Day: March 6, 2013
Drop it now
The failure of the latest round of Belgrade/Pristina talks to reach agreement on an association of Serb municipalities in Kosovo is neither surprising nor particularly discouraging. Mundane as it sounds, this is a delicate issue.
An association is clearly permitted under the Ahtisaari plan, which Belgrade has not accepted but Pristina has pledged to implement. Were it to become more than an a consultative body and acquire executive functions, such an association could come close to creating a Republika Srpska-like governing entity within Kosovo, one that would make it virtually impossible for Pristina to exercise full control over those functions it requires to qualify for EU membership. Pristina needs to make sure that it does not fall into this trap.
Tanjug (via B92 English) quotes Alexandar Vulin, Belgrade’s office chief for Kosovo, as saying Serbia:
simply supports the constitution of an association (of Serb municipalities) that would have the authorities, control and influence over the judiciary, police, education and all aspects important for the life of citizens.
This is a precise description of what no one in the international community should expect the Pristina authorities to accept. It would legitimize, not dissolve, the “parallel” (illegal) Serbian institutions in Kosovo.
To me, there is a simple, first test of what should be permissible for Belgrade within Kosovo: is it also permissible within Serbia? Whatever the Serbs of Kosovo gain in this negotiation should also be available to the Albanian-majority community of Presevo in southern Serbia. That community has nothing like the privileges in the Ahtisaari plan, never mind what Vulin is claiming. Belgrade needs to come to the negotiating table with wants that correspond to what they are willing to offer in analogous circumstances.
Of course the circumstances are not entirely analogous, because Belgrade does not accept Pristina’s authority as sovereign. This is a real problem and should not be ignored, as both the Brussels and Washington prefer. Belgrade’s bold assertion of continuing sovereignty over all of Kosovo conflicts with what Ahtisaari offered. It is wrong for Serbia to ask for the privileges contained in his plan (and then a good deal more) without paying the price of admission.
This phase of the Pristina/Belgrade talks is putting the Pristina authorities in an awkward situation. It is quite clear that no one in the Kosovo government, including its Serb participants, wants to go further than the Ahtisaari plan in accommodating Serbia. Anyone who does is likely to pay a price at the next election. Moreover, there is a real risk that Serbia will use an association of Serb municipalities to pry the southern Serbian enclaves away from their grudging acceptance of Pristina’s limited authority. That’s what Vulin is openly proposing.
No one has asked my advice on these issues, so I am free to state publicly what it would be: going any further than Ahtisaari would be a mistake. Even implementation of Ahtisaari should be conditional on Serbia’s dropping its claim of sovereignty and accepting the plan as a whole, rather than picking off the parts it likes and leaving the parts it doesn’t.
Belgrade can drop its claim of sovereignty elegantly (and silently) by allowing Kosovo to enter the United Nations. This would be a gesture to which Pristina could be expected to respond generously. Belgrade’s sovereignty claim is going to have to be dropped eventually in any event. The EU will never take in another member whose borders are uncertain, as it did to no good effect with Cyprus. Serbia would do best to drop it now. Once that is done, Vulin’s pretension will be voided and the question of the association of Serb municipalities will be far more manageable.
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The Islamists are coming
As a result of sweeping victories in elections, Islamists are emerging as strong political forces in post-revolutionary Arab states. Many argue that the Arab Spring has transformed into an Islamist winter and that Islamists will continue to dominate the political systems of post-revolutionary Arab countries for the foreseeable future. Others argue that the fate of these countries has not yet been entirely determined.
The Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center last week hosted a discussion of these and related issues under the title of “The Resistible Rise of Islamists.” Two distinguished experts on the region, Marina Ottaway and Leslie Campbell, offered perspectives on the causes of the rise of`Islamists and the possibility of non-Islamist governments in the Arab world.
Marina Ottaway, who is currently a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and previously at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, focused her discussion on the rise of Islamists in three countries: Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia. Egypt’s Freedom and Justice and the Salafist Nour Party got 67 percent of the seats in parliament, Tunisia’s (Muslim Brotherhood) Ennahda got 37 percent, and Morocco’s Party for Justice and Development got 22 percent of the vote.
The victories of Islamists at the ballot box were due in part to the weakness and fragmentation of the secular opposition. In Morocco, the danger of domination by Islamists is non-existent, because several other players present a counter-vailing balance. Morocco has a long history of well-established secular political parties that enjoy historical legitimacy due to their participation in the struggle for independence from the French. The palace is another major check on the power of Islamists.
In Tunisia and Egypt, Islamists are well-established and have strong support bases. The secular opposition is not only fragmented, but some of its parties and leadership were coopted by the authocratic regimes.
In Tunisia, the General Labour Union enjoys huge support but does not run in the elections. The center parties are fairly weak but have potential to grow in power. The Salafists are active in street demonstrations and will likely participate in future elections.
The Egyptian case is the most complicated of all. The Egyptian secular parties are weaker and more fragmented in comparison to their Tunisian and Moroccan counterparts. Only the National Salvation Front has real prospects. But once it decides to run in elections, its coalition will break down due to quarrels over leadership and lack of a unified message, other than saying ‘no’ to everything the Islamists want.
The rise of Islamists is resistible, not inevitable. Their success is due to the inaction and lack of organization among the secular parties. The opportunity for democratic governance in the Arab world is not lost. The Islamists are not necessarily more authoritarian or democratic than the secularists.
