Month: February 2013
A better way
North Korea’s third nuclear weapons test yesterday raises three questions:
- Why are they doing this?
- What difference does it make?
- How should the rest of the world respond?
Why does North Korea develop nuclear weapons?
If you believe what Pyongyang says, the answer is clear: to defy and threaten the United States, which the North Koreans see as their primary enemy. But this should not be understood as a classic state-to-state conflict. North Korea poses, at least for now, little military threat to the United States. But Pyongyang believes Washington wants to end its dictatorship (I certainly hope there is some truth in that–even paranoids have enemies). The North Koreans see nuclear weapons as a guarantee of regime survival. No one wants to run the risk of regime collapse if the regime holds nuclear weapons, for fear that they could end up in the wrong hands. NATO attacked Libya only after Qaddafi had given up his nuclear program. So the North Koreans view nuclear weapons as guaranteeing regime survival.
What difference does it make?
South Korea and Japan have reason to be nervous about North Korea’s nuclear weapons and improving missile capability to deliver them. But it is going to be a long time before North Korea can seriously threaten the US with nuclear weapons. And the US holds a capacity to respond massively.
The larger significance of the North Korean nuclear program is the breach it puts in the world’s nuclear nonproliferation regime, which has been remarkably successful in limiting the number of nuclear powers, especially in Asia. But Taiwan, South Korea and Japan face real difficulty in maintaining their abstinence if North Korea is going to arm itself and threaten its neighbors. There are not a lot of worse scenarios for the world’s nonproliferation regime than an expanded nuclear arms race in Asia, where China, India and Pakistan are already armed with nuclear weapons.
How should the rest of the world respond?
This is where the issues get difficult. There are already international sanctions on North Korea, which has managed to survive them so far with a bit of help from Iran on missile technology and China on economic ties. More can be done, especially if the Chinese crack down on illicit trade across the border. But the North Korean objective is juche (self-reliance), so tightening sanctions may help rather than weaken the regime.
The Economist last week suggested the efforts to block the nuclear program have failed and that the international community should instead now focus on regime change, by promoting North Korean travel, media access, Church-sponsored propaganda and trade. This would mean a partial reversal of the efforts to isolate North Korea and a new strategy of building power centers that might compete with the regime, especially among the growing class of entrepreneurs and capitalists operating more or less illicitly in North Korea.
We are not good at reversals of policy. But the failure of our decades-long attempts to isolate the Castro regime in Cuba is instructive. Communism did not fall in Eastern Europe to sanctions. It fell to people who took to the streets seeking a better life, one they learned about on TV and radio as well as in illegally circulated manuscripts. Isolation alone seems unlikely to work. Isolation of the regime with a more concerted effort to inform and educate the people might be a better approach.
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Chad’s latest cycle of conflict
SAIS graduate student Nathalie Al Zyoud worked as the Executive Director of Caring Kaela, an International NGO that empowered Chadian Diaspora members to engage in the governance of their country to bring sustainable peace to Chad. Links to the agreements cited here can be found at here. Nathalie recounts:
Escalation of hostilities
Large scale violence in Chad follows a pattern of exclusion from power, rebellion and co-optation.
President Idriss Déby ousted President Hissein Habré in 1990, now on trial in Senegal for crimes against humanity. Déby belongs to the Zaghawa tribe, a mere 1% of Chad’s 200 ethnic groups. After his rise to power, Déby skillfully managed competing tribal dynamics by rotating key posts inside his government, maintaining the most lucrative positions in the hands of his Zaghawa tribesmen.
When the World Bank gave the green light in October 2000 to the construction of a Chad-Cameron pipeline, it opened up the prospect of vast revenues for a government with little track record of good governance and fiscal responsibility. Despite the safeguards put in place to ensure the responsible use of Chad’s oil revenues, the Déby government quickly began diverting funds to consolidate its grip on power. Funds were used to purchase large quantities of weapons. In 2005 President Déby changed the Constitution to maintain himself in power. This was the final straw for disgruntled family members, competing tribal leaders, and hungry business elites, who went into rebellion to renegotiate their slice of the pie.
