Day: March 29, 2013
Optimism/diplomats = courage/soldiers
Chas Freeman appeared Thursday at the Carnegie Endowment to introduce his new collection of essays on China, Interesting Times: China, America and the Shifting Balance of Prestige. Those who know Washington will understand right away that such an event promises more wonkish amusement than dry analysis, as Chas is one America’s premier racconteurs and iconoclasts. From his early reference to DC’s “belief tanks” to his later claim that optimism is to diplomats what courage is to soldiers, Chas was in good form. To acclaim by several in the audience, he characterized the Chinese system as a unique form of “cadre capitalism”: a party-based system of political boosterism and entrepreneurialism.
But he was also serious in trying to dispel the misperceptions that cloud American and Chinese views of each other. Americans view the Chinese as their mirror image. But in fact the Chinese do not share our interest in military power, especially of the naval sort. China is an Asian land power as much as it is an Asian Pacific sea power. The Chinese are emerging from a lengthy period of weakness and humiliation, but their main concerns are economic and social. Our focus on the military dimensions of competition with China could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The Americans need a more multidimensional and multilateral approach to China. This should not aim for dominance. Chinese power is growing far too rapidly for that. We have to be realistic about our own influence and power, especially in the current political and budgetary environment. The pivot to Asia was the right thing to do, but we should be careful not to let it be seen as antagonistic to China. Polarization will not serve our purposes. Nor will the Trans-Pacific Partnership. How can we hope to establish an economic partnership that excludes the biggest and most important economy in the region?
Chinese leaders are feeling domestically vulnerable, as the ideological underpinnings of the Communist system have rotted away. The leadership knows China needs economic, legal and political reform. Legitimacy is now based excessively on development, including breakneck export growth that has to give way to greater domestic consumption. Rule of law is lacking. The Chinese are defensive and suspicious, as they have no political model to offer the rest of the world. But the leadership is trying to dampen nationalism, not inflame it. Beijing wants to avoid territorial conflicts with neighbors, which in any event should not concern the US. China will not challenge freedom of navigation. It defends the Westphalian state system. We are the revolutionaries introducing new elements like responsibility to protect, which the Chinese see as destabilizing.
The “China dream” is not something Americans should fear. It is still inchoate. Xi Jingping thinks a great nation needs a great dream, but he hasn’t really said what it is to be. The Chinese are creating alternatives to the Bretton Woods financial institutions, but that is due to our own refusal to institute governance reforms that reflect the growing power of the BRICs and other emerging powers. On the many demographic, environmental and social challenges China faces, Chas was confident the Chinese would be able to manage.
What did he say about optimism and diplomats?
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The dogs of war: bark or bite?
Tension has been building for weeks on the Korean peninsula. Kim Jong-un has unleashed a string of threats against South Korea and the United States after conducting a missile launch in December and a nuclear test in February in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions. He gains domestic traction from this belligerence, something he no doubt needs after succeeding to the presidency last December at under 30 years of age. He also hopes for payoffs from the international community, which have been a common response to North Korean provocations in the past.
President Obama had been inclined to a low key response. The North Korean threats all too clearly aim at extorting aid and trade from the outer world. The President has said he won’t play that game.
Yesterday the Americans chose a different course: they advertised the flight of B2 stealth bombers from the United States that conducted a mock bombing mission at a range in South Korea. This was part of a military exercise the Americans and South Koreans regard as routine but the North objects to. The implication was clear: if the North attacks the South, the United States will assist in the military response.
This is just the tip of the iceberg. The best account I’ve heard of the rest of it is Tom Gjelten’s piece on NPR this morning. It makes clear that the United States has committed itself to joint, coordinated action with the South against the North, if the North attacks and the Americans are consulted and agree on the response. But the bottom line of the piece is that the North may be getting enough of what it wants from threatening to attack and therefore will not go through with it.
For the Americans, there is a great temptation here. Diplomatic efforts to block North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and longer-range missiles with which to deliver them have failed. It is now only a matter of a few years before North Korea acquires and deploys a serious nuclear arsenal. This, it figures, will deter efforts at regime change and ensure regime survival, nullifying both internal and external threats. A sufficient Northern military provocation could give the Americans a reason to strike at Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear infrastructure. While some of it is hardened, the US could conceivably set back the North’s efforts at least a few years. Someone might hope Iran would take heed too.
The failure of diplomatic efforts may make that attractive to some in Washington. Making it appear a real possibility might also be useful in rousing China to do its best to restrain the North Koreans. The last thing Beijing wants is an American air intervention next door, especially one that might generate large numbers of refugees.
The United States does not need a war on the Korean peninsula either. However it turns out–and there is never a guarantee that things go well in war–it would cause serious damage to relations with China and give the pivot to Asia–intended as a peaceful and diplomatic effort–an entirely different cast. South Korea also has a great deal to lose if things get out of hand: the North can unleash a frightening barrage of artillery on Seoul. Let’s hope the dogs of war are barking and not biting.
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