Chad’s latest cycle of conflict

SAIS graduate student Nathalie Al Zyoud worked as the Executive Director of Caring Kaela, an International NGO that empowered Chadian Diaspora members to engage in the governance of their country to bring sustainable peace to Chad.  Links to the agreements cited here can be found at here.  Nathalie recounts:

Escalation of hostilities

Large scale violence in Chad follows a pattern of exclusion from power, rebellion and co-optation.

President Idriss Déby ousted President Hissein Habré in 1990, now on trial in Senegal for crimes against humanity. Déby belongs to the Zaghawa tribe, a mere 1% of Chad’s 200 ethnic groups.  After his rise to power, Déby skillfully managed competing tribal dynamics by rotating key posts inside his government, maintaining the most lucrative positions in the hands of his Zaghawa tribesmen.

When the World Bank gave the green light in October 2000 to the construction of a Chad-Cameron pipeline, it opened up the prospect of vast revenues for a government with little track record of good governance and fiscal responsibility. Despite the safeguards put in place to ensure the responsible use of Chad’s oil revenues, the Déby government quickly began diverting funds to consolidate its grip on power. Funds were used to purchase large quantities of weapons. In 2005 President Déby changed the Constitution to maintain himself in power. This was the final straw for disgruntled family members, competing tribal leaders, and hungry business elites, who went into rebellion to renegotiate their slice of the pie.

Pawns in a regional conflict

The Chadian Armed Opposition Groups (CAOG) found safe haven in Sudan. They set up in Khartoum and became a tool in the hands of Sudanese President Omar al Bashir, who was happy to pay back his old friend Déby for sparking the conflict in Darfur. The rebels’ difficulties were evident early on.  After sending countless youths to their deaths on April 13, 2006 in the first rebel raid on N’Djamena, rebel leader Mahamat Nour returned home for a promising position as Minister of Defense. Throughout the conflict, the CAOG were plagued by internal dissention, intrigues and splits.  They were never able to develop a political platform around which to rebuild their country.

International support for the status quo

France, Chad’s colonial power, was happy maintaining the status quo and refused all negotiations with the armed opposition. The United States needed Chad’s cooperation to access Darfur and to continue its Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in the region. Despite the use of child soldiers by the Government of Chad (GOC), the US maintained its military assistance to the country. In the midst of an open conflict, the EU was focused on election reforms and finalized the “August 13^th Agreement” in 2007 between the GOC and its political opposition, confident that a transfer of power could be achieved through the ballot box. International consensus was achieved around the deployment of a UN peace-keeping force, MINURCAT (UNSC 1878, 2007), along the Chad-Sudan border, but without a political mandate.

Public rhetoric and peace on paper

Several peace processes were initiated without much success:  the “Libreville initiative” led by late President Omar Bongo Ondimba of Gabon (September 2007) and the “Syrte Agreement” between the GOC and 4 major rebel groups, brokered by late-Colonel Muammar Gadaffi (October 2007). Each had limited results; each time a rebel leader would rally to the government, his second in command would take over the left over troops and reconstitute a rebel movement.

The final rebel raid on N’Djamena occurred on February 2, 2008. Three rebel groups united to advance unhindered to Chad’s capital. They called on President Déby to “negotiate or there will be war.” French authorities, a kind of parallel government in Chad, threw its support to Déby. Mercenaries and the Darfur Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) were flown in for additional support. On February 3, the CAOG were at the palace doors but bitter in-fighting raged inside their ranks.  The rebel military advance crumbled as a divided leadership fought over the spoils before they had won the war. In an anti-climatic move, rebels retreated to plan the transition and were pushed back by government forces and their allies. President Déby reshuffled his government.  The rebellion petered out.

Scrambling for control

In May 2008, the emboldened JEM launched an attack on Khartoum.  This time the international community was mobilized.  Caring for Kaela (CFK), an international nongovernmental organization (NGO), had built a collaborative advocacy network of NGOs from DC and NY to Europe and Chad to push for an inclusive dialogue between the Government and the armed opposition. The Chadian Diaspora obtained permission to assess the armed opposition’s willingness to negotiate.

The deployment of EUFOR, an EU bridging force, was accelerated.  June 16 the USG urged the GOC to “open lines of communication with the opposition and help facilitate dialogue.” In September 2008, EUFOR transferred power to MINURCAT. The EU, fearful of losing control and threatened by the Diaspora’s efforts to engage the CAOG into a dialogue, initiated its own exploratory mission with the support of the USG and the Swiss. Nothing substantive came of their meetings with rebel groups, which were divided, opportunistic and lacked a coherent vision for a transition in Chad.

Shifting power dynamics

The international community turned its attention towards the two heads of state. Under the auspices of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (IOC), Qatar and Libya, a series of agreements were signed between the Government of Chad and Sudan to halt hostilities.* President Bashir found himself indicted by the International Criminal Court for Darfur war crimes in March 2009 and genocide in July 2010.

The USG pushed President Déby to exert pressure on Sudan. He quickly defeated a May 2009 attack by the Chadian rebels along the Chad-Sudan border. Again militarily victorious, an emboldened Déby enjoyed renewed international community political support.  Khartoum and N’Djamena initiated a series of meetings in October 2009, culminating in a final agreement to normalize relations (January 2010).  Déby once again reshuffled his government.

The end of a cycle of violence

The pressure built to coopt and reintegrate the rebels back into the government.  The EU wanted to choreograph an election. Rebel leaders were promised government jobs. Foot soldiers were cantoned and disarmed. A program for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) was discussed but never implemented.  Given a few Chadian francs and a djallabia, soldiers were told to go home. They dissipated slowly. With Libya disintegrating, Central African Republic and Sudan still unstable and Boko Haram causing havoc in Nigeria, there was no shortage of work for armed men with fluid allegiances.

President Déby requested the departure of MINURCAT, pledging to take full responsibility for the protection of civilians on his territory. The mission closed on December 31^, 2010, in accordance with UNSC 1923 (2010). Elections are held on April 25^, 2010. President Idriss Déby Itno was reelected.

*March 13^th, 2008 OIC Summit “Dakar Agreement” between Chad and Sudan (facilitated by the Government of Senegal);  May 3^rd, 2009 “Doha Agreement” between the governments of Chad and Sudan (facilitated by the Governments of Qatar and Libya)