Pawns in a regional conflict
The Chadian Armed Opposition Groups (CAOG) found safe haven in Sudan. They set up in Khartoum and became a tool in the hands of Sudanese President Omar al Bashir, who was happy to pay back his old friend Déby for sparking the conflict in Darfur. The rebels’ difficulties were evident early on. After sending countless youths to their deaths on April 13, 2006 in the first rebel raid on N’Djamena, rebel leader Mahamat Nour returned home for a promising position as Minister of Defense. Throughout the conflict, the CAOG were plagued by internal dissention, intrigues and splits. They were never able to develop a political platform around which to rebuild their country.
International support for the status quo
France, Chad’s colonial power, was happy maintaining the status quo and refused all negotiations with the armed opposition. The United States needed Chad’s cooperation to access Darfur and to continue its Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in the region. Despite the use of child soldiers by the Government of Chad (GOC), the US maintained its military assistance to the country. In the midst of an open conflict, the EU was focused on election reforms and finalized the “August 13th Agreement” in 2007 between the GOC and its political opposition, confident that a transfer of power could be achieved through the ballot box. International consensus was achieved around the deployment of a UN peace-keeping force, MINURCAT (UNSC 1878, 2007), along the Chad-Sudan border, but without a political mandate.
Public rhetoric and peace on paper
Several peace processes were initiated without much success: the “Libreville initiative” led by late President Omar Bongo Ondimba of Gabon (September 2007) and the “Syrte Agreement” between the GOC and 4 major rebel groups, brokered by late-Colonel Muammar Gadaffi (October 2007). Each had limited results; each time a rebel leader would rally to the government, his second in command would take over the left over troops and reconstitute a rebel movement.
The final rebel raid on N’Djamena occurred on February 2, 2008. Three rebel groups united to advance unhindered to Chad’s capital. They called on President Déby to “negotiate or there will be war.” French authorities, a kind of parallel government in Chad, threw its support to Déby. Mercenaries and the Darfur Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) were flown in for additional support. On February 3, the CAOG were at the palace doors but bitter in-fighting raged inside their ranks. The rebel military advance crumbled as a divided leadership fought over the spoils before they had won the war. In an anti-climatic move, rebels retreated to plan the transition and were pushed back by government forces and their allies. President Déby reshuffled his government. The rebellion petered out.
Scrambling for control
In May 2008, the emboldened JEM launched an attack on Khartoum. This time the international community was mobilized. Caring for Kaela (CFK), an international nongovernmental organization (NGO), had built a collaborative advocacy network of NGOs from DC and NY to Europe and Chad to push for an inclusive dialogue between the Government and the armed opposition. The Chadian Diaspora obtained permission to assess the armed opposition’s willingness to negotiate.
The deployment of EUFOR, an EU bridging force, was accelerated. June 16 the USG urged the GOC to “open lines of communication with the opposition and help facilitate dialogue.” In September 2008, EUFOR transferred power to MINURCAT. The EU, fearful of losing control and threatened by the Diaspora’s efforts to engage the CAOG into a dialogue, initiated its own exploratory mission with the support of the USG and the Swiss. Nothing substantive came of their meetings with rebel groups, which were divided, opportunistic and lacked a coherent vision for a transition in Chad.
Shifting power dynamics
The international community turned its attention towards the two heads of state. Under the auspices of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (IOC), Qatar and Libya, a series of agreements were signed between the Government of Chad and Sudan to halt hostilities.* President Bashir found himself indicted by the International Criminal Court for Darfur war crimes in March 2009 and genocide in July 2010.
The USG pushed President Déby to exert pressure on Sudan. He quickly defeated a May 2009 attack by the Chadian rebels along the Chad-Sudan border. Again militarily victorious, an emboldened Déby enjoyed renewed international community political support. Khartoum and N’Djamena initiated a series of meetings in October 2009, culminating in a final agreement to normalize relations (January 2010). Déby once again reshuffled his government.
