The dogs of war: bark or bite?

Tension has been building for weeks on the Korean peninsula.  Kim Jong-un has unleashed a string of threats against South Korea and the United States after conducting a missile launch in December and a nuclear test in February in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions.  He gains domestic traction from this belligerence, something he no doubt needs after succeeding to the presidency last December at under 30 years of age.  He also hopes for payoffs from the international community, which have been a common response to North Korean provocations in the past.

President Obama had been inclined to a low key response.  The North Korean threats all too clearly aim at extorting aid and trade from the outer world.  The President has said he won’t play that game.

Yesterday the Americans chose a different course:  they advertised the flight of B2 stealth bombers from the United States that conducted a mock bombing mission at a range in South Korea.  This was part of a military exercise the Americans and South Koreans regard as routine but the North objects to.  The implication was clear:  if the North attacks the South, the United States will assist in the military response.

This is just the tip of the iceberg.  The best account I’ve heard of the rest of it is Tom Gjelten’s piece on NPR this morning.  It makes clear that the United States has committed itself to joint, coordinated action with the South against the North, if the North attacks and the Americans are consulted and agree on the response.  But the bottom line of the piece is that the North may be getting enough of what it wants from threatening to attack and therefore will not go through with it.

For the Americans, there is a great temptation here.  Diplomatic efforts to block North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and longer-range missiles with which to deliver them have failed.  It is now only a matter of a few years before North Korea acquires and deploys a serious nuclear arsenal.  This, it figures, will deter efforts at regime change and ensure regime survival, nullifying both internal and external threats.  A sufficient Northern military provocation could give the Americans a reason to strike at Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear infrastructure.  While some of it is hardened, the US could conceivably set back the North’s efforts at least a few years.  Someone might hope Iran would take heed too.

The failure of diplomatic efforts may make that attractive to some in Washington.  Making it appear a real possibility might also be useful in rousing China to do its best to restrain the North Koreans.  The last thing Beijing wants is an American air intervention next door, especially one that might generate large numbers of refugees.

The United States does not need a war on the Korean peninsula either.  However it turns out–and there is never a guarantee that things go well in war–it would cause serious damage to relations with China and give the pivot to Asia–intended as a peaceful and diplomatic effort–an entirely different cast.  South Korea also has a great deal to lose if things get out of hand:  the North can unleash a frightening barrage of artillery on Seoul.  Let’s hope the dogs of war are barking and not biting.