Month: March 2013
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The Project on Middle East Democracy and the Hariri Center at the Atlantic Council put out a letter to President Obama on Yemen today that I signed. Here are the policy recommendations:
- Leverage the US government’s close relationship with President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi of Yemen to strongly encourage his government meet the reform benchmarks to which he has committed and address human rights violations
- Support the National Dialogue in ways that empower independent voices—not only political party elites—and include more extensive outreach to Southerners and Yemenis outside of Sanaa and other urban areas
- Work within the Friends of Yemen group to ensure that the generous pledges committed to Yemen are delivered and that the government of Yemen has the capacity and resources it needs to implement projects
- Implement a more robust public diplomacy strategy to demonstrate that US interests in Yemen are not limited to counterterrorism and security issues
- Reevaluate reliance on drone strikes with the recognition that this approach generates significant anti-American sentiment and could strengthen the appeal of extremist groups
- Ensure that security restructuring achieves a unified command structure under civilian leadership and that US military assistance does not perpetuate the same mistakes made during former President Saleh’s tenure
- Increase economic assistance and draw upon regional funds to support Yemen, in addition to a bilateral assistance package
There are other ideas out there worthy of consideration. The well-meaning letter I signed does not provide a clear strategy for dealing with Al Qaeda, which is a serious threat to both Yemeni and American interests. Daniel Green over at the Washington Institute for Near East Affairs advocates a tribal-based approach to countering Al Qaeda, generated in the upcoming National Dialogue:
- A comprehensive political and security strategy to pacify al-Qaeda safe havens. Due to the centralization of the Yemeni state, local political authority has often been limited, creating a democracy deficit and prompting excluded tribes to use violence to achieve their goals. The United States should encourage participants in the National Dialogue Conference to discuss greater local political autonomy and authority within a more democratic framework.
- Efforts to legitimize tribal Popular Committees. Pacifying AQAP havens will require the assistance of tribal “Popular Committee” units, not just Yemeni army and police forces. As has been demonstrated in Iraq, Afghanistan, and even Yemen itself, a part-time tribal security force that is defensively oriented but recruited, trained, paid, and logistically supported by the state is central for enduring security. Tribes will support such an effort because it can provide security, employment, and a means of checking any abuses of power by expanding government forces. Washington should encourage Sana to legitimize these local units.
- Full accounting of al-Qaeda abuses. A great deal of emphasis has been placed on documenting abuses that Saleh’s forces perpetrated against protestors in 2011-2012. A similar effort must be undertaken to document al-Qaeda’s abuses, and to investigate whether security organizations colluded with the group when it expanded its presence in Yemen in 2011. The United States should encourage a full accounting on both fronts, including responsible prosecution of any security personnel who helped al-Qaeda.
- Working group of tribal and security leaders. Washington should urge conference participants to establish a working group of tribal, political, and security leaders from the areas most affected by al-Qaeda. This forum would help them share lessons learned in confronting the group, present a united reform agenda to the wider conference, and promote improved cooperation on shared goals after the conference.
While I might have some reservations about part-time tribal forces and their behavior, these recommendations have the virtue of dealing directly with the security issue.
These quite different approaches to Yemen have in common a sense that the drone war there is not working and may even be counter-productive. Former Yemen White House guru John Brennan, who has just become CIA Director, has long claimed that was not our strategy. Show me.
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We expect our friends to govern well
Margarita Kadriu, editor of the Pristina daily Kosova Sot, asked some questions. Here is what I replied. The interview should have been published in Albanian today:
Q: There are different statements in Belgrade and Prishtina about the possibility of an agreement between the parties, with the guarantee of Mrs. Ashton. Do you expect this dialogue to succeed?
A: I hope it succeeds. It is not guaranteed to succeed. There are real difficulties ahead for both Belgrade and Pristina.
Q: Serbia requested an autonomous community of the Serb municipalities, while Kosovo is agreed to have an Association of Serb Municipalities without executive powers. Is it dangerous for the stability of Kosovo such an association if it creates a new level of legislative or executive power?
A: Kosovo is well within its rights to ask three things: that whatever is agreed be consistent with the Ahtisaari agreement; whatever the Serbs get inside Kosovo should be available also inside Serbia to Albanians; that nothing should impede Kosovo’s progress towards European Union membership.
