Month: February 2013
Talk is cheap
Calls for negotiated solutions are all the rage. Secretary of State Kerry wants one in Syria. The Washington Post thinks one is possible in Bahrain. Everyone wants one for Iran. Despite several years of failure, many are still hoping for negotiations with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Ditto Israel/Palestine. Asia needs them for its maritime issues.
It is a good time to remember the classic requirement for successful negotiations: “ripeness,” defined as a mutually hurting stalemate in which both parties come to the conclusion that they cannot gain without negotiations and may well lose. I might hope this condition is close to being met in Syria and Bahrain, but neither President Asad nor the Al Khalifa monarchy seems fully convinced, partly because Iran and Saudi Arabia are respectively providing unqualified support to the regimes under fire. Ripeness may well require greater external pressure: from Russia in the case of Syria and from the United States in the case of Bahrain, which hosts the US Fifth Fleet.
It is difficult to tell where things stand in the Afghanistan negotiations. While the Taliban seem uninterested, Pakistan appears readier than at times in the past. The Americans are committed to getting out of the fight by the end of 2014. President Karzai is anxious for his security forces to take over primary responsibility sooner rather than later. But are they capable of doing so, and what kind of deal are the Afghans likely to cut as the Americans leave?
Israel and Palestine have one way or another been negotiating and fighting on and off since before 1948. Objectively, there would appear to be a mutually hurting stalemate, but neither side sees it that way. Israel has the advantage of vast military superiority, which it has repeatedly used as an alternative to negotiation to get its way in the West Bank and Gaza. A settlement might end that option. The Palestinians have used asymmetric means (terrorism, rocket fire, acceptance at the UN as a non-member state, boycott) to counter and gain they regard as a viable state.
The Iran nuclear negotiations are critical, as their failure could lead not just to an American strike but also to Iranian retaliation around the world and a requirement to continue military action as Tehran rebuilds its nuclear program. The United States is trying to bring about ripeness by ratcheting up sanctions pressure on Tehran, which fears that giving up its nuclear program will put the regime at risk. It is not clear that the US is prepared to strike a bargain that ensures regime survival in exchange for limits on the nuclear program. We may know more after the P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China + Germany) meet with Iran February 26 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.
Asia’s conflicts have only rarely come to actual violence. China, Korea (North and South), Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines and India are sparring over trade routes, islands, resources and ultimately hegemony. This risks arousing nationalist sentiments that will be hard to control, driving countries that have a good deal to gain from keeping the peace in some of the world’s fastest growing economies into wars that the regimes involved will find it difficult to back away from. Asia lacks an over-arching security structure like those in Europe (NATO, OSCE, G8, Council of Europe, etc) and has long depended on the US as a balancing force to preserve the peace. This has been a successful approach since the 1980s, but the economic rise of China has put its future in doubt, even with the Obama Administration’s much-vaunted pivot to Asia.
This is a world that really does need diplomacy. None of the current negotiations seem destined for success, though all have some at least small probability of positive outcomes. Talk really is cheap. I don’t remember anyone complaining that we had spent too much money on it, though some would argue that delay associated with negotiations has sometimes been costly. The French would say that about their recent adventure in Mali.
But war is extraordinarily expensive. Hastening to it is more often than not unwise. That is part of what put the United States into deep economic difficulty since 2003. If we want to conserve our strength for an uncertain future, we need to give talk its due.
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Happy birthday, Kosovo!
I did this interview on for Arben Ahmeti, editor of the new Kosovo daily Tribuna. They are publishing it today (the day after the fifth anniversary of Kosovo’s declaration of independence):
1. Has Kosovo achieved statehood five years after declaration of independence?
A: Yes, Kosovo is a state. It has a functioning presidency, government, Constitutional Court and judicial system. It has functioning municipalities and civil society. While there are many state institutions that are not fully formed yet, the main state institution lacking at this point is a security force capable of defending the state, its territory and its people. That will become permissible this year and will be needed within the next five years, because I find it hard to believe KFOR will stay any longer than that.
