Month: March 2013
Final SIGIR report is deficient
Gary Vogler, former senior oil consultant to US Forces Iraq, writes:
Sunday, 17 March marked the 10th anniversary of the Jay Garner-led ORHA team departure from the Pentagon to Kuwait, and then onto Baghdad. As Jay’s Oil Advisor, I was part of that initial group that met at the Pentagon parking lot on a Sunday morning for the flight to Kuwait. Little did I know that my home for 75 months over the next nine years would be in Iraq working on oil sector reconstruction.
The Special Inspector General for Iraq’s (SIGIR) final report, recently released, left a lot to be desired in terms of contemporary truths and lessons learned. Our experience and success in the oil sector was a lot better than he and his report portrayed.
As a member of the initial team of oil advisors in Iraq, I witnessed that the US Army’s Corps of Engineers partnered with the Iraqis to start Iraq’s oil flowing on April 23, 2003 in the important Rumaila oil field, several months ahead of pre-war plans and 14 days after the fall of Baghdad.
This momentum was maintained until the US Forces departed in 2011. Iraq’s oil has never stopped flowing and Iraq’s total oil revenues are approaching the $450 billion level since 2003 with projections to pass the $1 trillion mark by the end of 2016.
2012 oil revenues represent a 1200% increase over 2003 revenues-almost three times more than Apple Computer’s stock growth over the same time. Iraq’s production eclipsed the 3 million barrel a day level last summer for the first time since 1979.
Recently opened new export facilities in southern Iraq are currently operating at half capacity, but still ship about 0.9 million barrels a day. This equates to $36 billion a year of revenues at current prices and will increase to over $70 billion when phase 1 reaches the design’s full capacity of 1.8 million barrels per day. Phase 2 of the project is designed to add another 1.8 million barrels a day within the next 2 years. Just for a volumes comparison, ExxonMobil’s global oil liquids production in 2011 averaged 2.3 million barrels a day.
At the start up ceremony last year, Oil Minister Luaibi identified the project as not only the most important oil project, but also the most important infrastructure project completed in decades. I agree – international oil executives told me that they knew of no other single oil project that will impact global oil supply more over the next ten years.
Most importantly, the SIGIR report misses the fact that the US military and civilian oil advisors under the leadership of Americans like Generals Petraeus, Odierno and Austin were able to leverage the last $2 million of US oil reconstruction funds, in partnership with the Iraqis, to seed the construct of this multi-billion dollar export facility. Iraqi oil revenues have paid for the rest.
The project started in early 2007, just after General Petraeus took command of Multi National Forces Iraq. It quickly became one of the military’s top priority infrastructure projects, scheduled for recurring detailed briefs to the Commanding General until the 2011 departure of US Forces. This high level American military leadership focus was the key push and sometimes the only push behind the project. A reliable export channel for Iraq’s oil was appropriately considered an Iraqi national security issue by our military.
SIGIR touts their final report – “Learning From Iraq provides the most comprehensive picture of the reconstruction program yet produced”. From the perspective of the oil sector reconstruction effort, the SIGIR report is deficient. It fails to even discuss the US military’s contribution to Iraq’s most important infrastructure project in decades. The following US military units played significant roles: Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division, Coalition Navy, Energy Fusion Cell, Civil Affairs Cmd, US Division South and the US Forces J9 Staff.
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Doing the right thing
Belgrade daily Blic asked this afternoon:
We would like your short[ly] comment on the statement of president of Serbia Mr. Tomislav Nikolic that vicepresident of USA Mr Joseph Biden is not well informed about Serbian politics on Kosovo.
I responded:
That just means Mr. Biden said something Mr. Nikolic did not like. It would be surprising if it were otherwise: Mr. Biden knows the Balkans better than any other prominent American politician. He has been a strong supporter of Kosovo independence and a united Bosnia and Herzegovina. What could he have possibly said that would please Mr. Nikolic?
A word or two more may be in order.
Joe Biden has also been an advocate of a softer approach to Serbia, which the Obama Administration assiduously pursued for its entire first term. It got nothing, so far as I can tell, in return. That of course corresponded mainly to Boris Tadic’s presidency, when both Europeans and Americans tredded lightly so as not to weaken the relatively moderate Tadic, who was challenged only from the nationalist right (principally by Nikolic).
Now that Nikolic is in power, there really is no reason to tred lightly. Neither Europeans nor Americans are inclined to do so. The Germans have been particularly forceful in insisting on the dismantling of Serbian parallel structures in northern Kosovo. The result has been realy progress, though no final agreement yet, in the Belgrade/Pristina talks.
There is some hope in Washington that Nikolic will also prove more pliable on Bosnia. He is not tied, as Boris Tadic was, to the Republika Srpska president, Milorad Dodik. My guess is that Dodik is doing his best to remedy that. The Americans likely figure that they will get more from Nikolic on Bosnia with a tough line these days than with the failed soft line they used without success in the past.
