What happens if talks fail?
While I think it likely that Lady Ashton will somehow fish something she can call success out of the swirling soup of issues involved in tomorrow’s talks between Pristina and Belgrade about Serb-controlled northern Kosovo, the precise outcome will be determined in part by what the parties think their best options are in the case of failure. These options are known in the negotiations business as “BATNA”: best alternative to a negotiated agreement. Let’s have a look at them. This exercise is necessarily speculative, since we don’t really know what might be in a deal and even less about what might happen if there is no deal.
If the negotiations fail, Belgrade’s progress towards the EU “will grind to halt if dialogue fails,” according to Serbia’s deputy prime minister Rasim Ljajic. This is a bit of an exaggeration, since Serbia can continue preparing for EU membership no matter what happens with Kosovo. Accession is likely the better part of a decade off (2020 earliest, I’d guess), even in the best of all possible worlds. But Serbia won’t get a date to begin accession negotiations unless the dialogue with Pristina produces results.
“The date” is not only politically but economically important. Serbia can hope for a substantial infusion of EU funds with the fixing of the date. Belgrade needs that infusion and has few alternative sources of financing. Russia is one, but it is not clear to me that Moscow regards stepping in to save Serbia financially as any more attractive than saving Cyprus. In the end, the Russians took a haircut there, but they were none too pleased to do so. Anteing up for Serbia right now might be asking a bit much. Slavic solidarity has its limits.
If the talks fail, Pristina could lose an opportunity to negotiate a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU. This would be unfortunate, as everyone else in the Balkans has an SAA, which provides substantial access to the EU market. Pristina could also expect the EU to continue dealing with its application for a visa waiver program in slow motion. Neither of these losses comes close to Belgrade’s loss of a date (and the related financing) for opening accession talks, and both have the disadvantage of further isolating Kosovo. Lagging progress in getting closer to the EU is a factor in Kosovo politics, where the “Self-Determination” movement would prefer to give up on the EU and seek union with Albania. That anti-constitutional, irredentist proposition is one the EU and US oppose. Stiffing Pristina on the SAA and visa waiver would be counter-productive, to say the least.
What will happen in northern Kosovo if the talks fail? I really don’t know, but let me speculate. Those Serbs who man the barricades will feel they have won and hope to reassert their resistance to Pristina’s authority. At least one Serbian official is threatening that northern Kosovo might declare independence and seek an opinion of the International Court of Justice. There is deep irony in that of course, as the court advised that Kosovo’s declaration of independence breached no international law, but there is really no fear that such a move would gain recognition. Even Serbia would not want to risk its relationship with the EU and US.
The Kosovo authorities would feel they have lost, though they may also feel vindicated if they reject a deal they judged unworthy. Hotter heads among the Albanians may want to retake the north by force, or harm Serbs in the south, both lousy options guaranteed to harm Kosovo’s interests and rouse the Americans and Europeans to high dudgeon. Cooler heads in Pristina will want to continue to try to win over the “hearts and minds” of northern Serbs but may also feel compelled to take some sort of unilateral action to show toughness.
Patience would be a great virtue in the event of failure. Belgrade is spending far too much to sustain the Serbs in northern Kosovo and will likely need to reduce those expenditures in the next few years no matter what. If Pristina is able to moderate any reactions south of the Ibar, it is likely to find it relatively easy to revive both the visa waiver and the SAA negotiation, as neither one involves EU accession. Reviving the idea of a date for accession talks for Serbia would be more difficult, as internal EU resistance to enlargement is growing and German elections loom in September.
The big unknown about the talks is what they might do for Kosovo’s efforts to gain greater international recognition and acceptance. I find it hard to credit the idea that Belgrade can have “normal” relations with Pristina, the nominal objective of the dialogue, without dropping its campaign against Kosovo’s entry into international organizations, including the United Nations. Nor is it “normal” for a neighbor to oppose recognition by third parties, something Belgrade has done worldwide with significant success. Ending Belgrade’s anti-recognition and anti-acceptance campaign should be valued in Pristina, even if some may claim Kosovo should not have to pay a price for it.
It is my hope that Lady Ashton will bring an end to that campaign even if the talks on northern Kosovo were to fail. This is the very least the EU should ask of Belgrade at this stage. Allowing Kosovo full access to international organizations would give Pristina good reason for strategic patience and confirm what Belgrade has already accepted by meeting with the Kosovo authorities at the highest levels: whatever you think Kosovo’s status is or should be, its President and Prime Minister are its democratically validated and legitimate representatives.
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9 thoughts on “What happens if talks fail?”
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My friend,
Why the US and EU ask things from Serbia they will never ask from Cyprus or Georgia?
Must Cyrpus recognize Northern Cyprus?
Must Georgia recognize Ossetia and Abkhazia?
Why the West does not favor a Kurdistan in Iraq? Why not in Turkey too, by the way?
Why these double standards!?
Unfortunately those are US double standard. Albanians and Turks are seen as US allies in their own regions.
Why Albanians can have two states but Kurds none? There are much more Kurds than Albanians.