2. There is no international legitimacy yet, no authority over all territory; no rule of law. Do you think that these five years were more a test than actual existence as a state?
A: No. I don’t. You are building a state, which takes time. There is a good deal of international legitimacy: more than half the members of the UN have recognized Kosovo, which is increasingly accepted in regional meetings and international organizations. There is government authority over 89% of the territory. The law rules more than it doesn’t. Otherwise I don’t know why my driver on the way to the airport at 5 am keeps below the speed limit. The Constitutional Court has intervened twice on issues concerning the presidency, successfully. I know a lot of states in which that would not have been so readily accomplished.
There is of course room for improvement, especially concerning corruption and organized crime. But you should not ignore the real progress that has been made.
3. How long do you think will it take to Kosovo to become member of UN?
A: As long as it takes to convince Serbia that it is better off with a clearly defined border and a friendly neighbor than an indefinite border and a hostile neighbor. It is beyond me to predict when that might be, though I suspect it will be sooner rather than later. Belgrade needs a date to begin EU accession negotiations, because with the date comes substantial financing. No one in Belgrade is going to do Kosovo any favors, but you have some leverage in this situation.
4. Do you think that ongoing dialogue will result in normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia this year?
A: There has already been a good deal of normalization. Belgrade officials are meeting often with Kosovo officials, whom the Serbs accept as the democratically validated representatives of a legitimate government. But I won’t be satisfied until there is mutual diplomatic recognition and exchange of ambassadors. That isn’t going to happen this year.
5. Will north be a special territory?
A: I don’t know what a “special territory” is. I expect the north to have all the privileges defined in the Ahtisaari plan, which are many. There may also be some need for particular implementation agreements, like the Integrated Border Management agreement.
6. Do you expect the north to be integrated into Kosovo institutions?
A: Yes, while continuing the relations with Belgrade permitted in the Ahtisaari plan.
7. How do you see the lack of rule of law in Kosovo?
A: I see it as a problem, one that needs to be solved. I can remember a Kosovo that had much less rule of law than today. And I hope to see one with more rule of law than today.
8. How do you comment the evaluation of EU Commission for visas on Kosovo?
A: I see it as a first step in the right direction. The EU Commission has to be exacting and clear in what it asks of Kosovo. Experience with other Balkans countries will make the Europeans very tough. If you want to get into their club, you need to meet the requirements. If I were an EU citizen, I would expect a great deal of rigor in applying the requirements.
9. Do you think that Kosovo is losing too much lacking the economic development?
A: Kosovo has a lot to do still to make its business environment attractive to foreign investors. But in talking with Kosovar entrepreneurs, I’ve found a good deal of enthusiasm for the commercial possibilities. Growth in Kosovo has been high by European standards. Not sufficient, but still high. One of the key questions now will be how to incorporate the gray economy into the official statistics and make it part of the official economy.
10. Is Kosovo still a “black hole” in Balkans?
A: No. It is a developing country, an emerging market, that still needs to improve the business environment and rule of law. These are much better problems than it had ten or even five years ago.
While far more advanced than an infant, a five year old still has a lot of growth and maturing to do. Enjoy your childhood. It will be over soon enough. Happy birthday, Kosovo!
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This week’s peace picks
1. Iran’s Nuclear Program: Is a Peaceful Solution Possible?. Tuesday February 19, 10:00 AM-11:30 AM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, Falk Auditorium, 1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington DC 20036
Speakers: Tamara Cofman Wittes, Thomas Pickering, Kenneth M. Pollack
After several years of increasingly punishing sanctions against its economy, there is hope that Iran is now prepared to resume negotiations with the international community to reach a solution to the ongoing nuclear standoff. Many experts fear that Iran is quickly approaching the nuclear threshold, and that 2013 could be the last chance to avoid this outcome. If the international community cannot seize that opportunity, it may be left only with much worse alternatives.
