Drop it now

The failure of the latest round of Belgrade/Pristina talks to reach agreement on an association of Serb municipalities in Kosovo is neither surprising nor particularly discouraging.  Mundane as it sounds, this is a delicate issue.

An association is clearly permitted under the Ahtisaari plan, which Belgrade has not accepted but Pristina has pledged to implement.  Were it to become more than an a consultative body and acquire executive functions, such an association could come close to creating a Republika Srpska-like governing entity within Kosovo, one that would make it virtually impossible for Pristina to exercise full control over those functions it requires to qualify for EU membership.  Pristina needs to make sure that it does not fall into this trap.

Tanjug (via B92 English) quotes Alexandar Vulin, Belgrade’s office chief for Kosovo, as saying Serbia:

simply supports the constitution of an association (of Serb municipalities) that would have the authorities, control and influence over the judiciary, police, education and all aspects important for the life of citizens.

This is a precise description of what no one in the international community should expect the Pristina authorities to accept.  It would legitimize, not dissolve, the “parallel” (illegal) Serbian institutions in Kosovo.

To me, there is a simple, first test of what should be permissible for Belgrade within Kosovo:  is it also permissible within Serbia?  Whatever the Serbs of Kosovo gain in this negotiation should also be available to the Albanian-majority community of Presevo in southern Serbia.  That community has nothing like the privileges in the Ahtisaari plan, never mind what Vulin is claiming.  Belgrade needs to come to the negotiating table with wants that correspond to what they are willing to offer in analogous circumstances.

Of course the circumstances are not entirely analogous, because Belgrade does not accept Pristina’s authority as sovereign.  This is a real problem and should not be ignored, as both the Brussels and Washington prefer.  Belgrade’s bold assertion of continuing sovereignty over all of Kosovo conflicts with what Ahtisaari offered.  It is wrong for Serbia to ask for the privileges contained in his plan (and then a good deal more) without paying the price of admission.

This phase of the Pristina/Belgrade talks is putting the Pristina authorities in an awkward situation.  It is quite clear that no one in the Kosovo government, including its Serb participants, wants to go further than the Ahtisaari plan in accommodating Serbia.  Anyone who does is likely to pay a price at the next election.  Moreover, there is a real risk that Serbia will use an association of Serb municipalities to pry the southern Serbian enclaves away from their grudging acceptance of Pristina’s limited authority.  That’s what Vulin is openly proposing.

No one has asked my advice on these issues, so I am free to state publicly what it would be:  going any further than Ahtisaari would be a mistake.  Even implementation of Ahtisaari should be conditional on Serbia’s dropping its claim of sovereignty and accepting the plan as a whole, rather than picking off the parts it likes and leaving the parts it doesn’t.

Belgrade can drop its claim of sovereignty elegantly (and silently) by allowing Kosovo to enter the United Nations.  This would be a gesture to which Pristina could be expected to respond generously.  Belgrade’s sovereignty claim is going to have to be dropped eventually in any event.  The EU will never take in another member whose borders are uncertain, as it did to no good effect with Cyprus.  Serbia would do best to drop it now.  Once that is done, Vulin’s pretension will be voided and the question of the association of Serb municipalities will be far more manageable.