What Syrians want

Here’s what I learned recently from non-Islamist, anti-regime Syrians concerned about transitional justice issues.  The discussion was convened with support from the Public International Law and Policy Group by the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, with a view to developing a network of Syrian organizations concerned with transitional justice.  The views were not of course unanimous, but I think most would agree with these propositions, which I formulated:

1.  If they are ever caught, Bashar al Asad and other senior regime figures will have to stand trial in Syria, where the death penalty is in force.

Even Syrians who don’t like the death penalty acknowledge that it has to be available in any trial of senior Syrian leaders.  This rules out an international tribunal for the actual trial.  Some would like to see Bashar indicted now inside Syria by a court in a liberated area; others would like to see an international indictment.  Either one would be a warning to senior military commanders that they risk being held accountable for attacks on civilians.

A special tribunal may be needed for the actual trial.  Syrian law lacks provisions on crimes against humanity and war crimes.  This will be a real problem that needs to be fixed.  It is vital that regime files be preserved and not destroyed during the revolution.  The opposition needs to develop a prosecutorial strategy and collect evidence to support it.

For regime perpetrators who escape, some expect arrests and trials in other countries, which could set a good standard for trials inside Syria.

The prosecution of high level officials has to be done in a way that is accepted as legitimate by the entire population, which will require media outreach and perhaps televising of the trials, as was done in Iraq.  There will be a need to protect witnesses, judges and lawyers.  The trials will have to be fair, providing due process and kept insulated from politics.

2.  Syrians do not seek collective responsibility for the crimes committed.  They want the state to continue to function.

They are uninterested in lustration (disqualification of a particular class of people from office or other privilege) even for Ba’ath party higher ups.  They do not intend to make the Ba’ath party illegal, though they expect it to lose its privileges and return state property.

Vetting of individuals officials will need to be done, but Syrians want to preserve the state and reform it rather than collapse it and try to rebuild.  They want local officials to continue to provide essential services like water and electricity, to the extent possible in the midst of the fighting.

3.  Syrians expect reparations.

They are particularly concerned with more immediate humanitarian cases in which a breadwinner has been lost, but they want the society to make people whole, either by monetary compensation for losses or social assistance of other sorts.  Reparation should not only be for the last two years of fighting but also (in nonmonetary as well as monetary forms) for oppression from the start of the Asad regime, which has repressed Kurdish identity and place names, for example.  The place names should be restored and Kurds freed to use their own language.

Reparations should be made available on a nonsectarian and gender-neutral basis.  Funds should come in part from recovery of Asad’s assets but international grants should also be sought.

4.  The revolution has to start setting a good example.

It should begin to administer liberated areas through unique local councils recognized by the interim government, which should provide them with finances to pay salaries and continue to provide services.  These councils should be elected wherever possible, for example in Raqaa.

The local councils should seek, in cooperation with the local armed groups, to reconstitute the police and move the armed groups to the periphery of towns.  This will reduce the incentive for the regime to shell populated areas.  Armed groups in liberated areas should be controlled and financed by the interim ministry of defense. Summary executions and other abuses need to stop.

Safe zones for defectors from the regime should be created.  Sectarian and ethnic discrimination should end.  Identity based on Syrian citizenship should be emphasized.  Civil society should monitor the performance of the interim government, its local councils and the armed groups.

5.  While they oppose retaliation, Syrians are not so interested in reconciliation.

While revenge is not appetizing, resentment of the regime and its Alawite supporters is widespread.  Many would like to see more Alawites distance themselves from the regime, even if they don’t join the revolution.  Syrians are puzzled that Westerners are so concerned with what happens to the Alawites when so many non-Alawites are already suffering grievous harm now.  They find it hard to imagine a reconciliation process, though they are willing to consider establishing a truth commission to investigate abuses and give voice to victims.  They want everyone to be equal before the law.  No groups should be privileged above others.  The society is basically a tolerant one.  Individual rights and equality before the law are the ideals.