On February 19, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host a discussion to examine strategies for resolving the nuclear standoff. Panelists will include former Ambassador Thomas Pickering, co-founder of The Iran Project, who will present the organization’s latest set of recommendations for addressing the nuclear issue, and Brookings Senior Fellow Kenneth Pollack. Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.
After the program, panelists will take audience questions.
Website: here
2. America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, Tuesday, February 19, 1:00 PM- 3:00 PM, US Institute of Peace
Venue: US Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington DC
Speakers: Daniel Kurtzer, Willian Quandt, Shibley Telhami, Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen
Please note: This event has been rescheduled for February 19th, from 1 p.m. to 3 p.m. If you plan to attend on this rescheduled date, please RSVP here.
As President Barack Obama embarks on his second term and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu builds his coalition government, many warn that time is running out for the two-state solution. On the occasion of its publication, David Ignatius will join three of the authors of ‘The Peace Puzzle: America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace’ and USIP’s Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen to discuss their own views on whether and why that door is closing, and what the next Obama administration can do to keep it open.
‘The Peace Puzzle’ was written by Daniel C. Kurtzer, Scott B. Lasensky, William B. Quandt, Steven L. Spiegel, and Shibley Z. Telhami and co-published by USIP Press and Cornell University Press. It offers a uniquely objective account and assessment of the American role in the peace process over the last two decades, concluding with 11 recommendations for the next administration to strengthen its role in resolving the conflict. While the tone of the book remains optimistic, the authors question whether the ‘determined, persistent, creative, and wise’ American diplomacy and leadership that have ushered in breakthroughs in the past can be recaptured and whether the lessons learned from two decades of failures will be embraced.
Please join us for this discussion with David Ignatius on the prospects for a breakthrough in the peace process and the lessons offered in ‘The Peace Puzzle.’
Website: http://www.usip.org/events/americas-quest-arab-israeli-peace
3. A National Security Strategy for Lebanon, Wednesday, February 20, 12:30-2:00 PM, Aspen Institute
Venue: Aspen Institute, One Dupont Circle, NW, Suite 700, Washington DC 20036
This event will feature a panel of experts to explore the challenges facing Lebanon’s national security and promote actionable recommendations for a solvent national security strategy for the country going forward, especially as it relates to US-Lebanese relations, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran.
Website: http://www.aspeninstitute.org/events/2013/02/20/national-security-strategy-lebanon
4. Arab Perspectives on Iran’s Role in a Changing Middle East, Thursday February 21, 10:00 AM-12:00 PM, US Institute of Peace
Venue: US Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC
Speakers: Kristin Lord, Shibley Telhami, Michele Dunne
This meeting is co-sponsored by the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center and the United States Institute of Peace.
While there is much talk of an ‘Arab’ view of Iran, there are in fact significantly divergent views on Tehran’s role, even among rulers in the region. Additionally, despite the Sunni-Shiite divide, Arab public views of Iran and of its regional role are far more complex than-and often at odds with-the views of their leaders. Even those Arab governments that fear Iran most and, in some cases, support American military actions to weaken Iran’s influence, differ markedly from Israel’s calculations and expectations.
Shibley Telhami will present his analysis and paper on this subject on February 21, 2012 from 10:00am to 12:00pm. This is the second in a five-part series co-sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace and the Wilson Center’s Middle East program on ‘The Changing Security Architecture in the Middle East.’
Website: http://www.usip.org/events/arab-perspectives-iran-s-role-in-changing-middle-east
5.Women in Combat: The Changing Roles of Women in the US Military, Thursday February 21, 12:00 PM- 1:15 PM, Center for National Policy
Venue: Truman National Security Project & Center for National Policy- Capitol Hill Office, 1 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington DC, Suite 333
Speakers: Michael Breen, Kayla Wiliams, Scott Bates
On January 24th, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced the elimination of the ground combat exclusion rule for women in the military. Panetta stated his desire to move forward with a plan to eliminate all gender-based barriers to service. Join CNP President Scott Bates and an expert panel as they discuss the effects Secretary Panetta’s decision will have on current, and future generations of service-members, as well as which barriers will be the most challenging to overcome.