Q: Despite talks about normalizing relations, Serbia continues to have territorial claims about a part of Kosovo. Will the pressure from Brussels be sufficient to make Belgrade give up from this claim?
A: I don’t know, but I do think it important. Kosovo should not need to live with a neighbor claiming all or part of its territory. As I understand the situation today, the claim is over all of Kosovo, not just a part.
Q: It is mentioned an amnesty for the Serbs of the North who have been part of parallel structures. Is this a right thing to do?
A: I don’t see participation in the parallel structures as something people should be punished for, in and of itself. The question is whether they committed criminal acts: violence, property theft, expulsion of people from their homes and other crimes. A bit of understanding for those who cooperated with institutions that they thought legitimate is in order.
Q: Serbia’s urgent need is to get “the date,” while Kosovo has been promised the launch of negotiations for the S[tability and] A[ssociation] A[greement]. Which country has more urgent need to find a solution for the North in relation with the EU?
A: It seems to me clear that Serbia has the more urgent need. I don’t think a launch of SAA negotiations has the same significance in Kosovo that the launch of accession negotiations has in Serbia.
Q: Seeing the progress of dialogue, do you see any opportunity for creation of some sort of Republika Srpska in northern Kosovo?
A: I think it is something people in Kosovo are right to worry about. The question is whether the authority entrusted to the Pristina government will be sufficient to qualify the country for EU membership. That is not the case in Bosnia today. I would not want to see that disease infect Kosovo.
Q: A part of the opposition, “Vetevendosje,” is calling Prime Minister Thaci traitor, saying that he is trading with the North. How consistent is this accusation?
A: I don’t think it is appropriate to call anyone a traitor. The opposition has to criticize the government—that’s its role. But the Prime Minister is clearly trying to do the best he can for the country. I find it a bit surprising that an opposition that opposes clauses of the constitution and advocates a referendum on union with another country would call anyone a traitor.
Q: While continuing talks with Serbia, Kosovo has other important emergencies, especially in the development of the economy, attracting foreign investors, improving the environment for doing business. Recently, there is an increase of people’s dissatisfaction about the living standard, bills, privatization of public companies. Do you think that there is a risk from social unrest?
A: There is always a risk of social unrest, even when times are good. That Kosovo has a lot of problems is clear. I too look forward to the day it can focus on those and not on relations with Belgrade
Q: The rule of law is a strong concern in Kosovo. Judiciary suffers from political influences, various abuses, nepotism and misuse of justice. Is EULEX THE rescue mechanism, or Kosovars themselves should be able to strengthen the justice?
A: In the end, it will be courageous Kosovars who bring justice to the country. EULEX is trying hard to help, but there is no substitute for courageous police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and journalists.
Q: We hear a lot about corruption and it is a disease of all the countries in the region. How do you see the way out of this high degree of corruption affairs that have characterized the country several times?
A: The way out is good governance, which depends on transparency and accountability. You’ve seen how Croatia has moved in that direction. Serbia is moving too. Join the parade.
Q: This year there are foreseen local elections to be held, but there are voices that support the idea of holding national elections, too. Is this a good idea, or a premature one?
A: I think I’ll leave to Kosovo’s elected politicians the responsibility for deciding when to hold elections.
Q: Let’s talk a little bit now also about some developments in the region. Again, we have tensions in Macedonia. Why this country is continuing to have troubles?
A: Macedonia has well-known problems: the name issue with Greece, sometimes tense inter-ethnic relations and difficulty in meeting European political standards, even where ethnic differences are not involved. But it has done relatively well economically, has reformed its military and participates in the NATO mission in Afghanistan, and has a long record of inter-ethnic collaboration in governing the country. I hope to see Macedonia sort out its problems and continue to progress.
Q: In Albania, this year is crucial election year in relation to the EU. Do you believe that Tirana will pass this test?
A: I really don’t know. I hope so. Good elections are fundamental to qualifying for EU membership.
Q: Let’s conclude this interview with a Gallup poll that shows Albania and Kosovo as the most pro-American countries. What effect has this sentiment in relation to Washington?