Democracy depends on “establishing a better balance between the Islamist and secular forces…and on establishing a pluralistic and more balanced political spectrum.” The real danger to democracy in the Arab revolution countries comes from the weakness of the secular forces and their inability to overcome their fragmentation. Balance can only be achieved by electoral outcomes.
Leslie Campbell, the director of the Middle East and North Africa program at the National Democratic Institute, said there are two reasons for optimism. First, the inexperience of the Islamists with governing will make their continuation in power unlikely due to the disillusionment of some of their own constituencies. Second, there are “signs that secular parties can have ample strength once they organize properly…as with Yemen’s socialist parties.”
Most of Campbell’s discussion focused on possible means through which the secular forces could be empowered. He said that “globalization in politics is of extreme importance.” The secular parties and forces in the Arab world could benefit greatly from establishing links with and learning from the experiences of parties in other parts of the world.
Ottaway and Campbell agreed that the weakness of the secular parties is an important factor that cannot be overlooked when trying to understand the sweeping victories of the Islamists, especially in Egypt. The threat to democracy does not come from the Islamist nature of the parties that are governing now. They may, Campbell noted, be the most liberal of the emerging parties in the Arab transitions to democracy.
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Questions from the heartland
I gave a talk yesterday at the University of Scranton, a city that prides itself on once having been the anthracite coal capital of the world. I’m not sure this is the heartland, but it is as close as I’ve been to that ill-defined geographical feature lately. I asked for questions early in my presentation, which was on current war and peace issues. Here’s what was on the audience’s minds:
- Does the US have to be the world’s policeman?
- Is the US too closely aligned with Israel?
- What is the legacy of the Iraq war?
- Why do we prop up dictators?
- How and when do wars end?
- Do we need a court to decide on whether to strike with drones?
- Is fundamentalism a big threat?
- In light of our financial problems and sequestration, do we need to bring back the draft?
- Is it counterproductive to isolate North Korea and Iran, whose people seem much less hostile to the US than their regimes?
As on many other occasions when I’ve sp0ken with a lay audience, these questions are really good ones. They reflect unease with America’s role in the world and a feeling that surely we can do better.
I’m not quite ready to publish the powerpoint tour d’horizon I gave, which covered mainly the Middle East and Asia. But here is a brief summary of the answers I offered to these questions, improved a bit on reflection:
- Does the US have to be the world’s policeman?
We really shouldn’t be the world’s policeman, but we do need to be prepared to be the world’s fireman. There are fires that need to be put out before they spread and cause a lot of damage. And firemen properly spend a lot of time and effort on prevention. I also noted that there are different methods of policing: when we do intervene, we need to consider whether we should use force or act more like community police, who rely less on force and more on their rapport with the community.
- Is the US too closely aligned with Israel?
The Israel question was posed with some hesitation, even embarrassment. My simplistic answer is that we are too aligned with particular political parties within Israel that do not want to see the emergence of a Palestinian state. But most Israelis do want to see the Palestinian state, as that is vital to maintaining Israel as both Jewish and democratic.
- What is the legacy of the Iraq war?
The Iraq war has ended messily, with Prime Minister Maliki far from the democratic ideal. But there are lots of Kurds, Sunni and even Shia in Iraq who can keep his worst instincts in check. We’ll have to see how things work out this year in the provincial elections and next year in national elections.
- Why do we prop up dictators?
We shouldn’t prop up dictators, but we have to deal with them until a country’s citizens decide they’ve had enough. We should then support non-violent efforts (because they work far more often than violent ones) and help with the transition to democracy, as we have tried to do in Tunisia and Egypt.
- How and when do wars end?
The question about how and when wars end is a very good one. We were particularly inept in ending the Iraq and Afghanistan wars without signed peace agreements. This left the door open to insurgencies that would have been far more difficult to mount had we insisted on formal surrenders. We need a debate on ending the war on terror, which has real consequences for American liberties.
- Do we need a court to decide on whether to strike with drones?
I really don’t know whether drone court is a good idea. But there too I think we need a debate. We’ve gone from prohibiting assassinations to conducting them often, in the name of striking the command and control of our terrorist enemies. There is collateral damage to non-combatants. It’s a big policy shift that requires more attention than it has gotten.
- Is fundamentalism a big threat?
I don’t really care about what people believe in the privacy of their own homes, churches, synagogues and mosques. They are entitled. But fundamentalism is a threat if it seeks to undermine the institutions that maintain peace and stability, just as Fascism and Communism tried to do. If your ideology says none of the states of the Middle East should exist–only a single caliphate ruled by clerics–and you are prepared to use violent means to achieve that end, you are correctly seen as a threat.
- In light of our financial problems and sequestration, do we need to bring back the draft?
The draft is a non-issue, because the military does not want two-year draftees. Military technology is just too complicated today to make them valuable. Sequestration nevertheless has serious implications for both our military and civilian instruments for projecting power. We are going to have to think hard about priorities.
- Is it counterproductive to isolate North Korea and Iran, whose people seem much less hostile to the US than their regimes?
It would be a mistake for us not to react to countries like North Korea and Iran that are acquiring nuclear weapons. But we do need to recognize that the isolation we impose with sanctions has consequences also for their citizens. Outreach and improved understanding with them is both necessary and possible, but outside government channels. We need to exploit communications technology more effectively for citizen-to-citizen communication.
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