Website: http://cnponline.org/ht/display/EventDetails/i/41816
6. The Rise of Radical and Nonofficial Islamic Group in Russia’s Volga Region, Thursday February 21, 3:00 PM-5:00 PM, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K Street, NW Washington DC 20006, Basement Level Conference Rooms A & B
Speakers: Sergey Markedonov, Gordon M. Hahn, Andrew C. Kuchins
In the two decades since the dissolution of the USSR, Russian and Western experts, human-rights activists, and journalists have become accustomed to the political violence of the North Caucasus. Recent tragedies in Russia’s Volga region suggest that this sort of violence – and the Islamist terrorists who perpetrate it – may not be confined to the Caucasus. This has raised a question: how likely is it that the North Caucasus scenario will be repeated in the Volga region? Any attempt to answer this question is complicated by the variety of non-official Muslim groups of both local and international origin active there and the complex set of linkages between them.
This report sheds light on the ideological sources and resources of radicalism in the Volga region, nonofficial Islamic movements’ support among the regional population, and opportunities for the potential growth of different forms of Islamist activities. It describes the origins of different nonofficial Islamic movements as well as their post-Soviet development, ideology, and relationship with the authorities and official Muslim clergy. The report also offers practical approaches both for Russian domestic policy and for the U.S.-Russian security cooperation agenda.
Website: http://csis.org/event/rise-radical-and-nonofficial-islamic-groups-russias-volga-region
7. Tunisia: Are Economic Decline and Political Violence Prevailing?, Thursday February 21, 5:30 PM- 7:30 PM, John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS-Rome Building, 1619 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington DC, Room 812
Speakers: Mustapha Kamel Nabli, Emauele Santi, Stephen McInerney, Alexis Arieff, Daniele Moro
Mustapha Kamel Nabli, governor of the Central Bank of Tunisia and senior adviser to the World Bank chief economist; Emanuele Santi, principal country economist at Tunisia African Development Bank; Stephen McInerney, executive director of the Project on Middle East Democracy; Alexis Arieff, an analyst in African Affairs at Congressional Research Services; and Daniele Moro (moderator), visiting scholar in the SAIS African Studies Program, will discuss this topic.
8. The Middle East: What’s Next? With General James Mattis, Thursday, February 21, 6:00 PM- 7:30 PM, Young Professionals in Foreign Policy
Venue: Russel Senate Office Building, Constitution Avenues and 1st street, NE, Kennedy Caucus Room (SR-325)
Speakers: Gen. James N. Mattis
As the Middle East continues to undergo tectonic political, social, and economic change, the future of the U.S role in the region seems ever-more complex and uncertain. General James Mattis, Commander of U.S. Central Command, will share his analysis of the ongoing impact of the Arab Spring, long term American strategy in Afghanistan, U.S.-Pakistan relations, troubles with Iran, the future of Iraq, and the shifting balance of power within the Middle East. Gen Mattis will also discuss his perspectives on what Middle Eastern issues are likely to consume the attention of the next generation of foreign policy leaders.
9. Eastern Congo: Changing Dynamics and the Implications for Peace, Friday, February 22, 10:00 Am-11:30, US Institute of Peace
Venue: US Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington DC
Speakers: Raymond Gilpin, John Prendergast, Bennett Freeman, Ida Sawyer, Sasha Lezhnev
Unrest in northeastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continues to claim lives, disproportionately target women, fuel the illicit economy, constrain development and undermine prospects for peace. Mediation efforts by the United Nations and the DRC’s neighbors have yielded few tangible results and mistrust is rife. Major issues include the role of the M23 in the peace process, widespread gender-based violence and the resilient illicit economy (particularly in the mining sector).