A: Albanian and Kosovar affection for the United States are much appreciated in Washington, including by me, but of course we expect our good friends to contribute to regional peace and security, govern well and respect the rights of all their citizens.
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Nowruz/Passover/Easter: better than expected
I did not anticipate how well President Obama’s visit to Israel, Palestine and Jordan would go last week. I was not alone. In Washington, pre-roadtrip skepticism prevailed: differences over Iran and Palestine were anticipated to overshadow any cosmetic improvements in the President’s often tense personal relations with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.
It may still turn out that way in the longer-term. Whatever new castles Obama built in the Mediterranean sand could be quickly swept away. But for those who think the US is decline and can no longer influence events in the Middle East, this trip should sow doubt. And for those who thought Mitt Romney would do better with the Israelis than Obama, this trip suggests the contrary.
The President went out of his way to establish his bona fides with Israelis: praising their democracy, admiring their courage, recalling their idealism, remembering their history, sharing their losses, ensuring their security. But he at the same time spoke bluntly of the need to make peace with the Palestinians, who will have enjoyed his performance less but still got a blunt and unambiguous defense of their right to a state of their own. The well-crafted statement brought the president ample applause also from Israelis. Presumably there were not a lot of West Bank settlers in the audience. It was a virtuouso performance.
So much for the flash. What about the substance? The big issues for the trip to the Middle East were three:
Iran: The President and Netanyahu sounded more united on preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons. In fact, there are differences, with Israel concerned that the Americans will agree to allow Iran to hold on to a substantial quantity of 20% enriched uranium, which could be further enriched quickly with more advanced centrifuges that Iran is now installing. The Iranians are slowing their accumulation of enriched material while increasing their capacity to move quickly if they decide to develop nuclear weapons. Obama made it clear he would not stand in the way of Israel taking military action, but only the US can cause serious damage to the Iranian nuclear program. Netanyahu seems now to accept that the Americans will draw the redline, albeit closely consulting with the Israelis.
Syria: Secretary Kerry has been leaning forward on bringing an end to the civil war in Syria, but President Obama is still wanting it to be done without US military intervention or lethal supplies to the opposition. Israel is increasingly concerned about more advanced arms flowing to Hizbollah and about the buildup of more radical Sunni Islamists on its Golan Heights boundary with Syria. The apparent use during the week of chemical weapons–the regime says by the revolutionaries, the revolutionaries say by the regime–is a big problem for President Obama, who side-stepped the issue during his trip by saying he would await a determination on whether they were really used or not. Still, he said their use would be a game changer, whatever that may mean.
Palestine: The US and Israel need to keep the Palestinian Authority afloat, even as they discourage it from seeking further international recognition, taking Israeli officials to the International Criminal Court and reconciling with Hamas. This is a delicate dance, and Obama was less than clear on next steps. He is downplaying settlements per se and wants direct negotiations on borders, which of course would limit the extent of Israeli settlements.
Obama also has to be concerned about other issues:
Jordan: The big problem is the burgeoning flow of refugees from Syria, who are getting close to half a million. Amman just doesn’t have the capacity to welcome many more and needs help to manage the burden of those who have already arrived. The presidential visit will buck up King Abdullah, but the public relations effect is likely to be short-lived. He needs financial help (Obama pledged $200 million more for Syrian refugees in Jordan) and some good advice on carrying forward political reform. He is getting most of the former from the Saudis, who aren’t likely to give him much of the latter.
Egypt: The Israelis will have expressed concern about instability in Egypt, even though Muslim Brotherhood President Morsi has so far not undermined the peace treaty. The presence of Islamist extremists in Sinai appears still to be growing. The difficulties Egypt is having in establishing its new regime and maintaining legitimate governance throughout the country will be of concern to both Israel and the US.
Turkey: The big surprise of the President’s trip was his successful mediation of a Netanyahu apology for an attack on an aid flotilla to Gaza that killed nine Turks in 2010. This comes along with Turkish success in convincing imprisoned Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan to agree to a ceasefire in the decades-long rebellion. Both moves will help to shore up Turkey in its continuing confrontation with Bashar al Asad and restore some confidence in an Ankara whose “zero problems with neighbors” policy had been in tatters.