The end of a cycle of violence
The pressure built to coopt and reintegrate the rebels back into the government. The EU wanted to choreograph an election. Rebel leaders were promised government jobs. Foot soldiers were cantoned and disarmed. A program for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) was discussed but never implemented. Given a few Chadian francs and a djallabia, soldiers were told to go home. They dissipated slowly. With Libya disintegrating, Central African Republic and Sudan still unstable and Boko Haram causing havoc in Nigeria, there was no shortage of work for armed men with fluid allegiances.
President Déby requested the departure of MINURCAT, pledging to take full responsibility for the protection of civilians on his territory. The mission closed on December 31, 2010, in accordance with UNSC 1923 (2010). Elections are held on April 25, 2010. President Idriss Déby Itno was reelected.
*March 13th, 2008 OIC Summit “Dakar Agreement” between Chad and Sudan (facilitated by the Government of Senegal); May 3rd, 2009 “Doha Agreement” between the governments of Chad and Sudan (facilitated by the Governments of Qatar and Libya)
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Correcting the record
David Kanin, with whom I share a longstanding interest in the Balkans and service in the US government as well as the privilege of teaching at the Johns Hopkins School of International Study, writes:
In an interview with me published over the past couple of days, the Serbian daily Politika claimed I said Kosova was “taken illegally” from Serbia. I did not say this and do not believe it to be the case. In my view, Serbia lost its former province through its own mismanagement in the 1990s, and because Milosevic miscalculated NATO’s willingness to use force in 1999. Serbia lost Kosova the old fashioned way–on the battlefield. Legality had nothing to do with it.
For all our commonalities, David and I have often differed on the Balkans. I agree with him that Kosovo was not taken away illegally and that Milosevic’s mismanagement and miscalculation were important aspects of the story.
But I would not describe the loss of Kosovo as a loss only on the battlefield. There is nothing “old fashioned” about a group of foreigners intervening militarily to protect a population and then working closely with them for the better part of a decade to prepare them for self-governance and eventually independence.
More importantly, I share with David a desire to be quoted and cited correctly. I am acutely aware of the ease with which the Balkans media–of all ethnicities–bends what we say in their preferred direction. I talked recently with a Kosovar who thought–on the basis of an article by my friends at Koha Ditore, that I had suggested Herzeg-Bosna (the Croat war-time parastate in Bosnia) as a model for northern Kosovo. In fact, what I had suggested was the dissolution of Herzeg-Bosna as a model for the dissolution of the Serbian structures in northern Kosovo.
Of course mistakes will happen, especially when there are language and cultural barriers to clear communication. But I hope David’s complaint–and mine–are taken as a signal to the Balkans press to take care in citing the foreigners who still follow events in your not quite settled corner of the globe. We are only asking that our views be accurately presented.
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Peace Picks: February 11-15
Mid-winter is a good time to be indoors with the policy wonks:
1. Elections and Politics in North Africa—A Panel Discussion
Date and Time: February 11 / 12:00pm – 2:00pm
Address: Elliott School of International Affairs
1957 E Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20052
Lindner Family Commons
Speakers: Ellen Lust, Lindsay Benstead, Matthew Buehler, Marc Lynch
Description: Three leading political scientists will discuss elections in Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt.
Register for this event here: https://docs.google.com/a/aucegypt.edu/spreadsheet/viewform?formkey=dGRVSlNPbG1QNUtfX3djYzg4cW9reXc6MQ
2. The Role of Azerbaijan’s Post-Conflict Narrative in Limiting Refugees’ and IDPs’ Integration into Mainstream Society
Date and Time: February 11 / 12:00pm – 1:00pm
Address: Woodrow Wilson Center
1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20004
Speaker: Jennifer S. Wistrand
Description: Nagorno Karabakh is often referred to as one of the former Soviet Union’s “frozen conflicts” with little explanation of how the conflict “froze” or might “thaw.” Jennifer S. Wistrand, Title VIII-Supported Research Scholar, Kennan Institute draws upon twenty-two months of ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Azerbaijan, shedding light on some of the socio-cultural factors impeding both the peaceful resolution of the status of the region on a geopolitical level and the “successful” integration of Azerbaijan’s refugees and IDPs into mainstream society. Particular attention will be paid to the long-term socio-economic and mental health consequences of not resolving the status quo, especially for refugee and IDP youth.