The M23 rebel group was formed on 4 April 2012 when some 300 soldiers mutinied, citing poor conditions in the army and the government’s unwillingness to implement the 23 March 2009 peace deal. They seized control of Goma, the capital of North Kivu province in November 2012 and have been involved in regionally-brokered mediation efforts since being forced out in December.
On February 5, the South African government arrested a group of 19 Congolese belonging to a shadowy group called the Union of Nationalists for Renewal, who were allegedly plotting a violent coup in the DRC. This further complicates an already dire situation and injects an added sense of urgency. In light of these developments, peacebuilding in the DRC requires a nuanced assessment of conflict dynamics and creative strategies to leverage windows of opportunity.
On February 22, the U.S. Institute of Peace will convene an event on recent changes in the war in eastern Congo and their implications for peace. Panelists will share insights from recent trips to the region, examine opportunities and risks for advancing a meaningful peace process, and highlight lessons from other relevant peace processes potentially applicable to the Great Lakes.
Website: http://www.usip.org/events/eastern-congo-changing-dynamics-and-the-implications-peace
10. Is there a Widening Sunni-Shia Schism?, Friday February 22, 2:00 PM- 3:30 PM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington DC, 20036
Speakers: Durriya Badani, Suzanne Maloney, Geneive Abdo, Bruce Riedel
An upswing in sectarian violence in Pakistan, Bahrain and elsewhere in recent months highlights the historic tensions, and contemporary political importance of schisms between Sunni and Shia communities across the Muslim world. Why is the level of violence rising and what regional and internal factors are influencing it? What are the implications for these countries should the relationship between the two sects continue to deteriorate? What role does the U.S. or other external actors play in shaping these developments and what could they do to alleviate tensions?
On February 22, the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at Brookings will host a discussion to explore the factors behind this apparently worsening conflict between Sunni and Shia communities. Panelists will include Brookings Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel, director of the Brookings Intelligence Project, and Geneive Abdo, fellow at the Middle East program at the Stimson Center and author of a forthcoming Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings paper examining sectarianism in the context of the Arab Awakening. Durriya Badani, deputy director of the Project, will offer welcoming remarks. Brookings Senior Fellow Suzanne Maloney will moderate the discussion.
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Precarious ally
The Bahraini royal family needs to deliver credible reforms. There was little difference of opinion on that point at the Carnegie Endowment’s discussion of US policy and the political impasse in Bahrain this week. Greater debate surrounded the issue of US policy towards the country, particularly with respect to the Fifth Fleet. Should the US use the Fifth Fleet as leverage with the Bahraini regime, or should the US prepare to relocate it?
Divisions within the various sectarian groups make the Bahraini impasse complex. The inability to produce meaningful reforms has eroded support for the mainstream Shia opposition, Al Wefaq, whose supporters are shifting their allegiance to the leaderless February 14 Youth Coalition. The monarchy’s hardliners are stirring up sectarianism, isolating Sunni moderates and encouraging Sunni Islamists to redirect their class-based anger against the Shia.
Based on Frederic Wehrey’s paper “the Precarious Ally: Bahrain’s Impasse and US Policy,” the discussion concluded that the volatility of the internal political situation made the effects of relocating the Fifth Fleet impossible to predict.
Matar Ebrahim Matar, an MP belonging to the moderate Sunni opposition, blamed the regime’s marginalization of Sunni moderates in favor of Sunni Islamists for creating the inaccurate impression that no moderates exist among the Sunnis. Matar also characterized the Bahraini regime as “immature,” pointing to the “vengeful” force used in repressing the Pearl Roundabout protests. He warned that in the eyes of Bahrainis, continued provision of arms and recognition to the regime will taint American legitimacy in the country, inflaming anti-Americanism.