I have my doubts Obama will succeed where other presidents have failed: on Palestine and Iran in particular. But he did well last week, and for that we should all be thankful. The Nowruz/Passover/Easter season is proving better than expected.
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Irregular triangle: Turkey-Iran-Russia
Turkey, Russia and Iran are key players in the Middle East. Understanding their relations is important background to the current Middle Eastern turmoil, in particular the war in Syria. Differences over Syria threaten to disrupt Turkey’s relations with both Russia and Iran, while the Iran-Russia relationship is bound to suffer from mutual historical suspicions and conflicting long-term interests.
These were among the conclusions from a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) event this week focused on the “the Turkey-Iran-Russia nexus.” The panel featured CSIS’s:
- Bulent Aliriza, Director of the Turkey Project;
- Stephen Flanagan, Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Diplomacy and National Security;
- Andrew Kuchins, Director of the Russia and Eurasia Project; and
- Jon Alterman, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy and Director, Middle East Program.
The event drew on an abbreviated version of the panelists’ joint publication The Turkey, Russia, Iran Nexus: Driving Forces and Strategies. The information in this post draws both from the panelists’ comments, the publication distributed at the event, and Flanagan’s The Turkey-Russia- Iran Nexus: Eurasian Power Dynamics.
Aliriza explained that Turkey’s policy of “zero problems” with its neighbors, and ambitions to become an energy hub between the East and West, shape its relations with the other two countries. Seeking greater regional influence, Turkey wants to expand trade and economic cooperation with both Iran and Russia, taking advantage of its geostrategic location at the heart of Eurasia. The panelists agreed that the Iran-Turkey and Russia-Turkey relations were the most developed. The Russia-Iran relation is largely political and lacks a strong economic and energy dimension. Overall the CSIS discussion concluded that differences over Syria threatened to rupture the Turkey-Iran/Turkey-Russia relationship, while the Iran-Russia relationship was bound to suffer from the historical mutual suspicions and conflicting interests in the long term.
Turkey-Russia: a more tactical than strategic partnership
The current Turkish government has prioritized strengthening ties with the Kremlin. Understandably cool during the cold war, Russo-Turkish relations warmed up in the USSR’s last decade, when economic and energy ties combined with agreements to cease support of their respective separatist movements, leading to greater cooperation between Moscow and Ankara.
In 2010 the two countries launched a “strategic partnership” consisting of a high-level cooperation council, annual summits, and a joint strategic planning group. Trade, investment, and tourism also greatly increased in the past decade. After the EU bloc, Russia ranks as Turkey’s leading trade partner. In 2012 total bilateral trade amounted to $33 billion, with Turkish energy imports accounting for 80% of trade volume.
Bilateral energy trade relations represent both an area of mutual interest and an area of competition. Turkey aspires to balance becoming a vital energy transit point for Eastern oil to the West, with securing energy supplies from Russia. At the same time Turkey is aiming to reduce its heavy dependence on Russian energy through diversification. Russia’s efforts to control the flow of energy from the Black Sea and Caspian conflict with Turkey’s ambition to becoming a key player for the East-West energy corridor. These conflicting interests have stalled plans for projects such the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline.
Despite the increased economic and energy ties, tourism, and high-level political meetings between the two countries, Flanagan argues that insulating the energy and economic relationship between Turkey and Russia from the sharp differences over Bashar al Asad will become increasingly difficult. Unless Moscow decides to cooperate with the international community on Syria, act more constructively in the Eastern Mediterranean, and establish clear rules in the Caucasus, the Russo-Turkish relationship will suffer. Despite the “strategic” veneer of the relationship, the partnership remains largely tactical because the two countries lack a common political agenda and too many conflicting interests.
Iran-Turkey: on the rocks
According to the panelists, historical rivalry, mutual suspicion and sectarian differences limit this relationship, which has experienced ups and downs. The Turks engage in trade (especially energy) and investment with Iran, hoping to keep their competition peaceful. Iran leverages Turkey’s energy needs to prevent further political isolation. But Turkey is disappointed and frustrated, prompting Ankara to seek alternative partners.