The Balkans do not rank high on Washington’s list of priorities these days. Even Joe Biden may not be so well-informed about Serbian politics on Kosovo, as Nikolic suggested. But the Vice President is still doing the right thing to insist that Serbia accept reality in Kosovo and Bosnia.
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Can we do better today than 10 years ago?
There will be a lot of discussion today of the Iraq war: why did we do it, who won, what is its longer term significance? Andrew Bacevich’s answer to the last two of these questions strikes me as correct: even if the “surge” saved the US from unambiguous defeat, the larger narrative is one in which the Muslim world determines its own fate.
Ironically, that is nominally what some of the advocates of the Iraq war say they had in mind in 2003. But of course they did not really mean it. If Iraq decides to break up, or even install a theocracy on part of its territory, the neocon advocates of the war won’t want to count that as self-determination. At the same time, they are not too exigent any more about democracy in Iraq. Many would count Maliki as good enough, despite his obvious shortcomings.
That’s because democracy had little to do with the matter. The only valid justification for going to war in 2003 had to do with nuclear weapons, not democracy or even 9/11. Condi Rice was correct that it was incumbent on the United States to prevent the smoking gun from being a mushroom cloud. But she and the entire Bush Administration, as well as most of the Democrats in Congress, were wrong to think that Saddam Hussein had a nuclear weapons program, much less a nuclear weapon.
Today, that error is being blamed on “intelligence.” But of course intelligence is always uncertain. We elect political leaders to exercise good judgment and make key political decisions, like going to war. That is where George W. Bush failed most dramatically. It was his decision, validated by a vote in Congress, to go to war in Iraq, collapse the regime and ultimately occupy the country because of his Administration’s inadequate plans for the post-war transition.
This is inexcusable. History will not treat George W. Bush, or the electorate that put him back into office in 2004, kindly. But just as important is this: we are pretty much as poorly prepared for a post-war transition of this sort today as we were in 2003. We demonstrated as much in Libya, where we failed to follow up the NATO military mission with one that enabled the Libyans to establish a safe and secure environment. Nor is there any sign that we would be capable of helping the Syrians transition their country to something like a democracy if Bashar al Assad abandoned the field tomorrow.
The Iraq tragedy was rooted in the failure of civilian assistance in the few weeks immediately following the taking of Baghdad. Thereafter, we spent a lot and did a lot of good things, but all to little avail because the insurgency had already begun and we were too far behind the curve to catch up. The situation in Syria after the fall of Bashar will be far more complicated. There will be many militias, both Islamist and non-Islamist, claiming victory. There will be a broken Syrian army, pro-regime militias and some elite forces prepared to continue the fight. There will be Iranian Revolutionary Guard forces and Assad’s Mukhabarat, some of which will likely constitute an underground resistance (as the Saddam Fedayeen did in Iraq).
If the worst is to be avoided in Syria, we are going to have to back the government named in the wee hours of this morning by the Syrian Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC) amply and wisely. At least the SOC grows out of an indigenous and popular rebellion (as did the rebellion against Qaddafi). We are also going to need to respect Syrian choices–which may include an important role for Jabhat al Nusra and other forces we regard as extremist, even as linked to Al Qaeda. The fall of Bashar will be only a beginning, like the falls of Saddam, Ben Ali, Qaddafi, Mubarak and Saleh. Muslim self-determination, as Bacevich calls it, is just starting.
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Peace Picks March 18-March 22
A very busy spring break week in DC:
1. Overcoming Obstacles to Peace, Monday March 18, 10 AM- 11:30 AM, US Institute of Peace
Venue: US Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Ave NW, Washington DC, B203-204
Speakers: James Dobbins, Laurel Miller, William Durch, Joe Collins
How can societies build enduring peace? This is a simple question that the international community has tried to answer from a variety of different perspectives and efforts. A new book, “Overcoming Obstacles to Peace,” finds evidence that international interventions can in fact build more peaceful nations. Using thorough research supported by metrics, authors James Dobbins and Laurel Miller of the RAND Corporation demonstrate how 16 out of 20 selected conflicts over the past 25 years affirm the international community’s role and effectiveness in building stable nations.
Join the U.S. Institute of Peace and the RAND Corporation in this important discussion on March 18, 2013 from 10-11:30 AM at the U.S. Institute of Peace Headquarters.
Website: http://www.usip.org/events/overcoming…
2. Obama to the Middle East: Expectations and Implications, Monday March 18, 12 PM- 2 PM, Washington Institute of Near East Policy
Venue: Washington Institute of Near East Policy 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, D.C. 20036, Stern Library and Conference Room
Speakers: Dennis Ross, Michael Singh,and David Makovsky
President Obama embarks on the first foreign travel of his second term next week, and despite talk of a tilt toward Asia and disengagement from Middle East wars, he is headed into the heart of the region, visiting Israel, Jordan, and the West Bank. To discuss why he is visiting the Middle East, what his priorities are for the trip, and what implications it may hold for such key policy issues as the Iran nuclear challenge, the worsening Syria crisis, and the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate, TWI will host a Policy Forum luncheon with Dennis Ross, Michael Singh, and David Makovsky.