Regarding US policy and the Fifth Fleet, Matar suggested the U.S. should strongly remind the regime that the US-Bahrain defense relationship carries an obligation to reform. Failing that, the the US should relocate the Fifth Fleet. Otherwise, the Fifth Fleet will continue to be an obstacle to reform, one that causes Defense Department preferences to prevail over those of the State Department.
Jon Alterman of CSIS felt that US ability to influence political events in Bahrain is limited. He argued that moving the Fifth Fleet would do more damage to US and Bahraini interests than good, and that US or Saudi actions as external referees would definitely not solve Bahrain’s problem. Instead, the US should encourage dialogue among the parties, working to get those who reject dialogue back to the table.
Toby C. Jones of Rutgers University had a different view. He thought the US needs to expand the US-Bahraini strategic relationship to include economic objectives. If the US focuses only on oil, counter-terrorism and Iran, its leverage will be limited. By expanding its focus to regional economic issues, including the huge weapons market, the US would increase its leverage. The debate regarding the Fifth Fleet should center less on location and more on its mission, which should be a broad political one.
If and when Bashar al-Asad falls, Bahrain will remain the only ruling sectarian minority left in the region. To avoid a difficult future, the royal family must compromise with the opposition. In the words of Matar, “the propagation of problems moves with repression, not reform.” The US and the Al Khalifa monarchy need to keep that in mind going forward.
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Coal or renewables?
Rilind Latifi, a Kosovar master’s student at SAIS, writes:
Since the end of the war in 1999, Kosovo has faced critical electricity shortages that have hampered economic growth. Frequent power outages disrupt manufacturing, education and health services. Despite immense investments by donors, the existing inefficient coal power plants are unable to meet electricity demand. The Government of Kosovo (GoK) is cognizant that reliable energy supply is essential for economic development and is seeking to address the issue.
Two coal-fired power plants generate 98% of the electricity in Kosovo . Lignite (brown coal) is abundant; Kosovo has the fifth largest proven reserves in the world. However, lignite has lower energy density and higher CO2 emissions than black coal.
The GoK has planned the construction of a new, 600 MW lignite power plant to meet domestic demand and compensate for the expected closure in 2017 of Kosova A, one of the dirtiest coal plants still in operation in Europe. Following an options study that concluded the lignite plant was the lowest-cost option, the World Bank will give a partial risk guarantee to private investors bidding for construction of the new plant. The new coal plant would alleviate the energy crisis and support economic growth. But doing so would likely exceed domestic demand and saturate the energy market, eliminating the need to invest in renewable sources. Installation of a carbon capture and storage (CCS) system would require additional generation, which could translate into higher electricity prices.
This new coal plant will also adversely affect EU accession prospects, as Kosovo has obligated itself to the EU’s 20-20-20 energy and climate mandate:
- a 20% reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels;
- raising the share of EU energy consumption produced from renewable resources to 20%;
- a 20% improvement in the EU’s energy efficiency.
The project pits the World Bank against the EU mandate.
The Kosovo Civil Society Consortium for Sustainable Development (KOSID) has recently launched a campaign opposing the new coal plant and calling for alternative approaches to tackle the energy crisis. The campaign cites the World Bank’s own statistics on the health and financial impact of air pollution in Kosovo. KOSID has prepared a series of ads airing on national TV that call for development of renewable energy sources. The campaign is aimed at conveying to the public a sense of urgency and the need for action. The proposed coal plant has also attracted international attention due to the World Bank’s role (see Bank Information Center; Sierra Club, Huffington Post).
What alternatives are there? Technical losses of energy remain a persistent issue in Kosovo due to the old and inefficient distribution system. Commercial losses such as meter tampering, non-payment of bills and electricity theft through illegal connections to distribution networks exacerbate the problem. Combined technical and commercial losses are estimated to be around 40% of the total generation, pointing to an urgent need for updating the electric grid. The government recently approved the privatization of the Electricity Distribution Company to a Turkish consortium. It is not clear whether this will lead to improved efficiency.