Still Iran ranks as Turkey’s fifth-largest trading partner. Total bilateral trade increased from $1.05 billion in 2000 to $16 billion in 2011, with Iranian exports (mainly energy) constituting $12 billion. Travel also represents a significant area of growth in economic relations. Thanks to visa-free travel Iranians constitute the fourth largest group of foreign travelers to Turkey. Investment is also growing. Iranian firms increasingly operate in Turkey to gain access to international markets. In 2010 1,470 Iranian firms operated in Turkey, up from 319 in 2002. Turkish banks also serve as international intermediaries for financial transactions between Iran and states that fear antagonizing the US by engaging directly with Iran.
The Turkish and Iranian governments have attempted to expand energy trade since 1996. Despite failures to meet its commitments, Iran now ranks as Turkey’s second-highest supplier of natural gas. Turkish energy planners, however, increasingly prefer Azeri, Turkmen and Iraqi gas to Iran’s high-priced and unreliable supply. Turkish and Iranian interests contrast in regards to gas transit and the development of the Caspian basin. While Turkey hopes to serve as a transit corridor for Caspian, Central Asian and Iranian gas and oil, Iran opposes building the trans-Caspian pipeline because it favors Middle Eastern routes to Europe.
Iran and Turkey also diverge sharply on issues regarding the Arab Spring and in particular Syria. Iran’s insistence on manipulating Sunni-Shia’ tensions to expand its influence in the Middle East perturbs Turkish officials. Turkey continues to engage Iran diplomatically, hoping to convince Iran to take a more pragmatic stance on both Syria and the nuclear program, but Syria risks rupturing upsetting the pragmatic economic and energy relations put into place in recent year. Tehran hopes Turkey’s need for energy will sustain the relationship. But Aliriza believes Iran needs Turkey more than Turkey needs Iran.
Iran-Russia: a political relationship
The Iran-Russia relationship remains more political than economic. Russia sees in Iran a potential counterweight to US and Turkish influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Moscow does not view Tehran as an immediate security threat. Iran has supported Russia in its larger strategic goal of promoting a multi-polar world. Iran and Russia find commonalities in opposing the US. There is not much personal affinity between Putin and Ahmadinejad. But as differences with the US grow over arms control, missile defense, Syria, and the larger Middle East, Iran and Russia have found more reason to cultivate their relations.
Although bilateral trade between the two countries tripled in the past ten years, Kuchins argues the volume remains insignificant. Russia represents 1.8% of Iran’s foreign trade, while Iran only accounts for 0.5% of Russia’s. There is little quantifiable energy trade and no joint commercial production in the Caspian, despite a 2008 treaty on cooperation in development of Iran’s gas and oil. Moscow and Tehran disagree on demarcation of the Caspian, but both oppose the trans-Caspian pipeline. The two view themselves as competitors for the European market in the longer-term. Alterman went so far as to suggest that containment of Iran plays to Moscow’s advantage, as otherwise it would have to compete with Iran for the European market.
The panel argued that in the short term the Middle Eastern turmoil serves both Moscow and Tehran. But continued support of Asad, and late diplomatic engagement with new Arab governments, may put them at a disadvantage later. Although Russia and Iran are bonding over shared energy and political goals, age-old suspicions and competing commercial interests will limit the alignment’s durability.
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The meat ax is easier to wield than a scalpel
- $200 million cut from humanitarian assistance, which would impact millions of disaster-stricken people;
- $400 million cut from global health funding, hurting efforts to stop HIV/AIDs and child death;
- $500 million cut from global security accounts;
- $300 million cut from foreign military financing accounts, which could result in cuts to assistance to Israel, Egypt and Jordan; and
- $70 million cut from USAID operations accounts.
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Can Syria be saved?
I spoke yesterday on “Can Syria Be Saved” at the Italian Institute of International Affairs (IAI). I was honored at the last minute by Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Staffan de Mistura, who joined the event and provided some comments. Here are the notes I used, amplified with Stefano’s comments and a bit of the Q and A:
1. The situation inside Syria
Military: The regime can clear, but less and less; the revolution can clear more and more. Neither can hold securely or build without the other being able to strike. This is the significance of air power and Scuds, which prevent consolidation of rebel control.
Civilian: The government is doing all right in areas that are loyal, but not gaining and under severe economic pressure. The revolution is unable to supply many areas outside government control and therefore unable to consolidate control and support.
