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Arab uprisings fail to satisfy the street

From Tunisia to Egypt new transitional leadership has yet to address the economic, security and structural grievances that triggered the Arab spring uprisings.  The concerns that triggered the revolutions continue to pull the people into the streets.

Why have the new political leaders failed to address these concerns? According to University of California professor Laurie Brand, the desire to consolidate power in the face of new challenges and constraints, rather than domestic mass politics, drives current post-revolutionary leaders’ behavior.  In her paper Arab Uprisings and Mass Politics: Possibilities, Constraints, and Uncertainty discussed this week at the Wilson Center, Brand examines the mass politics of Egypt and Jordan to understand the effects of increased popular political mobilization on Arab states’ regional behavior.

Egyptian President Morsi’s commitment to the peace treaty with Israel is an example of his continuation of domestically unpopular policies.  Morsi’s approach to the Gaza tunnels has proven even tougher  than Mubarak’s. Morsi’s confidence after his mediating role between Israel and Gaza led him to assume extra-constitutional powers, causing the greatest domestic uproar of this presidency and showing how disassociated he has become from mass sentiment.  The economic crisis and Egypt’s IMF requests make this an inopportune moment for the Egyptian president to risk alienating the US by giving in to domestic anti-treaty sentiment.  An “uncomfortable marriage of convenience” between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military ties Morsi’s hands on corruption, a main popular grievance. Several articles in the new constitution protect key military interests at the expense of transparency. The $1.3 billion in annual US military aid keeps Morsi from stepping on the military’s toes.

The real differences between Morsi and Mubarak’s foreign policies occur at the regional level, not in relation to the US.  Under Morsi, Egypt entertains closer relations with Muslim Brotherhood-sympathising Qatar than with Mubarak’s preferred Saudi Arabia. Morsi’s visit to Iran also represents a significant break with the previous regime. These shifts in regional alignment did not result from mass political pressures, but rather from an attempt to reassert Egypt’s independent regional role.

Much like Morsi, Jordan’s King Abdullah has remained steadfast in the face of mass protests, even as young East Bankers have mobilized in the Harika movements and directly criticize the government, calling for its removal.  Jordan’s relations with the US have remained unchanged, while its relations with Egypt have chilled. Military exercises between the US and Jordan testify to the continued relationship, while Jordan’s domestically unpopular containment of the Muslim Brotherhood renders relations with the Egyptian government difficult.

Since the beginning of the Arab spring, popular demands have focused on domestic issues like unemployment, inflation, insecurity and the rule of law. These mass demands have not however shaped the current Arab leaders’ behavior.  They are far more interested in solidifying their power in the face of  regional and international challenges and constraints.  The growing gap between the people of Arab Spring countries and their governments will probably become a source of renewed conflict in the future. Marginalization of the youth and labor movements – what Brand calls the “footmen of the revolution”—resulted in the their failure to produce charismatic leaders with legitimate revolutionary credentials. Instead of new, young leaders coming to the fore, long suppressed, exiled or co-opted opposition leaders attained political power.  Once in charge, these leaders did not find serious disagreement with their predecessors’ international alignments and presented no remedy for the countries’ domestic issues.