Considering that over half of the electricity in Kosovo is used for residential heating, investments in energy efficiency are crucial to lowering demand. Retrofitting and weatherization of buildings would contribute to lower energy use for heating and cooling. Additionally, improvements in industrial energy efficiency can also help cut back growing electricity demand. Wind, solar, and hydropower are all intermittent and cannot guarantee generation at peak demand. They can serve as secondary sources, but cannot replace coal completely.
The choice is stark. The GoK and the World Bank point to the available and inexpensive lignite and forecasts of increasing demand. They claim that Kosovo will face a shortage of at least 500 MW once the old coal plant Kosova A is closed. KOSID insists that Kosovo can meet its energy needs through the elimination of losses, increased energy efficiency and renewable sources with no additional coal use, citing a University of California Berkeley study according to which Kosovo can reach total clean energy production of up to 780 MW.
There is no easy solution. The Government of Kosovo should fully engage stakeholders, including civil society, in reaching an acceptable solution. Balance is needed among sound resource use, economic growth, and environmental and health concerns. This is a tough decision.
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Behind the curve is not leading from behind
President Obama had little to say on international affairs in the State of the Union speech last night, which did not break new foreign policy ground. On Syria, this was it:
We’ll keep the pressure on a Syrian regime that has murdered its own people, and support opposition leaders that respect the rights of every Syrian.
There is nothing wrong with this formula (except grammar, since by my lights it should be “who respect”), but there is a good deal lacking in what the Administration is doing. Most Washington commentary has focused on military intervention. I think there are good reasons to hesitate on that front: the unpredictable regional impact, possible consequences for US relations with Russia and the political ramifications inside Syria.
But it is hard for me to understand why the Administration is not throwing 100% political and financial support behind the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces that it helped to create. One of its main purposes was to give a stronger voice to opposition people inside Syria, many of whom want an early end to the fighting. The Coalition’s leader, Moaz al Khatib, stuck his neck out calling for a conditional dialogue with the regime. Why would the US government continue to sit on its hands?
I don’t have an answer to that question. Some officials tell me money is flowing to the Coalition, but those I know in the Coalition haven’t seen it. What is needed is not only humanitarian aid, some of which should be administered through the Coalition, but also basic operational expenses to allow the Coalition to begin to govern in liberated parts of Syria. I would happily write a check for $50 million and tell these folks to come back in six months for more, provided they are able to give me a full accounting (with receipts) of what they did with the first slice and what its impact was.
That isn’t how it works, some say. But that is how it works when the US really backs a cause. If we want the Coalition to appoint an interim government, we need to provide the resources and flexibility required. There is little point in saying something in diplomacy if you are unwilling to act on it.
There are other things to be done besides money. Washington could formally recognize the Coalition as the legitimate government of Syria and give it possession of the embassy in Washington, which I am told is already in the hands of officials sympathetic to the revolution. The UN seat is another issue. Even if a credentials challenge mid-session is not possible, we could signal that come next fall the US will back a Coalition government bid for the seat.
I am told some in the Coalition are hesitant about US support. This would not be surprising. Attitudes in Syria towards the US are distinctly negative, and our inaction has not improved our image. Syrians resent the designation of Jabhat al Nusra, an extremist Sunni militia, as a terrorist organization, since its militants are among the most effective fighters and its treatment of the population better than that of at least some of the more secular Free Syrian Army fighters, whom Washington has been anxious to support.
The Administration is correct to want the Syrians out front fighting their own civil war and negotiating their own political settlement, if there is to be one. But Washington needs to make sure that the “opposition leaders” who “respect the rights of every Syrian” get what they need to prevail in what is likely to be a chaotic and bloody post-Asad Syria. There is a difference between leading from behind and being behind the curve.
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