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Can we do better today than 10 years ago?

There will be a lot of discussion today of the Iraq war:  why did we do it, who won, what is its longer term significance?  Andrew Bacevich’s answer to the last two of these questions strikes me as correct:  even if the “surge” saved the US from unambiguous defeat, the larger narrative is one in which the Muslim world determines its own fate.

Ironically, that is nominally what some of the advocates of the Iraq war say they had in mind in 2003.  But of course they did not really mean it.  If Iraq decides to break up, or even install a theocracy on part of its territory, the neocon advocates of the war won’t want to count that as self-determination.  At the same time, they are not too exigent any more about democracy in Iraq.  Many would count Maliki as good enough, despite his obvious shortcomings.

That’s because democracy had little to do with the matter.  The only valid justification for going to war in 2003 had to do with nuclear weapons, not democracy or even 9/11.  Condi Rice was correct that it was incumbent on the United States to prevent the smoking gun from being a mushroom cloud.  But she and the entire Bush Administration, as well as most of the Democrats in Congress, were wrong to think that Saddam Hussein had a nuclear weapons program, much less a nuclear weapon.

Today, that error is being blamed on “intelligence.”  But of course intelligence is always uncertain.  We elect political leaders to exercise good judgment and make key political decisions, like going to war.  That is where George W. Bush failed most dramatically.  It was his decision, validated by a vote in Congress, to go to war in Iraq, collapse the regime and ultimately occupy the country because of his Administration’s inadequate plans for the post-war transition.

This is inexcusable.  History will not treat George W. Bush, or the electorate that put him back into office in 2004, kindly.  But just as important is this:  we are pretty much as poorly prepared for a post-war transition of this sort today as we were in 2003.  We demonstrated as much in Libya, where we failed to follow up the NATO military mission with one that enabled the Libyans to establish a safe and secure environment.  Nor is there any sign that we would be capable of helping the Syrians transition their country to something like a democracy if Bashar al Assad abandoned the field tomorrow.

The Iraq tragedy was rooted in the failure of civilian assistance in the few weeks immediately following the taking of Baghdad.  Thereafter, we spent a lot and did a lot of good things, but all to little avail because the insurgency had already begun and we were too far behind the curve to catch up.  The situation in Syria after the fall of Bashar will be far more complicated.  There will be many militias, both Islamist and non-Islamist, claiming victory.  There will be a broken Syrian army, pro-regime militias and some elite forces prepared to continue the fight.  There will be Iranian Revolutionary Guard forces and Assad’s Mukhabarat, some of which will likely constitute an underground resistance (as the Saddam Fedayeen did in Iraq).

If the worst is to be avoided in Syria, we are going to have to back the government named in the wee hours of this morning by the Syrian Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC) amply and wisely.  At least the SOC grows out of an indigenous and popular rebellion (as did the rebellion against Qaddafi).  We are also going to need to respect Syrian choices–which may include an important role for Jabhat al Nusra and other forces we regard as extremist, even as linked to Al Qaeda.  The fall of Bashar will be only a beginning, like the falls of Saddam, Ben Ali, Qaddafi, Mubarak and Saleh.  Muslim self-determination, as Bacevich calls it, is just starting.