Ambassador Dennis Ross is counselor to The Washington Institute. Previously, he served on the Obama administration’s National Security Council staff as senior director for the Central Region, responsible for U.S. policy toward the Middle East and North Africa.
Michael Singh, the Institute’s managing director, served in the George W. Bush administration as senior director for Middle East affairs on the National Security Council.
David Makovsky, the Institute’s Ziegler distinguished fellow and director of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process, just returned from a trip to Israel and the West Bank.
3. Economic Turmoil in Arab Countries: Can Partners Help?, Monday March 18 12 PM- 1:45 PM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Marwan Muasher, Uri Dadush, Ibrahim Saif, Jean-Pierre Chauffour, Nemat Shafik
More than two years after the outbreak of democratic revolutions in several Arab countries, the economic situation in the region remains precarious. Progress in restoring confidence as well as sustainable and rapid economic growth will depend overwhelmingly on internal forces and the return of political stability. However, external partners can also play a role in helping normalize and eventually improving the underlying growth fundamentals of these economies. How will the Arab economic outlook evolve? What more can the United States and Europe-the region’s largest trading partners-do to support democratic transition and economic liberalization in the countries affected? What is the respective role of trade and aid?
Website: http://carnegieendowment.org/events/?…
4. The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War, Monday March 18 12:30 PM
Venue: Cato Institute 1000 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001Hayek Auditorium
Speakers: Fred Kaplan, Spencer Ackerman, Janine Davidson, Christopher Preble
In “The Insurgents”, Fred Kaplan tells the story of how a small group of soldier-scholars revolutionized the United States military. Their aim was to build a new Army that could fight a new kind of war in the post-Cold War age: small wars in cities and villages, against terrorists and insurgents. These would be wars not only of fighting but of nation building, often not of necessity but of choice.
Kaplan describes how these men and women maneuvered their ideas about counterinsurgency – or COIN, for short – through the bureaucracy and made it official policy. But it is also a cautionary tale about how creative doctrine can harden into dogma, how smart strategists – today’s best and brightest – can win the battles at home but not the wars abroad. By adapting the U.S. military to fight the conflicts of the modern era, they also created the tools – and made it more tempting – for political leaders to wade into wars that they would be wise to avoid.
If you cant make it to the Cato Institute, watch this event live online at www.cato.org/live and follow @CatoEvents on Twitter to get future event updates, live streams, and videos from the Cato Institute.
Featuring the author Fred Kaplan, War Stories Columnist, Slate, with comments by Spencer Ackerman, National Security Correspondent, WIRED; and Janine Davidson, George Mason University; moderated by Christopher Preble, Vice President, Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute.
Website: http://www.cato.org/events/insurgents…
5. Ambassador Marc Grossman on the Campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Monday March 18 3 PM-5 PM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Ambassador Marc Grossman, Jessica Tuchman Mathews
In his first public event since stepping down as special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador Marc Grossman will discuss efforts to reach a political settlement and the future of American diplomacy in the region. Carnegie’s Jessica T. Mathews will moderate.
Website: http://carnegieendowment.org/events/?…
6.Afghanistan in Transition: A Trip Report, Tuesday March 19, 9:30 AM, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20006
Speakers: Anthony Cordesman
CSIS Burke Chair Anthony Cordesman will discuss his recent trip to ISAF headquarters in Afghanistan, and the prospects for a U.S. transition. This event will also launch the Burke Chair’s latest report, a complete analysis of the Afghan transition.
Tuesday, March 19, 2013
9:30 am – 10:30 am EST
B1 Conference Center
CSIS 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006
Please click here to RSVP
Follow @CSIS for live updates
Note: You must log on to your CSIS account to register. If you do not have an account with CSIS, you will need to create one. If you have any difficulties, or do not receive ‘password reset’ emails, please contact imisadmin@csis.org
Website: http://csis.org/event/afghanistan-tra…
7. A Delegation of Syrian Opposition Leaders, Tuesday March 19 10:00 AM, National Press Club
Venue: National Press Club, 529 14th St. NW, 13th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20045, Zenger Room
Speakers: Haytham Manna, Rim Turkmani, Riad Drar Al-Hamood
A delegation of Syrian opposition leaders critical of President Bashar al-Asad, and which opposes foreign intervention and Saudi Arabian-backed ‘rebels’ in the current situation,
The speakers will discuss creating sufficient political momentum for a negotiated settlement to the present Syrian Crisis, and moving toward a democratic, secular future for the country.
