registered voters was 56%, but only 40% of the eligible voter population. This is low in comparison to the rates of electoral participation in neighboring Egypt and Libya.
The IAF remains popular. Since family ties motivated people to go to the polls, voters may have been reluctant to boycott. Studies indicate that in an equitable distribution system the IAF would win 20 to 25% of the parliamentary seats. The increased turnout is not a good barometer of the King’s popularity. To the contrary, the low turnout compared to neighboring countries suggests disappointment with the reforms the King is offering.
The conflict in Syria has frightened Jordanians, but they are unlikely to remain quiescent. Upcoming IMF-mandated food and fuel price spikes, and the continued influx of refugees from a hemorrhaging Syria, are increasing political pressure in the Kingdom.
Both Campbell and Greenfield came to the same conclusion: the King must demonstrate his commitment to reform to boost Jordanian confidence in the future. Perhaps the King’s abstention from tampering with the Parliament’s upcoming selection of the Prime Minister will represent the perfect opportunity.
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