What happens if talks fail?

While I think it likely that Lady Ashton will somehow fish something she can call success out of the swirling soup of issues involved in tomorrow’s talks between Pristina and Belgrade about Serb-controlled northern Kosovo, the precise outcome will be determined in part by what the parties think their best options are in the case of failure.  These options are known in the negotiations business as “BATNA”:  best alternative to a negotiated agreement.  Let’s have a look at them.  This exercise is necessarily speculative, since we don’t really know what might be in a deal and even less about what might happen if there is no deal.

If the negotiations fail, Belgrade’s progress towards the EU “will grind to halt if dialogue fails,” according to Serbia’s deputy prime minister Rasim Ljajic.  This is a bit of an exaggeration, since Serbia can continue preparing for EU membership no matter what happens with Kosovo.  Accession is likely the better part of a decade off (2020 earliest, I’d guess), even in the best of all possible worlds.  But Serbia won’t get a date to begin accession negotiations unless the dialogue with Pristina produces results.

“The date” is not only politically but economically important.  Serbia can hope for a substantial infusion of EU funds with the fixing of the date.  Belgrade needs that infusion and has few alternative sources of financing.  Russia is one, but it is not clear to me that Moscow regards stepping in to save Serbia financially as any more attractive than saving Cyprus.  In the end, the Russians took a haircut there, but they were none too pleased to do so.  Anteing up for Serbia right now might be asking a bit much.  Slavic solidarity has its limits.

If the talks fail, Pristina could lose an opportunity to negotiate a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU.  This would be unfortunate, as everyone else in the Balkans has an SAA, which provides substantial access to the EU market.  Pristina could also expect the EU to continue dealing with its application for a visa waiver program in slow motion.  Neither of these losses comes close to Belgrade’s loss of a date (and the related financing) for opening accession talks, and both have the disadvantage of further isolating Kosovo.  Lagging progress in getting closer to the EU is a factor in Kosovo politics, where the “Self-Determination” movement would prefer to give up on the EU and seek union with Albania.  That anti-constitutional, irredentist proposition is one the EU and US oppose.  Stiffing Pristina on the SAA and visa waiver would be counter-productive, to say the least.

What will happen in northern Kosovo if the talks fail?  I really don’t know, but let me speculate.  Those Serbs who man the barricades will feel they have won and hope to reassert their resistance to Pristina’s authority.  At least one Serbian official is threatening that northern Kosovo might declare independence and seek an opinion of the International Court of Justice.  There is deep irony in that of course, as the court advised that Kosovo’s declaration of independence breached no international law, but there is really no fear that such a move would gain recognition.  Even Serbia would not want to risk its relationship with the EU and US.

The Kosovo authorities would feel they have lost, though they may also feel vindicated if they reject a deal they judged unworthy.  Hotter heads among the Albanians may want to retake the north by force, or harm Serbs in the south, both lousy options guaranteed to harm Kosovo’s interests and rouse the Americans and Europeans to high dudgeon.  Cooler heads in Pristina will want to continue to try to win over the “hearts and minds” of northern Serbs but may also feel compelled to take some sort of unilateral action to show toughness.

Patience would be a great virtue in the event of failure.  Belgrade is spending far too much to sustain the Serbs in northern Kosovo and will likely need to reduce those expenditures in the next few years no matter what.  If Pristina is able to moderate any reactions south of the Ibar, it is likely to find it relatively easy to revive both the visa waiver and the SAA negotiation, as neither one involves EU accession.  Reviving the idea of a date for accession talks for Serbia would be more difficult, as internal EU resistance to enlargement is growing and German elections loom in September.

The big unknown about the talks is what they might do for Kosovo’s efforts to gain greater international recognition and acceptance.  I find it hard to credit the idea that Belgrade can have “normal” relations with Pristina, the nominal objective of the dialogue, without dropping its campaign against Kosovo’s entry into international organizations, including the United Nations.  Nor is it “normal” for a neighbor to oppose recognition by third parties, something Belgrade has done worldwide with significant success.  Ending Belgrade’s anti-recognition and anti-acceptance campaign should be valued in Pristina, even if some may claim Kosovo should not have to pay a price for it.

It is my hope that Lady Ashton will bring an end to that campaign even if the talks on northern Kosovo were to fail.  This is the very least the EU should ask of Belgrade at this stage.  Allowing Kosovo full access to international organizations would give Pristina good reason for strategic patience and confirm what Belgrade has already accepted by meeting with the Kosovo authorities at the highest levels:  whatever you think Kosovo’s status is or should be, its President and Prime Minister are its democratically validated and legitimate representatives.