Contacts:
National Press Club: PETER HICKMAN
301/367-7711 (c), 301/530-1210 (t), 202/662-7540 (NPC),pjhickman@hotmail.com
Speakers (Global Policy Forum):
DAVID GRANT
david67grant@gmail.com, 202/577-3145
MEL DUNCAN
mduncan@nonviolentpeaceforce.com, 651/245-8706
Website: http://www.press.org/events/delegatio…
8. Syria’s Humanitarian Crisis, Tuesday March 19 10 AM, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Venue: Dirksen Senate Office Building, Constitution Avenue and 1st Street, NE, Washington, DC Room 419
Speakers: The Honorable Anne C. Richard, The Honorable Nancy E. Lindborg, Mr. Tom Malinowski
Website: http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearing…
9. US Policy in the Middle East on the Verge of Obama’s Trip, Tuesday March 19 12 PM- 1:30 PM, Center for American Progress
Venue: Center for American Progress, 1333 H Street NW, 10th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005
Speakers: Rudy deLeon, Martin Indyk, Bruce Jentleson
On March 20 President Barack Obama will arrive in Israel in the first part of a regional visit that includes the West Bank and Jordan. The President’s trip to the region comes at a time of change in Israel and the region. On his upcoming trip, President Obama will face a full slate of challenges and opportunities, including concerns over Egypt’s continued political transition, Syrias civil war, the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict, and the threats posed by Iran.
Please join the Center for American Progress for a keynote speech by Sandy Berger, chair at the Albright Stonebridge Group and former national security advisor to President Bill Clinton, previewing President Obamas trip to Israel and the regional challenges that face him there. Following his keynote speech, Berger will join a panel discussion with Rudy deLeon, Senior Vice President for National Security and International Policy at CAP and former deputy secretary of defense, who just returned from a CAP delegation to Israel and the West Bank; Martin Indyk, vice president and director of foreign policy at Brookings and former assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs; and Bruce Jentleson, professor of public policy and political science at Duke University and an expert on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.
As part of this event, the Center for American Progress will release findings from a report based on discussions with Israeli and Palestinian officials during a recent visit to the region by members of the National Security and International Policy team.
Website: http://www.americanprogress.org/event…
10. After the Withdrawal: The Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Part I), Tuesday March 19 1:00 PM, US House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Venue: Rayburn House Office Building, 45 Independence Ave SW, Washington, DC 2172 House Rayburn Office Building
Speakers: Seth G. Jones, Kimberly Kagan, Peter Bergen, Daniel S. Markey
Chairman Chabot on the hearing: “U.S. national security interests in South Asia are both dire and immediate. The 2014 withdrawal plan from Afghanistan is strategically risky and threatens to plunge Afghanistan into a state in which terrorists will once again thrive. At the same time, the U.S. relationship with Pakistan has deteriorated dramatically and falters over Pakistan’s involvement with terrorist organizations and the drone war in the tribal bad lands. While Islamabad claims U.S. and Pakistani interests can be brought into alignment, we must remain skeptical of its internal divergent interests that risk undermining U.S. interests, the relationship with India, and the chance for a stable, peaceful, and independent Afghanistan. This hearing is an important opportunity to examine the President’s hasty withdrawal plan from Afghanistan and evaluate how events in Pakistan over the next year may affect U.S. national security interests throughout the entire region.”
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen on the hearing: With President Obama’s announcement last month that the U.S. will draw down our forces in Afghanistan by the end of this year without a clear withdrawal plan, it is necessary to have a hearing that will examine the security implications of this decision and analyze the capacity of the Afghani and Pakistan government to address crime and corruption while ensuring secured territories in their countries. This is imperative particularly in light of recent inflammatory accusations made by Afghani leader Hamid Karzai which have further strained U.S. – Afghanistan relations and put our troops at greater risk. We must do everything we can to prevent al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist militants from taking over and undoing the efforts and sacrifices made by the U.S. and our allies for over a decade.
Website: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/heari…
11. Iraq, 10 years later: A conversation with Senator John McCain, General Jack Keane, and Frederick W. Kagan, Tuesday March 19 3:30 PM- 4:30 PM, American Enterprise Institute
Venue: American Enterprise Institute, 1150 17th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Frederick W. Kagan, General Jack Keane, John Mccain
Ten years ago, the United States entered Iraq and in a few short weeks ended Saddam Hussein’s reign of tyranny. What followed — wild swings between victory and defeat, liberation and occupation — and ended with President Barack Obama’s decision to withdraw all US forces from Iraq in 2011, is likely to be a source of contention for years to come.
As we approach the anniversary of the beginning of the Iraq War, many questions remain: Is Iraq a success? What role will Iran and al Qaeda play in the vacuum left by the withdrawal of American forces? Were the war and the liberation of 25 million Iraqis worth the high price Americans paid in blood and treasure? Please join us as we reflect on a conflict that helped shape the beginning of the 21st century in American foreign policy. Senator John McCain will be joined by a panel featuring General Jack Keane (ret.) and AEI’s Frederick W. Kagan.
If you are unable to attend, we welcome you to watch the event live on this page. Full video will be posted within 24 hours.