@Ron,
You are trying to compare different things. Neither Georgia nor Cyprus were federal (actually con-federal) states as it was former Yugoslavia, which broke up. Neither US nor EU is forcing Serbia to recognize Kosovo but saying clearly that if Serbia wants accession to the EU, it must recognize Kosovo because Kosovo has EU perceptive and is recognized by vast majority of EU members. As EU officials say occasionally, its impossible having two STATES in an organization NOT recognizing each other.
In other side, NONE of EU members recognize “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)” since it would be illegal act by international law as UN SC resolution 1251 clearly forbids such an act. That’s why nobody can force or ask from Cyprus to recognize TRNC.
The same applies to so called states in territory of Georgia (South Osetia and Abhkazia). How can EU Members recognize South Osetia or Abhkazia while these territories are kept occupied militarily by Russia without authorization of UN Security Council?? Secondly, South Osetia and Abhkazia don’t fulfill minimum of conditions to be considered as states.
The headlines about “grinding to a halt” were jazzed up a bit – Ljajic was actually talking about the two-year slowdown that could be expected while the Serbs and the Germans both hold elections, not that either side would give up and walk away from the accession process.
As for the current round of talks, President Nikolic is currently saying that April 2 is not a fixed deadline, there’s a chance of an acceptable agreement any time until the Europeans actually vote on Serbia’s bid toward the end of the month. (Sounds like he’s planning on asking for an incomplete.) On the other hand, he may just be preparing the public for bad news – not the failure of the talks, but the success of talks due to their failure to achieve Serbian objectives. Namely, police and judicial powers for the Serbs and a guarantee of no Prishtina armed forces in the North. These, of course, are exactly what Prishtina sees as its own bottom lines. (Describing this as the “Indian reservation model” might be helpful here. Are Tony Hillerman and his Navajo Tribal Police mystery novels popular enough in the Balkans for this to have any resonance?)
Deputy PM Vucic (and current leader of the party Nikolic founded) has suddenly, at the last moment and of his own free will, decided to travel to Brussels tomorrow, as requested by the Europeans and the Americans, putting an end to any plans he may have had of keeping his skirts clean in Belgrade while Dacic grimly destroys his own future in Brussels. If there was to be glory to share, a practical politician would have volunteered to participate long ago.
Another possible sign of the Serbs’ expecting to cave: Dacic has a post-talk trip to Moscow announced. We can always hope he’s going in person to explain to the Russians why their help at the Security Council won’t be needed any more, and that Serbia has decided to try sweetness and light rather than truculence for a while.
And, lastly, you have to wonder how much you can tell from the photographs released after the meetings so far, where Thaci appears cheerful and relaxed, and Dacic – defensive and less than happy to be there. (Does the State Department provide lessons in having one’s picture taken during negotiations, I wonder? Dan?) It could be Thaci just wants to ensure that the pictures in the history books are flattering, I suppose. Courage:soldiers = optimism:diplomats = confidence:political leaders.
The serb delegation should give a final paper to both ashton and thaci with these points
1)northern kosovo to serbia
2)serbia fully recognizes kosovo
3)athisaari plan implemented for the serbs south of the ibar and for albanians in the presevo valley
Tell thaci and the baroness they are going to dinner and that they have two hours
There’s actually a simple solution, if both sides are acting in good faith. The Serbs in the North of Kosovo do not want to be “ruled” by the Albanians, but the Albanians fear – probably with good reason – that the Serbs intend to take whatever powers they’re granted and strive either to rejion Serbia or to achieve some kind of independence. The Serbs’ stated desires could be granted by offering them autonomy within Kosovo in return for formal pledges, by their officials and those in Serbia, to renounce in advance any idea of seeking independence (which they probably actually don’t want) or union with Serbia – just as Ahtisaari did on behalf of the Albanians. I’m not sure how much good international guarantees are in a case like this – after all, both Serbia and Russia are guarantors in the case of BiH, but the Kosovar state is already stronger and non-Serbs account for the vast majority of the population, making possible attempts at any funny business much less likely. And then, when everything has settled down nicely, there would be the possibility of a peaceful border adjustment of the North for the Preseva Valley, if anybody still cares at that point.
The presevo Albanians will have minority rights as the Serbs south of the ibar river.Kosovo gets recognition from serbia(it’s really the only recognition that counts)for N Kosovo
Fine by me, undoubtedly fine by the Albanians. It would even probably even be ok by the Serbians, except that they are counting on this agreement only lasting 20 years or so, in which case they want the option of getting the whole thing back. If Kosovo is a UN member at the time that the US falls to pieces it will be indelicate to mention that they want to send the police and army in to deal with the traitors and teach the Albanians how to behave like a minority again.
Peter,
I don’t think it would create stability and Albanians in southern Serbia accept your proposal. I don’t think giving the north is worth of UN seat. Secondly, to me is very strange treating the north and not recalling that we are speaking for just 40K of Serbs there. This is just a small group, almost irrelevant in comparison to almost 2 million people of Kosovo.
Actually there is very strange situation. Northern Serbs, in fact, should be the last group to deserve something as they caused suffering to the others, not the others to them. Serbs in the north killed many Albanians and expelled more than 10K of them from their houses. Its not just at all giving them any privileges but its done by Ahtisaari and Albanians accepted that. Now they want more. Its too much and unjust.