Day: February 13, 2013
Behind the curve is not leading from behind
President Obama had little to say on international affairs in the State of the Union speech last night, which did not break new foreign policy ground. On Syria, this was it:
We’ll keep the pressure on a Syrian regime that has murdered its own people, and support opposition leaders that respect the rights of every Syrian.
There is nothing wrong with this formula (except grammar, since by my lights it should be “who respect”), but there is a good deal lacking in what the Administration is doing. Most Washington commentary has focused on military intervention. I think there are good reasons to hesitate on that front: the unpredictable regional impact, possible consequences for US relations with Russia and the political ramifications inside Syria.
But it is hard for me to understand why the Administration is not throwing 100% political and financial support behind the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces that it helped to create. One of its main purposes was to give a stronger voice to opposition people inside Syria, many of whom want an early end to the fighting. The Coalition’s leader, Moaz al Khatib, stuck his neck out calling for a conditional dialogue with the regime. Why would the US government continue to sit on its hands?
I don’t have an answer to that question. Some officials tell me money is flowing to the Coalition, but those I know in the Coalition haven’t seen it. What is needed is not only humanitarian aid, some of which should be administered through the Coalition, but also basic operational expenses to allow the Coalition to begin to govern in liberated parts of Syria. I would happily write a check for $50 million and tell these folks to come back in six months for more, provided they are able to give me a full accounting (with receipts) of what they did with the first slice and what its impact was.
That isn’t how it works, some say. But that is how it works when the US really backs a cause. If we want the Coalition to appoint an interim government, we need to provide the resources and flexibility required. There is little point in saying something in diplomacy if you are unwilling to act on it.
There are other things to be done besides money. Washington could formally recognize the Coalition as the legitimate government of Syria and give it possession of the embassy in Washington, which I am told is already in the hands of officials sympathetic to the revolution. The UN seat is another issue. Even if a credentials challenge mid-session is not possible, we could signal that come next fall the US will back a Coalition government bid for the seat.
I am told some in the Coalition are hesitant about US support. This would not be surprising. Attitudes in Syria towards the US are distinctly negative, and our inaction has not improved our image. Syrians resent the designation of Jabhat al Nusra, an extremist Sunni militia, as a terrorist organization, since its militants are among the most effective fighters and its treatment of the population better than that of at least some of the more secular Free Syrian Army fighters, whom Washington has been anxious to support.
The Administration is correct to want the Syrians out front fighting their own civil war and negotiating their own political settlement, if there is to be one. But Washington needs to make sure that the “opposition leaders” who “respect the rights of every Syrian” get what they need to prevail in what is likely to be a chaotic and bloody post-Asad Syria. There is a difference between leading from behind and being behind the curve.
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A better way
North Korea’s third nuclear weapons test yesterday raises three questions:
- Why are they doing this?
- What difference does it make?
- How should the rest of the world respond?
Why does North Korea develop nuclear weapons?
If you believe what Pyongyang says, the answer is clear: to defy and threaten the United States, which the North Koreans see as their primary enemy. But this should not be understood as a classic state-to-state conflict. North Korea poses, at least for now, little military threat to the United States. But Pyongyang believes Washington wants to end its dictatorship (I certainly hope there is some truth in that–even paranoids have enemies). The North Koreans see nuclear weapons as a guarantee of regime survival. No one wants to run the risk of regime collapse if the regime holds nuclear weapons, for fear that they could end up in the wrong hands. NATO attacked Libya only after Qaddafi had given up his nuclear program. So the North Koreans view nuclear weapons as guaranteeing regime survival.
What difference does it make?
South Korea and Japan have reason to be nervous about North Korea’s nuclear weapons and improving missile capability to deliver them. But it is going to be a long time before North Korea can seriously threaten the US with nuclear weapons. And the US holds a capacity to respond massively.
The larger significance of the North Korean nuclear program is the breach it puts in the world’s nuclear nonproliferation regime, which has been remarkably successful in limiting the number of nuclear powers, especially in Asia. But Taiwan, South Korea and Japan face real difficulty in maintaining their abstinence if North Korea is going to arm itself and threaten its neighbors. There are not a lot of worse scenarios for the world’s nonproliferation regime than an expanded nuclear arms race in Asia, where China, India and Pakistan are already armed with nuclear weapons.
How should the rest of the world respond?
This is where the issues get difficult. There are already international sanctions on North Korea, which has managed to survive them so far with a bit of help from Iran on missile technology and China on economic ties. More can be done, especially if the Chinese crack down on illicit trade across the border. But the North Korean objective is juche (self-reliance), so tightening sanctions may help rather than weaken the regime.
The Economist last week suggested the efforts to block the nuclear program have failed and that the international community should instead now focus on regime change, by promoting North Korean travel, media access, Church-sponsored propaganda and trade. This would mean a partial reversal of the efforts to isolate North Korea and a new strategy of building power centers that might compete with the regime, especially among the growing class of entrepreneurs and capitalists operating more or less illicitly in North Korea.
We are not good at reversals of policy. But the failure of our decades-long attempts to isolate the Castro regime in Cuba is instructive. Communism did not fall in Eastern Europe to sanctions. It fell to people who took to the streets seeking a better life, one they learned about on TV and radio as well as in illegally circulated manuscripts. Isolation alone seems unlikely to work. Isolation of the regime with a more concerted effort to inform and educate the people might be a better approach.
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