Website: http://www.aei.org/events/2013/03/19/…
12. Crisis in Syria: The US Response, Wednesday March 20 9:45 AM, US House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Venue: Rayburn House Office Building, 45 Independence Ave SW, Washington, DC2172 House Rayburn Office Building
Speakers: Robert S. Ford, Anne C. Richard, Nancy E. Lindborg
Chairman Royce on the hearing: “Unfortunately, we are watching conditions in Syria continue to deteriorate precipitously. The Assad regime has killed tens of thousands of Syrians. Millions more have been displaced or have fled to neighboring countries increasingly strained by their influx. This is a regional crisis. It’s time for the Obama Administration, which has struggled on Syria, to present and defend its policy on all fronts, including its humanitarian efforts. The Committee will focus on how the U.S. can best protect its vital national interests and effectively promote a stable and peaceful Syria.”
Website: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/heari…
13.Changing Challenges for the Gulf States- A Panel Discussion, Wednesday March 20 12:00 Pm- 2: 00 Pm, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20052Lindner Family Commons
Speakers: Christopher Davidson, Kristin Smith Diwan, Gwenn Okruhlik, Marc Lynch
Christopher Davidson, Reader in Middle East Politics, School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University
Kristin Smith Diwan, Assistant Professor, Comparative and Regional Studies, School of International Service, American University
Gwenn Okruhlik, President, Association for Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies
Moderated by:
Marc Lynch, George Washington University
Three leading political scientists will discuss the current challenges facing the Gulf States.
*A light lunch will be served.*
RSVP: tinyurl.com/a6tvn2m
Sponsored by the Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)
Website: http://www.elliottschool.org/events/c…
14. Hezbollah’s Strategic Shift: A Global Terrorist Threat, Wednesday March 20 1:30 Pm, US House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Venue: Rayburn House Office Building, 45 Independence Ave SW, Washington, DC2172 House Rayburn Office Building
Speakers: Will Fulton, Matthew Levitt, Roger Noriega
Chairman Poe on the hearing: “Next week, the TNT Subcommittee will bring together experts to discuss the evolution of Hezbollah. Hezbollah has historically been a terrorist organization whose activity has been isolated in the Middle East. Hezbollah is the puppet of Iran worldwide. Under the guidance of the Iranian regime, this jihadist group has expanded its reach and shifted its strategy to operate in virtually every corner of the world including Latin America and Europe. I look forward to hearing testimony about the relationship between Hezbollah and the Iranian regime, how this threat has grown in recent years, and what implications this dangerous alliance has for U.S. national security.”
Website: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/heari…
16. The Muslim Brotherhood and the West, Wednesday, March 20 / 2:00pm – 4:00pm, Foreign Policy Research Institute
Venue: Reserve Officers Association, 1 Constitution Ave NE Washington, DC
Speakers: Lorenzo Vidino, Abdullah Bijad Alotibi, Joseph Braude, Sam Helfont
Few observers foresaw the Arab Spring, but it should not have surprised anyone that the Islamist movements the most organized movements in the Arab world became the main beneficiaries of the turmoil that ensued. Islamism, in its gradualist and pragmatic approach embodied by the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots worldwide, seems ready to reap the rewards of its three decades-old decision to abandon violence and focus on grassroots activities. This monumental change has created many concerns among liberals, religious minorities and, more generally, all non-Islamists in the countries where Islamists have won. In addition, Arab states ruled by non-Islamist regimes have expressed concern. The former worry that Islamist ideology even in its more contemporary, pragmatic form remains deeply divisive and anti-democratic, often at odds with their values and interests. The latter believe that on foreign policy issues, most of the positions of various Brotherhood-inspired parties are on a collision course with the policies of established regimes in the region.
In association with Al Mesbar Studies and Research Centre (based in the United Arab Emirates), the Foreign Policy Research Institute has just published as an E-Book The West and the Muslim Brotherhood After the Arab Spring, edited by Lorenzo Vidino. The book provides an overview of each of eight countries’ policies towards Islamism, including the United States, Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Spain, and Israel. In this program, Vidino highlights the key lessons of the volume, and comment is offered by Abdullah Bijad Alotibi and Joseph Braude.
Website: http://www.fpri.org/events/2013/03/mu…
16. The Petro-politics of Azerbaijan, Wednesday, March 20 / 2:00pm – 3:00pm, Institute of World Politics
Venue: Institute of World Politics, 1521 16th Street NW Washington, DC
Speakers: Vilen Khlgatyan
This lecture is part of a series on the Intermarium, organized by the Kosciuszko Chair of Polish Studies at IWP.
Mr. Khlgatyan will discuss the role Azerbaijan’s oil and gas reserves have played in attracting the Oil Majors to the region, and how this in turn has helped and hindered Azerbaijan’s domestic and foreign politics. Moreover, with Azerbaijani oil reserves having hit their peak in 2010-2011, what does the future hold?
Vilen Khlgatyan is Vice-Chairman of Political Developments Research Center (PDRC), a virtual think tank based in Yerevan, Armenia.