Register for this event here: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-role-azerbaijan’s-post-conflict-national-narrative-limiting-refugees’-and-idps’
3. Training for War and Fragile Peace
Date and Time: February 12 / 2:00pm – 3:30pm
Address: Reserve Officers Association
1 Constitution Ave NE Washington, DC
Speakers: Bob Feidler, Paul Hughes, Ferdinand Irizarry II, Lauren Van Metre
Description: With the U.S. Army taking on an advising and mentoring role in Afghanistan as Afghan security forces take the lead, U.S. troops are taking on fundamentally different missions than those for which they were trained. How can we best prepare the military for these operations in fragile states? Should the military do security force assistance differently in fragile states as opposed to developing states? Please join the Reserve Officers Association and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) for a program that will explore new education and training approaches used to help U.S. troops better prepare for these complex operating environments. Brigadier General Ferdinand Irizarry II, deputy commanding general of the U.S. Army’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, will provide an inside look into how the military is adapting their training to prepare for the new mission in places like Afghanistan. Dr. Lauren Van Metre, dean of students in USIP’s Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, will discuss USIP’s efforts to help the military address these challenges. Having recently been called on to work with a unit of the 101st Airborne that will deploy to Afghanistan to develop a specialized education program, Dr. Van Metre will talk about programs with the military, which emphasize USIP’s conflict management work at the community level with an in-depth understanding of the local Afghan context.
Register for this event here: http://www.usip.org/events/training-war-and-fragile-peace
4. Deterring Hezbollah: Lessons from Israel’s 30-Year War
Date and Time: February 13 / 12:00pm
Address: Georgetown University
37 St NW and O St NW, Washington, DC
Copley Hall Copley Formal Lounge
Description: Israel and the Lebanese Shia militant group Hezbollah have been at war for 30 years. Over the course of those three decades, Israel has relied on deterrence as a central strategy in coping with the Hezbollah threat. Has this strategy succeeded? What is the future of the Islamist-Israeli Conflict as Islamists gain power throughout the Middle East? What lessons can be drawn from the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict for states engaged in asymmetric warfare in the 21st Century?
Register for this event here: http://events.georgetown.edu/events/index.cfm?Action=View&CalendarID=349&EventID=101269
5. Evaluating Legal and Political Reform in Burma
Date and Time: February 13 / 3:30pm – 5:00pm
Address: Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Ave NE, Washington, D.C. 20002
Lehrman Auditorium
Speakers: Frank Jannuzi, Tom Malinowski, Jared Genser
Description: The ongoing war between the Burmese government and Kachin is a stark reminder that reforms in Burma are far from complete. How exactly is Burma doing in its political reform process? American officials and key figures in Congress have stressed that reform there is not irreversible. What are the prospects for reform continuing and becoming institutionalized? What are the prospects for backtracking? And is the U.S. policy of broad engagement properly calibrated and flexible enough to respond appropriately to set backs? Does Congress still have a role in setting policy? Our eminently qualified panelists will address these questions and many more as they evaluate political and legal reform in Burma.
Register for this event here: http://www.heritage.org/events/2013/02/burma
6. Schieffer Series: Foreign Policy Challenges for President Obama’s Second Term
Date and Time: February 13 / 5:30pm – 6:30pm
Address: Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20006
B1 Conference Room
Speakers: Bob Schieffer, David Ignatius, Thomas L. Friedman, Margaret Brennan
Description: The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and TCU’s Schieffer School of Journalism invite you to the next session of The CSIS-Schieffer Series Dialogues
Register for this event here: http://csis.org/event/schieffer-series-foreign-policy-challenges-president-obamas-second-term
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Europe’s Hizballah problems
All three counterterror experts at the Washington Institute’s discussion of Europe’s Hizballah problem last week agreed that Bulgaria’s fingering of the organization for the Burgas attack may represent a turning point in the stalled debate surrounding Europe’s designation of Hizballah as a terrorist organization. Designation would go a long way towards curbing the increased out-of-area Hizbollah activity and the efficacy of Iran’s state-sponsored terrorism.
