Irregular triangle: Turkey-Iran-Russia

Turkey, Russia and Iran are key players in the Middle East.  Understanding their relations is important background to the current Middle Eastern turmoil, in particular the war in Syria. Differences over Syria threaten to disrupt Turkey’s relations with both Russia and Iran, while the Iran-Russia relationship is bound to suffer from mutual historical suspicions and conflicting long-term interests.

These were among the conclusions from a  Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) event this week focused on the “the Turkey-Iran-Russia nexus.”  The panel featured CSIS’s:

• Bulent Aliriza, Director of the Turkey Project;
• Stephen Flanagan, Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Diplomacy and National Security;
• Andrew Kuchins, Director of the Russia and Eurasia Project; and
• Jon Alterman, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy and Director, Middle East Program.

The event drew on an abbreviated version of the panelists’ joint publication The Turkey, Russia, Iran Nexus: Driving Forces and Strategies. The information in this post draws both from the panelists’ comments, the publication distributed at the event, and Flanagan’s The Turkey-Russia- Iran Nexus: Eurasian Power Dynamics.

Aliriza explained that Turkey’s policy of “zero problems” with its neighbors, and ambitions to become an energy hub between the East and West, shape its relations with the other two countries.  Seeking greater regional influence, Turkey wants to expand trade and economic cooperation with both Iran and Russia, taking advantage of its geostrategic location at the heart of Eurasia.  The panelists agreed that the Iran-Turkey and Russia-Turkey relations were the most developed. The Russia-Iran relation is largely political and lacks a strong economic and energy dimension. Overall the CSIS discussion concluded that differences over Syria threatened to rupture the Turkey-Iran/Turkey-Russia relationship, while the Iran-Russia relationship was bound to suffer from the historical mutual suspicions and conflicting interests in the long term.

Turkey-Russia: a more tactical than strategic partnership

The current Turkish government has prioritized strengthening ties with the Kremlin. Understandably cool during the cold war, Russo-Turkish relations warmed up in the USSR’s last decade, when economic and energy ties combined with agreements to cease support of their respective separatist movements, leading to greater cooperation between Moscow and Ankara.

In 2010 the two countries launched a “strategic partnership” consisting of a high-level cooperation council, annual summits, and a joint strategic planning group.  Trade, investment, and tourism also greatly increased in the past decade. After the EU bloc, Russia ranks as Turkey’s leading trade partner. In 2012 total bilateral trade amounted to $33 billion, with Turkish energy imports accounting for 80% of trade volume.

Bilateral energy trade relations represent both an area of mutual interest and an area of competition. Turkey aspires to balance becoming a vital energy transit point for Eastern oil to the West, with securing energy supplies from Russia. At the same time Turkey is aiming to reduce its heavy dependence on Russian energy through diversification. Russia’s efforts to control the flow of energy from the Black Sea and Caspian conflict with Turkey’s ambition to becoming a key player for the East-West energy corridor. These conflicting interests have stalled plans for projects such the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline.

Despite the increased economic and energy ties, tourism, and high-level political meetings between the two countries, Flanagan argues that insulating the energy and economic relationship between Turkey and Russia from the sharp differences over  Bashar al Asad will become increasingly difficult. Unless Moscow decides to cooperate with the international community on Syria, act more constructively in the Eastern Mediterranean, and establish clear rules in the Caucasus, the Russo-Turkish relationship will suffer.  Despite the “strategic” veneer of the relationship, the partnership remains largely tactical because the two countries lack a common political agenda and too many conflicting interests.

Iran-Turkey: on the rocks

According to the panelists, historical rivalry, mutual suspicion and sectarian differences limit this relationship, which has experienced ups and downs. The Turks engage in trade (especially energy) and investment with Iran, hoping to keep their competition peaceful. Iran leverages Turkey’s energy needs to prevent further political isolation.  But Turkey is disappointed and frustrated, prompting Ankara to seek alternative partners.

Still Iran ranks as Turkey’s fifth-largest trading partner. Total bilateral trade increased from $1.05 billion in 2000 to $16 billion in 2011, with Iranian exports (mainly energy) constituting $12 billion. Travel also represents a significant area of growth in economic relations. Thanks to visa-free travel Iranians constitute the fourth largest group of foreign travelers to Turkey.  Investment is also growing. Iranian firms increasingly operate in Turkey to gain access to international markets. In 2010 1,470 Iranian firms operated in Turkey, up from 319 in 2002. Turkish banks also serve as international intermediaries for financial transactions between Iran and states that fear antagonizing the US by engaging directly with Iran.

The Turkish and Iranian governments have attempted to expand energy trade since 1996. Despite failures to meet its commitments, Iran now ranks as Turkey’s second-highest supplier of natural gas. Turkish energy planners, however, increasingly prefer Azeri, Turkmen and Iraqi gas to Iran’s high-priced and unreliable supply.  Turkish and Iranian interests contrast in regards to gas transit and the development of the Caspian basin.  While Turkey hopes to serve as a transit corridor for Caspian, Central Asian and Iranian gas and oil, Iran opposes building the trans-Caspian pipeline because it favors Middle Eastern routes to Europe.

Iran and Turkey also diverge sharply on issues regarding the Arab Spring and in particular Syria. Iran’s insistence on manipulating Sunni-Shia’ tensions to expand its influence in the Middle East perturbs Turkish officials.  Turkey continues to engage Iran diplomatically, hoping to convince Iran to take a more pragmatic stance on both Syria and the nuclear program, but Syria risks rupturing upsetting the pragmatic economic and energy relations put into place in recent year. Tehran hopes Turkey’s need for energy will sustain the relationship.  But Aliriza believes Iran needs Turkey more than Turkey needs Iran.

Iran-Russia: a political relationship

The Iran-Russia relationship remains more political than economic. Russia sees in Iran a potential counterweight to US and Turkish influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus.  Moscow does not view Tehran as an immediate security threat.  Iran has supported Russia in its larger strategic goal of promoting a multi-polar world. Iran and Russia find commonalities in opposing the US.  There is not much personal affinity between Putin and Ahmadinejad.  But as differences with the US grow over arms control, missile defense, Syria, and the larger Middle East, Iran and Russia have found more reason to cultivate their relations.

Although bilateral trade between the two countries tripled in the past ten years, Kuchins argues the volume remains insignificant. Russia represents 1.8% of Iran’s foreign trade, while Iran only accounts for 0.5% of Russia’s. There is little quantifiable energy trade and no joint commercial production in the Caspian, despite a 2008 treaty on cooperation in development of Iran’s gas and oil.  Moscow and Tehran disagree on demarcation of the Caspian, but both oppose the trans-Caspian pipeline.  The two view themselves as competitors for the European market in the longer-term.  Alterman went so far as to suggest that containment of Iran plays to Moscow’s advantage, as otherwise it would have to compete with Iran for the European market.

The panel argued that in the short term the Middle Eastern turmoil serves both Moscow and Tehran.  But continued support of Asad, and late diplomatic engagement with new Arab governments, may put them at a disadvantage later.  Although Russia and Iran are bonding over shared energy and political goals, age-old suspicions and competing commercial interests will limit the alignment’s durability.