He attended Webster University, where he double majored in International Relations and International Business, and graduated in Spring 2010. He spent a semester studying in Vienna, Austria, where he also attended OPEC and OSCE workshops.
His studies at IWP have focused on national security and the geopolitics of energy. He is writing his honors thesis on the ‘Geopolitics of Energy in the South Caucasus.’
Mr. Khlgatyan was a campaign staffer for Congressman Russ Carnahan of Missouri’s 3rd District, who sat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Important note: Attendance at all IWP events requires an RSVP in advance. In addition, prospective attendees must receive an e-mail confirmation from IWP indicating that seating will be available for them at the event. A government-issued ID that matches your name on the confirmed attendee list must be presented at the door for admission to any event. The use of photographic and/or recording equipment is prohibited except by advanced permission from IWP, the event organizer, and the speaker(s). IWP is a private organization; as such, all attendees are guests of the Institute.
Website: http://www.iwp.edu/events/detail/the-…
17. The Turkey, Russia, Iran Nexus: Driving Forces and Strategies, Wednesday, March 20 / 2:00pm – 3:30pm, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20006
Speakers: Bulent Aliriza, Jon B. Alterman, Andrew C. Kuchins, Stephen J. Flanagan
CSIS scholars will present the key findings of their 18 month project that has examined the forces and interests driving relations among Turkey, Russia, and Iran and the strategies that these governments are pursuing to manage differences and sustain economic and energy cooperation. They will also discuss how complex and often contradictory interactions among these three countries are shaping regional dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean, Caucasus, and Central Asia, as they have for centuries. The nexus of the three pairs of relations are also influencing each country’s dealings with the other two as well as with the United States, and are being whipsawed by recent events. Starkly differing policies toward the Syrian civil war and the Arab Spring have strained Ankara’s relations with Moscow and Tehran. Understanding these dynamics is essential to avoiding a wider war in the Middle East, renewed conflict in the Caucasus, and instability in Central Asia following the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan.
Please Click Here to RSVP online or email us at KissingerChair@csis.org.
(Note: You must log on to your CSIS account to register online. If you do not have an account with CSIS, you will need to create one. If you have any difficulties, or do not receive ‘password reset’ emails, please contactimisadmin@csis.org).
Website: http://csis.org/event/turkey-russia-i…
18. The Struggle for Democracy in Tunisia, Wednesday, March 20 / 2:30pm – 5:00pm, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: John Hopkins SAIS- Nitze Building, 1740 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036Kenney Auditorium
Webcast: This event will be webcast live beginning at 2:30pm ET on March 20, 2013 at www.usip.org/webcast.
Tunisia’s 2010-11 ‘Jasmine Revolution’ ignited a flame of political rebellion that quickly spread to Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain, and Syria. But as the ‘Arab Spring’ enters its third season, Tunisia’s struggle for democracy is beset by escalating ideological and even violent conflicts. What are the key challenges facing Tunisia? How can U.S. officials and nongovernmental organizations help Tunisians address mounting domestic and regional crises?
To discuss these and other questions, the United States Institute of Peace, Georgetown University, Johns Hopkins SAIS, and Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) are pleased to invite you to a public round-table featuring a delegation of prominent Tunisian political scientists on Wednesday, March 20, 2013 from 2:30pm to 5:00pm at SAIS. Members of the delegation will offer their perspectives on the situation and then participate in a frank question-and-answer session. We hope that you will be able to join us for this very special event.
Website: http://www.usip.org/events/the-strugg…
19. Turkey’s Kurdish Question: A New Hope?, Wednesday, March 20 / 3:00pm – 4:30pm, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Speakers: Kemal Kirisci, Aliza Marcus, mer Taspinar, Gnl Tol
Turkey’s approach to dealing with its Kurdish minority-the Kurdish question-at home and in the region is once again at a critical juncture. From the prospects for a new constitution to Ankara’s Syria dilemma, virtually all the pressing issues facing Turkey have a Kurdish dimension. After the failure of the ‘Oslo process,’ Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has initiated another round of negotiations, this time called the ‘Imrali process’ and directly involving the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan. The process has been challenging, but extremely cautious expectations and hopes are growing that the rejuvenated process will not succumb to the fate of the previous efforts at solving the Kurdish problem in Turkey.
Given past failures at dialogue and at finding a mutually-acceptable, peaceful, and democratic solution to the problem, how might the ‘Imrali process’ prove different? What do the Kurds of Turkey want? Is the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) ready to meet Kurdish demands? What is Erdogan’s objective? What are the regional implications? At a time when Syria is in turmoil and Iraqi is facing increasing domestic instability, is a major breakthrough possible?
On March 20, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) will host a discussion to explore these and other important questions related to Turkey’s Kurdish minority. Featured speakers include Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Ömer Taspinar, author and journalist Aliza Marcus, and Gönül Tol of the Middle East Institute. Brookings TUSIAD Senior Fellow Kemal Kirisci will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion. The event is part of the TUSIAD U.S.-Turkey Forum at Brookings. After the program, the panelists will take audience questions.