Daniel Benjamin, the State Department’s ambassador-at-large and coordinator for terrorism argued that Hizballah terrorism aims to demonstrate to the West the dangers involved with continued Western pressure on Iran over the nuclear issue. He also argued that increased activity is Iran’s and Hizballah’s way of avenging the deaths of Imad Mugniyah and of slain Iranian nuclear scientists.
An EU designation of Hizballah has long been a US goal. Such a move would limit the organization’s ability to fundraise, would damage the organization’s image and delegitimize the organization as a political actor. According to Matthew Levitt, director of the Institute’s Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Hizballah raises money hand over fist in Europe like the red cross.
However, many EU countries are incapable or unwilling to open counter-terrorism investigations against Hizballah without designating them as a terrorist organization.
The apprehension of a Hizballah operative targeting Israeli tourists in Cyprus, the foiling of a similar plot in Thailand, and the attack in Burgas all support Levitt’s point that Hizballah is very much a European problem. It trafficks narcotics and launders the proceeds from South America to Europe through Africa. Other fundraising methods include counterfeiting, which generates revenue specifically destined for Hizballah terrorist activities. The organization is involved full-throttle in the international terrorist scene.
Karen Betts, political counselor and representative for the UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee at the British embassy in Washington, agreed that European designation is the right response, but with one important caveat: maintaining the distinction between Hizballah’s “military” and “political” wings. This is a distinction, Levitt insisted, even Hizballah doesn’t make.
Hizballah’s popular mandate and role in the Lebanese body politic discourages Europe from designating Hizballah a terrorist organization. Europeans fear a designation would reduce their influence in Lebanon. The Europeans have the safety of the UNIFIL forces and Western targets in Lebanon to be concerned about. They also fear Hizballah’s possible upset of Lebanon’s stability in reaction to a European designation, though this seems unlikely given Hizballah’s interest in maintaining its image as the champion of Lebanese interests.
After a diligent, year-long investigation of the attack, Bulgaria’s accusation against Hizballah may move Europe towards the partial criminalization of the organization. In Benjamin’s words, the spilling of European blood on European soil is something European officials might find it difficult to ignore.
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Keeping an eye on Asia
Trying to catch up on my Asia reading, as things are heating up there:
- The Japanese scrambled jets last week in response to a Russian violation of airspace over the Kuril Islands.
- China has been pressuring North Korea not to conduct an announced nuclear test.
- Tokyo is complaining that Chinese radar “locked on” to Japanese ships, a step generally associated with initiating an attack, in the East China Sea (where the two countries dispute sovereignty over the Senkaku/Daioyu islands).
The smart money is still betting that China and Japan won’t go to war over uninhabited islands that Japan administers but China claims. There have been recent rumblings of a possible accord between Russia and Japan on the Kurils. It is of course welcome that China should restrain its North Korean friends from defying the UN Security Council again with another nuclear test. It is unclear whether Beijing will succeed.
The US Navy, facing budget and reducing its presence in the Middle East, has found a useful “hegemon” and bully in China. In the mist of preparations for the Quadrennial Defense Review, naval advocates would like to regain at least some of the budget momentum they lost when Mitt Romney–a strong naval advocate–was defeated for the presidency.
But that doesn’t mean the needs are not real. America’s ships are vulnerable, even to Iranian never mind Chinese cruise and other missiles. Washington has a lot of obligations in Asia: to Japan, to Taiwan, the Philippines, to South Korea. It also has some relatively new friends to oblige: Vietnam and Burma in particular. It is not going to be easy to meet all the needs in a severely constrained budget environment.
Those who complain about US inattention to Syria, Libya, Afghanistan and even the Balkans need to remember how many other commitments need to be fulfilled. Asia represents an important slice of the future of world economic growth. It also represents a serious risk of armed conflict on a scale that would have global consequences. We may not all be able to pivot to Asia, but we should keep an eye on it.
And I just realized: I am in Asia today, in Antalya, Turkey. Maybe that’s why my eyes have turned east, though the East I am writing about here lies thousands of miles away. Here’s the scenery from my hotel room:
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