2. Who is doing what outside Syria
There is no sign of the Russians or Iranians abandoning Assad, despite some change in Russian rhetoric. Russian arms supplies continue. Iranian forces are active within Syria, as is Hizbollah. Arms are flowing to the opposition, but unevenly and not always what they need.
The June 2012 Geneva communique, which provides for a fully empowered transition government approved by both the regime and the opposition, is still the only agreed diplomatic route. Brahimi is quiet, which is the best way to be until he has something definite. The Americans are exasperated but unwilling as yet to send arms. The naming of a prime minister this week should bring more civilian assistance, which is already topping $400 million from the US.
3. Why Obama hesitates to intervene more decisively, why Putin backs Assad
President Obama’s hesitation has little to do with Syria. He recognizes full well that a successful revolution there will be a blow to Iran and Hizbollah, but even an unsuccessful one is bleeding them profusely. The main issues for Obama are the Northern Distribution Network, which is vital for American withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran. He does not want to risk alienating the Russians on either front.
For the Russians, the main issues are no longer the port and arms sales, if ever they were. Now the question is one of prestige and power. Putin is defining his Russia in explicitly anti-Western terms, all the more so since what he portrays as Western trickery during the Libya intervention.
For Iran, the issue is an existential one. Loss of Syria would disable the connection to Hizbollah and isolate Iran from the Arab world, with the important exception of Iraq. This would be a big loss to a country that thinks of itself increasingly as a regional hegemon. The Islamic Republic would regard the loss of Syria as a big blow.
4. Options for the US and Europe
Britain and France are considering supplying weapons. That is unlikely to buy much allegiance. The best that can be hoped for is to strengthen relatively secularist and pro-Western forces, but that is going to be diffficult given the good military and relief performance of the Islamists, including those the US regards as extremist and even linked to Al Qaeda.
The US hesitates about arms transfers because of “fast and furious,” a US government scheme to track weapons transferred to the Mexican cartels. One of the weapons was used to kill an American border patrol agent. If an American-supplied shoulder-fired missile were to bring down a commercial aircraft, the incident would have major domestic political repurcussions.
Washington is instead focusing on enabling the civilian side, in particularly the newly named Prime Minister Ghassan Hitto and whatever interim government he cobbles together. This should certainly include ample humanitarian assistance and operating expenses.
It might also include military intervention, since the Hitto government won’t be safe inside Syria if Assad continues to use his air force and Scuds. The idea gaining ground outside the US administration is to destroy as much of that capability as possible while it sits on the ground. No one in Washington wants a no-fly zone that requires daily patroling. This is also a possible response to chemical weapons, whose possible use was mentioned during the IAI event but the facts were still very unclear (as they still are today so far as I can tell).
5. Possible outcomes and their implications
The fall of Bashar will be a beginning, not an end. It is not clear that the state structure in this Levant will hold. Lebanon is clearly at risk. You’ve got Kurds in Syria and Iraq who want to unite, in addition to an ongoing if somewhat sporadic Kurdish insurgency inside Turkey. You’ve got Sunnis in Iraq fighting in Syria who might eventually turn around and fight again in Iraq. You’ve got Alawites, Druze, Christians and others who will want to protect their own communities, isolated from others in enclaves.
Even if the state structure holds, there are big questions about the future direction of Syria. Will Islamists triumph? Of which variety? Will secularists do as badly in a post-war transition as they have in Egypt? The opposition in Syria agrees that the state should remain intact, but will it be able to under pressure from a “stay-behind” insurgency like the one that Saddam Hussein mounted in Iraq?
I also ran quickly through the options for post-war Syria that I’ve already published.
Staffan reacted underlining the importance of continuing to talk with the Russians, who are convinced that the intervention in Libya has opened the door to Al Qaeda extremism in Mali and Syria. He also underlined the importance of the opposition forming an inclusive and cohesive government that enunciates a clear plan for how to deal with the previous regime, including an exit for Bashar al Assad, and how to provide guarantees to the Alawites. He underlined that we should be putting together an international peacekeeping force now. We should not be tricked into international intervention by allegations of chemical weapons use.
I’ll stop my account there, as I’ve already gone on too long. It was a stimulating discussion. Many thanks to my hosts at IAI!
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