Participants can join the conversation on Twitter during the event using #FPKurds.
Website: http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~r/Broo…
20. What Should Obama do on North Korea?, Thursday, March 21 / 9:00am, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies1800 K Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20006
Speakers: Victor D. Cha, Walter L. Sharp
Please join us for a Korea Chair Platform event with Victor Cha, Walter L. Sharp, and Joseph R. DeTrani. In the wake of the December 2012 missile launch and the February 2013 nuclear test, our distinguished panelists will share their views on the road ahead and what President Obama should do on North Korea. We hope you can join us!
To RSVP for this event, please email KoreaChair@csis.org.
The Korea Chair Platform is made possible by the generous support of Samsung Electronics America.
Website: http://csis.org/event/what-should-oba…
21. The Rise and Fall of Democracies and Dictatorships: New Perspectives on Democratic Governance, Friday, March 22 / 9:00am – 11:00am, Woodrow Wilson Center
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20004
Speakers: Scott Mainwaring, Frances Hagopian, Steven Levitsky
Website: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the…
22. Mapping Egyptian Politics: Where Is Egypt Heading and What Does That Mean for the United States?, Friday, March 22 / 10:30am – 12:00pm, RAND Corporation
Venue: Rayburn House Office Building, 45 Independence Ave SW, Washington, DC 2168 Rayburn House Office Building
Speakers: Jeff Martini, Michele Dunne, Samer Shehata, Anne Gearan
Despite widespread unrest, continued wrangling over the election law, and threats of an opposition boycott, Egypt is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections in the coming months. Egypt’s transition has already been punctuated by a series of Islamist victories at the polls. In this session, three Egypt watchers will take a closer look at what past electoral performance and the current political context say about the Islamists’ strength in Egypt and what it means for the United States.
Website: http://www.rand.org/events/2013/03/22..
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Delaying the inevitable
Blic Online late last night published what purports to be a draft text of a Pristina/Belgrade agreement, one supposedly agreed by the EU and Pristina. It seems to me, as one would expect, consistent with the Ahtisaari plan in many of its details, and it follows the spirit of the Ahtisaari plan in ending at least some of the Serbian campaign against Kosovo membership in “international bodies” with
economic, cultural, and social (including sporting) purposes. Serbia shall not block Kosovo’s membership in the OSCE.
But it falls short of Kosovo membership in the United Nations.
It is difficult to comment on a text that was likely prepared originally in English, translated by Blic and retranslated into English for me by a kind reader. Nor is it clear where the original came from or how close to a final agreement this text may be. Is it being published now to test Serbian and Kosovar reaction? Does it genuinely represent something Pristina can accept?
I don’t know. Nor am I likely to know, as the diplomats will not want to discuss in public the status of this text.
What it shows, however, is that the two sides, one way or the other, are dealing with key issues: how can the Serb population of northern Kosovo participate in Kosovo institutions and still avail itself of the Ahtisaari plan’s provisions for governing themselves? How can Kosovo’s interest in maintaining a single judicial and security framework be satisfied while allowing wide latitude to local governance in the other respects provided for by Ahtisaari?
The devil here is not so much in the details. It is in the broader context. While this text purports to be status neutral, it would in principle allow Kosovo to join a lot of international bodies, some of which are open to membership only to sovereign states. That is, so far as I know, the case for the 57-member Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
Here there is a problem. The text obligates Serbia not to block (or encourage others to block) membership, but others would of course be free to continue to do so. The European Union has five non-recognizing states any one of which might block Kosovo membership. It is my hope that there is a clear and unequivocal understanding that none of the EU member states will block Kosovo membership.
That still does not solve the problem, because Russia could still be an obstacle where it is a member, including the OSCE. What this shows it seems to me is the difficulty of partial solutions that purport to be status neutral. Kosovo membership in the UN would end all discussion of its eligibility for membership elsewhere. Taking a step-by-step approach is fraught with difficulty, and inconsistent with the spirit of the original Ahtisaari plan, which foresaw universal recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state.
The simple fact, recognized almost as much on the streets of Belgrade as on the streets of Pristina, is that Kosovo is no longer part of Serbia and will never again be. Delaying the inevitable may be the best that can be done right now, but it means a continuing uphill struggle for a state that needs to focus on other things: jobs and economic development, the fight against corruption and organized crime, proper treatment of its Serb citizens and other (numerical) minorities.
It would be far preferable–and less painful in the long run–to end Serbia’s empty sovereignty claim. There may be five non-recognizing EU members that can block Kosovo’s entry into international organizations, but there are 22 EU members that can block Serbia’s eventual entry into the EU. Delaying the inevitable makes life harder not only for Pristina, but also for Belgrade.
