Delaying the inevitable
Blic Online late last night published what purports to be a draft text of a Pristina/Belgrade agreement, one supposedly agreed by the EU and Pristina. It seems to me, as one would expect, consistent with the Ahtisaari plan in many of its details, and it follows the spirit of the Ahtisaari plan in ending at least some of the Serbian campaign against Kosovo membership in “international bodies” with
economic, cultural, and social (including sporting) purposes. Serbia shall not block Kosovo’s membership in the OSCE.
But it falls short of Kosovo membership in the United Nations.
It is difficult to comment on a text that was likely prepared originally in English, translated by Blic and retranslated into English for me by a kind reader. Nor is it clear where the original came from or how close to a final agreement this text may be. Is it being published now to test Serbian and Kosovar reaction? Does it genuinely represent something Pristina can accept?
I don’t know. Nor am I likely to know, as the diplomats will not want to discuss in public the status of this text.
What it shows, however, is that the two sides, one way or the other, are dealing with key issues: how can the Serb population of northern Kosovo participate in Kosovo institutions and still avail itself of the Ahtisaari plan’s provisions for governing themselves? How can Kosovo’s interest in maintaining a single judicial and security framework be satisfied while allowing wide latitude to local governance in the other respects provided for by Ahtisaari?
The devil here is not so much in the details. It is in the broader context. While this text purports to be status neutral, it would in principle allow Kosovo to join a lot of international bodies, some of which are open to membership only to sovereign states. That is, so far as I know, the case for the 57-member Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
Here there is a problem. The text obligates Serbia not to block (or encourage others to block) membership, but others would of course be free to continue to do so. The European Union has five non-recognizing states any one of which might block Kosovo membership. It is my hope that there is a clear and unequivocal understanding that none of the EU member states will block Kosovo membership.
That still does not solve the problem, because Russia could still be an obstacle where it is a member, including the OSCE. What this shows it seems to me is the difficulty of partial solutions that purport to be status neutral. Kosovo membership in the UN would end all discussion of its eligibility for membership elsewhere. Taking a step-by-step approach is fraught with difficulty, and inconsistent with the spirit of the original Ahtisaari plan, which foresaw universal recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state.
The simple fact, recognized almost as much on the streets of Belgrade as on the streets of Pristina, is that Kosovo is no longer part of Serbia and will never again be. Delaying the inevitable may be the best that can be done right now, but it means a continuing uphill struggle for a state that needs to focus on other things: jobs and economic development, the fight against corruption and organized crime, proper treatment of its Serb citizens and other (numerical) minorities.
It would be far preferable–and less painful in the long run–to end Serbia’s empty sovereignty claim. There may be five non-recognizing EU members that can block Kosovo’s entry into international organizations, but there are 22 EU members that can block Serbia’s eventual entry into the EU. Delaying the inevitable makes life harder not only for Pristina, but also for Belgrade.
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Couldn’t agree more. Excellent as usual and to the point!
A couple of days ago the Austrian Standard (http://derstandard.at/1363239229397/Serbien-und-Kosovo-vor-historischer-Einigung) had a similar story based on an interview with an unnamed “long-time Balkan diplomat.” (Sheer coincidence that Ulrike Lunacek, the EP rapporteur for Kosovo was quoted in the final paragraph hoping that the Feckless Five to recognize Kosovo once an agreement was reached – you might try her for the original English). Blic‘s decision to publish, therefore, may have been merely a move to be first in Belgrade with the story.
Serbian politicians had already been warning for days that Brussels may ask for too much and that – after conveniently tying their own hands with the famous Resolution – they will simply have to walk away from the table now. Counting, I imagine, on the EU’s propensity to cave before long. The Serbs are still claiming that the current Constitution (there have been several) absolutely prevents the negotiators from doing anything that would imperil Serbia’s claim to Kosovo – overlooking the fact that the claim is made only in the non-binding preamble, just as they do with the Resolution 1244.) Thaci is simply going to have to be the one to compromise, Dacic says. But Thaci is already being accused of treason, by The Usual Suspect, at home, and doesn’t have that much room to maneuver himself, not that he would want it, I suppose.
Some Serbs are wondering how it ever happened that the Americans ended up supporting the Albanians in this dispute rather than their ally in two world wars. (And are over-interpreting, I think, what it means that Regular Army troops will be replacing the National Guard in Kosovo. It’s probably more a case that with the withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, the Guard can return to its traditional role.) In any case, I’ve recently been reading David McCullough’s 1776, and our instinctive choice of sides in cases involving attempts to overthrow heavy-handed rule appears more obvious than ever. The American rebellion seemed about as hopeless for almost the entire first year as the KLA’s taking on the Milosevic’s forces while being described – for a while, at least – as a terrorist force. It didn’t help that during the war the Serbian forces in Kosovo behaved remarkably like the Hessians in New Jersey in ’76. If there’s one hopeful lesson to take from history, it’s how thoroughly the details of past conflicts can be forgotten, and how little they eventually sting.
Just one thing to reiterate here. Americans were never Serbian allies in second world war (neither in 1st world war), but Serbs were allies of Americans (just read about Operation Halyard). Belgrade was bombed by allies (US and British air forces) in 1944 on Serbian Easter day and over one thousand Serbs were killed during allied bombing. I must say my naive countryman risked their own lives to save those same pilots who bombed them few months earlier. That much about Serbian allies.
There were Soviets who liberated Belgrade.
Could not agree more! Partial solutions, one may think, would be a lesser evil in the absence of comprehensive agreement, but less so for Kosovo. Anything short of full international recognition and UN membership, would leave an open door for more concessions demands by Serbia in the future. A Serb entity in Kosovo,however you name it,legalizes ethnic partition, which undermines all it was achieved in Kosovo in many years. For countries aspiring EU integration and membership, these arrangements are all but solutions to the problem
Dan,
I agree completely. What still puzzles me is why the US remains so tentative about Kosovo. It seems to me,as I have said before, that from an historical perspective (to which Amer, above, has alluded) — and all other factors being equal — the US should always be on the side of self-determination.
What do you recommend the US do Ed,invade Serbia?As for being on the side of self determination the Serbs in the north of Kosovo aren’t allowed the same ?
US had a chance to invade in 99 when Yeltsin was Russian president.
US and EU policy towards Serbia was the main reason why we have such a nationalist government in Serbia.
Why Republika Srpska does not have right for self determination? 14 years later Serbs still live in ghettos in “multiethnic Kosovo”. Is that the main idea behind “multiethnic Kosovo” for which US attacked Yugoslavia?
Nothern Kosovo will never be part of Kosovo as much as Kosovo will never been part of Serbia again. Same with Republika Srpska. That is reality and as long as US does not see that and still insist on integration of North Kosovo to rest of Kosovo and trying to abolish Republika Srpska, problem will exist for years to come in whole region.