Failure has its consequences

With Belgrade taking on the responsibility of blocking a positive outcome to the dialogue with Pristina, Kosovo Prime Minister Thaci is now enjoying the best of all possible worlds:  he doesn’t have to implement an agreement that surely included some things he did not like, and blame for failure is falling on Serbia.  He is even signaling willingness to return to Brussels for new talks, ensuring that he cannot be blamed for a breakdown of the dialogue.  Not a bad show of statecraft for a newcomer.

That said, he still faces some difficult issues.  Serbia may yet come to its senses and accept what is on offer, or some modified version.  A definitive written text has not yet surfaced to my knowledge, making it easier to jiggle.  We are not quite at the very last moment, as Catherine Ashton does not have to publish her report on progress in the dialogue, which is what determines whether Serbia gets a date to begin EU accession negotiations, until April 16.  She does not present it to foreign ministers until April 22.  Serbia could still decide to cave, claiming to have gotten satisfactory adjustments.

If that does not happen, Pristina still faces the reality of its northwestern 11%, which will remain in Serbia’s less than complete control.  I hope everyone in Pristina will remain calm, cool and collected, realizing that time and financial shortages will erode Serb resistance in the north and enable gradual reintegration. Any violence or disorder could deprive Kosovo of the advantages its statecraft has brought it.

There are two problems with that approach.  The smuggling and other criminal activities with roots in the north (but tentacles south of the Ibar river) really should be stopped, if only to regain lost revenue and reduce the staying power of the northern resistance to integration with the rest of Kosovo.  The northern Serbs will portray any crackdown as an ethnic attack.  To prevent this, Pristina really needs to begin with a crackdown south of the Ibar, where the northern traffickers sell many of their wares, leaving the northerners to the EU rule of law mission and Serbia’s own need to demonstrate to the EU that it can control its own border.

The other problem lies in domestic Kosovo politics.  While Thaci has wisely broadened his base of support by inviting one of the opposition political parties to participate in the dialogue process, failure of the talks on reintegrating northern Kosovo will redound to the benefit of those Kosovars who see the future of their state not in “good neighborly relations” with Serbia but in becoming a province of Albania.  This unlikely and anti-constitutional proposition (union with a neighboring state or part of one is prohibited in the Kosovo constitution) has some support, especially among younger voters.

The EU can counter the Albanian nationalist reaction by moving expeditiously on the visa waiver for Kosovo and opening negotiations on a Stability and Association Agreement, which were the carrots on offer in the dialogue process.  It is clear enough that Pristina has not caused its failure.  While Kosovo should have to meet the technical requirements, the political door to these goodies should now swing wide open.

What about Belgrade?  It already has the visa waiver and a Stabilization and Association Agreement.  It is also a candidate for EU accession.   All it lacks is that date to begin negotiations, which brings with it a bundle of money.  It has been clearly understood from the first that a successful conclusion of the dialogue on northern Kosovo was a precondition for getting the date.  In fact, the precondition was broader:  normalization of relations, which might not include diplomatic recognition but should certainly include an end to Serbia’s campaign against recognition and UN General Assembly membership for Kosovo.  Failure has its consequences.