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Preventing mass atrocity after Assad
Reuters (http://reut.rs/WMw240) published this piece today:
As the second anniversary of the Syrian uprising approaches, close to 80,000 people have been killed, a million are refugees and several million are displaced. The Syrian army and air force are under severe stress and attacking civilian populations, the revolutionaries are increasingly radicalized in a Sunni Islamist direction and Lebanese Hezbollah as well as Iranian Revolutionary Guards are getting deeply engaged in the fight.
It may seem superfluous to worry about what happens to the Alawite community — the mainstay of Bashar Al Assad’s regime – after he falls. But revenge killing is common after an uprising of this sort, and few regimes born in mass atrocity survive as democracies. A massacre of Alawites could be prelude to state collapse, an extremist regime and regional warfare far worse than the spillover we have seen thus far.
How can mass atrocity in the aftermath of the Assad regime be avoided? Above all, it is Syrians who will need to make sure it does not happen. The Syrian Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces has already made clear that it intends to construct a multi-sectarian, multi-ethnic and democratic regime post-Assad. What needs to be accomplished to achieve that goal?
A lot. Here are just a few of the options that need to be considered:
- A negotiated end to the regime. Atrocities will be far less likely if there is a clear, well-constructed and well-communicated end to the Assad regime, with a roadmap to a future democratic constitution that will respect minority rights. A chaotic collapse of the regime will make mayhem much more likely, including a possible “stay-behind” insurgency like the one in Iraq after the American invasion.
- International supervision. The roadmap could be implemented with oversight from a “contact group” that includes the main international powers with influence, including neighbors and regional powers. The big issue here is whether Iran is in or out, which depends on Tehran’s attitude toward any negotiated settlement.
- An international intervention force. There will be many armed groups in Syria, however the conflict ends. A strong, legitimate international intervention force of both police and military could separate warring parties, establish a safe and secure environment and protect minorities. The big question is: Who would provide these troops and police? Iraq’s neighbors have all been parties to the conflict. The Arab League is inexperienced at stabilization and peacekeeping. The United States and Europe are trying to stay out.
- New security forces. Assad’s army, police, intelligence and other security forces will be thoroughly discredited once the regime is gone. It will be necessary to reconfigure, retrain and reform the security forces so they can reestablish a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence accepted by both former regime elements and rebels. It was the failure to do this effectively that has made a mess of post-Qaddafi Libya. Training of a small Syrian “stabilization” force could begin even now outside Syria, for deployment into liberated areas.
- Accountability and justice. It is never possible to punish all those who have supported a dictatorial regime, but victims will be looking for satisfaction. This can initially be offered in a well-articulated plan of action for holding a clearly defined and limited number of senior regime figures accountable for abuses, as well as a broader reconciliation effort to give victims an opportunity to voice grievances and seek eventual redress.
- Outreach by the new leaders to communities that have not supported the revolution. Few countries are blessed with a Nelson Mandela, but even lesser figures could try to reassure those who have supported the regime and provide credible guarantees of security. They might even invite in foreign forces to establish a “safe and secure environment” for particular communities at risk.
- Basic human needs. Many Syrians are lacking food, water, sanitation and shelter. The country will need a rapid infusion of vital humanitarian assistance that is distributed fairly and transparently by a duly constituted authority.
- Quick stabilization of the economy. The Syrian economy will be in free fall. The country will be unable to pay its debts and will need relief from international obligations. It may also need a new currency and a credible central bank. It will certainly need jobs, especially for the many youth already unemployed before the war. They will otherwise find employment with militias unlikely to be sensitive to human rights.
- Local community development. Major development projects will have to wait. They will require a well-functioning government and a credible sovereign guarantee to reopen lending by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. A well-targeted reconstruction effort that local communities help plan and monitor, like the successful National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan, would be a good start, provide livelihoods and contribute to mitigating the likelihood of violence.
- Dispute settlement. As people return to their homes, disputes will break out over property, much of which will be badly damaged and destroyed. It is important to establish a relatively quick administrative procedure for settlement of disputes and recovery of private property, in particular real estate.
- Funding for civil society. Syria under Assad lacked the vigorous nongovernmental organizations that provide advocacy, serve as watchdogs and help protect human rights and minorities in open societies. Funding and empowerment of grassroots organizations committed to a democratic outcome and organized across sectarian and ethnic lines, including the revolutionary local administrative councils that have spontaneously appeared in liberated areas, can strengthen social cohesion and prevent violence.
- Safe havens for particular minorities. Odious though it may be on other grounds, temporary separation of ethnic and sectarian groups in the immediate aftermath of violent conflict can help to prevent violence and reduce risks to vulnerable minorities. Many Syrian neighborhoods are more or less segregated. It may be best to keep them that way for a time, but to move once trust is re-established in the direction of much more sectarian and ethnic integration.
Syrians will have to decide for themselves what they want to take advantage of, or not, from this laundry list. They may well also discover some new tricks. But the country will be far better off in the long term if Syrians and internationals start thinking now about what to do to prevent the worst from happening after Assad falls.
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